IN APARTHEID'S SHADOW

AUSTRALIAN RACE POLITICS AND SOUTH AFRICA, 1945–1975

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ROGER BELL

Cover: Robert Campbell Jr, *Barred from the Baths*, 1986

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To Sarah for everything

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Prologue

The seeds of this book lie in the dusty margins of the Riverina and the Western plains of New South Wales, in a vast place I now know as Wiradjuri country. More immediately, they lie in a small country town 500 kilometres west of Sydney, in the 1950s and 1960s. My schooldays overlapped the so-called Menzies era when, to paraphrase Russel Ward, affection for our 'white nation' and for the British Empire were for most Australians complementary sentiments.

We schoolkids thought the familiar patterns of rural life normal, comfortable, reassuring. We hardly noticed that Aboriginal families sat only in the front stalls of our grandly named Tivoli picture theatre; that in a neighbouring town, much larger than ours, the black kids gathered outside the fence that denied them entry to the local swimming pool; or that most of the men in the travelling boxing tent at the annual town show, or the shearers in the woolsheds, or the 'domestic help' on the surrounding farms, were Aboriginal, 'black'. Yet we did know that Aboriginal families seemed always to live on the fringes of town; that their children left school early; their parents died young.

We knew, too, that there were church missions and government reserves—but these were further west, near 'The Lake' and the Lachlan, faint reminders of my country's segregating history. The rough-chipped stone axe-head half exposed in the sandy creek bed in the bottom paddock of the family farm hinted at a much earlier history—of Indigenous occupation and industry, and loss.

For us 'white' kids the marginalisation of Indigenous people was an unproblematic sign of a seemingly natural social order. Australia was an outpost of orderly European settlement, not a brutal example of invasion or dispossession. A complacent racism underpinned our world-view. Our

nation was an extension of the Empire—Christian, democratic and white. Oblivious to deep local histories, the maps of the world on our schoolroom walls coloured Australia, along with much of Africa and Asia, in imperial pink. We celebrated Empire Day with bonfires and fireworks and glimpsed the Queen when she toured her far-flung Dominion.

In the aftermath of global war the interwoven strands of Empire, whiteness and nation began to unravel. An insular Australia was buffeted by the winds of change—international pressures that it could not easily ignore or deflect. European colonialism and racialised discrimination faced unprecedented challenges. Contests over Apartheid in Southern Africa greatly sharpened these forces. The politics of race at home and abroad were joined. The insular country of my youth gave way, however unwillingly, to the pressures challenging 'white supremacy' everywhere.

RB

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Introduction

If European imperialism intensified and to some extent actually created the problem of race relations, it also provided its own solution. The solution was white or European supremacy … This system, of course, bore the seeds of its own defeat.[1]

H.V. Hodson, *International Affairs*, 1950

This policy, known as 'apartheid', is the trigger that has fired racial explosions in South Africa and sent the echoes rumbling round the world.[2]

R.T. Foster, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1952

Dominions of Race

As Europe's 'grab for Africa' drew to a close, Australian soldiers fought to defend Britain's imperial possessions—in the Sudan in 1885 and, more significantly, in Southern Africa from 1899, sending 16,000 troops to fight in the Anglo-Boer War. The hard-won victory of Britain and her white colonies left a bitter legacy in Afrikaans-speaking communities. British ascendancy was reflected in the Treaty of Vereeniging that forced the former Boer republics, the Transvaal and Orange Free State, into the Empire. In the decades after federation of the Australian colonies in 1901 and South African Union in 1910, the new British Dominions consolidated brutal legislative barriers that protected white privilege and racial boundaries. In both countries segregation and discrimination were deeply rooted. Inequality was rationalised by ideas that justified white privilege—ideologies of racial purity and racial hierarchy that expressed colonisers fears of race-mixing, miscegenation, racial contamination and social competition.

World War II—the Allies 'war for democracy'—starkly exposed the undemocratic underside of Western civilisation. Concepts of race and European superiority were fundamentally disrupted. During the 1940s, as the great evil of the Holocaust was revealed, the very concept of race was challenged. Racialism (now more commonly 'racism')—the most obviously unacceptable face of colonialism—was starkly exposed. Assessing the immediate political implications of the war, officials in the US Department of State acknowledged that the prestige of the British Empire had been 'completely shattered'; that Japan's victories were the 'final blow to any concept of "white supremacy"'. It was a measure of the unanticipated impact of global war, as well as the tenacity of ideas about race, that the terms of the peace settlements explicitly recognised 'the equality of states and all races'.[3] These sentiments were also echoed in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation negotiated in 1945, and more forcefully three years later in the draft Universal Declaration of Human Rights. *Racism,* as the title of Edmund Soper's 1947 book suggested, had become 'a world issue'.[4] In a new international order symbolised by the United Nations and the drive against colonisation, W.J. (Bill) Hudson commented, 'anti-racism became almost universal orthodoxy'.[5] Efforts to end colonialism and unravel its racist legacies were intertwined. But imperialism and European or white privilege, to cite Edward Said, 'did not end, did not suddenly become past' once decolonisation had set in motion 'the dismantling of the classical Empires'.[6]

In an post-war world, Australia's nervous search for security defined foreign policy. The threat of invasion ended suddenly with Japan's defeat in 1945; threats to the Anglo-Australian way of life were now ideological.[7] White Australia reluctantly accepted that traditional ties of Empire could never be fully resuscitated. The future had to be secured in a volatile Asia-Pacific region divided by contests against European colonialism and deepening Cold War tension. Struggles against racism were deeply interwoven with these broader geo-political currents. Anti-racism, to again cite Said, was linked inextricably to 'the great movement of decolonisation' across an emergent "Third World"'.[8] Post-war challenges mounted by 'people of colour' against European colonialism mirrored growing demands for racial equality within settler countries

long divided by discrimination. These challenges were at the heart of the geopolitical conflicts that defined global politics after the war: struggles that in Eric Hobsbawm's words could 'reasonably be regarded as a Third World War'.[9]

Visiting South Africa in 1960, fifty years after South African Union, Britain's Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan warned that white supremacy could not be sustained in the face of growing anti-colonial nationalism. In colonial settler states traditionally defined by racism, post-war pressures brought unexpected, contradictory and uneven change—most notably, in the British Empire, in South Africa and Australia. The assault on European supremacy did not stop at the geographical boundaries of the colonised world. It brought, also, fundamental challenges to 'colonialism within'. As Henry Vincent Hodson commented shortly after India and Pakistan won independence, colonialism sowed the seeds of its own demise.[10] Struggle for self-government and civil rights erupted in the wake of global war. The very oppression that enforced white ascendancy was everywhere confronted by demands for freedom and equality, and in the developed world a powerful transnational movement organised to fight racism.

In the United States, as war in the Pacific ended, desegregation in the armed forces and president Truman's civil rights platform optimistically anticipated the end of segregation. Other countries defined by institutionalised racism confronted unprecedented pressure to change. Civil rights' struggles within these nations were intertwined with international contests over decolonialism, Indigenous recognition and rights.

In both Australia and South Africa a new but very different politics of anti-racism was unleashed. Within each the politics of white supremacy were fractured. The drive for racial equality dramatically affected, yet did not quickly disrupt, the ideas or practices that had for generations served to define and divide. Trajectories of international engagement and patterns of domestic race politics increasingly diverged. The institutionalised apparatus underpinning discrimination was hesitantly discarded in Australia while in South Africa it was more brutally elaborated.

'White' Fragments of Empire

Sometimes referred to as 'Sisters of the South', Australia and South Africa were from the early twentieth century widely identified as nations built overtly on ideas and institutions of white supremacy laid down across generations of colonisation. Those parts of Europe's vast Empires that were permanently occupied by waves of Europeans were conventionally understood as distinct settler colonies, transplanted fragments of Europe, supplanting societies shaped by colonialism, settlement and immigration. Other narratives emphasised, or at least came to emphasise, invasion, frontier violence, wars of resistance, dispossession, settler violence, Indigenous struggle and survival.

Conquest had paved the way for occupation and settlement. Ideas, institutions and social practices were transplanted from the Old World to the New. European privilege, institutionalised racism and inequality were deeply embedded in all settler colonies from the very first generations of occupation.[11] Writing at the height of the Civil Rights struggles in America, Robert Blauner expressed a view by then widely shared by scholars and activists alike: 'There is a historical connection between the third world abroad and the third world within', he wrote. Students of race relations uncovered in settler societies like Australia, South Africa or the United States a persistent form of colonialism in which 'the oppressing white nation occupied the same territory as the oppressed people themselves'. Indigenous communities and unfree people of colour were commonly subjected to internal colonialism. The global assault on colonialism was, then, also a drive for racial equality within the fragments of Empire. The term 'colonialism within' summarised enduring patterns of dispossession and discrimination in self-proclaimed white countries. Walls of exclusion and separation perpetuated racial distinctions and social divisions laid down across many generations of European occupation, settlement and coercion.[12] Yet within this broad historical arc distinct nations grew and endured.

The roots of racism differed greatly in each white country, as did underlying aspects of racial ideology and of social division. Yet like settler colonies more generally, Australia and South Africa were shaped

by intertwined and sometimes parallel historical narratives. Racialised inequality was laid down in Australia under British colonisation and settlement from the late eighteenth century. In Southern Africa, the roots of racial exploitation lay in a protracted history of Dutch and British occupation and settlement that began long beforehand. Ideas about race sanctioned discrimination and segregation. Cultural and national identities were constituted by pervasive assumptions about whiteness as race, with other races defined variously as native, non-white, coloured, or black.

In South Africa, a powerful if uneasy alliance of Afrikaner and English settlers ensured its privileges by legislating a rigid separation of white from non-white people, with the latter collectively comprising about 80% of the total population. The Union of South Africa was deeply divided by language, history, culture, region, race and colour. It was a state encompassing long-established Afrikaner and newer British settler communities, conquered and dispossessed African societies, and communities, labelled Asian or Coloured, descended from indentured or immigrant workers from India and other parts of Britain's vast Empire. Unlike most modern nation states, this multi-ethnic/multi-racial society embraced no overarching historical story. Relatively few of its people were willing partners in a unifying or unified national community, whether imagined or material. Political and economic power resided overwhelmingly in European hands. Within white South Africa deep divisions persisted between the English-speaking and the generally poorer, predominantly rural Afrikaans-speaking communities. Yet after Union a self-proclaimed white South African nation was essentially united by relations of power, privilege and race. White supremacy was legitimised and consolidated by legislation affecting, differentially, all aspects of politics and society. After the Boer War, the Union government had legislated quickly to entrench patterns of racial separation and economic domination laid down under colonialism: the infamous Native Land Act of 1913 extended territorial segregation; Indian immigration ended; and the political rights of non-Europeans, already severely limited, were further reduced. And in 1936 the Native Trust and Land Act provided a blueprint for much of the legislation elaborated as

'apartheid' in the wake of victory by the Afrikaner-controlled National Party in 1948.

Early iterations of 'apartheid' defined it as 'a policy that sets itself the task of preserving and safeguarding the racial identity of the white population', while preserving the identity of 'separate racial groups' through territorial segregation of the 'various races of the country'.[13] 'Racial purity and self-preservation' are the 'impenetrable armour' of the white state, prime minister Daniel Malan proclaimed as the National Party came to power.[14] The newly elected Afrikaner-dominated government promptly legislated to further extend the reach of racial domination. It elaborated systems of racial classification, disenfranchisement, segregation, regional separation and migratory labour that were brutally enforced by white minority rule, creating a racialised apparatus of state control labelled by its architects, as well as its critics, 'apartheid'. White supremacy—expressed through exclusive political power, white privilege, and the routine assertion of racial superiority within an explicit racial hierarchy—defined the apartheid state. Complex ethno-racial classifications buttressed the vast apparatus of apartheid: groups were labelled variously as White, European, Afrikaner, English, Coloured, Indian, Asian, Bantu, Native or African. Political authority resided almost exclusively in European hands. Reflecting the victory of 'volk' nationalism, Afrikaner hegemony was consolidated by 'cradle-to-grave' apartheid. In the decade from 1948 its framework was fully elaborated under a complex of laws that included the Population Registration Act, Group Areas Act, Bantu Authorities Act, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, the Bantu Education Act (or the Coloured People's Education Act), and the Job Reservation Act. Laws prohibiting mixed marriages or interracial sexual relations (enforced by the Immorality Amendment Act of 1950), along with ubiquitous signs on public amenities dividing Whites/Blankes from Blacks/Africans, became infamous symbols of forced separation in public places—transport, parks, beaches, theatres, toilets, cafes, schools, hospitals, sport and sporting facilities. These laws reflected so-called 'petty' apartheid. They were widely interpreted as its defining feature.

Less acknowledged, abroad at least, were deeper structures legislated as 'grand' apartheid. A decade after the first explicit apartheid laws

were enacted a vast complex of legislation ensured that three million whites would exercise permanent authority over a coloured majority of thirteen million people and control more than 80% of the nation's land and resources. The remaining land areas, generally of poor quality with few natural resources, were reserved for 'African' use. These dispersed parcels of land were labelled as 'Homelands', 'Bantu Homelands' or 'Bantustans'—areas set aside ostensibly for 'separate development'. In practice they were economically unsustainable and served as convenient sources of cheap migrant labour for white South Africa's farms, factories and homes. Most African communities were forced to reside in Homeland areas or townships separated from whites-only areas. 'It is Government Policy that the Bantu are only temporary residents in the European areas of the Republic', an official Bantu Administration circular stressed in 1967, 'for only as long as they offer their labour'.[15] White economic privileges and national economic growth demanded continued exploitation of a lowly paid, mobile labour force. Industry was built on the controlled exploitation of migratory labour from African Homelands and townships. The Group Areas Act and Pass Laws Act were used to regulate the supply of labour without undermining privileges reserved exclusively for whites. Separate, unequal access to education and training, coupled with rigid race-based job reservation laws and an elaborate framework of controls over internal movement, added to the complex of legislation that sustained the economic well-being of European South Africa without compromising economic policy, racial separation or social controls. Political, economic and social power was exercised coercively by a white minority government representing about a fifth of South Africa's people. The remaining four-fifths, non-white majority exercised no real power in national politics. Typical of liberal assessments of South Africa's race policies was Martin Luther King's claim that 'Apartheid is medieval segregation and a sophisticated form of slavery'.[16]

In Australia, an overwhelmingly British society would ensure racial authority by laws privileging white Anglo-Celtic immigration and denying entry to people from countries outside Europe; by assimilation policies that sought, in the crudely racist language of the time, to 'breed-out' racial differences; and by discriminatory legislation that in effect segregated

Aboriginal people and communities from a far larger Anglo-European society. Prime minister Billy Hughes proclaimed, as the terms of peace were negotiated after the First World War, that racial homogeneity was the 'greatest thing we have achieved'.[17] Within this 'New Britannia[18] citizens of Anglo-Celtic heritage comprised an overwhelming majority of the population, while Aboriginal and Strait Islander communities comprised perhaps 5% of it. Post-war Australia, as the Indian high commissioner in Canberra noted in 1951, was determined to preserve 'a British way of life' and protect the 'white democracy'. And, he emphasised, European Australia was determined to avoid the conflicts dividing multiracial South Africa; White Australia would continue to shelter behind a 'wall of colour'.[19]

In the racist logic of the self-proclaimed white nation, homogeneity demanded not only that non-European migrants be denied entry but that other 'races' be denied equality under the law. Thus the Constitution of the Commonwealth excluded Indigenous people from full citizenship, stating that 'No Aboriginal native of Australia, Asia, Africa or the islands of the Pacific except New Zealand shall be entitled to have his name placed on the Electoral Roll'. In the following decades, numerous acts of parliament at federal, state and territorial levels established networks of discrimination that, arguably, had even more devastating consequences for Indigenous people than did the formal denial of citizenship and political equality. In summary, in all states and the Northern Territory most Indigenous people, especially those in rural or remote communities, lived segregated from mainstream society and institutions. Many Indigenous communities were distanced from 'country'; denied rights to traditional land; and separated from local cultures or community languages.

A legislated colour bar regulated the lives of many Indigenous people. Customary segregation was widespread, especially but not exclusively in regional and rural areas. Legislation varied greatly across state jurisdictions. Only in New South Wales and South Australia, for example, did Indigenous people have the right to own property. Until 1969, in most states, children could still be subjected by white authorities to forced removal from their families, made wards of state, or given up for private adoption. 'Racial purity', 'whiteness', would be achieved by breeding-out 'Aborigine blood'.

Until well into the 1960s federal governments assiduously defended race policies designed to gradually absorb or assimilate Aborigines and part-Aborigines into a single Australian community. Dissenting voices claimed that assimilation policies were designed to breed-out difference and were complicit in efforts to smooth 'the pillow of a dying race'. Despairing Indigenous voices lamented the brutal implications of assimilation. In 'The Dispossessed', written in 1964, poet Oodgeroo Noonuccal spoke of 'A dying race you linger on, degraded and oppressed / outcasts in your own land, you are the dispossessed.'[20]

Church Missions and Protection Boards were disturbing agents and symbols of systemic discrimination and separation. In most states 'any Aboriginal' could be removed to or detained in a reserve; 'any Aboriginal child' could be committed to an institution or forcible separated from family; or 'deprived of their liberty' and citizenship rights 'in many other ways', including the right to marry, consume alcohol or access public facilities. As late as 1965 Queensland legislated to extend 'reservations' and further entrench segregation. In rural communities, especially, most Indigenous people lived segregated lives, routinely denied equal access to hospitals, theatres, swimming pools and other recreational facilities, hotels and accommodation. The right to marry was denied to many; interracial marriage was prohibited in some states; and perhaps most disturbingly, generations of Indigenous children were forcibly separated from parents and raised in state institutions divorced from Indigenous cultures and extended family. These children would later be known as 'the stolen generation', as brought to public attention by Peter Read's book *The Stolen Generations: The Removal of Aboriginal Children in New South Wales 1883 to 1969* (1981) and the 1997 publication of the government's *Bringing Them Home – Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families*. In the name of assimilation, thousands of Aboriginal children were taken forcibly from their families to be trained and educated in coercive institutions or fostered out to white families. Informed estimates suggest that across two or three generations until the late 1960s–early 1970s as many as one third of all Aboriginal families were affected by this attempt at social engineering. The official Community Summary of the Stolen

Generation report recognised that 'Indigenous families and communities have endured gross violations' of fundamental human rights. Even more disturbingly, it concluded, such violations 'were an act of genocide, aimed at wiping out Indigenous families, communities and cultures vital to the precious and inalienable heritage of Australia'.[21]

Constitutional change from 1962 to 1967 brought formal political equality for Aboriginal people and gave the federal government power to override the many laws, regulations and local practices that sanctioned discrimination on the basis of race. But racism was deeply embedded—institutionally, socially and culturally. Writing recently of his early life growing-up in Wiradjuri country in rural New South Wales during the 1960s–70s, Stan Grant speaks of 'living in the cracks'; of an unrelenting 'fear [of] the state'; of a 'powerlessness' and the 'intrusion of the police and welfare officers who enforced laws that enshrined our exclusion and condemned us to poverty'. His poignant descriptions reflect wider conditions of un-freedom and inequality that confronted generations of Indigenous people.[22]

Indigenous disadvantage was not the only difficult symbol of systemic racism. Anglo-European Australia was also defined by the wall it had erected against colour. Menzies told a sympathetic Hendrik Verwoerd (South African prime minister, 1958–66) that immigration restrictions were 'based not upon any foolish notion of racial supremacy [as undoubtedly Verwoerd believed], but upon a proper desire to preserve a homogenous population and so avert the troubles that bedevilled some other countries' (presumably South Africa and America). Patronising policies that aimed ostensibly to 'protect' and assimilate native or Aboriginal people paralleled immigration policy. Menzies, and most who defended a white Australia, were wedded to the virtues of racial homogeneity that would be achieved by the assimilation of all Aborigines and by laws that in effect prohibited non-Europeans from entering the country. Until the late 1960s–early 1970s immigration law continued to deploy, albeit sometimes unofficially, categories of race to deny people of colour entry to the self-proclaimed white nation. And the assimilation of racial, ethnic or cultural difference remained an explicit goal of social policy, unapologetically designed to ensure an homogenous Anglo-European nation.[23]

The Semantics of 'Race' and 'Whiteness'

Few scholars would disagree with Richard H. King's recent observation that 'all in all, race is the modern West's worst idea: it is hard to think of any idea that has had more destructive consequences'.[24] Informed opinion, since the Holocaust at least, endorses the judgement advanced by Ashley Montague in 1942 that the idea of race is *Man's Most Dangerous Myth*, 'the witchcraft of our time'.[25] In the immediate aftermath of war, as the true horrors of Nazi race policies were fully revealed, UNESCO issued its watershed *Statement on Race*. Importantly it noted that race 'as a valid scientific idea' was largely discredited during the interwar years, but race as popular myth flourished.[26] UNESCO found that biological notions of race, including ideas of racial superiority or inferiority, were not supported by scientific evidence. A generation after the war, the biologist Stephen J. Gould wrote famously that the idea of distinct races populating different rungs of a so-called racial ladder was unscientific: it reflected *The Mismeasure of Man*.[27]

Although race and colour have no objective purchase when applied to human populations, *ideas* about race and colour are of fundamental historical significance.[28] Racial labels have real social meaning. 'In the troubled affairs of men,' Robert Redfield wrote as early as 1945, 'race is of consequence because of what men think and feel about it, and not because of anything that race is of itself: That is the cardinal fact'.[29] Michael Banton, a respected scholar in this field, has emphasised that 'patterns of race relations during the past 200 years have been influenced by what people *believe* to be the nature of race, and it is necessary therefore to take account of these ideas'. By extension, 'racism' is broadly used to refer to forms of prejudice or discrimination that focus on groups or individuals *believed* to represent a particular race. Echoing Montague, Edward Shils wrote at the height of the civil rights struggles in the US that race 'is inherently meaningless'. Race is a cultural or social construct, important as myth or ideology, but not as an 'objective' social category.[30] Thus in this book when—unavoidably—a term like 'white', 'black', 'coloured' or 'Asian' is used, it refers only to an individual or group who is or are believed to be a person or people of that colour or race, or have

been defined by the state or society as belonging to a particular racial group.[31]

However arbitrary, ideas about race and difference, or colour and difference, were deeply embedded in histories of Empire and settler colonialism. They were fundamental to the fabric of modern nations built on European privilege and ideas of white supremacy. Yet as Ta-Nehisi Coates has written recently, '"race" is the child of racism, not the father'.[32] European expansion promoted biologised ideas of race; ascribed particular colour to these so-called races; and privileged white over black or colour. Race was natural and, in European eyes at least, self-evident. Racial ideologies reflected inequalities that grew from, and helped rationalise, settler privileges in the colonised world. As Harold R. Isaacs has written 'Racial mythologies built around differences in skin colour and physical features were among the prime tools of power used in the era of Western Empires'.[33] Ideas and images of race and races circulated routinely within and across European states and societies—ubiquitous signs of obvious group difference. Belief in a racial hierarchy excused social segregation, economic exploitation and denial of political rights. The renowned African-American scholar W.E.B. Du Bois wrote in the early 1900s that 'whiteness' is 'a very modern' 'discovery', a convenient label that helps justify the segregation of 'Black Folks'.[34] His claim applied with equal force to Europe's fragments of Empire. Racial ideologies legitimated historical narratives of violence and inequality—narratives that outlived European imperialism, decolonisation, and the spread of democracy in the twentieth century.

Referencing South Africa, Anthony W. Marx has written: 'even the terms "black" and "white" remain unfortunate shorthand for socially constructed and varying identities'.[35] In this book I argue that politics within and between the two white nations of Autralia and South Africa were influenced at every level by racial ideologies and assumptions: by what Europeans communities thought about race, group difference and assumed genetic hierarchy. It mattered little to those in each society who were determined to promote white privilege that such beliefs could not be defended scientifically or rationally. In contrast, it mattered greatly to opponents of racism in each society that concepts of race and colour were

as untenable as they were unethical; that they were elaborate myths that substituted ideology for historical explanation.

Racial discourses remained tenacious historical agents throughout much of the twentieth century. Typically, for example, *Die Transvaler* editorialised in 1965 that 'The white race has maintained itself in South Africa because of a special factor—no intermingling of blood'.[36] In Australia, whiteness was to be preserved by immigration exclusion and policies designed to eliminate racial difference. In their singularly important work, *Drawing the Global Colour Line*, Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have traced the appearance of whiteness as an enduring 'mode of subjective identification that crossed national borders and shaped global politics'. Different histories in different nation states left distinct imprints on these broadly racialised assumptions; belief in whiteness as race was pervasive, reflecting and shaping patterns of inequality and exclusion. In the wake of global war racialised beliefs and practices confronted unprecedented challenges.[37]

In this book it is argued that protracted conflict over apartheid in South Africa encouraged significant ideological shifts as well as important legislative change within white Australia. Gradually, also, assumptions suggesting biological group difference and racial hierarchy were discredited. Yet customary ideas about race, biology and group difference outlived formal political structures that protected and rationalised white privilege in both societies.

Overview: Intersecting Histories, Diverging Trajectories

In tracing the interlocking histories of separate nation states, it is difficult to escape comparative generalisations. As Peter Kulchin has noted, 'because most historical judgements are implicitly comparative, what we term comparative history constitutes the effort to do explicitly … what most historians do most of the time'.[38] This book is in part a comparative study of two very different countries, although it does not explicitly seek to extend the important comparative project at the centre of *Southern Worlds: South Africa and Australia Compared*, published in 2010. In the decades of international division over apartheid, similarities between the two states

were frequently claimed—especially by those anxious to defend apartheid as an unexceptional consequence of European expansion. National comparisons and moral judgements were a bedrock of the discourse provoked by racism in Southern Africa. David Yudelman caustically observed in the late years of apartheid that his country was 'widely' and unfairly 'seen as a bizarre exception' to international norms: 'The image is, of course, convenient for those anxious to distance themselves from, and to avoid obvious comparisons with, the dark side of their own societies, past and present.'[39] Yudelman was referencing other countries divided by racism, particularly Australia, but also the United States.

Like South Africa, Australia has built a 'wall of colour',[40] the South African prime minister D.F. Malan told the Australian prime minister Robert Menzies in Johannesburg in 1953. Throughout the long contests over apartheid white South Africa's propaganda offensive repeatedly claimed that Australians were in no position to criticise apartheid because their country, too, was built on discrimination and segregation. In response, Australia's opponents of apartheid claimed, if somewhat lamely, that 'one cannot draw a reasonable comparison between the systemic racial persecution inherent in apartheid and Australia's maltreatment of the Aborigines and archaic immigration policy'.[41] Contests over apartheid were rooted in claim and counter-claim over the character or morality of white supremacy in South Africa and Australia. From 1948 until the early 1970s, comparative judgements dominated public discourse: South African example was routinely conflated with Australian practice. Yet if the institutions and ideas underpinning white supremacy in part overlapped, the post-colonial histories of the two countries reflected distinctly separate narratives. It would be misleading and ahistorical to conflate their experiences. While each expressed the politics of white supremacy, they did so very differently.

A plethora of previous studies have charted white Australia's hesitant transition towards an open multiculturalism against a background of immigration reform, Indigenous struggle or Asian 'engagement'. The politics of race—domestic, regional and global—provoked by apartheid are neglected in this otherwise impressive historiography.[42] Yet the retreat from white Australia was significantly affected by the nation's deep political

and moral ambivalence over apartheid and minority rule in South Africa. Australia was deeply entangled in the international contests buffeting South Africa. Transnational struggle against apartheid had provocative, if largely unanticipated, consequences in Australia. Like South Africa, Australia was obliged to grapple with the 'wind of change' transforming not only the colonised world, but international politics more broadly.

Jane Carey and Claire McLisky have suggested that assumptions about whiteness were 'central to the racial regimes which … so profoundly shaped the development of the Australian nation' and other settler-dominated regions in the Americas and Southern Africa.[43] Struggles provoked by the regime of white supremacy in South Africa destabilised ideas that had long defined that other assertively white nation, Australia. From the early 1950s, but especially after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, shadows cast by apartheid in South Africa disrupted Anglo-Australia's racialised sense of nation, sharpening debate over Indigenous rights and assimilation practices, immigration reform and cultural pluralism. Racialised anxieties and racial assumptions were disrupted in each white society. Understandings of race and group difference were challenged, as were the discriminatory politics that enforced 'natural' ideologies that privileged whiteness over colour; that imposed settler entitlement over the rights of Indigenous people and communities. These contests open a uniquely important window through which to view the evolution of ideas about race and racism as white Australia slowly discarded old practices and moved towards multiculturalism.

My work maps the evolution of Australian reactions to apartheid against an international landscape changed inexorably by the drive against colonialism and racism. It engages with historiographical controversies far wider than those centred on the anti-apartheid movement and divisive anti-Springbok protests in the early 1970s, although these are explored at length in Part III. The post-war histories of both countries were shaped by the interplay of external and domestic forces; by overlapping transnational exchanges and frictions that transcended their increasingly porous borders. My study explores not only conventional bilateral political and economic intersections, but emphasises the cross currents of culture, ideas and social movement that broadly conditioned the bilateral relationship.

It explores also more formal negotiations conducted through supranational organisations, especially the United Nations and the rapidly changing Commonwealth, as well as international sporting organisations, the International Olympic Movement, and the international crusade against apartheid. Transnational linkages provided important substrata of negotiation and advocacy, shaping more formal diplomacy and negotiations centred on apartheid.[44]

Given that apartheid was interpreted abroad as fundamentally a moral or ethical issue, it cannot easily be incorporated into arguments that deem the 'rational' pursuit of national interests as the overriding determinant of foreign policy. White Australia's increasing readiness to condemn white South Africa, while steadfastly refusing to support action against apartheid, is a central theme of this book. Such ambivalence had significant implications for Australia, domestically and internationally. As global condemnation of apartheid intensified, Australia too was censured. While ever it refused to differentiate itself from the apartheid state, Australia was exposed and judged as complicit with it.

This book traces the involvement of Australia's people and governments in the protracted struggles over apartheid during 1945–75, from the complacent early years of the Menzies era to the fractious years of the Whitlam Labor government. In short, it traces Australia's tortured responses to apartheid in the generation after World War II. It explores what might be seen as the ripple effects of the rising assault on institutionalised white supremacy. These were often unexpected. They changed as the political architecture of apartheid was elaborated in the decade after the victory of the extremist National Party in 1948. They shifted dramatically with a changing climate of oppression marked by the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, South Africa's forced exit from the Commonwealth the following year and banning of the African National Congress (the ANC). And they accelerated as the politics of race and sport were joined in the late 1960s, precipitating mass anti-Springbok protests that isolated white South Africa from international competition. With the election of a radical Labor government in Australia in late 1972 the ripples of change became waves of anti-racism, sweeping away legislative support for white Australia and rupturing relations with the apartheid state.

My study, then, explores bilateral relations between two so-called daughters of Empire—two European-dominated settler nations defined by narratives of racism and the politics of white supremacy. It explores the implications for Australia of the bitter domestic and transnational politics of anti-racism that disrupted apartheid in South Africa and led eventually to its collapse. Government-to-government relations were woven into the broader fabric of international and domestic contests over decolonisation. The politics of race infused virtually every aspect of these relationships. And as was obviously the case with the conduct of Australian foreign policy—bilaterally, regionally or globally—relationships that involved South Africa were embedded in deep transnational exchanges that were cultural and social, as well as more conventionally political, strategic and economic. From the early 1950s, struggles over white South Africa centred on the UN and the Commonwealth—multilateral associations themselves transformed by decolonisation and the drive against racism. In each putatively white society these contests brought social division, political reaction and very gradually meaningful reform. The narrative arc of my book is thus necessarily broad. The shadows cast by apartheid are explored within a framework of historical change that is simultaneously local and cosmopolitan, domestic and international.

Race as Nation: Overlapping Histories, 1945–61

The South African example is an eloquent one. It deserves close study, and anyone who studies it cannot fail to realise that there is an overwhelming case for a homogenous community so long as we can maintain it.[1]

Liberal Party leader Robert Menzies, June 1949

In the early weeks of war in the Asia-Pacific, as Japan's troops occupied colonial Singapore, Winston Churchill privately declared that he did 'not become His Majesty's Prime Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire'. In a related vein, Australia's prime minister, John Curtin, was adamant that the war must not lead to any dilution of White Australia, declaring 'This country shall remain forever the home of the descendants of those people who came here in peace in order to establish here in the South Seas an outpost of the British race'.[2] Ironically, during the hostilities the Allied Powers, led by Great Britain and the United States, anxiously courted military support from 'all the coloured races of the world'. Beyond Europe, India and China made major contributions to victory over the Axis powers, as did vast numbers of troops from many parts of colonised Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific. Despite discrimination in their own countries, African and coloured troops fought alongside white South African forces. Many Aboriginal Australians enlisted. In contrast to the chauvinistic assertions of Churchill and Curtin, the agreed Allied justification for war stated that victory would make the world 'safe for democracy' and guarantee

'the rights of all people to political and economic self-determination'. Such grand declarations were interpreted in much of the colonised world as convenient propaganda, not as genuine support for decolonisation. Gandhi captured the rising anti-colonial temper unlocked by victory over totalitarianism when he declared that claims the Allies were 'fighting to make the world safe for freedom of the individual sound hollow, so long as India, and for that matter Africa, are exploited by Europe's imperial powers'.[3]

Paradoxically, in 1948, the same year as the apartheid regime won power in South Africa, the UN declared that human rights were universal; that regardless of race or colour all people should be equal before the law and free from discrimination. Soon after, in 1954, the United States Supreme Court signalled the end of legal segregation, ruling that 'separate facilities' reserved for different social groups were 'inherently unequal'. But in the early post-war years Anglo-Australia was little affected by the growing international demands for civil rights and democratic equality for all citizens regardless of race. Affection for other settler Dominions and for the Mother Country and the Empire infused Australia's international outlook. Traditional ties of race, blood and kinship sustained enduring relationships. Neither the political realities of the Cold War, nor strategic reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific, quickly eroded Australia's affection for Great Britain or its affinity for members of the old Commonwealth. Shortly before the Sharpeville massacre early in 1960 the *Sydney Morning Herald* conceded that despite growing 'feelings of aversion to the racialist policies of the governments of Dr Malan, Mr Strijdom, and Dr Verwoerd', the 'ties this country has with South Africa are as firm as ever they were.' Sharpeville's impact was dramatic but it did not permanently unsettle the 'real affinities and a deep sense of friendship' between the two self-proclaimed white nations.[4]

Accommodating Racism: Apartheid's Early Intrusions into 'White Australia'

In Apartheid there is a plain object lesson for Australia. It emphasises the necessity for avoiding the social and economic problems and international disputes which inevitably arise from the existence of foreign minorities of differing colour.[5]

Editorial, *West Australian,* 1950

A black shadow! Nowhere can you move in South Africa without meeting that racial spectre in one form or another …. The white inhabitants can never escape it. It haunts the mind of the visitor. It must permeate the writings of anybody who tries to interpret this country to white Australia.[6]

R.T. Foster, *Sydney Morning Herald,* 1952

'Apartheid—racial segregation—is probably a new term in Australia, but in South Africa it is the most discussed topic since General Smut's recent defeat', an Australian newspaper editorialised in 1948.[7] In the following decades shadows cast by apartheid fell across its sister Dominion in complex ways. For more than a generation opinion in Australia about apartheid remained ambiguous and inconsistent; the actions of government, timid and ambivalent. Overlapping racial sentiment and shared histories as white Dominions within the Empire formed a

common ideological bedrock that decayed only slowly as the excesses of apartheid were revealed. A racialised sense of nation endured in much of Australia, even as it charted a future less bound by heritage and history, by Britain and Empire. Ideas of race and nation—of race as nation— were deeply embedded: they continued to influence many in a post-war Australia who remained reluctant to criticise or sanction South Africa's apartheid regime, even as international opinion and action set against it.

Despite wide demographic differences, many assumptions clustered around claims of racial difference and cultural superiority were shared—if unevenly—across European communities in each Dominion. These ideas were often expressed obliquely. The racial assumptions that permeated R.T. Foster's reports in the *Sydney Morning Herald* of a 'black shadow' cast by South Africa were never fully erased. They were uttered less assertively as international opprobrium hardened against entrenched racism in white countries. Nonetheless, in each Dominion racialised anxieties endured, remaining important influences on public opinion, social customs and government policies. Ideas about race, difference and hierarchy outlived post-war proclamations against racism, scientific rebuttals of race and painful memories of the Holocaust. Racism endured as white Australia hesitantly confronted the wider implications of its racialised identity and reluctance to distance itself from the apartheid regime in South Africa.

After the Malan's National Party came to power in 1948, Australia's discriminatory practices and laws were frequently associated with those common to regimes determined to enshrine white supremacy. South Africa's minority government welcomed such generalised comparison. It sought to deflect international criticism by arguing that practices identified as apartheid had much in common with race relations in other settler societies, especially Australia and America's Deep South. Prime minister Malan told journalists visiting Pretoria in 1952 to mark the inaugural Qantas Empire Airways flight from Perth to Johannesburg that apartheid had important parallels in white Australia, as it too had successfully segregated its 'Natives', placing them 'on their own reserves' and abandoning efforts to make them 'Europeans'. In Malan's opinion, apartheid with Bantustans, so-called Homelands, at its core would ensure social outcomes in South Africa like those that defined white Australia.[8]

Reporting in 1951 on an early United Nations debate on segregation, a Townsville newspaper observed with trepidation that the 'major challenge' facing 'the Western World' lay in its difficult 'relationships with coloured races, whether they be yellow, brown or black'.[9] More liberal voices argued that when seen through a wider historical lens this 'major challenge' reflected reasonable 'demands from subject races': it was a justifiable 'cry against imperialism and colonialism', not a disturbing threat to white supremacy or European authority. Such tolerant understanding was rare. Fears of racial 'mixing' and violent conflict by 'blood-lusting savages' infused many reports in Australian newspapers that addressed the challenges to race relations so evident in Southern Africa.[10]

After the war, as before, the lens of biological racism continued to frame ideology in both white Dominions. Some in Australia, Great Britain and the Empire at large defended apartheid in overtly racist language (in terms not dissimilar to those used by its most extreme Afrikaner defenders). Discredited ideas of race echoed throughout much of post-war Australia, if less loudly than in white South Africa. Justification for white Australia was expressed by the architect of its post-war immigration policies, Arthur Calwell, and epitomised an orthodoxy widely shared. The infamous 'great white walls' that protected Australia were, in this view, 'not based on any arrogant claim of racial superiority'. Rather, immigration restrictions simply recognised 'racial differences' and were necessary to avoid 'internecine strife and the problems of miscegenation'. Menzies expressed a similar argument. 'The truth is that' the white Australia 'policy is based primarily on broad and proper considerations of race, but not of racial superiority', he stated. Australians are 'basically a different race', Menzies claimed, while asserting that other races must be excluded from his country. 'The real test is assimilability', he asserted in 1949, as he did across subsequent decades. Menzies spoke of the necessity of retaining an 'homogenous population' and averting 'the troubles that bedevilled' multiracial countries. Language used to justify the quest for social uniformity was widely shared in the white Commonwealth nations. During the next two decades it continued to echo through the racialised discourses that

defended both a white Australia and apartheid in South Africa.[11]

Overwhelmingly, Anglo-Australian sympathies revealed in newspaper reports and diplomatic correspondence lay with South Africa's English-language community, not with the resurgent Afrikaner nationalists represented by Malan and the secretive neo-Nazi Broederbond that shaped the extremist policies of his government.[12] Indeed some Australian reports of the apartheid regime emphasised parallels between it and Nazism, equating the 'master race' creed of the National Party with German racial ideology and Fascist violence. Reports drew attention to the fact that some leading proponents of apartheid, including B.J. Vorster (who served as prime minister, 1966–78) and J.G. Strijdom (prime minister, 1954–58) had been imprisoned along with other prominent Afrikaner nationalists by the Smuts government because they openly sympathised with Fascism and supported Germany during World War II. Malan, leader of the opposition National Party that won office in 1948 sought publicly to distance himself from Fascist ideology. Yet he had favoured a German victory; was supported throughout hostilities by the openly pro-Nazi organisation, the Ossewbrandwag ('the Way of the Ox'); and was greeted openly with Fascist salutes from some of his supporters. A principal architect of one of apartheid's most fundamental laws, the Group Areas Act, Malan proudly acknowledged his unerring embrace of 'everything that is holy and dear to a Christian nation and to a white race'. Local Indian communities appealing for equal voting rights controversially highlighted the National Party's 'Hitlerian racial policies' (albeit with no effect). Reports of neo-Nazi Afrikaner politics and support for a master race creed discomforted some in Australia as their nation celebrated victory over the Axis states and reasserted traditions of kinship, monarchy and Empire.[13] Yet neither Chifley's Labor government (1945–49) or (from 1949) Menzies' Liberal-Country Party Coalition administration was openly critical of white South Africa's distinctly racist political divide or the ideologies on which white supremacy rested.

The politics of apartheid were reported through a European prism that largely ignored or reflected the intractable racism that underpinned discrimination (or 'native policy' as it was often euphemistically labelled). The respected Australian historian Fred Alexander spent more than

four months on sabbatical from late 1949 'surveying current trends' in South Africa. His reports allegedly derived from 'unusual opportunities for talking with South Africans, in many walks of life, in all four provinces of the Union'. Yet they were typically partial, reporting not the undemocratic consequences of separate development for the African majority but benignly emphasising that on the 'all important issue of native policy' there is broad agreement amongst European citizens on the need for 'some form of segregation'.[14] Photograph-based publications reaching Australia, like Cyrus Townend Brady Jr's *Africa Astir*, predictably recorded events like the British Royal visit to the 'capital of Zululand' in 1947. Surprisingly, Brady's book, published in 1950, also hinted at aspects of 'petty' discrimination. His work included images of signage denoting areas reserved for 'non-European/nie-Blankes' in False Bay in Cape Province, printed above a caption that read: 'no matter where you go, nor how beautiful the landscape, disquieting racial and social problems intrude'.[15]

The famous nationalist war historian and journalist C.E.W. (Charles) Bean cautioned his readers that the race 'problem' in South Africa was 'especially complicated': 'while the white is dominant, the Bantu Blacks outnumber them by three to one and are increasing at a faster rate'.[16] Unlike most observers from Australia Bean accepted the recent findings of scientists and statements by the United Nations that stressed that 'no innate mental or moral difference' existed 'between Blacks, whites or any other races'. And Bean explicitly condemned those who portrayed 'Negroes' as an 'inferior race'. Yet this aversion to biological racism did not weaken his support for central planks of white Australia. Like most local commentators at the time, Bean warned that his country should avoid open immigration and protect itself from problems inherent in any multiracial state. The 'introduction into Australia of a large coloured population would certainly produce here a problem similar to that in the United States if not in South Africa', Bean wrote, 'and is, therefore, wisely avoided at almost any cost'.[17] Like most Australians, Menzies reached a similar conclusion. 'Experience in other countries shows that we are basically different races', he stated while defending selective immigration. 'European races and Negroes in United States of America,

and Europeans, South Africans, and Indians in South Africa live side-by-side' causing 'great problems', he asserted. The white Australia policy—and by implication apartheid—avoided or at least managed such disturbing social difficulties. There was an 'overwhelming case' for maintaining an 'homogenous community', Menzies concluded.[18]

The problem of maintaining racial purity was widely interpreted in South Africa as a problem shared with Australia. In repeating this claim Pretoria's political leaders attempted to enlist Australians as natural supporters of their discriminatory regime. Strijdom, as the minister responsible for implementing the infamous Group Areas Act, and later rewarded with the prime ministership, said in Cape Town at bilateral celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of Federation in Australia that white supremacy was under threat in both Dominions. And, he claimed unapologetically, Australia still pursued policies for 'maintaining … [its] race and western civilisation—[and] we have our policy [apartheid] of a like nature'. Strijdom's defence of apartheid uncomfortably endorsed the objectives of the white Australia policy. In words repeated often in following decades, Strijdom asserted that in Australia restrictive immigration laws coupled with a declining Indigenous population had 'solved the problem of the survival and supremacy' of the European 'race'. Apartheid was necessary, he asserted, because uniquely in South Africa this 'problem … 'remains as acute as ever'.[19] In reply, M.H. Marshall, a somewhat embarrassed acting high commissioner for Australia conceded, guardedly, that the two countries enjoyed 'great similarity' in their 'way of life'.[20] For prime minister Menzies, and for many European Australians, this similarity rested on a shared desire to protect racial homogeneity and thereby avoid 'great problems of social and racial … bitterness and unhappiness'.[21] Related assumptions shaped European Australia's racialised sense of nation and its anxious invasion narratives. 'Underlying the White Australia Policy', Arthur Calwell, its most outspoken defender, told parliament, is a determination to achieve 'a united race of freedom-loving Australians who can intermarry and associate without the disadvantages that inevitably result from the fusion of dissimilar races': 'We will avoid the evils that plague America, that distress South Africa, that embitter Malaya and that worry Fiji'.[22] The

uncertain future awaiting Europeans in multiracial South Africa always excited anxious commentary in Australia.

South Africa's racial problems were a powerful warning of future social dislocation should Australia's white walls be breached. Writing in the late 1950s on the issue of *Race and Reason*, I.D. MacCrone identified European South Africa with a uniquely 'pure race attitude'—an attitude that was most commonly expressed as fear of the 'rising tide of colour'; of 'being swamped by the Blacks'.[23] Press opinion in South Africa suggested that the two white nations shared a common racial history and were engaged in a common struggle for existence. 'Australia and South Africa are bedfellows in concern', the *Cape Argus* editorialised: 'Our story is an experiment in permanent white settlement at the foot of a black continent'. Similarly, 'Australia must preserve her civilisation against the envious eyes of the Asiatic'. Not unexpectedly, the uncertain future awaiting Europeans in a multiracial, democratic South Africa provoked most commentary in white Australia. The anxieties of the European minority in a sister Dominion reinforced in much of Anglo-Australia the importance of maintaining social homogeneity and assimilating so-called 'racial' differences—differences of 'colour' or 'blood'.[24] The 'plain object lesson' of apartheid is obvious, the *West Australian* editorialised: we must avoid the social conflicts that arise 'inevitably' in mixed societies. The newspaper's conclusion resonated sympathetically in much of Australia—in the early years of Menzies rule, at least: 'The best assurance of Australian immunity from such troubles' as now confront South Africa 'lies in firm adherence to the principle of white immigration'.[25]

Reports read in Australia during the 1950s were often premised with figures on the 'racial imbalance' at the heart of South African society. Most emphasised that apartheid was endorsed by overwhelming majorities in English-speaking and Afrikaner speaking communities. This fact was reiterated constantly. Usually it was coupled with details of the Dominion's unique demography: 2,500,000 'Europeans' and 8,500,000 'non-Europeans'.[26] The extremes of apartheid were often reported under banner headlines that explained, or excused, white anxieties: 'Hatred between Races'; 'Will they Cut our Throats?—A Question which 2½ million South Africans Ask Themselves'; and 'One Minute to Midnight

in South Africa'. Usually stories beneath such lurid statements warned that violence by the majority against the minority was inescapable. 'The drums are beating in the political darkness of Africa', R.T. Foster warned, 'but they are muffled as yet: Their final rhythm waits the midnight hour.'[27] Not all reports endorsed such apocalyptic narratives—if only because they anticipated that the Afrikaner-dominated government would survive any level of African disquiet or protest. Foster's conclusion conceded this: 'If the political scene in South Africa were as dark as it sometimes appears from outside, the breakup of the Union and a revolt of the "oppressed" coloured races would have to be assumed', Foster wrote, 'but neither of these dramatic events is imminent or probable.'[28]

Until the Sharpeville massacre, commentary consistently cautioned white Australia against easy condemnation of minority rule. 'We are not', McCall wrote in his book *Blood and Race*, 'in a position to pass judgement lightly on other countries', most notably South Africa and the United States.[29] 'Nothing irks South Africans more than the pontification of people with no first-hand knowledge of conditions in the Union, yet project their censure into its inflammable atmosphere', Foster advised his Australian readers.[30] In a report which unconsciously removed Aboriginal people from his own nation, Foster cautioned those who lived in Australia's 'purely white environment' and who want to understand South Africa to 'consider these points': 'If there were in southern Australia 8½ million Blacks not long removed from savagery, 1 million coloureds, 300,000 Indians, and only 2½ million whites … would we … act very differently from the way the South Africans have acted and are acting?' For Foster, as for very many Australians in the following decades, the answer to this question was self-evident. In a related vein, European Australia was constantly reminded that it used race-conscious immigration policies to avoid the dilemmas and problems that result from the presence of 'substantial coloured minorities'. Thus it should not be 'unduly critical of South Africa's racial measures'. Foster reported, as early as 1952, that whites from 'all parties are becoming alarmed and resentful over the increasing isolation' of the Dominion 'from the outside world'. 'They feel the lack of friends', he suggested sympathetically, 'and are eager to be understood, particularly … by Australians—people, as they put it, of their own sort'.[31]

Some commentary in Australia acknowledged the 'tragedy of the detribalised native' in South Africa. But at the same time it was claimed that the white minority was haunted by a 'racial spectre'; that it lived precariously under shadows cast by its black, disenfranchised, majority. The re-election of Malan's Nationalist Party, in 1952, was interpreted as a victory by those 'best fitted to deal with the threatening Native problem'. Against a background of 'Mau Mau terrorism in Kenya' and recent 'native riots in the Union', the *Sydney Morning Herald* editorialised that the European electorate 'felt, apparently, that the only safe course was to follow the party which stood for absolute white supremacy in South Africa'. And it concluded that 'Apartheid, a winning slogan four years ago' when the Nationalists first won office, 'made an even stronger appeal to racial fears and prejudices' in the recent election. If, like much Australian commentary, the *Herald* criticised 'native policies' and argued that 'coloured voters' should not be removed from South Africa's electoral rolls, it nonetheless gave implicit support to other legislation foreshadowed by Malan and Strijdom because it offered 'the best hope of preserving white civilisation in South Africa'. Consular advice from Pretoria reinforced this warning: in 1958, for example, the annual *South Africa Report* from the high commissioner acknowledged that the National Party offered 'the best lifeline to the whites against eventual swamping by the black hordes'. This advice was unconcerned that the right to vote was restricted on racial criteria, enfranchising only Europeans and less than 50,000 'coloured voters' in the Cape province—about 20% of South Africa's adult population.[32]

Apartheid's architects accepted that the need for white minority rule was self-evident. Much commentary in Australia agreed. The expansion of the white state's discriminatory reach was publicly rationalised by discourses that naturalised the routine separation of different social groups which the government categorised according to racial criteria. Race and colour were routinely conflated. Race as colour was widely asserted as a natural and agreed social descriptor, most routinely in references to black or white races or groups. Equally common, and arbitrary, were references to coloureds or asians. Observer-informed commentary, including that from many liberal

English-speaking politicians, explicitly conflated race with colour as justifications for 'separate development'. 'The architects of apartheid', Margaret Ballinger wrote, for example, seek not to create a multiracial state but to preserve 'whiteness' and avoid being 'drowned in a black sea'. 'They equate this' desire 'with Western Christian civilisation of which they feel themselves to be the guardians in Africa', Ballinger observed in *Australian Outlook* after 'grand' apartheid was fully legislated: they 'believe that races are essentially and unchangeably different'—that races 'are in fact unassimilable and in their own interests they should and indeed must be kept apart'.[33] Observing that grand apartheid made South Africa 'quite different' from any other state, as it alone excluded a non-white majority from its geographical boundaries, Douglas Brown suggested uncomfortably that 'the question that apartheid raises is not how South Africa should be governed but what comprises South Africa and by extension what comprises humanity'.[34] Given their own country's historical quest for racial homogeneity and history of discrimination this fundamental question troubled few in white Australia.

'Apartheid is popular', a *Sydney Morning Herald* journalist wrote on assignment in South Africa in 1952, 'but' … [by] the standards of racially homogenous countries' South Africa is 'an uneasy, fearful, even explosive land'. Commonly, newspaper reports implied that explosive violence cast shadows over South Africa that must be avoided by Australia. Menzies' visit to South Africa in 1953, for example, was interpreted as exposing the explosive potential of racially-mixed societies and the valued protections given by restrictive immigration laws and an homogenous population. While hosting Menzies, Malan attempted to exploit Australia's racial fears and its assumed vulnerability. Australia's immigration barriers sheltered it from 'looming dangers', Malan patronisingly told Menzies. The National Party was, like Australia, building walls to 'protect white civilisation against similar dangers'.[35] Speaking as Malan's guest, Menzies appeared to endorse the sentiment underlying Malan's view. If the eight million Australians of 'European stock' were to be confronted by '25 or 30 million of Aboriginal natives of varying degrees of development or underdevelopment, literacy or illiteracy', Menzies told his sympathetic white audience, 'we might well find no quick and easy solution'. His

remarks implicitly justified colonialism and apartheid as protectors of European privilege: 'We would want to preserve our own civilisation and culture, our religion, our parliamentary system and our administration of justice, while at the same time we would feel an acute sense of trusteeship for improving the welfare of the many millions around us'.[36]

Some Australian observers welcomed the possibility of change in a 'future South Africa'—provided it did not imperil or question 'the supremacy of the white man'. Most stories unapologetically echoed racialised fears. R.T. Foster's references to South Africa as a uniquely volatile society echoed in other reports of 'racial provocation'; of a 'dark shadow of racial strife, of Black set against White [that] looms large and menacing'. Usually, political unrest and African protests were equated with mob violence and threats to white security. For example, 'bloody riots' in East London and Port Elizabeth in which twelve people died in 1952 were reported in the *Sydney Morning Herald* under the headline 'Grim Trend in South Africa Race Unrest'. Written by 'a special correspondent—lately in South Africa', the report read: 'African mobs have tasted white blood, and racial feeling will be inflamed and a sense of insecurity created throughout the union'. Assertions linking blood and race with anti-white violence underpinned this and much other commentary. 'Zulu mobs', 'native violence' and aroused 'bloodlust' of Bantus and 'savages' prefaced one discussion of 'the hideous slaughter of European men and women by frenzied Africans', and the growing threat to 'white security' of 'violence among ordinarily tractable native communities'. African nationalism and resistance, not the routine repression exercised by the apartheid state, was assumed in much commentary to be the root cause of civil conflict. Twenty-five years later, during the Soweto Uprising, newspaper and television reports generally highlighted the aggression of African demonstrators while ignoring the routine institutionalised violence that such protests sought to overthrow.[37]

Ideologies of blood and race that had long sustained colonialism and justified dispossession were for some Australian commentators at least sufficient to explain and justify white privilege, segregation and separate development in Southern Africa. Many reports in the Australian press accepted uncritically Malan's defence of apartheid as a moderate attempt 'to maintain Western civilisation in the Union on the basis of the parallel

development of the white and non-white races'. Most stories endorsed European-defined categories of race and accepted that human capacities differed across different races. Reflecting concerns about the evils of 'race mixing', a correspondent to the *Adelaide Advertiser* wrote that the legacies of miscegenation combine the 'worst traits of black and white' and are an affront to 'the laws of nature'. A few years earlier Calwell expressed similar fears in justifying the White Australia Policy. 'The evils of miscegenation always result in rioting and bloodshed', he told parliament: 'Our country has avoided these problems … and we will continue to avoid them if we are wise'.[38] Statements from Pretoria's 'Christian' government were similarly unqualified, most notably in the claim that apartheid 'is definitely opposed to any miscegenation between the European and non-European races and favours the territorial, political, residential … and industrial separation of Europeans and non-Europeans'. 'Laws against miscegenation have long existed', Foster wrote from Johannesburg, 'and the Malan regime has tightened them under the Immorality Amendment Act'.[39]

Some visitor reports, like those from Fred Heselwood in the *Courier Mail* and from prominent journalist Douglas Wilkie in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, betrayed familiar, if contradictory, assumptions. Typically, they associated blacks with violence, while at the same time portraying 'the black man and woman' as docile labourers 'working in their slow happy way, or standing by to serve'. (The contented slave, 'Sambo', was of course similarly a caricature from slavery in the American South.) 'Violence breeds in the native shanties around Jo'burg', Wilkie wrote, under a headline that warned it was 'One Minute to Midnight'. At the same time, he reassured his readers that 'the Blacks are not ready to rebel because most of them are simple, apolitical and disorganised' and, he added pointedly, because the South African police are 'ruthless and well-armed'.[40] Informed commentary often displayed a customary—if paternalistic—racism. The *Herald*'s report on riots in Durban implied, for example, that a rigid system of racial separation was in the best interests of the 'native African' who 'has not shown a desire to progress'.[41] 'Black Africa' and African 'Negroes' were often portrayed stereotypically as people recently 'awakened … from the Stone Age' by Western education and colonial tutelage, as Brady wrote in *Africa Astir*. A 'barefoot' Durban child's 'pretty little European-printed

dress' was, he suggested, a 'living symbol of the progress' her native 'Homeland is making along the path of Western civilisation'.[42] Africa itself was sometimes portrayed as a passive continent that, in the words of prominent journalist and historian Barbara Ward, had only recently been 'burst open by the aggressive dynamism of Western industrial civilisation'. Thus awakened, she wrote, Africa threatened the lives and fortunes of European settlers who now feared being 'engulfed in a black sea'. European visitors' reports routinely emphasised the vulnerability of the white minority in the face of 'the ten million non-European who lived with them'.[43] Tropes of threat and loss dominated responses in Australia, and indeed Great Britain and much of Europe, to rising African demands for freedom from colonialism in settler Dominions.[44]

Racialised anxieties underpinned the often repeated arguments deployed in defence of apartheid: they surfaced in white Australia again and again—if sometimes in disguised or muted language—across at least a generation of political debate about South Africa. In press stories and photographs, radio reports and later on television, stories of apartheid often juxtaposed unexamined examples of African protest with the survival fears of whites. Assumed racial differences and the inevitability of conflict framed most reports. Politics were explained as 'race against race'; oppositions of 'we' and 'they'; or divisions built on mutual 'racial bitterness'. Even before the nationalist's narrow victory in 1948, Australian newspapers interpreted domestic politics in terms of conflict between English and Afrikaner communities, or as disputes arising from the 'Indian question' or the intermediate political status of 'coloured' communities. Discrimination against 'Coloureds' and 'Indians', not against 'Natives' (Africans), heavily influenced discussion about a future South Africa. Very little coverage was given African 'civil disobedience' campaigns, or the plight of the African majority. Often, disenfranchised non-white communities were referred to in an undifferentiated way as 'the natives'. In this discourse race itself, not colonial legacies or unequal power, explained and justified routine segregation.[45]

In the aftermath of Partition in India, the Indian problem and 'coloured' disquiet invited stories of 'the old Gandhi pattern' of 'civil disobedience' and 'passive resistance' led by the Indian National Congress

and the African National Congress. In the eyes of some, however, such public contest evidenced a 'grim trend' of growing political instability in the multiracial state. The demands of the Indian community for political equality with whites, not African demands for such rights, dominated Australian concerns well into the 1950s. This reflected the fact that the Indian question, not broader racial equality, was during this time at the centre of argument provoked by white South Africa in both the Commonwealth and United Nations. The 'white settlers' of the union 'have long realised that they have an Indian problem in their midst', a *Sydney Morning Herald* correspondent wrote just months after India won independence. Under a bold headline announcing 'Africa's Big Indian Problem', Australian readers had earlier been told that the Durban riots in 1949 were 'really inspired by native resentment' against the 'Indian business community', and were not a response to new apartheid laws.[46]

'We can hardly open daily papers' without finding some reference to 'race', I.D. MacCrone wrote a decade after World War II.[47] Race as language or culture or nationality remained a common descriptor, especially in European societies. Unsurprisingly, given the protracted conflict between Afrikaner and English settlers in South Africa, commentary often spoke of racial divisions within its enfranchised white community while ignoring the fate of other races. MacCrone emphasised this point: 'We constantly find English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans referred to as 'two "white races"'.' In this narrative the eclipse of General Smuts, the Union Party and the English ascendancy in the watershed elections of 1948 marked the revival of an 'old English–Afrikaner animosity', somewhat reminiscent of the Boer war era. From the perspective of a white Australian anchored securely within the Commonwealth, the links between the Afrikaner ascendancy and growing support for a future republic, not apartheid per se, were pivotal bilateral issues. Against this background the problem of 'we' and 'they' was a problem rooted in the smouldering contest between so-called British and Boer races that still largely defined the nation's fragile political culture.[48] Deep historical divisions in privileged European society preoccupied Fred Alexander's extensive commentary about South Africa in the early 1950s. And diplomatic correspondence reaching Canberra from Pretoria was similarly focused, even if advice offered to the Menzies

government occasionally acknowledged that the political implications of new apartheid laws were difficult to assess as visitors were excluded from non-white areas and denied open access to African activist organisations, notably the African National Congress. Thus diplomatic correspondence to Canberra, in part unavoidably, gave little attention to the interests or role of non-Europeans in the multiracial state: it focused overwhelmingly on what high commissioner H.C. Hodgson described after Malan's second electoral victory as 'the long-standing and deep-seated division between the Afrikaans and English-speaking Europeans'.[49] This reporting bias remained a constant feature of media stories reaching Australia until the rise of mass 'township' protests in the mid-1970s.

White South Africa's racial fears and uncertain future—not the implications of apartheid for the non-white majority—were the major focus of both newspaper features and diplomatic correspondence. Peaceful protests and organised political dissent made relatively few headlines in Australia or the Western media more generally.[50] However, African resistance, especially public protests that ended in violence or mass arrests, was sometimes described, as were some civil disobedience campaigns. As early as 1952 the *Sydney Morning Herald* reported that 'storms originating in its racial policies are blowing up darkly for the Malan government'. Completing a mixed metaphor the paper then identified two causesof the 'Shadows Over South Africa': first, open resistance by 'Cape Coloured' voters to pending disenfranchisement; and second, 'a passive resistance movement … among non-Europeans'—a 'novel' 'non-violent revolt where black Africans are making common cause with Indians' against regulations restricting non-whites to separate public amenities' (forms of segregation that came to be known as 'petty' apartheid).[51] Subsequently, programs of 'disciplined disobedience' were acknowledged, notably those organised by the youth wing of the African National Congress or by the Civil Rights Action Committee and the Trans-Apartheid Resistance Committee of the Coloured People's National Union. Efforts by resistance organisations to link with sympathetic delegates at the United Nations or in Western European parliaments were sometimes mentioned. Across four years, as 'segregation intensified', a 'considerable passive resistance movement against "unjust laws"' has emerged', the *Herald* special correspondent

accompanying the Qantas 'first flight' to South Africa reported; 'the jails at the moment are bulging with mild-mannered transgressors'. Although disorganised and divided within, non-European resistance was very occasionally interpreted as an example of rising 'native nationalism' that was linked to wider anti-colonial 'currents from Asia and Northern Africa [that] are eddying down into the Union and touching its coloured masses'. In acknowledging that African resistance against apartheid paralleled nationalist independence movements against colonialism, Foster gave voice to an historical perspective seldom evident in Western media before the Sharpeville massacre. Criticism of the undemocratic extremes of apartheid was not entirely absent from mainstream news—even if in Anglophile Australia such excesses were usually attributed to Afrikaner political domination rather than broad agreement across its European elite.[52]

The sporadic excesses of the apartheid regime—not minority rule or the routine violence apartheid embodied—drew substantial comment in Australia. The 'fanatical intransigence' of Afrikaners and Malan's determined efforts to 'further the pure policy of apartheid' were in the eyes of more liberal Australians commentators 'anathema to British minds'.[53] If press reports and editorial opinion often empathised with the 'fearful' position of the 'European minority' they also highlighted the resurgent political divide between 'Boers and Britons', the deep contest that defined European South Africa's divisive past. Anglo-Australia's immediate concerns centred largely on the eclipse of English-speaking whites by a more numerous Afrikaans-speaking community. Typically, a report in the *Sydney Morning Herald,* published as the Malan government campaigned for re-election, emphasised that even as 'segregation sharpened and tightened into a fixed and permanent system of subordination', the 'most potentially explosive question in South Africa' was the Nationalists' desire to leave the Commonwealth. This, not apartheid, 'could blast the country apart'. Most sections of the Australian press were convinced that, when visiting Pretoria in 1953, Menzies will have the 'Afrikaner case' justifying apartheid 'put to him copiously and persuasively'. At the same time, 'from English-speaking leaders in Natal and the Cape he will hear a different story', a 'special correspondent lately in South' (probably Foster) wrote: a

story of 'Dutch bigotry and intolerance, of the elevation of the Afrikaans language and flag, of plots to turn the Union into an Afrikaner-dominated republic'. Nonetheless, some reports did explore issues beyond the Afrikaner–English divide, while most exaggerated the extent of opposition to apartheid within English-language communities. Occasionally the Australian press did comment on the undemocratic and extremist core of apartheid. Foster, who returned to South Africa to report on the opening of direct air links with Australia, told his readers that 'separate development' is 'a popular but explosive' slogan at home, while abroad 'it has become the detested epitome of laws and actions of the Malan regime, added to the earlier initiatives of Smuts and Hertzog'. Foster's widely published reports exhaustively described domestic conflicts. They also reflected on the wider ramifications of apartheid. One lengthy dispatch, 'Apartheid is Popular', concluded presciently: 'This policy … is the trigger that has fired racial explosions in South Africa and sent the echoes rumbling round the world'.[54]

As the Afrikaner-dominated regime methodically legislated apartheid, the laws and language that sanctioned it seeped into political discourse in Australia. Developments in South Africa were described in the *Herald* in the early 1950s in words that became increasingly familiar to its readers. 'Segregation [has] intensified; the colour bar [has been]raised even higher', its correspondent reported from Johannesburg.[55] Even as movement for Aboriginal equality grew at home, an imported lexicon of race relations expanded to include terms like 'segregation policy', 'petty' or 'grand' apartheid, 'Bantustan', 'separate development', 'Homelands', 'township' and 'pass laws'. From the early 1950s descriptions drawn from United States, most notably the terms 'segregation', 'Jim Crow', 'civil rights' and 'Black Power', also formed part of a new transnational discourse. Throughout the turbulent 1960s images and stories of racial conflict in the US complemented local news reports of apartheid. Yet before South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961 it uniquely dominated reports reaching Australia that surveyed race relations in other countries, or more broadly discussed the international politics of anti-racism or anti-colonialism.[56]

As the international preoccupation with racial issues intensified, conditions in Australia were confused with apartheid's extremes.

Diplomats conceded that race relations in Australia were commonly and 'indiscriminately' described by the pejorative term 'apartheid'. Increasingly, racism in the two countries was discussed and compared. Assumed similarities were emphasised. Awkward questions awakened by comparison with apartheid infiltrated political discourse and influenced government policies with much greater force in the decade after Sharpeville. White Australia was widely defined as another state of apartheid.[57] Despite their very different political trajectories, race relations in the two countries were frequently conflated. The politics of race in Australia were played out in a shifting transnational environment, and were increasingly influenced by it.

Given the biologised conceptions of race and difference that infused white Australia until long after the war, its empathy for European South Africa was perhaps unsurprising. Throughout the 1950s Australian census definitions defined an Aborigine as a person with at least '50 per cent Aboriginal blood', echoing earlier categories like 'quadroon' or 'octaroon', while tropes of 'caste' were commonly used. Legislation in State and Territory jurisdictions spoke of 'full blooded' or 'half-caste' Aborigines, using assumptions based on 'blood as race' to justify discrimination ranging from forced segregation to denial of marriage rights. At the same time Australian immigration laws endorsed racial distinctions used also under apartheid. For example, South Africans of 'European descent' did not need a visa to enter Australia, whereas 'natives' or those 'not of European race' required special approval for entry—'even for a temporary visit'. Fearing 'adverse publicity' at-home, the immigration department seldom granted such exceptional permissions.

In 1953, for the Australian high commissioner noted that a 'South African paper reports that three native boxers and trainers were refused entry into Australia'.[58] As late as 1959 Australian missions abroad were instructed that 'borderline' immigration 'cases' relating to 'persons of mixed descent' would be assessed for entry on the basis of 'the subject's racial appearance' and 'estimated prospects of assimilation in Australia'.[59] Given the racialised justification for white Australia it is hardly surprising that international opinion, especially within the emerging postcolonial Commonwealth, equated it with other noxious examples of racism. Kim Beazley Sr. commented in 1959, when drawing attention to his country's

difficult reputation abroad, that white Australia and white South Africa were often equated. In the Commonwealth especially, Australia's race-based policy was sometimes interpreted 'as being not an immigration policy' but a variant of 'Jim Crow racial discrimination' in the American South, or apartheid in South Africa.[60]

The South African prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd's belief that his people constituted a distinct genetic race which would be contaminated by mixing with different—presumably inferior—racial groups, expressed a view that was also entertained by some in Australia. Speaking to Adelaide's Commonwealth Club in December 1959, Alexander Downer, minister for immigration, stated rhetorically: 'We seek to create an homogenous nation. Can anyone reasonably object to that?' Some progressives did. In that same year, at a controversial national conference convened by eminent Australian scientist Macfarlane Burnet, speakers critiqued the 'genetics' used by conservatives to protect white Australia from 'migration and race mixture'. In contrast to official policy, speakers suggested that immigration laws be relaxed as the introduction of different 'racial traits' was 'key to the nation's future'. The *Age* reported the discussions as *de facto* authorisation of an inter-marriage scheme that would radically disrupt immigration patterns. A more sober *Sydney Morning Herald* reported that the conference endorsed 'genetic diversity—but within limits'. Progressives who hoped the conference would be a 'permanent refutation of racial purity and racial superiority' were disappointed, but some discussion did challenge fundamental misconceptions about race. Later, as the International Olympic Committee moved to expel South Africa, Labor leader Arthur Calwell stated that his people were descended from the British race and 'our policy of assimilation and absorption is the only sensible policy for Australia to pursue'. Even as most informed opinion accepted that ideas of racial purity and superiority had been scientifically refuted, reaction to reform proposals suggested by the newly founded Immigration Reform Movement in Australia usually reiterated the need to retain social homogeneity and genetic boundaries. White Australia was putatively of Anglo-Saxon, or Anglo-Celtic stock, a sub-branch of the British race that included the Scottish, Welsh or Irish. At times, those defending a white Australia still charged those advocating

immigration reform as wanting to introduce 'non-European genetic material' into a distinctive (or exceptional) population—an argument that mirrored Afrikaner justifications for racial separation. Nonetheless, both sides of politics implicitly accepted—as had Menzies' Cabinet shortly after the Suez crisis—the need 'to mitigate the hostility which Asians feel' about white Australia and thus to remove 'references to such delicate matters as racial origin' from policy documents.[61]

Throughout the 1950s, sporting exchanges, high-level government visits, direct air links, expanding trade and commerce and more regular press reports greatly expanded Australian awareness of its sister Dominion. Initially, these contacts strengthened white Australia's empathy for the assumed vulnerability of South Africa's white minority. Fundamental political questions, like the arbitrary construction of racial categories (white, black, coloured and Indian) or the coercive allocation of African communities to Homelands or townships or 'locations', were important issues largely absent in reporting from Southern Africa. Indeed, most commentary reaching Australia ignored the structures of grand apartheid, highlighting instead racial separation or segregation under the proliferating laws of petty apartheid, like the prohibition of mixed marriages or the reservation of separate amenities. Under apartheid's coercive laws visitors to South Africa, including journalists and foreign diplomatic staff, were in effect denied access to non-white communities. It was perhaps inevitable that only the public veneer of petty apartheid, easily observable in blacks only / whites only signage in major cities, or in the segregation most evident in transport, recreational areas or schools, became the recognisable face of apartheid. Deeper structural inequality was more difficult to observe and less reported. Diplomatic dispatches, like government policies, were always more concerned about the level of Afrikaner support for a republic than with the difficult consequences of apartheid for South Africa's non-white majority. At the same time the views of non-whites, submerged beneath political exclusion and inequality, were often casually dismissed as too difficult to gauge.[62]

Menzies expressed his country's dilemmas over apartheid more graphically than any figure prominent in public life. He consistently defended the need for social and racial homogeneity in 'British' countries.

His reluctance to condemn apartheid, or the Sharpeville massacre, betrayed his wider views on culture and race. In essence he echoed the views of his old Empire friend Smuts rather than those of Malan, suggesting that complete racial segregation was not practicable. Menzies implied defence of South Africa, during debate, shortly before it was forced to withdraw from the Commonwealth in 1961, delighted apartheid's defenders at home and overseas. 'Menzies own view of apartheid', David Tothill wrote with perverse pleasure, 'resembled F.W. de Klerk's' decades later. It also closely resembled views expressed by prime minister, then president Hendrik Verwoerd in reaction to Harold Macmillan's 'Wind of Change' speech. Verwoerd, who like his party 'eschew[ed] integration of any kind', reiterated that apartheid would ensure in perpetuity that the 'white' would not be submerged by the 'black'. Menzies stated that he sympathised deeply 'with the desire of South African Europeans to preserve their integrity and indeed to preserve their control in a country whose economy and modern structure they have almost entirely created'.[63]

Menzies' hesitant response to the massacre at Sharpeville in early 1960 drew bitter criticism. Yet he was adamant that he was not 'concerned to defend apartheid, which, indeed I condemn'. His comments on South Africa were always nuanced. Menzies wrote privately that apartheid 'does not seem to me to involve moral considerations', and concluded, 'I think my own objection to the policy is that in the long run it will not work.' On another occasion he told Verwoerd: 'I don't moralise about South African policy … All I say is that I don't think it will work'. Menzies acknowledged that his own view was 'pragmatic'. His private comments to Verwoerd were forthright. 'The more it [apartheid] succeeds … the more it will fail in the long run', Menzies stated. He concluded graphically: 'If it goes that way you may find that the ultimate conflict will be bloody and devastating'.[64]

Despite widespread condemnation of apartheid as evil, many in Australia shared the assumptions that rationalised it. Most endorsed their government's refusal to act against it. Menzies starkly personified the complex of racial ideas held in much of the 'old' Commonwealth. He compared favourably South Africa's 'Homeland' policies to Australia's obligations in its overseas territories, as these would permit 'the Bantu' or 'the native' gradually to reach a stage where self-government might be

appropriate.[65] He spoke paternalistically of 'natives' and sympathised with the National government's desire to 'build up the minds and bodies of the Bantu' (although he cautioned that this would end badly for the white minority). Judith Brett has written that Menzies thought of Aborigines 'within the Social Darwinist terms of the turn of the century'. Like many in middle Australia, Brett suggested bluntly, he believed Aborigines occupied the 'the lowest rung on the ladder of human races' and blamed 'them for the destitution to which the white invasion had reduced them'. His views on race were, as a Canadian bureaucrat noted diplomatically, 'the least distant philosophically from the South African position'. He was referred to fondly in the Afrikaner press as 'Oom Robert'—Uncle Bob.[66]

'Australian historians are probably unaware that the great long-serving prime minister had a special place in his heart for South Africa and white South Africans', the inexhaustible commentator David Tothill wrote shortly after apartheid ended: and this affection included 'abrasive and republican Afrikaners like the South African minister for external affairs, Eric Louw, as well as Malan's successors Hans Strijdom and Hendrick Verwoerd'.[67] Menzies ambiguous interpretation of apartheid and his unambiguous loyalty to white South Africa are most kindly summarised by Cameron Hazlehurst in his study *Menzies Observed*. 'In fact he was not an advocate of apartheid', Hazlehurst wrote, 'much as he seemed to enjoy opportunities to avoid condemning South African racial policies'.[68] Menzies guarded views might reasonably be interpreted as supporting policies that would sustain white privilege rather than foster multi-racial equality in a democracy. A.W. Martin, the principal biographer of Menzies, has concluded that he was generally sympathetic 'with South African whites (especially [those of] British stock)', and held South Africa in high regard because it was an original Commonwealth member, an ally in two world wars, and represented traditional British values and shared British institutions. 'He was also something of an old-fashioned racist and colonialist (though not more so than most Empire men of his class and generation)', Martin stated. Nor was he 'intrinsically too sympathetic to black or brown independence movements'.[69] It is difficult to confirm the extent to which Menzies' views were shared in the wider community. Evidence of public attitudes on questions of race or South Africa before

1960 is sketchy. But it is apparent that moral indignation expressed over the evils of apartheid always far outweighed support for tangible action against it.

Post-war Australia accepted South Africa as a traditional Commonwealth friend and Western ally. Yet friendship with South Africa did not necessarily imply approval of apartheid. Paul Sauer, a prominent propagandist for the apartheid regime, visiting Australia in the early 1950s as a guest of Qantas, assumed that here he would find a welcoming reception from people of 'his own' kind—fellow Europeans who shared fears of the 'advance of the black African masses'; a white society that had somehow escaped the opprobrium of the outside world and could be easily cultivated as the most important friend of South Africa. In defending apartheid Sauer found important similarities between the two Dominions, not only in their ideas and policies about race relations but in their governments' efforts to outlaw communism and protect 'trust territories' from UN interference. Like most later visitors Sauer claimed to have found 'keen sympathy and understanding' from his Australian hosts 'towards South Africa's efforts at keeping the southern part of Africa white, just as Australia on the southern fringe of Asia aims at keeping the continent European'. Nonetheless, Sauer was disappointed, expressing surprise that community disinterest and occasionally mild rebuke, not overt approval, usually greeted his partisan advocacy.[70] In the following decades white South Africa's other visitors, most prominently the tireless Tothill, were similarly surprised by the growing reluctance of Australian governments and people to overtly defend apartheid.[71]

Even as international criticism intensified after 1960, W.J. Hudson wrote, Anglo-European Australians remained 'more likely than most to feel at least some sense of rapport with White South Africans in their unenviable predicament'.[72] This difficulty was in Hudson's view, and indeed in the view of most Australian observers at this time, embedded in the demographic imbalance between the white minority and the African majority. By implication, as Sauer had suggested, an analogous predicament confronted white Australia. Here—as those defending its infamous immigration barriers still passionately asserted—a relatively small European nation lived precariously isolated on the edge of an awakening

populous Asia. Unsurprisingly, representations of white South Africa constantly highlighted white Australia's deep-seated security concerns, drawing parallels between the 'vulnerable' circumstances and racialised fears of Europeans in both countries. *Die Transvaler* (Johannesburg) claimed in 1957, during a high-level 'goodwill' exchange with Australia, that the unique friendship rested on the 'fundamental fact that both lands are distant outposts of white civilisation'. In white 'South Africa the dark shape of great Africa looms threateningly'; in white Australia 'the teaming mass of a hungry and over-populated East hangs over it like a vulture'. 'Therefore they are necessary to one another', it concluded: the '"Sisters of the South" … are alone against the rising tide of African and Eastern nationalism.' Some English-language observers conceded that such assertions typified extremist Afrikaner race-nationalism and did little to strengthen bilateral friendship or encourage constructive reform.[73] Argument reflecting racialised fears punctuated the extremes of public debate in both societies. In Australia, however, the appeal of such emotive and racist claims declined appreciably after the Sharpeville massacre, as international condemnation of South Africa took stronger root.

Troubled Friendship:
Interruptions of Racism

*Members of all parties [in white South Africa] are becoming
alarmed and resentful over the increasing isolation of the Union
from the outside world. They feel the lack of friends, and are
eager to be understood particularly … by Australians—people
as they put it, of their own sort.*[1]

R.T. Foster reporting from Johannesburg, 1952

… the best friend South Africa has[2]

Verwoerd to Menzies, after Sharpeville, 1960

Empathy and shared interests overlapped to encourage post-war
Australia governments to support a stable, if undemocratic, South
Africa. 'The valuable ties of sentiment' at the heart of cooperation in
the old Commonwealth fostered a special affinity between its two most
controversially white member-nations. The keenest South African observer
of white Australia, David Tothill, concluded that all governments, from
Smuts' to Vorster's, 'held Australia to be their best friend internationally.'
H.G. (Hugh) Gilchrist, perhaps the most perceptive Australian official
to serve in apartheid South Africa, wrote that 'Australia is regarded by
White South Africans as a friendly and fortunate country whose people
are "just like South Africans" (but whose life without servants, they think,
must be very arduous)'. Most English-language newspapers published in
South Africa, as well as some Afrikaner-language publications, endorsed

such assessment.[3] Writing of his government's elaborate efforts 'to sell the apartheid to 1950s Australia', Tothill repeated a racial narrative familiar in both Dominions: as 'White men's countries' South Africa and Australia shared a 'natural historical empathy' that uniquely sustained their close, if difficult, relationships.[4] As the influential minister for external affairs in the Menzies government R.G. Casey (1951–60) acknowledged, Australia's interests in South Africa were 'basically sentimental', biased towards the 'large English-speaking minority of British origin' with whom Anglo-Australia 'has a great deal in common'.[5]

For at least a generation after the World War II, most 'white Australians' embraced what Russel Ward and others have described as a dual nationality—'for most, but not all people, national and imperial patriotism were complementary, not contradictory'. This observation ignored sectarian and political divisions within. Nonetheless, on the eve of Menzies electoral victory in 1949, Casey could claim without rebuke: 'we draw our main strength not from 8 million of our own population, but from the fact that we are a member of a great cooperative society—the British race, of which the senior partner is our mother country Great Britain'. Menzies was equally unambiguous: 'Great Britain … is the centre of our history, the centre of our being: Without Britain and the Empire we are rudderless … in a very strong sea'. Even as it committed to the American alliance and war in Korea, the Menzies government adamantly asserted that this strategic shift implied 'no weakening of the Commonwealth bond, nor any turning away from Britain.'[6]

Post-war Australia remained wedded to the power of Great Britain and the traditions of Empire. A self-professed white Australian community continued to celebrate Empire Day and Royal visits, and to recognise a British monarch as its head of state. British race patriotism remained a tenacious obstacle to change. Maintaining an homogenous white nation, not untested experiment with cultural pluralism, guided immigration and social policy. David Lowe has written eloquently in his *Menzies and the Great World Struggle* that embedded deeply in Australian political culture during the Cold War 'were core hopes and fears, visions of white racial progress and rapid development, anxieties about decolonising Asia, and nervousness about Australia's tenuous propriety hold on a vast continent and about the

future of European civilisation'. Most historians accept Lowe's conclusion that developments in the immediate post-war decade proved 'a great rejuvenating force for Australian identification with the British Empire'.[7]

Ties of race and culture—of race as culture—conditioned white Australia's reluctance to openly criticise South Africa, but these were not the only factors of significance in the relationship. And, as advice to prime minister Ben Chifley and external affairs minister Evatt noted immediately after the war, 'strategic reasons' also made it 'vital for Australia' that South Africa should remain within the Commonwealth, a close friend and Western ally against international communism, and a reliable bilateral partner. In 1946 high commissioners were exchanged, establishing direct diplomatic contact between the two Dominions. Malan's victory in 1948 did not initially disrupt the benign bilateral relationship.[8] Routinely, cultural, sporting and political exchanges were celebrated as reflections of a unique relationship between the 'Sisters of the South'.

Waning Warmth

The newly elected Afrikaner-dominated government of Malan understood the singular importance of good relations with Australia. Returning from the United Nations in 1949, Evatt stopped-over in South Africa, briefly visiting Cape Town and Durban. His meetings with Malan and senior colleague Eric Louw went 'very well'. Pointedly, in deference to the wishes of his hosts, Evatt turned down a request to meet in Durban a deputation from the Natal Indian Congress. Malan acknowledged Evatt's role in building 'close understanding between our two countries'. 'Not only were you largely responsible for the establishment of direct diplomatic relations,' Malan told Evatt, 'but we in South Africa owe you a special debt of gratitude for your firm support of the South African point of view', especially in the United Nations. Avoiding the delicate question of white-minority rule, Canberra stressed that changed strategic reasons underpinned close bilateral cooperation. The leader of the Country Party, Earle Page, suggested that South Africa join the ANZAC pact, a controversial wartime agreement asserting Australian and New Zealand

ambition to costrain rising American influence, especially in the Pacific region.[9] Strategic cooperation was made more valuable, for South Africa at least, as the drive against colonialism and racism accelerated. Dominion unity would protect against the uncertainties of a post-colonial world.

In the early years of the Malan and Menzies governments cultural affinities merged with mutual fears over the spread of communism, both at home and abroad. Shortly after assuming office Malan succeeded where the newly elected Menzies was to fail. In 1950 the radical National Party administration enacted the Suppression of Communism Act, outlawing membership of the Communist Party and, by extension, making illegal membership of left-wing nationalist organisations, like the African National Congress (ANC). Menzies' attempt to ban the Communist Party was defeated by referendum in 1951. Through the late 1940s and early 1950s nationalist forces shook the foundations of colonialism everywhere; the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb; peasant-based communism triumphed in China; and war in Korea signalled decades of Cold War division in the Asia-Pacific. Anti-communist suspicion and rhetoric dominated political culture in the Western democracies. In both Dominions, international politics was viewed through the ideological lens of Cold War: Communism, as Paul Hasluck told parliament in 1950, 'must be resisted wherever it is exemplified'. Throughout the Cold War, despite concern over apartheid, South Africa was regarded by most Western powers as a unique bulwark against international communism: its unrelenting opposition to communism overshadowed irritating ethical or political issues provoked by apartheid and white supremacy or colonial authority over South West Africa. 'In defending South Africa', prominent historian W.J. Hudson noted—in language common in the 1950s—'Australia defended part of the West, and so herself, against mischievous attack'.[10]

It was the unequal status of Indian migrant communities, not the plight of so-called 'native' people in either country, that first came to the attention of the UN and the Commonwealth. As apartheid was formalised, 'the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa' was a major focus of wider clashes over race and rights. Gandhi's celebrated campaigns early in the twentieth century anticipated more formal disputes

over the discriminatory treatment of Indians (if not racism generally) in South Africa. After Federation, Australia's restrictions against 'coloured' immigration had drawn bitter condemnation from India—complaint that increased after the Second World War as independent India's future relationships with the Commonwealth was negotiated. In 1949, for example, prime minister Nehru told the Indian parliament that Australia's discriminatory immigration regime was 'a racial policy' that was ' wrong and to be deprecated'.[11] In a confidential reply the Labor government re-emphasised that Australia was determined to retain its controversial immigration policies: it would remain a 'white democracy' and preserve its 'British way of life'. Influenced by Nehru's criticism, the *Hindustan Times* suggested, rather politely, that Australian immigration law should be 'more progressive'; that Australia should 'consider itself more an Asian nation than an outpost of the West'. Reflecting on intra-Commonwealth relations during the Chifley–Evatt years, 1945–49, and the determined inflexibility of Calwell as the minister for immigration under Chifley, the Indian high commissioner in Canberra claimed, in strict confidence, that Australia's rigid immigration restrictions had 'alienated the goodwill and inspired the enmity of all Asian people'.[12] W.R. Crocker, the Australian high commissioner in New Delhi expressed a related view, albeit more soberly, reporting that 'the Indian press was increasingly linking Australia and South Africa'.[13]

Australia strenuously resisted calls for UN discussion of its immigration regime. The Chifley administration and later the Menzies government argued that 'internal affairs of states' should never be 'considered and ordered' by any international organisation. The 'treatment of Indians', like apartheid generally, was purely a domestic matter. As late as 1953 Australia's delegate to the UN, W.D. Forsyth, stated unequivocally: 'it is not the function' of outside organisations 'to issue directions to States as to the content of their legislation'. This argument was shortened to a banner newspaper headline that resonated with many during the Menzies years: 'Australia Urges: Hands Off Race Issue'.[14]

From the very first days of Malan's administration, Australian diplomats were typically advised that 'the colour question' might complicate relations with a 'complex' and 'somewhat difficult' South

Africa.[15] Reflections of apartheid surfaced unexpectedly during test match cricket, with the skills of visiting players applauded most loudly by non-white spectators watching from segregated areas. Jon Gemmell observed that when Australian cricketer Neil Harvey scored an unbeaten 151 runs in the test match in Durban in 1950 'every shot was cheered by Black spectators, one of whom was Nelson Mandela'. But apartheid's architects saw the game very differently. Officially, high-level sporting visits were celebrated as legitimating white minority government. Sporting competition symbolised a bilateral relationship that had 'never' been 'more friendly' or more important. The polite surface of diplomatic correspondence and official contacts also reflected Canberra's implicit acceptance of apartheid (and the political controls that maintained it).[16]

In mid-1953, when returning from a special meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in London—a meeting that coincided with the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth—Menzies and his family visited South Africa. Fulfilling an invitation offered two years earlier, the prime minister spent a week as a guest of the Malan government. Given the close relationship between the two Dominions, Menzies visit was not without controversy. Uniquely, it focused Australia's attention on South Africa at the very time when the network of laws enforcing apartheid neared completion and the white-minority government attracted strong criticism in the UN. Newspaper reports, as well as briefing notes reaching Canberra, now explicitly spoke of 'Apartheid' and of an 'ever rising tide of racialism' that was encouraged by 'the Afrikaans', if not all, European groups. While the 'bitterness' of 'English-speaking Europeans' in the face of Afrikaner domination was emphasised, so too was state repression of 'defiance' or 'passive resistance campaigns'. Australia's high commissioner, W.R. Hodgson, reporting from Pretoria shortly before Menzies' visit, warned that for 'the first time' 'the Indians, Coloureds and Natives' have combined in 'common purpose'. In the eyes of many European citizens this constituted a 'general challenge to white supremacy'. But diplomatic advice also betrayed racial concerns familiar in both white societies. Hodson described resistance campaigns as 'outbreaks of barbaric violence' across 'Johannesburg, Kimberley, Elizabeth and East London' and repeated his warning that resistance now constituted 'a major challenge' to the

'basic doctrine of white supremacy'.[17] Given Menzies' views on race and/ as civilisation, such advice was disturbing. It highlighted the importance of supporting South Africa's elected government—especially as concerns grew about rising communist-inspired opposition to apartheid, most prominently from Indian civil rights organisations as well as the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

On the eve of Menzies visit in 1953 the high commission cabled that political dissent was tightly controlled and social unrest unlikely during the prime minister's stay. A lengthy dispatch detailing the 'course of the passive resistance campaign directed by the joint committee' of the ANC and the South African Indian National Congress reassuringly concluded that the campaign seemed to have 'come to an end'. Internal opposition to segregated sport went unreported. The actions of the 'security section of the police force' did not feature in newspaper reports, even though they were acknowledged in some diplomatic advice. In press reports, internal resistance was usually portrayed as threatening social stability— equated with intermittent 'savage riots' and 'acts of barbarity'. Active protest was not supported by the 'vast majority' of the poor non-whites and, reassuringly, was effectively contained by state security forces. In short, South Africa was a safe place for Australian visitors; a hospitable environment for its elite sports men and women. The obligatory use of segregated public facilities, and separate 'enclosures' for 'non-European' spectators, comforted Australian visitors, players and officials watching sport in the divided Union.[18]

The briefing notes provided to Menzies for his ten-day visit drew his attention to 'Some Delicate Issues in which Care must be Exercised', but they made no direct mention of apartheid. Menzies was advised about the constitutional crisis of 1952–53 linked to 'Disenfranchisement of Coloured voters in the Cape Province', and about Supreme Court rulings on whether 'non-Europeans were entitled to equal facilities with Europeans in public places': but these were deemed petty disputes. In contrast, anti-British demonstrations in the Orange Free State and reports that the Afrikaner National Party might seek to establish a Republic and leave the Commonwealth raised genuine concern. Far more comforting, as global Cold War contests merged with independence struggles, was

South Africa's vigorous anti-communism and strategic role in the Western alliance.[19]

At the official prime ministerial welcome in Cape Town, Malan described Menzies as 'South Africa's staunchest friend'. However, to the consternation of most invited guests, Malan also used this rare opportunity to offer Australia support should it come into conflict with India—support which Malan presumed would be reciprocated by Australia should the 'Indian problem' escalate further in his country. Malan spoke of the need to 'preserve white civilisation' and suggested that the Indian diaspora coupled with instability in Asia confronted 'the twin sisters of the South' with broadly similar problems. Malan's warning was interpreted as suggesting mutual 'armed assistance against a common enemy'. Malan did not concede that his offer was misjudged or that it constituted interference in Australia's domestic politics: rather, like most European South Africans, he saw it as a gesture of friendship 'which could not fail to be appreciated' by Menzies or his colleagues. The explanation for this 'embarrassing gaffe', 'this strange incident', Fred Alexander commented, 'may be found in the deep antagonism to Indians and in the widespread fear of the government of India' evident 'among English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking inhabitants'. Commenting under an unfortunately worded headline that read 'South Africa's Fear of Indian Penetration', Alexander wrote that this 'hostility and suspicion' was so pervasive in white South Africa 'that it seems to be taken for granted that we Australians' share equally this fear of Indians and India, and by implication shared other distasteful racial attitudes.[20]

Most commentary in Australia, along with that in India and Pakistan, condemned Malan's appeal to Menzies as highly inappropriate. But Menzies was not obviously disturbed by it. Reflecting on his recent visit, ostensibly to learn of South Africa's 'domestic problems', Menzies on his return told the Australian press that he was 'sympathetic' to South Africa's efforts to maintain 'European settlement and civilisation in the presence of numerically much greater non-European populations'. He cautioned against making any judgement about South Africa's 'racial and political structures'. He gently echoed Malan's comments, asserting that 'we must increase our contacts with South Africa', encourage 'close political

and economic cooperation', and refrain from 'acid criticism'. While not welcomed by others in his Cabinet, notably external affairs minister Casey, Menzies polite words nonetheless suggested that Malan's undiplomatic misjudgement had not openly disrupted the 'most cordial' bilateral relationship. Both Dominions, *The Times* observed, still eagerly pursue 'the closest cooperation'.[21]

Throughout the 1950s Menzies was one of very few world leaders unwilling to criticise the apartheid regime. His public support was welcomed with genuine enthusiasm by leaders of the National Party, the local press and by 'all shades of political opinion'. Menzies visit in 1953, for example, was a 'very good thing for the morale and spirit' of people currently 'very sensitive as regards international criticism of their attitude towards racial discrimination and apartheid', Hodgson reported from Pretoria. 'In every possible way' the prime ministers' visit was 'an outstanding success', the high commissioner advised Casey. Like Australian officials and politicians more generally, Hodgson equated 'South Africa' with European South Africa—with its white minority government not with its multiracial disenfranchised majority. More than a decade would elapse before the undemocratic state was identified routinely as a white minority government or, in the words of its critics, as the apartheid regime. Public expressions of support like those evident during Menzies' visit were less common after 1953. But the sentiment they reflected changed very slowly and unevenly.[22]

As sporting, trade and political contacts expanded, an undercurrent of moral disquiet entered debate in Australia. Protestant church leaders, unionists and a few academics guided dissent. Concerns about white minority rule were expressed in public meetings, trade union action, and newspaper opinion. Addressing more than 2,000 people in the Brisbane Town Hall shortly after Menzies' friendly discussions with South Africa's leaders in 1953, the most prominent Australian critic of apartheid, the Reverend Alan Walker, asserted that the White Australia policy must be liberalised. Walker, who was later described cynically as 'The Methodist Pope' and 'The Conscience of the Nation', warned that 'as a nation, we shall pay dearly if we continue to stand uncritically with South Africa'. In words repeated often as the anti-apartheid movement in Australia took root,

Walker said that 'Menzies would be a truer friend of South Africa' if he told Dr Malan that there is 'grave concern in Australia about the present racial policies of the South African government'. Unlike some fellow opponents of apartheid, Walker also expressed shame about the colour bar in his own country. He highlighted typical cases of segregation, like that reflected in a sign reading 'no one of Aboriginal extraction allowed here', placed at the entrance to a railway restroom in a West Australian town.[23] In emphasing links between apartheid abroad and racism at home, Walker foreshadowed overlapping protests against discrimination in both countries.

Traditions in sport, especially in cricket and rugby, were a bedrock of the relationship between the two countries. As Malan's government consolidated its power in the late 1940s, Evatt had visited South Africa. He welcomed the resumption of cricket tests between the Dominions as an important symbol their shared history. Shortly afterwards, a 'successful ten-week tour of the Union' by the Australian soccer team was applauded by Football Association president, F.W. Fell, as 'form[ing] another strong link in the great friendship'. Menzies was even more effusive, describing the place of cricket in the relationship as 'precious'. In other sporting codes, notably Rugby and tennis, relationships were similarly prized. The prime minister's enthusiasm was widely shared in sports-loving Australia.[24]

Australian cricketers toured South African in 1949–50 and 1957–58. An all-white South African team played five tests in Australia in 1952–53. Australian rugby teams toured South Africa in 1953 and 1961. An all-white Springbok rugby team visited Australia in 1956. Despite criticism of apartheid by Walker and some trade union groups, racism in elite sports was all but ignored in media reports and diplomatic dispatches. The segregation of sport at local level was similarly unremarkable. For example, when a team from Surf Life Saving Australia toured in 1954 it happily demonstrated its skills to the Indian Beach Surf Lifesaving Club of Durban on a segregated 'Indian Beach' and reported the event without comment on the rules of racial separation that controlled the event. The following year, as the International Football Federation (FIFA) voted to suspend the all-white Football Association of South Africa (FASA), Australia hosted a series of soccer matches organised jointly with FASA. Racialism in sport, especially football/soccer, was beginning to attract international attention.

But in Australia most sporting associations, media and politicians overlooked discrimination and the government was unconcerned about any adverse publicity which might flow from playing against representatives of apartheid.[25] Indeed, as John Nauright has suggested, such sporting contests symbolised, and projected to an international audience, the racialised identity and sporting prowess of both white nations.[26]

White South Africa's participation in the Melbourne Olympics in 1956 passed with little controversy or protest. The fact that an unofficial colour-bar decided sporting participation and Olympic selection in a 'sister Dominion' went virtually unnoticed. Given that law and custom in Australia still denied most Indigenous people access to equal sporting facilities or open competition, Australian officials were pleased that charges of racism did not disrupt the Melbourne Games. Protest against communism—not accusations of racial discrimination—did prompt major boycotts. Cold War divisions in Eastern Europe and the international status of 'Communist China' brought international politics to Melbourne. The prestige of the games was significantly diminished by boycotts from countries as diverse as Egypt, China and the Netherlands. Four countries—the Netherlands, Cambodia, Spain and Switzerland— boycotted the games in retaliation against the Soviet Union's suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956. Three countries—Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt—refused to participate in protest against intervention by the UK, France and Israel in the Suez crisis, actions that were very publicly highlighted by Menzies' failed special mission to the region. The People's Republic of China boycotted Melbourne for a very different reason— because the Republic of China (Taiwan) was accepted as a competitor- nation. The fact that Australia joined with Britain in the Suez Crisis and joined with the US in refusing diplomatic recognition of Communist China made the Dominion itself a target. Although barely publicised in Australia at the time, international divisions weakened the games and anticipated future widespread political boycotts of Olympic competition.[27]

In the same year as the Melbourne Olympics, Pretoria legislated to ban all 'interracial' or 'mixed sport'. These laws confirmed discrimination customary in virtually every field of sport and recreation. During UN discussions prompted by this legislation, only Australia and Great Britain

defended South Africa's action. Already, some international sporting associations, notably in table tennis and football, had taken steps to end competition with any team chosen on a discriminatory basis. In contrast, neither the Menzies administration nor any major Australian sporting organisation found apartheid in sport troubling. Indeed, consular officials working in Pretoria searched for ways to enhance their nation's reputation by taking advantage of its sporting successes. During preparations late in 1957 for the forthcoming cricket series, Canberra was keen to use sport 'to increase favourable Australian publicity' in South Africa. Reporting on the Boxing Day test match in Johannesburg, a consular official enthused that the visiting cricketers received 'extensive newspaper space and radio-time' and were the subject of highly favourable comment, both public and private, in many places, 'and no unpleasantness of any kind had marked their tour'.[28] *Die Transvaler* in Johannesburg was equally convinced of the 'great importance' of sport 'in the strengthening of the ties of friendship'. It welcomed reciprocal exchanges, expressed deep appreciation for support in 'battles at the UNO' and was convinced that the two white nations 'are necessary to one another'. Media coverage of sport was conspicuously devoid of comment on the racial bias of competing teams or the murky relationships between non-white sporting organisations and apartheid's rigid bureaucracy.[29]

The 1957 test cricket series coincided with the inauguration of South African Airways service to Perth and a goodwill visit by the minister for transport, B.J. Schoemann. Predictably he used his time in Australia to highlight the warm relationship between the Dominions. He suggested that, immune from 'international backbiting and mutual recrimination', contacts developed on the 'fields of sport' were 'of the first importance' to this deep bilateral relationship. In a major speech broadcast over Australian national radio he spoke of a common heritage and identity within the 'civilisation of the West', and a 'shared fellowship in the Commonwealth'. The 'really significant thing about our relationship', he emphasised, 'is that we share a common racial, social and spiritual ancestry'. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of his long address was a thinly veiled defence of apartheid as a necessary vehicle for protecting 'people of European stock' while enabling 'the whites of my country' to teach 'the semi-primitive African peoples

the essentials of Western faith and code'.[30] Given Australia's refusal to condemn apartheid in international forums; Menzies' implied support for South Africa's race policies during parliamentary debate in 1957; and overwhelming public support for visits by whites-only sporting teams, Schoemann had no reason to believe that his assertions would not be received sympathetically.

Despite the reciprocal affection so apparent during Menzies' visit in 1953 and the lengthy cricket tour in 1957–58, new international realities gradually encouraged Canberra to moderate its public support for the apartheid regime. Menzies' humiliating efforts to defend British imperial interests during the Suez crisis in 1956 undermined Australia's willingness to identify routinely with British interests or oppose decolonisation. After Suez, Pretoria's attempt to court closer bilateral links with Canberra by exploiting parallel fears about the 'vast masses of people in Africa', 'the teeming masses in Southeast Asia', or 'Afro-Asian' influence in the UN, had much less purchase than previously. Australia's international gaze turned hesitantly from the Empire and Europe to America and the Asia-Pacific area.[31]

Even as newly independent Asian and African states redefined the East–West balance in global politics, Menzies steadfastly refused to condemn apartheid. However, by the late 1950s his government's public embrace of an undemocratic South Africa cooled appreciably. En route to London in 1957, Menzies pointedly spent only a few hours in Cape Town, inspecting the strategically important Simonstown naval dockyards and meeting with prime minister Strijdom. He also met with Roy Welensky, the relatively moderate yet equally undemocratic leader of the new Central African Federation, an entity comprising the white self-governing Southern Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi), territories under British colonial authority. Although pointedly brief, Menzies' stopover was welcomed enthusiastically by his white hosts. His visit provoked no controversy in Australia. Indeed, it generated fresh news coverage of South Africa's unique demography and veiled warnings that should Australia allow its white walls to be breached it risked racial problems similar to those confronting South Africa.[32]

During 1956–57 and again in 1959 Menzies controversially defended the right of South Africa's unofficial ambassador of apartheid, the arch-propagandist Thomas Boydell, to speak to Australian schools, universities and community groups. A bipartisan cross-section of prominent state politicians endorsed Menzies' decision, notably from within the Country Party in Western Australia, Queensland and New South Wales. Eventually, Menzies did accept the need to establish some political distance between Canberra and Pretoria. After 1959 invitations by the Verwoerd administration asking the prime minister to again visit were politely rejected. Reciprocal invitations were not extended by any Australian administration to the leader of any National Party government.[33]

Gradually, the less tangible things that united the two Dominions were eclipsed by more tangible things that divided them. Policy advice from External Affairs changed. The apartheid regime was isolated in the UN and the Olympic movement. Advocacy from newly independent member states made uncertain South Africa's future in the Commonwealth. Bilateral ties cooled appreciably.[34] Confidential diplomatic and departmental advice was informed essentially by a pragmatic understanding of the national interest, not by ethics or humanitarian concerns. Increasingly, throughout the 1950s such advice had important implications for domestic policy-making. Increasingly, it drew attention to how Australia's discriminatory immigration laws and Aboriginal policies were perceived abroad, most notably in so-called Black Africa, within the new Commonwealth, and at the UN. Like the bureaucratic advice to the Menzies' government on the benefits that immigration reform would have for the nation's interests and image abroad, this advice was far more progressive than either government policy or public opinion at this time.[35]

Routinely, diplomats acknowledged that their reports were unavoidably constrained and partial, as high commission staff and visiting journalists were denied access to segregated Homelands and non-white communities. Reports to Canberra acknowledged, sometimes with regret, that it was difficult to assess African resistance or define African opinion except when resistance campaigns surfaced in strikes or public demonstrations—resistance often led by the ANC, repressed violently and dismissed as communist-inspired. Not until after the Sharpeville massacre

did newspaper reports or government dispatchers give detailed attention to the growing assertiveness of the ANC and its links to the wider Pan-Africanism movement, even when strikes, riots or civil disobedience campaigns disrupted the repressive surface of apartheid. Nor did they give detailed advice about criticism of apartheid from within liberal sections of South African society, especially from within English-language, Indian or coloured communities. Yet from the late 1950s, as links strengthened between local resistance and the anti-apartheid movement abroad, so too did awareness grow in government and bureaucratic circles about the extreme dimensions of apartheid. The implications for Australia of its continuing identification with white supremacy were increasingly emphasised. But such concerns were always in tension with the realities—and contests—that divided international politics.

Although apartheid was seldom mentioned by name, by the late 1950s briefing notes from the high commission in Pretoria acknowledged the 'objectionable' state of race relations in the Union, and the difficult implications of these for Australian foreign relations. Advice from Canberra downplayed these difficulties: 'In practice', the newly appointed high commissioner, Owen Davis, was advised in 1959, 'Australia takes advantage of South Africa's pro-Western attitudes on most international issues, while trying (not always successfully) to avoid being associated with support for South African racial policies'. In the diplomatic language of the Cold War, South Africa was a vital link in the chain of anti-communist alliances.[36]

Resistance to apartheid was commonly dismissed at the highest political levels in Australia, and indeed in most Western countries, as communist-influenced and unrepresentative of democratic aspirations in Africa. Nationalist independence struggles and movements against racism, like those identified with the ANC or SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation), were in this context conveniently portrayed as ideologically driven examples of communist subversion, revolutionary violence, or terrorism directed against a legitimate elected government (and significant ally). Although its influence declined over time, anti-communism was always more than an ideological red herring: it confused and complicated Australian and international policy responses to apartheid until the very

end of the Cold War. Despite international complaint, white South Africa remained an important strategic and economic partner of Australia and 'the West'.[37]

Cold War anxieties compromised Australia's relations with the apartheid regime throughout the 1950s. (Indeed they were a powerful influence across more than four decades.) South Africa 'is of enormous political value in the struggle against communism', Casey stressed in 1959: 'it must be cultivated as a friend and ally even if—as now seemed likely—it is forced to leave the Commonwealth'. Cultivation implied compromise. Australia did not voice strong opposition when a decade after Malan's victory the new ultra-nationalist prime minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, further entrenched 'apart-ness' under grand apartheid—uncompromising legislation that placed Bantustans and coerced migratory labour at the economic centre of apartheid. Reluctant to countenance any weakening of bilateral ties, Casey did not protest as apartheid was fully legislated. The principle of non-intervention was not negotiable. Casey reiterated support for white South Africa's right to organise domestic affairs free from external interference. Reflecting the deep impact of the ever-hardening Cold War on bilateral relations, Casey was unequivocal: 'Australia is primarily concerned that Africa remain out of the Soviet orbit'. In this context, Australia's best interests were served if South Africa remained a stable pro-Western Dominion. To the extent that Pretoria has 'successfully checked communism at home and has morally supported the West abroad it has acted in accord with Australian interests', Casey wrote. Typically, his 'guidance notes' made no explicit reference to apartheid. Indeed, diplomatic correspondence still largely avoided using this controversial word, just as it largely ignored the ethical or political challenges that it implied.[38]

David Tothill observed with some justification that before 1957 'Australians courted the good opinion of the South African government and of white South Africans in general'. Thereafter, he suggested with some regret, 'what courting was done was by South Africans of Australians', as many Australians were now less willing to be identified with white supremacy.[39] As attention was drawn to the extremes of apartheid and the rising number of political prisoners in South Africa's jails, the cracks

in local opinion widened. A few elected representatives expressed dismay as discrimination in sport drew attention to the broader extremes of apartheid. In 1957 Evatt, now leader of the ALP, declared in parliament that 'South Africa has become a police state' as he unsuccessfully challenged Menzies to condemn repressive actions by security forces against resistance campaigners. Trade Unions, notably the Amalgamated Engineering Union, made similar protests directly to Verwoerd, and attempted to rally support from the powerful ACTU. Proponents of apartheid visiting Australia, most notably Thomas Boydell during his second lecture tour, could not now avoid strong public condemnation. The NSW teachers federation attacked Boydell for 'indoctrinating' school 'children with racism'. A handful of politicians, along with some prominent Christians, labour leaders, academics and student groups, now openly criticised the prime minister's racial ideas and his government's benign response to apartheid. On the eve of the massacre at Sharpeville, the *Sydney Morning Herald* noted, with some exaggeration, 'the growth here since the war of the strongest feelings of aversion to the racialist policies of the governments of Dr Malan, Mr Strijdom, and Dr Verwoerd'.[40] Yet very few influential Australians advocated specific bilateral action or multilateral intervention that might destabilise the Afrikaner regime.[41]

In the early 1950s, few Australians shared Alan Walker's views about South Africa's 'tragic racial policies' or were concerned that 'Australia appears to be in sympathy with the most reactionary and ruthless racism in the world'. Yet as apartheid hardened and international criticism intensified, public opinion slowly changed. The Australian government did seek to distance itself from action that might imply acceptance of racism. Before 1957, when Hugh Gilchrist became acting Australian high commissioner, advice from Pretoria usually referred casually to 'White supremacy in South Africa' and to its race policies as 'unfortunate'; from 1957 systemic violence and systemic inequality was documented. Gilchrist's willingness to detail the brutal divisions engineered by apartheid, and his more compassionate voice, helped moderate expressed government policies.[42]

Returning to Canberra 1959 Gilchrist submitted to External Affairs a paper on 'Australia and Africa'. The astute Gilchrist believed Australia's

wider foreign policy interests demanded that it recognise the implications of decolonisation in sub-Saharan Africa. In the next few years, he advised, 'power will move out of the hands of people generally known to us and friendly to us, into those of people less well known, whose attitudes to us are uncertain and unstable, and maybe unfriendly'. Less subtly, he warned that Australia must decide whether 'to support "white" or "black" interests on the continent'. Conventional security concerns could not any longer be separated from considerations about race and discrimination, colonialism and trusteeship, or domestic issues of immigration and Aboriginal rights. Constructive relations with the new Africa, along with more progressive domestic race-politics, were essential if Australia was to win acceptance and cooperation in post-colonial Africa or Asia.[43] Gilchrist's could not have anticipated the turbulent aftermath of Sharpeville, but his ideas did inform Canberra's diplomatic responses to the massacre. Menzies, however, was not convinced by such an understanding of a post-colonial 'Black Africa' or of the importance of the region to Australia international standing.[44]

Before Sharpeville, Menzies was little troubled by apartheid's discriminatory acts. In contrast, the *Sydney Morning Herald* in 1959 went so far as to suggest that they were an 'outrage' to 'all Christian and democratic principles of justice'. But it stopped short of implying that apartheid was thought an outrage by most, or indeed many, citizens of white Australia.[45] Throughout the 1950s, public opinion was always constrained by sympathy for the predicament faced by South Africa's white minority. Assumptions underlying foreign policy were influenced by similar cultural, or racial concerns. On the one hand, statements by Australian representatives in United Nations and Commonwealth meetings always carefully avoided language that could be construed as expressing sympathy or support for apartheid or the minority regime responsible for it. On the other hand, in no international forum did Australia vote against South Africa's interests, or contradict its claim that apartheid was a domestic matter protected by agreed principles of state sovereignty and non-interference.

Massacre at Sharpeville: Apartheid Exposed

On 21 March 1960 mass demonstrations against pass book laws in Sharpeville, a township near Johannesburg, resulted in the killing by security forces of 69 protesters; the arrest of 18,000 activists; banning of both the PAC and the ANC; and declaration of a state of emergency (a measure used frequently in subsequent decades as local protests gained momentum). Sharpeville was a defining moment in international race politics. As Deon Geldenhuys and a host of other commentators noted, the massacre put apartheid 'prominently on the world's agenda'.[46] The violence unleashed a firestorm of international protest. Its immediate impact on intra-Commonwealth relations and UN actions was profound. Its effect internationally on attitudes towards white South Africa was dramatic, as it was on opinion in white Australia. Confronting images of civilians slain by security forces stirred extraordinary protest and political debate. But Sharpeville did not abruptly alter white Australia's multi-layered relationship with the apartheid state.

Menzies cautiously refused to join the chorus of international condemnation provoked by the killings. Despite widespread newspaper comment on the 'horrendous' 'murderous' 'outrage', he refused to acknowledge it as an act of state-sanctioned violence, or a massacre. Calling for a full investigation and report before any response could be initiated by parliament, he lamely characterised events at Sharpeville as a 'racial riot' and rejected calls for sanctions against Pretoria.[47] His suggestion that Sharpeville constituted a riot implicitly blamed African protesters, not police or government agents, for the outbreak of violence. His dismissive claim was widely criticised, even by some prominent in his government.[48] But his muted response to Sharpeville was welcomed with 'a deep sense of gratitude' by Verwoerd, prompting his comment that 'all shades of [white] opinion' saw Menzies as 'perhaps South Africa's best friend'.[49]

Arthur Calwell, as leader of the Opposition, moved a detailed parliamentary motion condemning the actions of South Africa's security forces. In language echoed broadly in local media, Calwell claimed his country had been 'shamed' by Menzies 'complete indifference to all moral and ethical principles'. He rebuked Menzies for hiding behind 'the niceties

of international law'—non-intervention—when nine million South Africans confronted 'the rule of the club, the whip and the bullet' and were routinely 'denied access to any law'.[50] At the same time Calwell attempted to censor the Menzies' administration for the damage its ambiguous position on apartheid had done to Australia's image and prestige in Africa and Asia. (The irony of the ALP leader—once an outspoken defender of 'white Australia' and racial homogeneity—condemning the Coalition government over its indifference to apartheid was not lost on local commentators, members of the government or indeed more progressive elements in his own party.) In response, prominent government representatives, including Garfield Barwick and Country Party leader John McEwen, conceded that apartheid was morally repugnant—but they held fast to the principle of non-intervention in domestic matters. This highly qualified argument became a refrain repeated endlessly by conservatives across decades of political contest. It was denounced in the aftermath of Sharpeville, not only by the ALP but by a wide cross-section of religious leaders, reform groups, and newspapers. Gough Whitlam's reproach exemplified their criticism. The rising Labor politician told the House of Representatives that protecting domestic jurisdiction was the overriding 'question' in the prime minister's mind when apartheid was debated—'not the policy nor the morality, not the principle, but the legalism'. Conscious of rising anti-Western feeling, Whitlam told parliament that 'the whole of Africa, most of Asia and the whole of the British Commonwealth of Nations are in turmoil' over apartheid: 'This matter is clearly one of international concern'. He endorsed the rising voice of anti-racism activists and non-aligned governments: 'It is sheer and monstrous legalism to suggest that matters such as these are purely matters of domestic jurisdiction', he asserted.[51]

The Coalition's meek reaction to the massacre aroused immediate protests. Sydney's Lord Mayor, Harry Jensen, took the unusual step of organising a public rally at the Town Hall. Trade union groups and antiracism organisations on university campuses also initiated protests and petitions in support of a proposed worldwide boycott of South African exports. In April 1960, a rally in Sydney attracted more than 1,500 protesters who petitioned Menzies to express publicly his 'unqualified

opposition to racial segregation'. The president of the ACTU, Albert Monk, telegrammed the South African prime minister to advise that Australian unions would participate in an international boycott against 'racial killings and segregation' perpetuated by his government. Speaking on behalf the Central Methodist Mission, the Reverend Alan Walker, the most outspoken local activist, told protesters that since 1946 Australia had with 'depressing monotony' voted with a handful of other recalcitrant nations to stop South African racial policies being considered by the UN. The *Canberra Times* noted that it was ironic that those protesting included 'a number of coloured students studying in Australia under the Colombo Plan', a program introduced in the first year of Menzies' administration that opened universities to select scholarship-students from outside the old white Commonwealth. The plan, the paper emphasised pointedly, is widely interpreted as the first tangible step to modify white Australia.[52]

Calwell condemned the government's muted response to Sharpeville, claiming that it did not reflect the 'horror and indignation' felt by 'the majority of Australian people'. However, the suggestion that a majority of Australians were horrified by the 'brutalities' perpetrated at Sharpeville and outraged by apartheid is impossible to verify. Certainly, many Australian's were disturbed by Menzies' mild response to the massacre. Yet after Sharpeville, as before, most Australians continued to believe their government should remain 'completely neutral' and should not pressure white South Africa to grant 'black populations majority rule'.[53]

Menzies' primary concern centred on the implications of apartheid for intra-Commonwealth relations and South Africa's future membership in the face of mounting condemnation from Commonwealth countries in Asia and Africa. Menzies' Cabinet shared his preoccupation with Commonwealth stability, but his views on race and apartheid increasingly distanced him from many of his Coalition colleagues, most officials in External Affairs, and many working in diplomatic posts abroad.[54] As a South African diplomat observed from his post in India, Australian officials and politicians resented 'any suggestion that the white Australia policy and apartheid had anything in common.[55] Progressives at home were equally disturbed that their country was identified as similar to South Africa. In an effort to remove his party, if not his country, from

the shadow of apartheid, Labor's most eloquent spokesman on foreign affairs, Whitlam, invoked international opinion and international law. 'The disenfranchised majority of South Africans have the sympathy of all the emergent peoples in Africa and all of the self-governing peoples of Asia', but not of white Australia, he told parliament. Apartheid disturbs 'international relations' and puts South Africa in 'breach of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', he argued. Thus the international community, including Australia, must move beyond rhetorical moralising and take action to end apartheid.[56]

Despite acrimonious debate over Sharpeville, the Australian parliament produced only a bland resolution that expressed 'regrets' for lives lost in the 'recent incidents inside South Africa', especially as 'such events … have occurred in a member country of the Commonwealth'. Predictably, the resolution concluded with the hope 'that order may be re-established as soon as possible' and 'adjustment of all disputes and differences … achieved by orderly, just, lawful and peaceful processes for the common benefit of the people of South Africa'. The *Sunday Telegraph* commented approvingly that 'Amidst the heat generated in parliament last week over South Africa, prime minister Menzies spoke with caution and realism'.[57] Unsurprisingly, this view was shared by Pretoria. Unsurprisingly, wider reaction to Menzies' benign position on apartheid was overwhelmingly negative.

As international disquiet over apartheid intensified, the importance to white South Africa of its unique friendship with white Australia increased.[58] However, even apartheid's most vigorous advocates were obliged to concede, if somewhat bitterly, that after Sharpeville white South Africa's feelings towards its 'best friend' were no longer openly reciprocated or publicly supported. The politics of race placed unprecedented strain on relations between the two countries. But in the following decades the pursuit of economic and strategic interests, not the moral disquiet briefly evident in the wake of Sharpeville, continued to decide the policy of all Coalition governments towards South Africa.

International Dimensions: Apartheid and the UN

[White] South Africans have become increasingly, even if reluctantly, convinced by post-war developments that their future may be closely affected … by what happens outside the Union and outside the continent of Africa.[1]

Fred Alexander, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1951

Whenever there is discussion in the UN [about apartheid] we take the side of the reactionaries …[2]

ALP Senator Don Grant, 1955

Global war transformed the very character of the international system and the conduct of international politics. Negotiations to establish a global peace-keeping organisation, the United Nations, progressed with unexpected speed even before the atom bomb ended conflict in the Asia-Pacific in late 1945. An unprecedented symbol of multinational consultation, the UN promised a new era of co-operation between states and societies under a revised regimen of international law. But peace did not follow war. In Europe victory over Fascism foreshadowed new international division as Allied military cooperation was abruptly transformed into intractable East–West contests of the Cold War. At the same time, in complex ways in different regions, global war fractured Europe's colonial authority over much of Africa and Asia, and parts of the Pacific and Middle East. Colonialism unravelled as nationalist pressures

accelerated. But independence in much of the colonised world was not easily won. Political violence, ethnic, racial and religious conflicts were the unwelcome companions of decolonisation. Nationalist drives for independence were drawn into global contests between the so-called East and West, between communism and capitalism. Cold War politics bled into the efforts of the colonising states—most notably France, Portugal, the Netherlands and Great Britain—to resist or delay independence for colonised people in their once vast Empires.

The 'struggle in Africa between nationalism, communism and "imperialism"' is 'sharpest in South Africa', Hugh Gilchrist, Australia's acting high commissioner, warned from Pretoria as laws imposing grand apartheid were legislated. And, he observed, 'freedom for non-European races' was at the heart of the drive to overthrow colonialism. In Gilchrist's informed view, national independence and racial equality were the 'testing points' of British Commonwealth unity. These related contests also dominated debate in the infant UN.[3] From the early 1950s interlocking struggles to overthrow white supremacy and end apartheid in South Africa brought these wider disputes into sharp international focus. That other white nation, Australia, was inevitably implicated: it too was obliged to navigate the new realities of a postcolonial world. As newly independent states transformed the UN, and the British Empire grew into a multicultural Commonwealth, Australia's self-defined racial identity was exposed and challenged. The growing influence of Asia and Africa in the UN ensured that 'any suggestion of racialism' would be brought 'under the full glare of world opinion and criticism', R.G. Neale observed. In this charged global environment, he wrote, attempts to defend white privilege—whether in Australia, South Africa or the United States—attracted 'world-wide condemnation'.[4] But in the white Dominions of Britain's declining Empire, racial equality was not easily won.

Deflecting Change: Race and Rights

Efforts to accelerate decolonisation and assail racism were of the heart of actions by the UN from its very first meetings. These aims were boosted inexorably by the admission of newly independent nations: from 1945 to

1960 membership doubled from 51 to 99 states as almost one billion people won independence from metropolitan Europe. Denied real influence in a Security Council dominated by the great powers, newly independent nations increasingly shaped the agenda of the General Assembly. The enduring legacies of white supremacy and internal colonialism, evidenced most starkly in Southern Africa, were debated endlessly. Australia's controversial—if at times implied—support for white South Africa was revealed uncomfortably as members of the UN met to establish a governing Charter and negotiate new norms of international law and human rights. Uncomfortably for the white Dominions, protection of human rights and principles of non-discrimination were at the heart of Charter negotiations. Efforts to protect domestic sovereignty in the face of agreed international action plagued negotiations. Evatt led efforts at the San Francisco meeting in May 1945 to ensure that the UN could not interfere in domestic matters in ways that might curtail a state's freedom of action. As an Australian official noted unambiguously, policies were guided by 'the need to maintain complete discretion with regard to immigration matters' and other sensitive concerns.[5]

Australia supported Charter provisions that in effect protected a nation's sovereign right to independently decide its domestic policies— including policy over non-self-governing possessions—even if other states found these policies objectionable. Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter stated: 'nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'. This compromise reflected Canberra's wish that the original draft be changed to replace 'solely' with the less precise 'essentially'. Unsurprisingly, the phrase 'essentially within' remained a constant obstacle to those seeking decisive UN action on sensitive issues. Subsequently Australian governments, Labor and conservative, invoked this non-intervention provision to protect a white Australia. 'Separate development' in South Africa was similarly quarantined by this provision.[6]

Under Evatt's guidance as minister for external affairs and briefly as president of the General Assembly, Australia—in contrast to South Africa—strongly supported moves to develop the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). Approved in Paris in December 1948 it was

in essence a statement of principles that awaited strong 'enforcement mechanisms' and a 'binding international treaty'. Conveniently for Australia and South Africa the elimination of racial discrimination was not an explicit goal of the very general statement. Confident its sovereignty was protected by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, from the late 1940s Australia remained—unlike South Africa—an 'engaged participant' in lengthy and frustrating negotiations on all Human Rights conventions.[7] As terms of the draft UDHR were debated, Australia attempted to distance itself from South Africa. But subsequently in the pragmatic arena of the General Assembly Canberra acted very like Pretoria. From 1948 until the early 1960s both states consistently voted to protect domestic racial practices and colonial administrations from outside scrutiny or sanction. Evatt conceded that it was appropriate for various bodies of the UN to discuss matters of substantial international concern, including racism. But the UN delegation he led either voted with Pretoria, or abstained from voting, on all matters critical of South Africa. Pretoria and Canberra agreed that the General Assembly had no mandate to act on internal matters. Neale observed at the time that under Evatt's influence Australia tended to interpret 'intervention' narrowly, as a 'definite and tangible interference in a particular situation'. After 1949 the Menzies government adopted a position that was more dogmatic. In words welcomed in Pretoria it asserted that 'discussion in itself is intervention' because 'the whole purpose of bringing forward an item or a resolution is to modify or change an existing situation which is *ipso facto* intervention'.[8]

Uncomfortably for white Australia, systemic racism in South Africa was generally interpreted as contravening international obligations and human rights protocols. During 1946–47 a majority in the General Committee of the General Assembly ruled that 'Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa' and 'domination … of non-White peoples by … Europeans' were related issues that fell within the competence of the UN. Designated by the Assembly as issues that impaired efforts to preserve international peace, these discriminatory practices fell outside of normal protections afforded by 'national sovereignty' or 'domestic jurisdiction' provisions.[9] In 1947 a majority of the General Assembly voted in support

of an Indian complaint against South Africa. Despite strong Third World support, the resolution was not adopted as it lacked a two-thirds majority. Thirty-one states voted with India; 19—including Australia—voted against. Six abstained. Requests for consideration were supported overwhelmingly by newly independent nations—countries as diverse as the Philippines and Saudi Arabia—identified broadly as the Asian-African bloc. Evatt consistently opposed action by any UN-related body on concerns raised by India. At the same time, India's robust complaints about Australia's immigration laws were politely deflected. India remained the driving force behind UN efforts to condemn racism, warning (in language shaped by generations of colonialism): 'If the belief that there is to be one standard of treatment for the White races and another for the non-Whites continues to gain strength … the future for solidarity among the members of United Nations, and consequently for world peace, would indeed be dark'.[10]

White Australia's close identification with white South Africa was frequently revealed. In 1950 activists representing South Africa's 300,000 Indian residents again petitioned the UN seeking intervention that would end the Malan government's 'Hitlerian racial policies'. In November a resolution condemning the Group Areas Act as a unique expression of 'doctrines of racial discrimination' was carried in the Special Political Committee. Only Australia, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and South Africa opposed this action. The major powers, other than China, abstained. To Australia's surprise, New Zealand also abstained. It was a measure of support for the apartheid regime that Australia was prepared to vote differently from both United States and United Kingdom on sensitive racial issues. Voting shortly afterwards on an apartheid-related procedural issue, only Australia, Greece and South Africa voted negatively, while the United States joined 35 other nations voting positively. Britain, France and the so-called 'Russian bloc' were among the 17 nations that abstained. Significantly, commentary in Australia conceded, the vote established that race relations were not 'domestic' matters in terms of article 2(7) of the Charter. In this, the *West Australian* observed somewhat anxiously, 'there is a plain object lesson for Australia'. A Queensland newspaper regretted that 'the United Nations has plunged deeply into the issue of relationships between the world's white

and coloured races and at the same time has made another far-reaching incursion into the doctrine of national sovereignty'. And, the newspaper implied, the UN's actions would have far-reaching implications for racial politics in Australia.[11]

Amidst intensifying repression under the Malan regime, and with encouraging support in the UN, in 1952 the ANC and the South African Indian Congress jointly launched a vigorous non-violent Campaign of Defiance Against Unjust Laws. Protest focused on Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg. Police and security forces reacted swiftly. An estimated 8,000 protesters were arrested. Many were imprisoned. In January, as this campaign widened, Australia voted against the establishment of a UN commission to further examine discrimination against Indians. Apart from South Africa, only Australia was opposed. Other members of the British Commonwealth abstained. Forty-one states supported the decision. Exasperated, the Melbourne *Argus* commented: 'Why do we make these fantastic, suicidal gestures? What do we hope to gain by alienating half the world for the sake of a clique in Cape Town? If he knows it, will Mr Casey [minister for external affairs] please give Australia the reason for his African and Asian policy?'[12]

Embedded in wider debates on decolonisation and anti-racism, apartheid became a major focus of debate, if not action, in the General Assembly from early 1952. India's attempt to put racism on its agenda was formally protested by South Africa. Casey endorsed this objection. Both Dominions rejected India's widely supported claim that apartheid violated the principles of the UN charter and could therefore be debated. The *ad hoc* Political Committee voted overwhelmingly to accept apartheid as an agenda item. Carried by 45 to 6, with 8 abstentions, the decision broadly anticipated subsequent voting patterns on apartheid-related issues. Only South Africa, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Luxembourg opposed the decision. Uncomfortably for South Africa, India and other non-aligned states argued that apartheid was 'in fact if not in law' a matter of international importance and thus could not be excluded from UN consideration.[13] The United States and the Arab-Asian bloc supported this crucial decision. It provoked substantial comment in Australia. Surprisingly, only the *Riverine Grazier*, published in remote NSW, was

openly 'discomfited and embarrassed' by their government's refusal to accept that Australia's position was a 'legal error' as it conveniently ignored sections of the UN Charter that protected 'fundamental human rights and freedoms'. Expressions of such ethical principles were rare. Major metropolitan newspapers, like the *Mercury* (Hobart), far more accurately reflected local opinion—opinion that sometimes 'regarded' apartheid 'with revulsion' or openly criticised it on 'moral grounds', but nonetheless opposed any international or UN action on the grounds that this might compromise national sovereignty. Canberra consistently urged the UN to respect 'domestic jurisdiction' and, in the words of the *West Australian,* keep its 'hands off' the 'race issue'. In contrast to the public rhetoric of the British government—if not its actual policies—the Menzies administration refused to concede that opposition to intervention might be interpreted as moral approval of apartheid. In contrast, activists proclaimed loudly that Australia was sympathetic to a level of 'ruthless racism' condoned by no other country.[14]

The restriction of possible UN intervention to matters 'essentially' domestic, shielded racism everywhere from effective sanction. It protected white Australia and was welcomed by Pretoria as it deployed its military to extend apartheid into South West Africa (Namibia), its *de facto* 'fifth province'. Afro-Asian bloc member-states criticised Australia's refusals to support referral of South-West Africa to the International Court of Justice and condemned its repeated failure to support any UN resolution hostile to the wishes of Pretoria. Criticism of Australia hardened after an Australian delegate, echoing Menzies, stated bluntly that 'discussion' of apartheid-related questions 'in itself is intervention' and thus prohibited by the UN Charter. This view was tacitly supported by the major colonial powers, most notably France and Britain. It underpinned arguments used throughout much of the 1950s by Australia and a handful of states anxious to blunt possible intervention against the apartheid regime or condemn its policies in South-West Africa (or by extension, the colonial practices of powerful European friends).[15]

As UN membership grew, apartheid was joined inextricably to wider contests over decolonisation and communism. The UN decision to discuss charges against South Africa of racial discrimination 'is a cause for grave

concern', the *Mercury* argued in 1952: it contravened the Charter, threatened to alienate 'loyal members', 'especially British Commonwealth countries', and has 'set "coloured" peoples against the white man' creating 'divisions among the Democratic and anti-Communist countries'. Other newspapers joined this criticism. Australia's very visible support for Pretoria was also approved, or at least easily tolerated, by Great Britain and others in the old Commonwealth. In contrast, newer members, especially India, were disturbed by the deep racism implied so obviously in Australia's position. Responding to a subsequent majority decision in the General Assembly, Australian representatives went so far as to accuse it of pursuing an illegal course of action as it had made no attempt to demonstrate 'that apartheid or its execution' had given rise to a situation that 'threatened' international peace. Only a handful of member states openly supported this extremely self-interested argument, although throughout the 1950s a significant number gave it implicit support by abstaining from voting on the many resolutions that condemned apartheid.[16]

Australia's public posture on South Africa and colonialism sometimes differed from that expressed by its newly acquired 'great and powerful friend', the United States. Beyond public pronouncements, however, differences in policy were not acute. The CIA identified South Africa as the only state of 'substantial power and stability' South of the Sahara, and in language typical of the Cold War 'welcomed' the fact that 'the Union's orientation is unquestionably towards the West'. Australia was similarly pleased. Ironically, given America's own failure to end segregation, policies pursued by it endorsed efforts by non-aligned nations to bring discussion of apartheid before the UN. But Washington stopped short of approving any level of actual intervention against Pretoria. US public criticism of racism was calculated to conscript emerging Third World nations as Cold War allies in the West's crusade against communism. Declaring serious concern over segregation and racial conflicts in South Africa, Charles Sprague, the US delegate to UN, argued in December 1952 that only by 'full discussion' of developments in South Africa would the 'world know that the United Nations desired all of its members to conform with the United Nations Charter and promote observance of fundamental human rights and freedoms'. Washington's public position on apartheid did exacerbate

Australia's discomfort in the UN. In reality, however, US initiatives sought to deflect the UN from meaningful action against Pretoria and were quietly accepted by Canberra. Alex Thompson has concluded that 'by using a strategy of generalising the problem of human rights and urging all member states to look to their own record in this area, the United States succeeded', at least until after Sharpeville, 'in avoiding any mandatory resolution being specifically laid against South Africa'.[17]

Apartheid, and colonialism more generally, were openly criticised by both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations—criticism that became more frequent as civil rights struggles erupted in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown vs. Board of Education* in 1954. But throughout the 1950s Washington, like close allies Britain and Australia, encouraged 'friendly relations' through strategic and economic cooperation with Pretoria. 'Quiet diplomacy', 'practical realism' and 'neighbourly helpfulness' expressed the limits of America's opposition to South Africa. Conscious of its own bleak race-relations history the US, like Australia, generally refused in the UN to support strong resolutions condemning apartheid.[18] Canberra's rhetoric did not fully reflect Washington's public disquiet. Nor did Australia's actions always echo America's largely rhetorical anti-colonialism. Apartheid issues gradually brought new tensions to Australia's relations with Great Britain and virtually all members of the Commonwealth, but they had relatively little impact on alliance relations within ANZUS.

Throughout the 1950s tangible action against racism was consigned to the labyrinthine committee structures of the UN. In 1954 the UN Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa was established. Although focused on apartheid the committee also attempted to identify what measures other countries had adopted in 'eliminating, correcting or alleviating' racial conflict, and in remedying problems affecting aboriginal populations. It thus asked Australia to provide 'all positive assistance in the performance of [this] task'. Australia, like South Africa, refused to cooperate with this committee. Keith Shann, head of External Affairs, advised the UN delegation unapologetically: 'in view of the fact that the Commission is engaged in improper activities it is considered the best course open to us is to preserve continued silence and not reply'. Race

relations were a domestic issue and white Australia was to be protected from 'improper' international examination.[19]

Despite growing international criticism, the Menzies' government remained intransigent. Patronisingly, Australia's representatives at the UN held that 'it is in the best interests of the Bantu population' that South Africa 'not be confirmed in obduracy by an imposed isolation'; that dialogue supported by patient and sustained diplomacy would bring 'eventual improvement in racial relations in the Union'.[20]

Resolutions hostile to South Africa were adopted by the General Assembly on at least twelve occasions from 1952 to 1959. Throughout, Australia voted to support, with varying degrees of reluctance, efforts by South Africa to avoid scrutiny. No country more consistently opposed possible UN action. However, a varying alliance of countries, drawn mainly from the old Commonwealth and Europe's colonial powers, usually voted as Australia did. These countries claimed that neither the policy of apartheid nor its extension into South West Africa gave rise to a situation that threatened international peace: therefore, these related questions fell beyond the remit of the UN. Assembly votes followed a predictable pattern—until abruptly interrupted by the Sharpeville massacre. In 1956, for example, 61 countries voted to place apartheid on the General Assembly agenda; only 8 voted against. All Asian countries admitted to the Commonwealth voted with the majority, while opponents included Australia and the UK. In the following year, 59 countries voted favourably on a similar motion. Only 6 countries, including Australia, voted negatively—although a significant number abstained. In 1958 a resolution deploring South Africa again won overwhelming support in the Assembly, passing by 70 votes to 5, with 4 countries abstaining. Only Australia, Belgium, France, Portugal and UK still refused to censure the apartheid regime. In 1959, 62 countries voted to condemn apartheid: only 3 countries voted to shield Pretoria from criticism. The UK was included in this small group, while Australia joined 6 other countries and abstained. Summarising Australia's distasteful 'diplomatic policy' Whitlam told parliament in 1959: 'Every year, for the last ten years, the UN has had before it a motion condemning the racial discrimination involved in the South African policy of apartheid' and Australia is now 'one of the few

countries prepared to support South Africa'. Whitlam might also have added that Australian policies alienated it from most members of the Commonwealth, if not from its major allies.[21]

Until Sharpeville, Australia's voting record in the General Assembly was defended with the convenient assertion that racialised inequality in South Africa was a domestic matter under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and as such did not endanger international peace and fell outside the competence of the General Assembly or Security Council. Apart from Australia and South Africa, few member-states endorsed such a restrictive claim. As we have seen, and as Gordon Greenwood commented at the time, underlying this assertion 'was the fear that some Australian policies might be called in question and become matters of international debate and scrutiny and perhaps ultimately of intervention'.[22]

Throughout the 1950s General Assembly resolutions condemning the apartheid regime were largely symbolic—wishful expressions of intent. However, in the immediate aftermath of Sharpeville, it was the Security Council and not the General Assembly that acted most precipitously in condemning South Africa's minority government. On 25 March 1960, four days after the massacre, delegates from 29 African and Asian countries requested that the Security Council consider urgently 'the situation arising out of the large-scale killings of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation in the Union of South Africa'. Four days later, under Resolution S/4300, employing stronger language than earlier majority resolutions in the Assembly, the Council demanded that apartheid must end. At the same time its decision implied that racialised inequality in South Africa might constitute a dispute likely to endanger international peace. Seven of the nine Security Council members supported the call to abandon apartheid and end discrimination. To the dismay of most newer members of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom abstained from voting, as did another major colonial power, France. The muted response of the UK in the Security Council was tacitly endorsed by Australia. Neither country wanted to encourage actions that might precipitate South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth or imply criticism of their own colonial policies. White South Africa remained defiant. It responded to the Security Council demand with

increased repression: 'Political assembly' was prohibited and the ANC and PAC declared illegal—'banned'—organisations. Pretoria also rejected efforts by the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, to negotiate 'mutually acceptable arrangements' to phase out racial discrimination.[23]

South African recalcitrance added fuel to the international drive against it. In the twelve months after its controversial abstention in the Security Council, the United Kingdom changed its policy dramatically in both the UN and the now deeply fractured Commonwealth. In April 1961 the UK delegation in the General Assembly conceded for the first time that white supremacy in South Africa constituted an 'exceptional' situation under Article 2(7) and thus could be subject to separate and collective international action. A few days later Britain supported an Asian-sponsored resolution that condemned apartheid as 'reprehensible and repugnant to human dignity'. Faced with altered British policy and the prospect of isolation from agreed multilateral action, Australian policy also changed. The assembly adopted the resolution by an overwhelming majority, 96 votes to 1. Only Portugal continued to hold out against the tide of anti-racism. For the first time, the UK and Australia joined a majority of Assembly member-states and voted for a resolution that unambiguously condemned the apartheid regime.[24] Thus, it was not until after Sharpeville, as South Africa was levered out of the Commonwealth, that Australia finally agree to support a decisive UN resolution. And it did so only after Britain had acted. Menzies angrily protested about the abrupt reversal of British policy, but reluctantly accepted that his country could no longer swim openly against the tide of international opinion: that it could not reasonably defend policy that either condoned or supported 'racial policies … practiced in South Africa'.[25]

Although a significant declaration of opinion, the UN resolution was a compromise made possible by earlier agreement declaring apartheid 'exceptional'—that is, a unique issue that would establish no precedent for action against any other state. Conveniently for Australia, only the particular forms of racism embedded in apartheid were so deemed. Thus, in effect, only white South Africa was exposed to possible action. Much earlier, in 1948, Australia accepted provisions of the proposed Declaration on Human Rights only after a broadly similar compromise was agreed.

Consistently, white Australia would support UN initiatives only if they acknowledged the 'special aspects in each state' and eschewed any 'uniform solution' to a 'complex and delicate question'.[26]

Following the Assembly resolution of April 1961, South Africa was excluded from specialised agencies of the UN: in effect it was labelled unworthy to participate in the international community. However, repeated calls from non-aligned states for its permanent exclusion from the UN failed. The 1961 decision foreshadowed stronger resolutions advocating that diplomatic and trade relations with the pariah state be permanently severed. Pressure for mandatory sanctions was ignored by the Security Council, at least until Cold War divisions no longer overrode international action against apartheid.[27] Efforts to sanction South Africa were largely confined to the Third World dominated General Assembly, not the great power controlled Security Council. Not until 1977, after the murder in custody of activist Steve Biko and the mass unrest of the Soweto Uprising, did the Security Council take 'meaningful action' and override the constraints of non-interference and the sanctity of domestic jurisdiction. (Resolution 418, 4 November 1977, declared the arms trade with South Africa a threat to peace under Article 39 and an arms embargo mandatory.)

The impact of the Sharpeville massacre on international opinion was immediate, but its impact on international action remained essentially declaratory, submerged by wider contests that until the early 1970s relegated anti-racism to the margins of global politics.

Decolonisation and Anti-racism

As the terms of the UN Charter were debated, Australian delegates anticipated and supported liberal decolonisation policies that would encourage the welfare of native peoples, promote social justice, and expedite self-government and independence. The Chifley government, guided by Dr Herbert Vere Evatt, energetic, if enigmatic external affairs minister, pushed initially for a system of universal trusteeship that would remove distinctions between 'non-self-governing territories' and

territories acquired under earlier League of Nations mandates (including New Guinea and Nauru, and South-West Africa). This proposal aroused strong criticism. The *Sydney Morning Herald* denounced it for 'airing' Evatt's 'humanitarian impulses' rather than 'offering a united front to nations which are all too ready to denounce British "imperialism".'[28] Evatt quickly recognised its likely adverse implications, not only for Britain in its many colonies, but more immediately for Australian authority over Papua (an Australian territory since 1906) and New Guinea (the former German colony administered by Australia as a mandated territory after World War I and as a UN Trust Territory after World War II). Equally, Evatt feared that universal trusteeship arrangements might establish an unacceptable precedent in international law, undermining domestic sovereignty and legislation that underpinned white Australia. He thus retreated from his earlier advocacy, advising Chifley that non-interference was 'a matter of fundamental principle … and we cannot compromise on it'.

Australia clung to UN Charter provisions that protected sovereignty. It particularly welcomed the fact that the UN was in effect denied the right to intervene directly on trusteeship matters. Evatt acknowledged privately that this served to 'fully protect our rights in New Guinea'. As an unintended consequence, perhaps, these tame provisions also strengthened South Africa's refusal to place South-West Africa under UN trusteeship arrangements or to accept UN surveillance of them. At the same time, they emboldened other states—notably France in North Africa and Portugal in Sub-Saharan Africa—to deny the UN any real capacity to influence policy in any colonial possession or territory.[29]

From the very first meetings of the General Assembly, issues tethered to decolonisation precipitated fractious debate. As soon as deliberations began it sought to 'oblige' countries controlling mandated territories to adhere to agreed management practices and timetables for independence. Prominent amongst these territories were former German colonies in South-West Africa and New Guinea, designated as 'C' Class mandates in the Versailles peace treaty. These mandates were transferred to the administrating countries which were now expected to manage their transition to independence under UN guidance. Predictably, a group of Western nations that usually included France, the Netherlands, Portugal

and Great Britain shared with Australia a reluctance to permit thorough scrutiny of territorial administration. While most UN members supported a trusteeship agreement that would lead to independence for South-West Africa (Namibia), Australia was initially unconcerned with Pretoria's plans to incorporate it into the South African Union. Australia abstained from supporting moves by a large majority of UN members, acting on legal advice from International Court of Justice, to oblige Pretoria to convert its former League Mandate into a Trust Territory under UN protocols. Indeed, Australia gave unsolicited advice to Pretoria on how to maintain its hold over Namibia and shield it from UN scrutiny.[30]

'Throughout the 1940s and 1950s' all three major political parties in Australia 'stood firmly against the anti-colonial states', Geoffrey Sawer observed. Major colonial powers, including Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Britain and South Africa, 'showed more hostility to the anti-colonial cause than Australia', but its opposition was stronger than that of France, the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands or New Zealand. As late as 1960 Australia was one of only nine countries not to vote for the routine UN declaration on colonialism. Australia's obstinacy on colonial questions was made conspicuous by Menzies' efforts to defend British and French interests during the Suez crisis in 1956, and further highlighted by his government's voting record as a temporary member of the Security Council from 1955 to 1958. Repeated attempts by non-aligned states to declare the governing policies of metropolitan powers 'a threat to peace', and thus appropriate for UN debate and possible action, were vigorously opposed by Australia's delegation. It was unwilling to expose administration of Papua and New Guinea to external scrutiny or UN 'intervention'. Consistent with this position, Australia initially worked closely with the Netherlands to resist Indonesian claims over West New Guinea—a collaboration described by Afro-Asian supporters of Indonesia as an example of 'obsolete … ethnic, racial' and 'colonial' attitudes and policy.[31]

In the aftermath of Britain's humiliation over Suez, its approach to decolonisation changed. Increasingly it accepted, as did the US, that independence should be promised and granted expeditiously. Given metropolitan flexibility, it was hoped newly decolonising states might align more readily with the West in the crusade against communism.

Like most colonial powers struggling with the global contests of the Cold War, Britain now agreed—as French president de Gaulle's conceded—that decolonisation 'is in our interest, therefore it is our policy'.[32]

From 1955 Australian troops joined British-led efforts to defeat the left-nationalist 'insurgency' in colonial Malaya. Australia also endorsed Britain's efforts to quell the Mau Mau insurrection in Kenya. But even as it remained engaged militarily, Britain accepted that Malaya should be granted independence as soon as security concerns permitted. At the same time Britain began negotiations over self-government for Singapore. An alarmed Menzies' Cabinet feared that such moves might foreshadow British support for early independence of Papua New Guinea. More broadly, Cabinet was concerned that changes in British decolonisation policies foreshadowed abrogation of its military-strategic commitments East of Suez. Most Cabinet colleagues—if not the prime minister himself—now reluctantly accepted that Australia's determination to oppose, or at least delay decolonisation, was increasingly out of step with Britain's new-found willingness to negotiate and perhaps hasten self-government in its many possessions (28 of which became independent in the decade from 1958). Australia was increasingly at odds with the US and other metropolitan powers, most of which accepted that while decolonisation might be delayed it could not indefinitely be denied (unless, as in Indo-China, nationalist independence movements tainted by communism were identified as dangerous obstacles to the Cold War objectives of America and its regional allies).

Despite preliminary advice from the International Court of Justice that the UN Charter would permit intervention in the administration of South-West Africa, and broad international condemnation of Pretoria's refusal to agree that this possession fell under UN trusteeship arrangements, throughout the 1950s Australia continually refused to vote against South Africa on this issue. In effect, Australia's controversial position supported Pretoria's claim that South-West Africa was *de facto* the fifth province of the Union, and equivalent to a 'Homeland' under apartheid. Nor was Washington particularly concerned, suggesting lamely that it would be 'desirable for South Africa to submit South West Africa to trusteeship' and send administrative reports to the UN. Condemning on the floor of

parliament Australia's position 'in defiance of the rulings of the World Court' on South-West Africa, Gough Whitlam asked uncomfortably: 'is the vote to be explained by the fact that Australia approves of South Africa's introduction of apartheid … in its trust territory?'[33] The underpinnings of Australia's position were, however, more complex than Whitlam's argument allowed. Australia's principal concern was to limit UN intervention in trusteeship administration, thereby protecting the interests of the Netherlands in West New Guinea and Australia in Papua New Guinea. Indonesia's claims to West New Guinea came before the UN on five occasions from 1955 to 1960. Throughout, Canberra gave unqualified support to the Netherlands, shielding it from efforts to hasten decolonisation in Australia's Near North.[34]

Before the killings in 1960 by South African security forces of more than 60 African protesters in the township of Sharpeville, UN voting patterns on issues linked to territorial administration and decolonisation were broadly like those on apartheid. Significantly, from Australia's perspective at least, South Africa's colonial policies and apartheid were closely related. Not only did Australia refuse in the UN to support any effort that might dilute South Africa's unilateral control of South West Africa but, as Whitlam had emphasised, it refused also to condemn either the extension of apartheid into that territory or the exercise of state-sanctioned terror against its African population. Australia's intransigence persisted despite long-held international concerns that South Africa also wanted to incorporate three British protectorates—Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland—as 'Reserves' into the Union and was already extending fundamental native segregation practices and forced migration policies to these areas. Menzies openly acknowledged that the self-interested reasons for his government's opposition to resolutions on Trusteeship might 'cripple' the protection of 'domestic jurisdiction'. Menzies assumed the External Affairs portfolio following Casey's retirement in February 1960. He stated that 'with the Aboriginal problem, the immigration problem and Papua New Guinea, either on our doorstep or inside our house, the complete integrity of the domestic jurisdiction clause is vital'.[35] He was adamant that neither 'native policies or our policies in Papua and New Guinea … be thrust into United

Nations jurisdiction'. Later, in a much-cited speech to the Australia Club in London, he again defended the principal of non-interference. Predictably, this was interpreted as implicit support for South Africa. Menzies' address attracted strong criticism; but it was welcomed by the South African high commissioner as 'the fairest, most objective, speech ever made in public outside of South Africa'.[36]

After Sharpeville Australian responses to decolonisation began to align more closely with those of Britain and most members of the Commonwealth, including some of its newly independent members. At the Commonwealth prime minister's meeting in May 1960 Menzies reluctantly conceded that Britain's Empire was dissolving and decolonisation was inevitable. 'Whereas at one time many of us might have thought that it was better to go slowly in granting independence so that all the conditions existed for a wise exercise of self-government', Menzies stated on returning to Australia: 'I think the prevailing school of thought today is that if in doubt you should go sooner, not later: I [now] belong to that school of thought'. And, surprisingly, he accepted publicly that the 'sooner rather than later' timetable for independence applied to Papua New Guinea. Hasluck also attended the Commonwealth meeting and returned convinced that Australia should now defer to international pressure and move deliberately to grant independence. At the same time, in response to unambiguous pressure from the UK prime minister Harold Macmillan and US president John F. Kennedy, Australia in late 1961 withdrew its support for continuing Dutch possession of West New Guinea, agreeing reluctantly that the *realpolitik* of the Cold War made inevitable a prompt transfer of the territory to Indonesia.

Consistent with this overdue change on decolonisation, Menzies now stressed that 'the creation of a favourable and friendly image of Australia is one of our most important tasks in Africa at present'. More sensitive policies on apartheid and more liberal policies towards independence movements were central to this goal. An External Affairs memorandum addressing the 'Significance of Africa South of the Sahara', written just a few weeks after Sharpeville, cautioned: 'we will be judged on the manner in which we show our interest in—and create new ties with—the newly independent peoples of Africa'. White Australia's international reputation

was in need of repair. Its history of immigration restrictions, racial discrimination and hostility to decolonisation had negative implications and must change, the Department advised; 'the more we establish friendly relations with the new African countries, the more are our policies likely to be accepted in South East Asia'.[37]

The changing emphasis in Australia's foreign policy was symbolised early in 1961 by Menzies' decision to stop over in Washington, and not as was customary in Cape Town, *en route* to the vital Commonwealth conference in London scheduled to decide if South Africa should remain a member. He now accepted that his personal empathy must be ignored in the interests of improved relations with the wider multicultural Commonwealth. His change of heart reflected the fact that both Westminster and Washington now refused publicly to imply support for the apartheid regime.

In the wake of Sharpeville and Harold Macmillan's 'Wind of Change' warning, Paul Hasluck acknowledged that Australia's intransigence on Papua New Guinea, like its position on apartheid, could no longer be defended—ethically or politically. Like a wealth of diplomatic advice received from Australian missions abroad during the late 1950s, Hasluck's reflections foreshadowed a growing willingness to accept that it was not in the nation's interest that it be identified as hostile to decolonisation. Nonetheless, as late as November 1959 Australia refused to support a watershed UN action when, in the words of its UN delegate, it 'rightly or wrongly' abstained from voting on General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the important Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Facing a similar resolution 15 months later, Australia again planned to abstain from voting. However, 'without any notice' and 'without any consultation', Australian delegates learnt that the UK was changing its vote from 'opposition to straight out support'. 'If we abstained', Menzies was advised, Australia would find itself 'alone': there would be 'serious and worldwide misrepresentation and Australia would incur a solitary hostility among African and Asian nations'. Fearing 'humiliation' and 'considerable ridicule' the delegation voted to defend what it termed Australia's 'general repute', siding belatedly with the UK and virtually all UN member states, other than South Africa.[38]

Amidst rising acrimony over South Africa's future membership of the Commonwealth, Australia jettisoned its long-standing support for South Africa's distasteful colonial practices. Following Britain, Australia voted for a draft Assembly resolution that explicitly noted the 'ruthless intensification' of racial segregation in South-West Africa and called on Pretoria to accept that the territory, like colonial possessions generally, was in transition to unqualified independence. Shortly afterwards Australia's delegate, Laurence McIntyre, told a special UN trusteeship committee that South Africa was morally obliged to end apartheid in the territory and promote its transition to nationhood. Nonetheless the decision to vote against South Africa, rather than abstain, was for McIntyre a 'most painful and embarrassing' one—a decision that he felt obliged to explain personally to Menzies. Consistent with its revised policy, and in response to promptings from Washington, Australia now accepted that it must expedite independence for Papua New Guinea and accept UN guidance over this process. Voting for the first time to condemn Portugal's intransigent colonial policies, Australia was seeking to align its policy on decolonisation with majority opinion in the UN. Australia's dramatic shift mirrored its belated condemnation of apartheid and tacit support for cooperative international action against racism. No longer were the related issues of racism, trusteeship and colonialism easily defended as internal or domestic matters beyond international reach.[39]

CHAPTER 4

A Commonwealth Against Racism

[W]e would strongly deplore a South African withdrawal from the Commonwealth, not only for reasons of sentiment, but also because it would not serve [Australia's] interests.[1]

R.G. Casey, minister for external affairs, 1959

Dr Verwoerd's sole supporter at the London conference was, significantly enough, prime minister Menzies of Australia … the Dominion's White Australia policy being only one rung separated from apartheid.[2]

Bombay Free Press Journal, 1961

Although from the early 1950s Australian governments sought to hinge foreign policy on strategic alliance with the United States, Liberal–Country Party Coalitions held tightly to ties of culture and race that bound them to Britain and Empire. The *Sydney Morning Herald* echoed this ambivalence when it suggested, shortly after Menzies became prime minister, that 'Australia's relations with America are often imperfectly understood: they imply no weakening of the Commonwealth nor any turning away from Britain.[3] Conservative Australians were reluctant to accept the geopolitical realities of the post-war world. (Menzies controversially declared the ANZUS treaty 'a superstructure on a foundation of jelly'.)[4] In the following decade it was not uncommon for prominent Australians to announce, as did a former ambassador to Washington, James Plimsoll, that 'we do not see' new regional associations 'as a threat to British relationships'. Wistful suggestions could not conceal the inexorable drift away from Great Britain

and the Commonwealth.[5] Royal visits, royal honours, and celebrations of Empire remained linchpins of public life. Nonetheless, symbolic expressions of race patriotism declined, if unevenly, in the face of Anglo-Australia's efforts to adjust to new international realities, especially those embedded in the eclipse of European colonialism and contests of the Cold War. The ties of Empire weakened; the bonds of race nationalism eroded slowly; the importance of the Commonwealth declined.[6]

A more liberal multilateral global order emerged—if somewhat paradoxically—in parallel with the deep bi-polar divide of the Cold War. In this new geopolitical environment, Australia's attachment to Britain frayed.[7] Britain's imperial reach receded. Integration into the European Economic Community and NATO would compensate it for the end of Empire. As decolonisation accelerated intra-Commonwealth relations were transformed. Cooperation between the old 'Crown' Dominions waned. In the decade after partition of India, the Empire was transformed into a multiracial Commonwealth shaped increasingly by newly independent nations. Although membership expanded rapidly its international significance declined—as did the influence of the old white Dominions that had long dominated it. Imperial decline foreshadowed, Lester Pearson, the Canadian prime minister suggested, a new Commonwealth built on 'diversity of race, culture and tradition'—a free association of independent nations, old and new, with historic links to Britain and the Empire.[8] White Australia's growing disquiet about the direction and future of the Commonwealth was a marker of much broader foreign policy challenges—challenges that obliged it to adapt to a new multilateral and multi-racial international order or, like white South Africa, risk international opprobrium, diplomatic isolation and possible economic sanction.

White Australia: Out-of-Step

Independent India's wish to join the Commonwealth as a sovereign republic threatened its very future. Special prime minister's meetings were held in London in late 1948 early 1949 to devise a formula that might permit the republic full participation. Future membership for

other aspiring republics, including South Africa, Pakistan and Ceylon, was also at issue. Malan warned that the Commonwealth might fracture if newly independent (coloured) states joined. Evatt was determined that it respond flexibly to new circumstances. 'I regard it as sheer defeatism, inimical to the security and well-being of Commonwealth, to assume for a moment that South Africa or any of the new members will be cut off from association with the British group which helped so much in war and peace to maintain liberty and resist oppression', he stated in 1948. And, he concluded optimistically, 'I do not see why a new and even greater and more powerful Commonwealth group should not emerge as a result of the present world crisis'.[9]

In the short term, at least, Evatt's optimism proved well-founded. The so-called London Declaration of 1949 made Commonwealth membership possible for the Republic of India, which joined the following year. The declaration left unchanged the criteria for membership but granted the new republic entry after it explicitly accepted the British monarch as the symbolic head of the 'free association of its independent member nations'. Despite Afrikaner reservations about on-going links to Britain, the declaration was accepted by Malan's Cabinet as a reasonable compromise. So long as membership implied 'no infringement' of sovereign independence, including the future 'right to become a republic', the newly installed prime minister wrote in 1949, 'South Africa has no intention of leaving the Commonwealth'. Yet the Afrikaner state's allegiance was always conditional. The National Party government remained an uneasy participant. Although the London declaration accepted prospective republics as members, it did so at a time when the racial character of the Commonwealth and the number and influence of people and nations of non-European origin threatened to eclipse the authority of traditional white-member countries. Unsurprisingly, as the complexion of the Commonwealth changed, enthusiasm expressed for it by the newly-elected governments of Malan and—less overtly—Menzies, receded.[10]

Australia's posture on non-intervention during Commonwealth discussions echoed its rigid defence of national sovereignty in the UN. 'It would be the end of the Commonwealth' if it discussed the domestic policies of member nations', Menzies stated unapologetically: 'I cannot imagine a

more rapid process by which to dissolve the Commonwealth'. Newspaper opinion largely agreed that South Africa's argument that her apartheid policy is beyond the authority of the multilateral UN or Commonwealth was 'incontestable'. However, some opinion put morality above politics. 'On the merits of the apartheid policy, South Africa is vulnerable', the Hobart *Mercury* editorialised: 'the systematic denial of elementary human rights to non-white races will be regarded with revulsion by most people'.[11] As the Commonwealth changed, ethical concerns rather than the protections of state sovereignty increasingly informed argument over South Africa, even if such anxieties had little direct effect on foreign policy.

Despite Casey's long tenure as external affairs minister, during the decade from early 1951 the imprint of Menzies sat heavily on all major Cabinet decisions, especially those with implications for relations with Great Britain or the future of the Commonwealth. In the face of reservations from some in his Cabinet, Menzies engaged constructively with Malan and his successors Strijdom and Verwoerd in the hope of keeping bilateral relations buoyant and South Africa an engaged member of the Commonwealth. Earlier, when leader of the Opposition, Menzies' agreed with South Africa and opposed moves by India to be admitted as a republic. Later, as prime minister, he defended Britain's colonial interests, rejected Casey's suggestion that Australia might endorse the Bandung Conference of non-aligned African and Asian nations. He expressed growing disquiet about the transformation of Britain's Empire gave into a 'Brown Commonwealth'. Prominent diplomat Walter Crocker suggested, privately, that 'Menzies is anti-Asian; particularly anti-Indian; Yes anti-Asian. He just can't help it'.[12]

Shortly after he came to office Menzies expressed regret that 'the old points of unity have become looser; the old common allegiance' to Britain and monarchy, 'looser'.[13] Menzies was equally disturbed by the eclipse of English identity and culture in South Africa following Smuts' defeat in 1948. For both Menzies and Casey 'the importance of South Africa to Australia' lay largely in mutual links to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. Defending Australia's interests demanded that it work to keep white South Africa within the Commonwealth, even if both countries were uncomfortable with the changing multiracial character

of the organisation. The Johannesburg *Star* suggested that Malan and Menzies shared 'fears for [the] Commonwealth'; that they were concerned that rapid decolonisation and Britain's acceptance of self-government for her colonies risked 'killing' the organisation. Bemoaning the admission of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and the resulting loss of 'solidarity between the members', Malan pleaded for support from other white Dominions to resist African nationalism and maintain Commonwealth solidarity that reflected 'common interest and necessary homogeneity'.[14] However, advice from the Australian high commission in Pretoria now bluntly acknowledged that developments in 'South Africa and Southern Africa generally' were being pushed to the margins of Australian diplomacy.[15]

By 1952, when apartheid was first listed for debate in the UN, the politics of race had already divided the Commonwealth. Intra-commonwealth relations threatened to fracture on the fault-line of racism. 'If the Commonwealth today has claims to being anything more than a white-man's club'; if it can claim to be 'an outstanding example of inter-racial East-West co-operation', the *Overseas Hindustan Times* editorialised, it must repudiate South Africa: the reluctance of Australia, Britain and New Zealand to distance themselves from racism threatens 'the very fundamentals on which the commonwealth relationship' is built. Echoing Nehru's argument that protecting White Australia undermined Australia's own desire to work co-operatively within the Commonwealth and within Asia—the area 'to which both geographically and historically it now belongs'—the influential *Eastern Economist* warned that race-based immigration exclusion was tantamount to a 'racial war' and 'wrecked' Australia's prospects for deeper 'political and economic cooperation' both in Asia and the emerging Commonwealth.[16]

Welcoming Menzies to Cape Town in 1953 Malan controversially identified India as a common danger to both Dominions and applauded the 'wall of colour' that protected each nation. Shortly afterwards Menzies appeared to support Malan's observation. In a talk broadcast nationally on the ABC about his recent trip to London for the Queen's coronation and then to South Africa, Menzies warned against sitting in moral judgement of another country. Far more controversially he implied that South Africa's unique demography justified its particular social policies. Consular staff

in both countries judged Menzies visit an 'outstanding success' in 'every possible way'—'a very good thing for the morale and spirit of South Africa'.[17] However, a few Australian newspapers thought Menzies' reflections on South Africa, unfortunate. Some newspapers in India interpreted them as a veiled criticism of Nehru's hostility to apartheid and his government's frustrated efforts to protect Indian communities in South Africa.[18] India routinely rebuked white Australia for its immigration restrictions, and was irritated by claims, such as that made by Casey in 1954, that Australia wished to avoid an unassimilated racially-divided society: 'the sort of situation that has arisen with regard to Indians in South Africa'.[19]

Menzies continued to believe that Australia and Britain 'must at all times nourish our ancient structural unity which remains the best thing in the free world'. In 1954 Queen Elizabeth II became the first reigning monarch to visit Australia. As Neville Meaney has written, her presence evoked 'the greatest outpouring of British race sentiment in Australian history'. The *Sydney Morning Herald* expressed a widely held view that the monarchy symbolised 'the supreme achievement of the British race'.[20] Race-patriotism remained a cornerstone of Australia's embrace of the Empire and sympathetic connections with other white Dominions. But in the eyes of new members of the Commonwealth this enduring unity symbolised a resilient trans-national racism. Menzies did little to allay these concerns. Australia gave no support to the anti-apartheid rhetoric of new members—especially as such rhetoric broadened to target Western race-nationalism generally and focused on settler countries of the old Commonwealth.[21]

Canberra was well aware that South Africa's 'handling of racial problems' had 'strongly and to some degree unnecessarily' complicated relations with other African states and most members of the Commonwealth. Apartheid had made it difficult to cooperate openly with Pretoria without losing goodwill in Asia and Africa. This, in turn, made it important that Australia formulate more clearly its 'attitude to South Africa's domestic policies' and 'consider possible ways of influencing them'. Officials in Pretoria and Cape Town would be encouraged to make 'discrete contact with coloured and African groups'—while cautiously trying to not antagonise Malan's government. After entry of the first

black African state, Ghana, to the Commonwealth in 1957, these efforts grew. Hugh Gilchrist noted approvingly that press reports in Australia about South Africa were now 'quite substantial'. At the same time a more progressive department of external affairs dispatched Richard Wollcott to Kenya, Uganda and Tanganika 'to report particularly' on a range of matters including 'Communist activities and influence', Indian 'activities' in East Africa, the Mau Mau movement and state of emergency in Kenya, and 'multiracial problems'. While Australia was unprepared to act against South Africa, it did not wish to see similarly racialised political systems take root in other parts of the continent (although it was not optimistic that this could be avoided). As the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland moved towards independence and grappled to establish a 'racial partnership' as 'an alternative to apartheid', high commissioner Owen Davis cabled Canberra expressing scepticism as to whether 'Africa nationalities will remain moderate and willing to work with European minorities', not only in Southern Africa but in Kenya and Uganda also. In the eyes of Australian officials, responsibility for establishing democracy in colonised parts of the British Empire lay not with the colonising powers or white settlers, but with its colonised subjects.[22]

As the Commonwealth changed, Indian diplomats wondered whether it 'was not dividing mechanically on a racial basis'.[23] Nehru routinely asserted that his nation's participation hinged on resolution of the 'acrimonious dispute' over apartheid.[24] Others believed the Commonwealth would disintegrate if white South Africa remained a member. Harold Macmillan warned similarly, and more eloquently, in his 'Wind of Change' speech in Cape Town in 1960. His statement was prescient. European authority could not be sustained in the face of rising anti-colonial nationalism. Different 'races' and 'civilisations' were now pressing their claims to 'an independent national life', Macmillan told the whites-only parliament. His words were widely interpreted as signalling the end of British imperialism in Africa. 'The wind of change is blowing through this continent', he stated, 'and whether we like it or not, this growth of national political consciousness is a political fact' that 'our national policies' must now reflect.[25]

The import of Macmillan's cautionary speech was violently underlined six weeks later by the incident at Sharpeville. Widely reported

internationally, the 'Sharpeville massacre' became an enduring symbol of apartheid and a rallying point for opponents of racism everywhere. Privately, in a conciliatory letter to the Verwoerd, Menzies acknowledged that 'everybody' in the Commonwealth realised that 'Sharpeville had, in the modern phrase, "triggered off" violent outbursts of opinion in other countries'.[26] After Sharpeville the politics of race were a burning international concern, beyond the protections of 'domestic jurisdiction'. But Menzies and his Coalition successors remained distinctly reluctant to join the growing international conversation on racism.[27]

Distancing White South Africa

As pressures to isolate South Africa's grew, Casey warned that if it chose to become a republic and was forced out of the Commonwealth, it would remain inevitably under the control of 'extreme Afrikaner-Calvinist Nationalism'. (Casey might have acknowledged that the Dominion had, since 1948, been ruled by this very faction and that his government had worked with it.) Nehru spoke for all Asian and African members when in London in 1960 he warned that the South African issue would 'shake the very foundations of the Commonwealth'. In contrast, Casey mildly conceded that the Union's racial policies cause embarrassment with the Asian and African countries that had joined recently. Far more emphatically he stated that sentiment, combined with economic and strategic interests, dictated that his government would resist pressure to eject South Africa from the Commonwealth. Contradictory impulses informed Australian policy-making. As an important Cold War ally, South Africa's distasteful racism was offset by its strategic importance and vigorous anti-Communism.[28]

Menzies was far less concerned with the violence of Sharpeville than with its possible impact on the future of the Commonwealth. He told Verwoerd that the international reverberations from the violence were 'regrettable'.[29] In contrast, most Australian newspapers argued the massacre had alarming implications. The Brisbane *Courier Mail* condemned Canberra's benign response and warned that further violence would result. The editorial condemned Canberra's intransigence under the headline

'Missing the Tide in Africa', and expressed fears Sharpeville would further weaken an already divided Commonwealth. Other newspapers argued that Australia must accept that the political ramifications of apartheid are international and thus should soften its stand on domestic jurisdiction. Some British newspapers argued similarly. The *Manchester Guardian,* for example, asserted that the Commonwealth 'should stand for the principles of justice and fair dealing between men of all races and colours and creeds'; to defy 'these principles' would render the Commonwealth 'not worthy of its name'.[30]

A bitter chorus of condemnation greeted Menzies when he again visited London to attend a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. Held shortly after Sharpeville, in May 1960, CHOGM was dominated by the politics of racism.[31] Having earlier urged Australia to adopt a more relaxed and less legalistic position on domestic jurisdiction, the UK and other Commonwealth members offered Menzies little comfort during the meeting. Uncomfortably for him and South Africa's substitute representative, foreign minister Eric Louw, Commonwealth leaders declared that South Africa must aim 'to create as rapidly as practicable conditions in which the individual can be free to develop his personality to the full, irrespective of colour, class or creed'. Fearing South Africa would be expelled from the Commonwealth, Menzies suggested that 'the problem of the White population of South Africa was well understood' and that his colleagues in the Commonwealth would have been 'happy to get a few changes' to South Africa's laws, including 'direct representation' for 'Cape Coloureds' and a few 'Bantu seats' in the National parliament. He apparently believed such concessions would ensure South Africa was not expelled. Significantly, Menzies understood apartheid as a problem for its powerful white minority, not its powerless African majority. Nonetheless, Louw rejected even these moderate suggestions. Menzies recorded privately that Louw 'was immovable, completely defensive, and entirely tactless', reiterating Pretoria's determination 'to never afford the native or coloured populations a vote of the same kind as that enjoyed by the white man'.[32]

Following the conference Menzies again suggested that reforms to apartheid might negate criticism of it. He wrote privately, at 'tedious

length', to Verwoerd, suggesting that Commonwealth countries might be sympathetic to South Africa if it introduced changes in three areas: the rights of Cape Coloureds; the exclusion of 'the Bantu' from 'white' areas; and 'personal discrimination' against non-Europeans visitors. Like other Commonwealth leaders, Menzies seemingly had little knowledge of the extreme character of apartheid or of Verwoerd's uncompromising efforts to police it. Verwoerd was unmoved by Menzies unsolicited advice. For white South Africans, the privileges flowing from rigid apartheid were far more important than international respectability or membership in a multiracial commonwealth. Anticipating a fractured and weakened organisation, Menzies noted privately: 'trouble now—so far from ending—is about to begin'.[33]

Menzies pessimism reflected a customary mix of sentiment and *realpolitik*. As advised by External Affairs, he understood that South Africa's exclusion could foreshadow to a Commonwealth in which the old white members would be continually voted down by new 'coloured' members. This might have 'very serious implications' for white Australia, especially in relation to 'New Guinea, immigration or the treatment of Aborigines'. Menzies may have retained an inflated view of the significance of the Commonwealth, but he was realistically aware that its future deliberations would be dominated by 'the colour question'.[34]

Estranged internationally and within the Commonwealth, the Verwoerd government was obliged to act. Following the 1960 CHOGM it promptly scheduled a referendum on whether to become a republic and, by extension, to stay in the Commonwealth. The right to vote in the referendum was restricted to whites only. To encourage an affirmative result the voting age was lowered to 18 and whites living in South-West Africa were included on the rolls. On 5 October, by an unexpectedly narrow majority, white South Africans voted 'in favour of a Republic for the Union'. Fifty two percent voted 'Yes'. Predictably, support for a republic was strongest within Afrikaner communities. Yet the narrow margin suggested that many whites feared withdrawal from the Commonwealth would merely confirm their nation's isolation, culturally and economically, while unnecessarily antagonising old friends, including Australia.[35]

Having declared itself a republic South Africa was obliged to seek

permission from a now hostile Commonwealth if it wished to remain a member. Anticipating its withdrawal, Menzies wrote privately to Macmillan that this was 'a wretched business': it would herald 'one of the great turning points in Commonwealth history'.[36] The fate of the apartheid republic dominated discussion at the special Commonwealth leaders meeting in March 1961. Asian and African representatives led opposition to re-admission. Julius Nyerere, prominent anti-colonial leader of soon-to-be independent Tanganyika (later Tanzania), stated uncompromisingly that 'to invite South Africa in is to vote us out'. 'To remain outside would be an unhappy thing', he concluded: 'But it is a sacrifice we must be prepared to make in our fight to preserve the dignity of Africa and to wipe out racialism'. Other prominent leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya, reiterated concerns about Pretoria's unacceptable racism. The Malaysian leader welcomed rejection because 'apartheid is incompatible with the spirit of the commonwealth and with the principles of human rights which we uphold'. His comments had strong support, with most arguing that expulsion of South Africa would raise the Commonwealth's 'reputation in world affairs'.[37]

Menzies views were not shared by other white Dominions, and he was dismayed that Canada's prime minister, the conservative John Diefenbaker, spoke forcefully against South Africa's re-admission. Responding to a draft resolution condemning apartheid as inconsistent with the ideals of the Commonwealth, Menzies rejected the right of the organisation to act collectively against apartheid. He argued that this would set an 'intolerable' precedent. Anticipating the breakup of the Commonwealth Menzies reiterated a familiar defence of white Australia: 'On all such matters' as race relations '"autonomous" and "independent" nations must have the right to manage their own affairs in their own way'. 'We are not a court', he declared: 'We are brothers in a special international family'. No country—other than South Africa—agreed with Menzies. Even the UK now acknowledged that 'apartheid had aroused widespread anxiety throughout the world and had now acquired an international significance which made it more than a matter of domestic concern to the Union government'. With expulsion imminent the Republic of South Africa withdrew its request. On 15 March 1961 Dr Verwoerd announced

that 'in the interests of South Africa's honour and dignity' his country would immediately cut ties with the Commonwealth and become a fully independent republic. It was, in effect, forced to withdraw from a now overwhelmingly hostile organisation. Anti-apartheid activists, including African leaders like the ANC's Chief Albert Luthuli and the Kenyan Tom Mboya, were 'overjoyed' by South Africa's exclusion, celebrating it as 'a triumph over apartheid'. International opinion broadly concurred.[38]

Predictably, most Afrikaners praised Verwoerd's 'heroic stand for the white man'. Many white settlers in neighbouring Southern Rhodesia expressed 'deepest regret' at the news, seeing it as a disturbing precedent. Others asked rhetorically: 'what is there to stop' Australia being excluded because of 'its White Australia policy'?[39] Menzies could do little more than lament the demise of 'the old intimate association' of 'white countries'. He wrote to Macmillan: 'When I ask myself what benefit we of the Crown Commonwealth derive from having a somewhat tenuous association with a cluster of Republics, some of which like Ghana are more akin to Moscow than London, I begin to despair'. And, more soberly, he wrote that the South African precedent meant it was now 'quite legitimate' for the Commonwealth 'to discuss' and possibly act on internal matters like 'the Australian immigration policy which is aimed at avoiding internal racial problems by the expedient of keeping coloured immigrants out: I hope my fears are not justified'.[40]

Typical of the reaction of so-called 'Brown Commonwealth' countries to Menzies' futile efforts was that of the *Bombay Free Press Journal*. It claimed that Menzies was Verwoerd's only supporter during the London conference and repeated a charge common in South Asia that white supremacy was deeply entrenched in both South Africa and Australia. *The Times of India* suggested that future conflict over Australia's 'racialist immigration policies' might permanently fracture the fragile organisation. In this view, as Eric Meadows has written, if concerns about white Australia had been 'raised by African and Asian members of the Commonwealth with the same determination as they had shown on apartheid, then the Commonwealth might disintegrate'.[41] Menzies was aware that Afro-Asian demands might be generalised to other states. Should South Africa be obliged to leave the Commonwealth, he had earlier

conceded, 'in view of our plainly discriminatory immigration policy we have a good chance of being next in line'. Menzies seemed to grasp the meaning of a warning made privately by a prominent Cape Town resident: 'when your time comes, homogeneity will be named discrimination'.[42]

The forced departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth on 31 May 1961 was for Menzies an 'absolute tragedy', one that left him 'sad and depressed'. Expressing anger at the actions of other member countries, and dismay over Macmillan's unexpected role, Menzies asked in his self-acknowledged 'simple colonial fashion': 'Why can't we disagree with South African policy without pushing South Africa out—and believe me it was pushed out'. Menzies, like most of his Cabinet colleagues, was convinced that 'Australia's traditional relationship to United Kingdom' was now irrevocably diminished; its relationship to the old Commonwealth permanently changed.[43]

Bemoaning Menzies 'curiously old-fashioned' views, the *Age* emphasised that they were not shared by other member countries, Macmillan, or 'a vocal section of the Australian people'.[44] Unlike the UK, Australia controversially continued to resist the wind of change. Prominent leaders of the ALP charged that Menzies' position on apartheid diminished Australia's status abroad; that it 'created the impression he was the friend and defender of Dr Verwoerd'. In the face of such criticism, Menzies public rhetoric changed. He now claimed that his actions in London were 'not concerned to defend apartheid—which indeed I condemn'. Menzies told parliament that he was 'not an apostle of apartheid', prompting Whitlam to remark: 'that may be', but you certainly appear 'to the whole world as its chief acolyte'.[45]

Addressing the Australia Club in London before returning to Australia in March 1961, Menzies remained nostalgic for the 'exquisite intimate personal relations' of the Crown Commonwealth. He described anti-apartheid arguments as 'so false as to be absurd'. The South African high commissioner in London welcomed Menzies' address. In contrast, comment in Australia was scathing. Geoffrey Sawer observed that 'On Apartheid, as on colonial questions', Australia in 1960–61 'found herself in shrinking and embarrassing diplomatic company'. However, Menzies found considerable support from Coalition colleagues at home. Deputy

prime minister John McEwen praised him privately for his 'unstinted and unremitting efforts', emphasising that unhappiness about South Africa's departure was 'shared by most Australians'. Casey 'deplored' the expulsion, anticipating that it would 'magnify' problems within the Commonwealth (and make agreement with its 'new' members even more difficult). ALP leader Arthur Calwell, while saddened by South Africa's exclusion, suggested that it cannot 'stand alone as an independent republic in a sea of colour': thus it would eventually subscribe to 'the principle of racial equality' and return to the Commonwealth.[46] Yet as Cold War divisions hardened white South Africa was not obliged to stand alone—even as it continued to face virulent criticism in international forums and sustained protests from a vast transnational movement mobilised against it.

Under Macmillan, Britain's 'turn to Europe' was balanced by a willingness to extract itself from colonial entanglements. By 1960–61 the UK secretary of state for commonwealth relations, Duncan Sandys, suggested that 'British' should apply only to the United Kingdom; that the 'British' Empire had dissolved, replaced by a multinational Commonwealth. Only gradually did senior members of Menzies' Cabinet accept the reality implied by Sandys' observation. As the ties of Empire weakened, Australian race nationalism and the immigration practices on which it rested were exposed to unprecedented pressure in the Commonwealth.[47] At the same time consular advice conceded that Australia's wider relationships in Asia and the Pacific were corrupted by racism at home and 'confusion of our policy with apartheid'. A special publicity campaign was necessary to explain 'the less desirable aspects of our immigration policy or our treatment of Aborigines'. 'Preoccupation with racial questions has become intense', Australia's high commissioner to South Africa Owen Davis cabled to Canberra in 1961: 'There is a risk that educated persons in Asia and Africa will confuse the problem of our Aborigines with the South African racial problem, and our policy with apartheid'. 'Therefore', Davis cabled, 'it would … seem to be necessary to acknowledge the need for some counter propaganda'.[48] Similar pragmatism was reflected in subsequent Australian policy. Declaratory condemnation of apartheid, not a genuine conviction to act in international concert against it, defined Australian policy across the following decade.

Complementary Contests: Apartheid and 'White Australia', 1961–71

Just as racism has become an international thing, the fight against it is also becoming international. Those who were the victims of it are beginning to compare notes. They are beginning to find that it doesn't stem from one country alone. It is international. We need to fight it internationally.[1]

Malcolm X, *The Final Speeches*, New York, 1965

Increasingly … relations between Australia and South Africa can only lead to Australia being tarred twice over with the brush of apartheid and white Australia.[2]

Editorial, *Australian Financial Review*, 1970

Spokesmen of the South African government expressed confidence that the moral isolation of the Republic … with respect to its racial policies will not lead to isolation in other fields.[3]

UN Special Committee on Apartheid, 1970

The 'wind of change' sweeping across the colonised world brought in its wake unexpected contests within Britain's white Dominions. Violence at Sharpeville accelerated struggle against racism everywhere, foreshadowing wider regional tensions and international division. 'Today', an External Affairs papers noted, 'any question involving race or colour can become a political issue internationally'; 'preoccupation with racial questions has

become intense'.[4] In the same year, 1961, Peter Calvocoressi observed in *South Africa and World Opinion* that 'the course of international politics had been invaded by a moral issue' which 'in the tangle of world affairs' might encourage governments 'to deviate from settled policies or act against their interests'.[5] However, as developments in Australia in the following decade confirmed, ethical concerns were always more important incentives for community mobilisation than they were levers of government action.

The decade after Sharpeville and South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth was marked in Australia by diplomatic ambivalence and bitter social division. The fractured contests over racism abroad did not redirect foreign policy, but they jolted an increasing number of Australians into protest action against both apartheid in South Africa and racism at home. The very fabric of Australian society was changed by challenges to racism everywhere. As a society divided by a 'parallel apartheid', Australia more than any other country invited international censure similar to that building against Pretoria. But no Coalition government—from Menzies to McMahon—was willing to break the nation's comfortable associations with white South Africa. In 1966, in the face of continuing international provocation, the international affairs director of the ANC, Robert Resha, told a Melbourne audience that 'UN resolutions aimed at revoking apartheid in South Africa always failed because the big Western powers' that spoke of apartheid as being 'morally indefensible' refused to support their words with strong action.[6] Resha's criticism applied equally to smaller Western powers, particularly white Australia. Throughout the 1960s its reluctance to isolate itself from the apartheid state ensured that it would not escape scrutiny, or judgement, similar to that confronting white South Africa.

Ambivalent Decade: Bilateral Relations and the Politics of Race

[It is] not sufficient to condemn apartheid it [is] necessary to take action against it.[7]

Kwame Nkrumah to Menzies, 1964

Yet instead of trying to win the confidence of the people [of the Pacific and Asia] we appear to be deliberately antagonising them by seeking closer ties with South Africa.[8]

Don Whittington, *Sunday Observer*, 1969

Interests before Rights

Throughout the 1960s developments in Southern Africa raised seemingly intractable international problems. South Africa, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese-ruled territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea expressed the divisive politics of race. In each, as a special committee of the UN reported, 'decolonisation was opposed by powerful vested interests in the form of large settler minorities'. These territories occupied the southern extremity of the continent and formed a lasting 'stronghold of white supremacy' that used military and political cooperation with metropolitan powers 'to perpetuate their domination'.[9] Gradually, in the wake of Sharpeville, Australian officials stopped referring to a special relationship with South Africa. Now, it was implied,

Australia would seek to create 'a favourable and friendly image' in Africa generally. More tangibly, policy on sensitive racial issues and trusteeship would reflect empathy for decolonisation and support for an engaged multi-ethnic Commonwealth. 'To a degree we will be judged on the manner in which we show our interest in and create new ties with the new independent peoples of Africa', an External Affairs memo noted. Echoing Hugh Gilchrist's earlier paper on 'Australia and Africa' it concluded: 'this has implications for us in Southeast Asia; the more we establish friendly relations with the new African countries, the more are our policies likely to be accepted in Southeast Asia'.[10]

Menzies approved in 1961 the first high-level diplomatic initiative in Sub-Saharan Africa. A delegation led by the senior External Affairs officer in the London high commission, K.C.O. (Mick) Shann, visited the Sudan, Kenya Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanganyika, Congo, Ruanda-Urundi and Mauritius, and reported at length on the delicate diplomatic issues raised by white Australia's conservative political reputation. While conceding that African states were aware of and troubled by Australia's immigration policies and 'attitudes towards Aboriginals', Shann suggested that 'the image of Australia is basically an inaccurate one, but there is a good deal we can do about this'. Nonetheless, his 122-page report did little more than endorse ambassador Owen Davis's earlier lame recommendation that Australia's bad image made it 'necessary to acknowledge the need for some counter propaganda'.[11] Verwoerd commented dismissively at this time that 'Australia was clearly out to create' a favourable impression to promote its regional interests, 'but no one knew how it was going to reconcile that with its White Australia policy'.[12]

Sharpeville dramatically accelerated condemnation of apartheid; but its effect on international politics was less decisive. Alliance politics and anti-communism, not anti-racism, continued largely to define the contours of international relations. As Nelson Mandela later observed, in the 1960s, as in the 1950s, 'when we went to Western governments seeking contributions to the ANC we were turned down flat'.[13] Within South Africa, Sharpeville aroused more sustained African resistance; but it also led to greater government repression. The ANC set-up an armed wing *uMkhonto we Sizwe* (MK), and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) joined

efforts to militarise and join in armed struggle. Resistance organisations were immediately banned; their leaders arrested, imprisoned or exiled. International efforts to undermine apartheid intensified but throughout the 1960s these stopped well short of action sought by African opponents, notably Mandela, Lithuli, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo, or by the fast-growing international anti-apartheid movement. Conscious of the former Dominion's continuing importance as a Cold War ally, Menzies advised his Cabinet that 'the general approach' diplomatically 'should continue to be to keep intervention against South Africa at the minimum'. Like other Western leaders Menzies was, as he told parliament, convinced that the 'boycott weapon' advocated by some non-aligned states was 'as dead as the dodo'. Despite changing diplomatic rhetoric, the two countries remained—to borrow from Christopher Thorne—'allies of a kind'. In the following decade, even as Australia was obliged to interrogate its own racist practices, successive Coalition governments still refused to endorse specific initiatives against South Africa.[14]

Racial assumptions remained important influences on Australian policy. But they were camouflaged by rhetorical anti-communism. Regional vulnerability and invasion fears that had long shaped narratives of nation in white Australia also permeated concern about white South Africa's vulnerability. Analogies were implied between an isolated minority of Europeans living on the southern edge of Africa and an isolated European Australia situated uncomfortably on the southern edge of Asia. Advice from ambassador Charles Kevin in Pretoria captured this sentiment succinctly. Australia should not act in ways that might undermine 'separate development', the cornerstone of apartheid, as this would greatly threaten 'the position of the white minority', he told then external affairs minister, Garfield Barwick. In language that resonated with many in Cabinet, Kevin warned that compromise resulting in 'multiracialism … must mean eventual Black supremacy'. While encouraged by Pretoria's success in countering 'endemic subversion' and internal dissent, Kevin suggested that African states beyond the republic's 'near northern borders' 'seem determined to seize the South African prize'. This advice was a veiled echo of Menzies' suggestion that African resistance led inevitably to bloodshed and chaos. Such ideas reflected a racially informed and

ultimately pessimistic interpretation of politics in southern Africa. Kevin's views were broadly sympathetic to the interests of the National Party administration in Pretoria. It followed, in the ambassador's view, that Australia should encourage 'greater elasticity' from Pretoria and also seek to 'induce greater moderation among Afro-Asians or at least among the Asians who are less emotionally committed' to undermining white minority rule.[15]

Throughout the decade, possible action against apartheid was always compromised, if not overridden, by security and economic interests. 'We maintain our consistent stand of unwillingness to take a practical step in disapproval of South Africa's racial policies', the *Canberra Times* editorialised in late 1963: thus we 'risk our national sentiment being further misinterpreted' abroad. 'Having joined in public condemnation', the newspaper concluded 'we then appear to believe that there is nothing more to be done'.[16] Jim Cairns, an outspoken member of Labor's left faction, voiced in parliament an argument made increasingly in mainstream media. Australia should use its 'position of special influence with regard to South Africa' to moderate the extremes of apartheid, Cairns said. Paul Hasluck, as the minister for external affairs, responded predictably, stating that 'calmness', 'moderation' and 'wisdom', not 'inflammatory or provocative statements', were needed if a further hardening of white extremism was to be avoided. In the following decade, under four different Coalition prime ministers, Australia adhered broadly to the benign diplomatic strategy implied by Hasluck's words.[17] Despite mounting international pressure against apartheid, official Australian rhetoric and calculated (in)action served largely to camouflage the underlying character of the bilateral relationship.

Economic, diplomatic and military-security contacts were deeply interrelated. Integration of South Africa into the fabric of Western cooperation against communism boosted Pretoria's capacity to police apartheid and defend the state from external subversion. It also helped project apartheid into South-West Africa, support white settler interests in Rhodesia and enable deployment of as many as 4,000 troops to protect colonial interests in Angola and Mozambique. All Australian governments fully understood that the republic's increasing economic and military

strength consolidated its political stability and state power; that this both enhanced its importance as a strategic partner in the struggle against communism and expanded the reach of its police and security forces. Some Australian officials welcomed, confidentially, the 'success' of South Africa's police in 'breaking underground organisations', praised Pretoria's defence build-up and self-sufficiency in arms manufacture, and seemed pleased that 'external pressures' and sanctions have 'had no adverse effect on the economy', which by the mid-1960s was 'buoyant' and expanding.[18]

As international attempts to isolate South Africa grew, Australia promoted stronger relations with it. Canberra cultivated a more elaborate web of security relationships that included South Africa. Like the major Western powers, Australia did not sharply protest or support intervention against Pretoria's armed incursions into neighbouring territories. Responding to events in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia and in areas under Portuguese colonial rule, Australia sought to promote political stability. It did not oppose South Africa's efforts to control and extend its borders and endorsed agreed Western policy that was described openly as ensuring 'no confrontation with South Africa'. Predictably, most black African countries condemned Western policy because it legitimised repression within the South African state while permitting it to act with impunity in neighbouring territories.[19]

Economic links underpinned the bilateral relationship. Australian exports to South Africa rose by more than 200% in the six years from 1964. At the end of the decade South Africa ranked fourth, behind the UK, Japan and the US, as a customer for Australian manufactured goods. The balance of trade favoured Australia by a factor of four to one. Australian arm sales and technical and military cooperation expanded substantially. Unexpectedly, South Africa's bilateral trading links, such as those with Japan, also grew rapidly. Despite UN sanction recommendations, the republic's trade with members of NATO also expanded. Imports from France, Germany, the US and UK approximately doubled in the decade after Sharpeville. What was true of the expanding economic intimacy with Western countries generally was true also of relations with Australia. At the same time, collaborative multilateral investment expanded, especially through British and American-based subsidiary companies, including

Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Rothmans and Kraft. The activities of Australian companies were often linked to subsidiaries operating in Rhodesia and, significantly, Australian trade with Rhodesia appreciated as rapidly as it did with South Africa throughout the 1960s.[20]

South Africa was a uniquely attractive target of international capital. Chris Child, writing on multilateral collaboration that underpinned its economy, observed that historically 'major inflows' of foreign capital 'coincided with the extension of the cheap labour system and the more vigorous application of repression to support it'. Prime minister B.J. Vorster, who came to office in 1966, conceded that apartheid survived in large part because of its sympathetic links to the international economy. 'Each trade agreement, each bank loan, each new investment is another brick in the wall of our continued existence', he acknowledged. In the two decades from 1948 growth of foreign investment was equal to that for the entire 70-year period before World War II. Dependence on foreign capital increased fourfold in the decade from 1966, despite the disruptive efforts of anti-apartheid campaigns. In the two decades after 1948 the South African economy grew at an average rate of about 9% per annum, faster than perhaps any Western economy in the same period.[21]

Australian investment and trade were promoted by trade commissioners in Cape Town and Johannesburg; regular trade missions and exhibitions; and business exchanges. Less than eighteen months after Sharpeville, the South African Tourist Corporation established offices in Sydney. Through Qantas, Australia maintained a formal partnership with South African Airways—an arrangement underpinning expanding tourism and sporting exchanges. Apartheid's critics wanted to dampen or end bilateral trade, arguing that a strengthening South African economy translated inevitably into a stronger apparatus of state repression. In the late 1960s efforts by the Australian Department of Trade and Industry to promote business investments in Bantu Homelands and exploit the potential provided by 'relatively untapped sources of black labour', provoked bitter condemnation both in Australia and UK. In advocating such a cynical economic strategy, Brian Noone commented, the Coalition government 'endorses apartheid and its racist language to encourage Australian companies to profit' from exploited 'African labour'.[22] Writing

in *Australian Quarterly* Ron Witton was equally convinced that Australian companies and governments shared responsibility with their Western partners 'for the continuation of South Africa's iniquitous economic and social system'. Like local activists, he observed 'a major contradiction' between rhetoric and practice. 'In soliciting and facilitating economic ties with the racist states of southern Africa', the Australian firms 'directly benefit from, and promote through their investments, the immoral political structures that the Australian government now condemns and seeks to change.'[23] Australia's ambassador made a similar point in more restrained language. 'That South Africa has so far been scarcely touched by punitive measures owes much to her trading partners, in particular Britain and the United States whose economic stake in the Republic is substantial and whose strategic interests must carry some weight', Charles Kevin reported from Pretoria.[24]

The level of economic intimacy enjoyed by South Africa with the outside world greatly disturbed its opponents. Pretoria openly pursued an 'Outward Policy' that linked economic and strategic interdependence. South Africa's defence minister, P.W. Botha, initiated talks between 'friendly countries in the southern oceans' to explore a possible free trade agreement and a joint naval pact to safeguard Cape sea routes and strengthen the Simonstown naval base. Negotiations on trade and defence arrangements continued with Australia and New Zealand throughout the 1960s. Bilateral defence discussions and planning gained new urgency from 1967 when Britain announced that during the following decade it would withdraw all troops stationed East of Suez—a decision confirming its 'turn' to Europe. Australia shared Pretoria's concerns. Some alarmist commentary asserted that Australia, 'still a British country', was now alone in the Asia-Pacific. The decision was a 'Far East death warrant', and Australia must awaken 'to its peril', a Sydney daily newspaper suggested anxiously. Strategic fears strengthened Australia's uneasy search for renewed ties with old Commonwealth friends, including the Republic of South Africa.[25]

The geopolitical concerns of Western states continued to drive closer relations with Pretoria. Speculation, supported by newspaper leaks in the UK, suggested that a defence treaty embracing South Africa,

Portugal, Brazil and Argentina and Australia was being considered. So widespread were such reports that Australia insisted that the chair of the Special Committee of the UN on Apartheid advise that Canberra had not been approached by Pretoria 'for the purpose of creating a military alliance amongst certain southern hemisphere countries'.[26] Suggestions that NATO would enter formal military arrangements with South Africa were common, as were less speculative reports that the Cape route would be protected by arrangements with the UK and other NATO powers. Extension of the Simonstown Agreement was anticipated. Pretoria and Canberra held confidential defence discussions on proposals for deeper naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean and better intelligence sharing. By the late 1960s it was widely reported that the Ikara anti-submarine weapons system might be purchased by South Africa from Australia, encouraging even greater defence intimacy. In 1969 prime minister John Gorton's support for the controversial US Indian ocean base on the British island of Diego Garcia was warmly welcomed by Pretoria. Such was the level of expectation of increased strategic cooperation that some newspapers reported, and some UN members believed, the two nations had entered into formal naval arrangements covering the Indian ocean. Against this background, it was not surprising that Australia and the United Kingdom chose largely to disregard UN sanctions and arms embargo resolutions— implied support welcomed warmly by Pretoria and by neighbouring Southern Rhodesia.[27]

Despite Security Council resolutions approved in 1963–64, sales of military equipment and technology to South Africa continued to grow. UN-sponsored efforts to impose an oil embargo, limit communications and air links, and stop arm sales, were circumvented. South Africa was able to further build up its military capacity and defence facilities—in part because of weapons and local manufacture agreements with NATO countries. The US viewed South Africa as a *de facto* member of NATO, supporting after 1957 development of atomic energy under a bilateral agreement and construction of a US-supplied nuclear research reactor in Pretoria. The US and its close ally Australia were undisturbed when in 1968 Pretoria refused to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty—a decision that prefigured its controversial ability to enrich uranium and

ultimately develop a nuclear weapons capability. Some Western countries, notably United States and France, used third-party agreements to avoid being directly linked with arms sales or weapons' production, including sophisticated missile systems. South Africa was integrated into *de facto* military-strategic alliances with the West. A UN special report concluded at the end of the decade that 'South Africa is now more powerful than ever before'.[28]

Resolute (In)Action

The contradictory impulses shaping Australian policy were starkly revealed as the UN strengthened its resolve against apartheid and approved broad covenants on human rights and racial equality. During the 1960s Australia was obliged to confront the implications of pursuing in the UN policies that had long identified it as a supporter of racism in general and white South Africa in particular. 'On apartheid, as on other questions', one commentator noted, 'Australia had found herself in shrinking and embarrassing company—'only Portugal' was as 'prepared fully to support South Africa'.[29]

After the killings at Sharpeville, Australia policy in the UN shifted. It approved in 1961 resolutions condemning apartheid. After protracted debate the General Assembly accepted—by a required two-thirds majority—that apartheid was an issue that disturbed international peace. Thus direct intervention against it was acceptable under the UN Charter and the norms of international law. During committee debate Australia's representative, J.D.L. Hood, criticised Pretoria's intransigence and condemned apartheid. But along with 15 other nations Australia voted against a further resolution that called for the severing of diplomatic relations, imposition of economic sanctions, and a special meeting of the Security Council to consider expelling South Africa from the UN.[30]

In late 1963, a special UN Committee on apartheid, convened specifically to decide policy compliance, unanimously called on member states to observe a recently agreed embargo on arms shipments. Although they did not openly dissent from this opinion, most Western allies, including the UK, the US and New Zealand, refused to accept the premise

that apartheid constituted a threat to peace and security. Canberra agreed, privately, with this view. However, on another issue Australia was more in accord with international opinion. In 1963 it did not oppose a resolution calling on the republic to abandon the much publicised Rivonia trial of Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, Indian community leader A.M. Kathandra and six others interned for sabotage and initiating armed resistance. Eight activists were found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, escaping the death penalty in part because of vociferous international pressure. Australia's ambassador Charles Kevin advised Pretoria that if any of the accused in the Rivonia trial 'were found guilty and sentenced to death it would be in South Africa's international interest that the government should exercise its prerogative of mercy'. Often referred to as 'the trial that changed South Africa', it was universally condemned. Shortly before it opened the General Assembly resolved that apartheid must end, all political prisoners be released, and ways found to ensure effective change in South Africa. Australia voted for this resolution. Only South Africa opposed it. Under the headline 'Policy Switch on Apartheid', the *Canberra Times* commented that 'the Menzies government had reversed its former attitude'. Allan Fraser, a Labor Party member of Australia's UN delegation, welcomed the fact that for the first time his country had joined world-wide demands that action be taken to end apartheid. In somewhat exaggerated language Fraser stated this action was the 'ultimate reversal' of the Menzies government's 'domestic jurisdiction' defence of the oppressive regime. Australia's changed position agreed with, and was obviously influenced by, that of its closest friends, the US, UK, Canada and New Zealand.[31]

At the height of international disquiet over the Rivonia trial, in December 1963 the Security Council unanimously requested that all states 'cease forthwith the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa'. The UK and France, while supporting this resolution, stated that they would distinguish between weapons that might be used to suppress internal dissent and those used for conventional defence and security purposes. Although not binding, this was the strongest UN declaration against apartheid to date. It built on the General Assembly resolution

of the previous year and anticipated further economic and material sanctions. Immediately, however, the US, UK and France reiterated their opposition to any mandatory or broader economic sanctions. Australia followed a similar path, claiming that such sanctions might be counter-productive or, in the words of external affairs minister Garfield Barwick, 'provocative of opposition'. (A decade later George W. Shepherd noted that no UN recommendation had 'stopped the flow of arms from the West [or] changed the relationship in any fundamental way'.)[32]

In the public arena Australia's policies adjusted to accommodate better relations with Asia and African members of the Commonwealth while, in the diplomatic words of its very conservative ambassador in Pretoria, not 'unduly dismissing' South Africa's interests. Cabinet broadly agreed that 'a calculated effort' should be made 'that straddled both sides without unnecessarily antagonising either'. Placating non-European opinion while balancing existing relations with the new Republic guided policy after 1963. Australia's changing UN posture might have reduced Afro-Asian concerns but, ironically, as ambassador Kevin reported from Pretoria with marked overstatement, 'External pressures on the republic have consolidated white opinion, submerged traditional differences between the Afrikaner and the British South African, and prompted both groups to adopt a common attitude against outside interference'. And, he continued, there 'are no indications that the government will yield to foreign criticism and it is confident that it can resist UN pressures arising from its race policy'. Kevin was arguably the senior diplomat most anxious to defend white South Africa—apprehension often explicit in his advice to Canberra. Shortly after, in the same year as Australia finally agreed that some level of economic sanction might be imposed on Pretoria, the ambassador reported with undisguised enthusiasm: 'meanwhile the South African economy is in a new phase of expansion', gathering momentum through expanded trade with Europe and North America and Japan. 'Militarily the country is reasonably well prepared and economically is in excellent shape,' he suggested.[33] The ambassador's deeply opinionated dispatches accorded closely with Cabinet sentiment—indeed they helped shape it. Despite the disruptions of Sharpeville, expulsion from the Commonwealth, international condemnation of the Rivonia trials and

the jailing of Mandela and other ANC activists, normal bilateral relations were resumed, and flourished.

Statements by Menzies' and senior Cabinet ministers sought to placate international criticism. But confidential Cabinet discussions painted a different picture. Shortly before the watershed Security Council resolution on 'voluntary sanctions' was issued in late 1963, Barwick failed to win Cabinet support for a proposal that Australia should seek 'to influence South Africa to at least modify its apartheid policies'. His views reflected departmental advice, not opinion held broadly in either the Liberal or Country parties. 'Australia, with its migration policy, Papua New Guinea and our past—and for that matter present—treatment of our aborigines', Barwick advised, must not imply 'support of a white minority government in Africa maintained by repressive legislation and perhaps by force of arms'. His words applied not only to developments in South Africa but also to those in Southern Rhodesia. Rejecting Barwick's advice, Cabinet reiterated Menzies earlier assertion that intervention in Africa 'was dead'. It resolved to support South Africa against efforts to impose an arms embargo. Diplomatic, trade and sporting relations would continue unchanged. Opposition to South Africa's possible expulsion from the UN would remain. Barwick's concern that Australia might be embarrassed internationally because of its apparent endorsement of apartheid was not widely shared in Cabinet and was never translated into consistent policy or informed public advocacy.[34] Barwick's successor, Paul Hasluck (minister for external affairs from April 1964 to February 1969), a traditional conservative with successful experience as minister the territories, told parliament in May 1964 that his government now supported General Assembly and Security Council resolutions 'aimed at dissuading the government of the Republic of South Africa from pursuing its policy of apartheid'. Nonetheless he eschewed direct intervention or 'inflammatory or provocative statements', favouring instead 'diplomatic calmness, moderation and wisdom'. In words repeated *ad nauseam* by conservatives in the following decade, Hasluck told parliament that sanctions and isolation would further entrench discrimination.[35]

The Coalition's benign policies attracted vociferous criticism, especially from African and Asian leaders. Ghana's prime minister, Kwame

Nkrumah, bluntly told Menzies in 1964 that condemning apartheid was meaningless unless it was supported by concrete action against it.[36]

Australia's representatives were little troubled by such unsolicited advice. Ambassador Kevin advised that at an 'official level' there 'seems to be some readiness to distinguish between Australian criticism of South African policies made in the United Nations and other international forums' and those less strident comments 'made in Australia or in the Australian Parliament'. Privately, South African officials did not interpret Australia's voting pattern in the UN as 'unhelpful', and they conceded that Australia's public position on race relations was necessarily 'governed by relations with Asia' rather than antipathy to white South Africa or white South Africans. (Pretoria's sympathetic interpretation of Australia's difficult position was not seriously ruptured until after the Springbok rugby tour in 1971.)[37]

Across the decade, from 1961, a plethora of UN resolutions urged member states to break off diplomatic relations with Pretoria, cease exporting arms and military equipment, and isolate the regime culturally and economically. Until 1967 the General Assembly appealed for moral, political and military assistance to opponents of apartheid engaged in a legitimate struggle for rights that were recognised under the UN Charter and its numerous Conventions. From 1968 it approved not only an expansion of such assistance but also intervention 'by all means available', an ambiguous phrase criticised by most western states which resisted suggestions that sought to legitimate armed intervention. Without Security Council agreement or wide support from countries other than those outside the non-aligned bloc, the 1968 General Assembly resolution—like so many before it—had little practical effect.[38]

No Western state complied fully with the UN in 1970 the Assembly again urged states to end arms sales and take no action that would assist the manufacture of arms in South Africa. Only South Africa and Portugal voted against this resolution. Australia, along with eight other western states, abstained, while 98 countries voted in favour of what had become a routine expression of censure. Australia and its allies steadfastly refused to support specific resolutions seeking to terminate diplomatic relations, economic links, or military cooperation. More than seven years after the

Assembly issued in December 1963 its most radical recommendations for multilateral sanction, the Security Council still refused to take comparable action. In essence, a majority on the Council did not accept that apartheid, or the cross-border armed conflict that helped sustain it, were a threat to either regional or world peace. However, against a background of global anti-apartheid protest, in 1970 the Council acknowledged that the struggle of South Africa's oppressed majority was legitimate and called upon all states to implement and strengthen the arms embargo anticipated almost a decade earlier.[39]

The reluctance of the international community to act against the minority government was criticised bitterly by the chairman of the UN's Special Committee on Apartheid, Abdulrahim Abby Farah. 'Too many resolutions and too little action are all that the UN can show after having dealt with the problem for twenty-five years', he commented. His strongest criticism was directed at the hypocrisy of the US, the UK and France whose frequent condemnations of racism 'have not been matched by either performance or precept'. And, he concluded, 'Not only has the UN failed to halt the progressive erosion of the inalienable rights of the non-white population of the region by white minority regimes, but we have allowed ourselves to become passive witnesses to the development of a situation which now constitutes a real threat to international peace and security.[40]

Extending White Supremacy: Namibia/South-West Africa and Zimbabwe/Southern Rhodesia

As Harold MacMillan acknowledged when addressing the South African parliament in 1960, most colonial powers accepted that African independence could no longer be denied. By the middle of the decade black African states occupied a larger number of seats than any other regional group at the UN, but their collective influence did not grow appreciably. Similarly, Commonwealth membership increased by the end of the decade to more than 30 countries, mainly from Africa and Asia; but its international influence waned. East–West tensions and war in Indochina dominated world politics. In this changing geopolitical environment white minority rule in Southern Africa was a second-order question—

irritating but not of central importance to any powerful actor in the Cold War. During the 1960s white supremacy was entrenched even more deeply across much of Southern Africa. Decolonisation stalled. Some prominent in the UN predicted that 'race war' was possible.[41]

Divisive issues raised by race and colonialism did not stop at South Africa's borders. After Sharpeville, struggle against apartheid in Namibia— South Africa's *de facto* fifth province—was led by SWAPO (the South West Africa People's Organisation). In 1966 SWAPO launched guerrilla raids against South African forces in 'occupied' Namibia. Pretoria's military response marked the beginning of a lengthy counter-insurgency war. SWAPO's efforts to liberate the Namibian people met repression very similar to that waged against the ANC and the non-communist splinter organisation the PAC. Although not agreeing with Afro-Asian demands that the UN terminate South Africa's mandate in Namibia, Australia did insist that Pretoria disavow its claim to have annexed the territory. Canberra argued that Pretoria must meet its international obligations to foster political and racial equality and support eventual independence for the territory. At the same time, Australia dissented from UN resolutions and refused to recognise SWAPO as the 'sole and authentic representative' of the Namibian people. Canberra was reluctant to endorse UN efforts to terminate what was, in effect, South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia—even when these were endorsed by the International Court of Justice. Australia's implicit support for apartheid was evident again in 1968 when it abstained in the Assembly from voting against an Afro-Asian resolution proclaiming that South-West Africa should be known as Namibia and that South Africa's illegal authority over it should end. A subsequent Council resolution in mid-1970 supported earlier Assembly recommendations but had no effect on South Africa's policies or power regionally.[42]

Australian response to events that threatened to extend white supremacy in Southern Rhodesia was typically cautious and ineffective. International division over the draft constitution proposed by Great Britain in 1961 was broadly similar to division over apartheid. Policy advice to Menzies suggested that 'African feeling' and 'African political rights' must be respected in discussions to resolve the constitutional crisis engulfing

Southern Rhodesia. Gordon Greenwood commented at the time that the 'conflict over Rhodesia was in reality an extension of the South African problem and of the reaction of the newly emancipated African states to any possibility of white political supremacy' within their continent. African resistance, headed from 1963 by ZANU under Robert Mugabe, echoed the rise of the ANC and SWAPO in the struggle against apartheid. Afro-Asian States argued that even if a draft constitution favoured by Great Britain was implemented, it would not guarantee majority rule based on the democratic principle of 'one man one vote'; that power would not be shared democratically between African and European citizens. Initially, Barwick endorsed departmental advice and in 1963 intimated that entry of an undemocratic Rhodesia to the Commonwealth 'would lead to appalling trouble'. However, Whitehall interpreted Barwick's position as insincere. It suggested confidentially that Menzies, if not all in his Cabinet, were untroubled by the prospect of another white-minority government in Southern Africa.[43] The Foreign Office was convinced that Canberra 'instinctively welcomes the prospect of an individual voice in the Commonwealth sympathetic to Australia's policies in such matters as New Guinea, immigration etc.' Canberra would welcome any new member of the Commonwealth that was 'unlikely to criticise' Australia 'and willing to play her part to defend the West against communism'.[44]

Yet if Australia's response to events in Rhodesia was confused by residual empathy for white settlers and Cold War strategic concerns, it was also informed by changing international opinion. As Menzies approached Marlborough House to join discussions on Rhodesia with 17 other Commonwealth leaders 1964 he was 'greeted with demonstrations against' his policies on 'apartheid and colonialism'. More surprisingly, however, Marlborough House was daubed with the slogan 'stand by white Rhodesians', while British National Party banners declared opposition to the changing 'colour' of the Commonwealth and bemoaned the death of the 'white-Dominion Union'.[45] Australian policy in subsequent years sought to balance conflicting interests, but it was never willing to act unilaterally. Canberra was always content to quietly follow Britain's diplomatic lead, regardless of which party held power in Westminster. Menzies somewhat reluctantly joined Labour prime minister Wilson

in warning of the 'various' 'serious' 'undesirable consequences' that would flow from any precipitous action by the white settler minority in Rhodesia. A declaration of independence that denied the democratic rights of its 'African majority', Wilson stated, would not be recognised as a legal state, either regionally or within the Commonwealth. Following Britain, Menzies told Commonwealth members in 1964 that Australia now endorsed an 'accelerated movement towards adult suffrage'. But, he suggested somewhat preposterously, any concerted Commonwealth action to promote majority rule would be 'an invasion of domestic jurisdiction'. Nonetheless, the lessons of international struggles over apartheid had been learnt. Menzies agreement with Wilson was pragmatic rather than principled. Privately, Menzies acknowledged that the consequences of unilateral action by Australia in support of a white Rhodesia might precipitate international action against Australia that would 'resemble that now being given to South Africa'.[46]

Following white Rhodesia's defiant Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) under Ian Smith in 1965, Menzies' Cabinet reluctantly accepted that the Security Council had the right to oppose the rebel regime. It agreed, as did subsequent Coalition governments, that the Smith's regime was illegal and that some level of 'selective sanctions' might be imposed to pressure it to change. Identification with white supremacy in any political form now posed political risks for Australia, in part because this was inconsistent with policies promoted by both the US and the UK (at least when Labour, not the Conservative Party, was in power). Australia was able to distance itself from developments in Southern Rhodesia because, as Menzies told parliament, 'the authority and responsibility for leading it to independence must continue to rest with Britain'. Later Coalition governments followed a similar line of reasoning (implying that intervention against Rhodesia's white government was inappropriate as UDI was a matter of 'domestic jurisdiction' for Britain as the colonising power). Menzies was losing interest in the Commonwealth, if not in Great Britain. He declined a British offer that he head a special Commonwealth mission to Rhodesia and did not attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lagos on this issue. (Memories of his embarrassing diplomatic

intervention in the Suez crisis perhaps dissuaded him from again acting on behalf of the 'mother country'.)[47]

Australia's ambiguity over white minority rule in Rhodesia mirrored policy towards white South Africa. Menzies' Cabinet reluctantly agreed that UDI was illegitimate, and morally wrong: but it would not give genuine support to sanctions mandated by the UN and agreed by the UK. Australia's cautious response to UDI was captured in a Cabinet submission in late 1965: 'If Australia does not go as far as the British, this will be interpreted as evidence of lack of sympathy for the rights of the black peoples and will be seen as aligning us with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia'. Menzies' Cabinet and subsequently those of Holt, Gorton and McMahon were divided by sympathy for Rhodesia's white communities and a desire not to break with UK policies. Any rift might undermine future 'British help in Southeast Asia' or New Guinea. Australia thus gave nominal public support to the UK—although there remained in Cabinet, as Cabinet member Peter Howson observed, 'a general feeling that for too long we have been swimming with the tide of majority opinion on "the winds of change".' His conclusion reflected a significant body of opinion within the government. 'The time has now come when we should support our white brethren in Southern Rhodesia', Howson wrote, 'even if it means that we are going to suffer in United Nations'. After Menzies retirement, the UK Foreign Office expressed surprise that his successor, Harold Holt, was willing to show 'sympathy for the Smith regime'. It was even more surprised by the new prime minister's statement that 'if he were a Rhodesian he would feel that he was committing racial suicide by conceding majority rule'. Five years after UDI, Glen Barclay observed, the perseverance of Rhodesia's rebellious settlers was 'strengthened by continuing and increasing demonstrations of sympathy and support from the old Dominions, most particularly from Australia'.[48]

Britain's faltering efforts to oversee a democratic transition to independence in Rhodesia resuscitated divisions over white supremacy within the Commonwealth. The Heads of Government Meeting in 1966 in Lagos was the first to be held outside the UK. Nineteen countries sent official delegations. Australia was satisfied with limited representation and sought observer status only. Its support for proposed UK intervention against

Smith's regime and for coordinating machinery to enforce sanctions was equally tentative. While prepared to follow efforts by Wilson's Labour government to negotiate an end to the illegal white rule, Australia, unlike most African and Asian members of the Commonwealth, never expressed support for the use of force should selective mandatory sanctions fail. Parliamentary lobbyists within the Coalition, led by D.J. (Jim) Killen and Wilfred Kent Hughes, visited Southern Africa as guests of the Rhodesian and South African governments, and enjoyed strong (if private) support from within Coalition parties. Holt implicitly suggested that Rhodesia's interests were synonymous with those of its British settlers.[49] Canberra was not genuinely concerned that from 1967 South African military units intervened to defend the Smith regime—actions that violated British territorial sovereignty as well as the rights of Africans in the territory. More generally, Australia was unwilling to openly condemn South Africa's use of special military forces to destabilise neighbouring countries and strengthen Portuguese colonial authority in Mozambique and Angola.[50] Indeed, Australia's expanding military-strategic links with Pretoria indirectly strengthened the actions of police and security forces beyond South Africa's borders. While conceding that the Smith regime was illegal, Cabinet sympathy rested with its white rulers, as it did with South Africa's minority government. But Canberra was not prepared to openly oppose UN resolutions on Rhodesia, simply because, as one commentator observed, 'International life almost exclusively in the company of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia does not bear thinking about'.[51]

In the UN from 1968 to 1970 Australia's agreed that Rhodesia's independence should not be granted before universal suffrage underpinned constitutional reform; but Canberra continued to oppose any use of force against the Smith regime. Nor did Australia act bilaterally to comply with sanction recommendations. In March 1970, the breakaway minority government declared Rhodesia a republic. This stimulated stronger condemnation within the Commonwealth and the UN where an overwhelming majority of countries agreed that member states should refrain from formally recognising the illegal regime and not assist it in any way.[52] However, no effective Commonwealth consensus emerged in the 1960s on appropriate action against apartheid or minority rule in

Zimbabwe/Southern Rhodesia. Other racial issues also continued to divide the Commonwealth, including Britain's contentious response to a growing influx of coloured immigrants, and Australia's discriminatory practices on immigration and Indigenous rights. Expressed most strongly by African members—the 'black Commonwealth'—rifts on these issues as well as apartheid persistently aggravated divisions between member nations. Senior journalist David Solomon observed with dismay that in the decade after Sharpeville 'the British Commonwealth barely survived a series of crises over race issues'.[53]

Assessing the political realities of Southern Africa at the end of the decade the US National Security Council judged the white regimes stable, their authority beyond serious challenge. 'There is no likelihood in the foreseeable future that the liberation movements could overthrow or seriously threaten the existing white governments', it concluded. Despite current sanctions, with 'South African help' the white regime in Rhodesia can 'hold out indefinitely' while 'the South African police and military forces will be able to successfully counter any insurgent or dissident activity in the foreseeable future'.[54]

An International Convention on Racial Discrimination

The changing climate of international opinion on human rights and racism encouraged landmark resolutions in the UN during the 1960s, although such statements had little enforcement power. In late 1963 the UN finally approved the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Debate was protracted, overlapping acrimonious consideration of apartheid. It inevitably drew attention to the problem of white supremacy and postcolonial racism, not only in southern Africa but also in Australia and the United States. And, equally troubling for those wedded to conventional Western assumptions about race and difference, the agreed declaration emphasised that 'Any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous'. Anti-racism groups and the anti-apartheid movement were buoyed by the declaration. Hugh Gilchrist, who had

served so constructively in Pretoria and Cape Town in the late 1950s and was now a member of Australia's UN delegation, observed that 'racial intolerance' was a 'dreadful disease … and it is the duty of all of us to work for its elimination'. But there remained predictable limits to Australia's willingness to act against apartheid or racism generally.[55]

Coalition governments continually deferred ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination that was opened for signature on 21 December 1965. In UN debates it was widely acknowledged that Sharpeville had heightened the need for united action on civil rights. The agreed final date for ratification by individual countries was notionally 31 December 1971. Successive Coalition governments were reluctant to accept the monitoring and enforcement machinery set out in the convention. It was, critics emphasised, the first human rights instrument to insist that parties take particular action to achieve defined objectives. Coalition governments, wedded to doctrines of non-intervention, deemed mandatory reporting and policy implementation unacceptable threats to Australian national sovereignty. And, no Coalition administration would, or could, insist that all states or territories remove offending discriminatory legislation from their statutes. Without national compliance, the convention could not be approved. Surprisingly, however, in 1968 Canberra did support a General Assembly resolution condemning racial discrimination and encouraging countries to join the convention. By the end of 1970 more than 40 states had acceded to the convention. Australia had not. Only after the ALP came to power in 1972 and discriminatory statutes were finally removed in both federal and state jurisdictions was the convention ratified and Australia's Racial Discrimination Act approved.[56]

Coalition Drift: 'Standard Formulas'

Prevarication over the signing of the convention was emblematic of broader foreign policy ambivalence. During the 1960s all Coalition governments were guided by 'standard [policy] formulas'. These, a senior official noted, 'made it clear' that Australia 'deplores the policy of apartheid', but

'withdrawal of recognition or harsh sanctions' against South Africa was 'unacceptable and counter-productive'.[57] Australia remained a significant colonial power in Papua New Guinea, defended Dutch authority over West New Guinea, and was as America's staunchest ally at war against nationalist forces in Indochina. In Southern Africa it paid little more than lip-service to UN-sponsored attempts to isolate Pretoria or leverage democratic change in Namibia or Southern Rhodesia. Beneath this predictable diplomatic surface, bilateral relations were built on mutual security concerns and un-relenting anti-communism. The political implications of apartheid were global, regional, and local.[58] Gordon Greenwood commented that Australia was at the end of the decade, as it had been at the start, 'out of accord with the climate' of world opinion, its behaviour still 'likely to antagonise Asian and African states'.[59]

In defiance of UN and Commonwealth recommendations, in 1968 Australia mounted a huge trade exhibition in Johannesburg. Occupying twenty-five acres, it was the largest trade fair staged in Southern Africa. Unsurprisingly, it drew bitter international condemnation and accelerated anti-apartheid protest in Australia. The Gorton government was unapologetic—unconcerned that the lavish event was viewed as tangible support for the minority regimes in both Pretoria and Salisbury. At the same time, diplomatic advice reinforced a theme familiar across the 1960s: Australia should not publicly encourage new military ties or overtly acknowledge relationships in 'the political field'; but it should do nothing that might hinder trade or 'commercial exchanges'.[60]

In the UN the Gorton administration agreed to only the most innocuous expressions of opposition to apartheid. It abstained or opposed resolutions that sought to isolate South Africa diplomatically or economically. Australia's compromised behaviour allied it with a very small shifting Coalition of states that variously included France, Portugal, South Africa itself, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Gorton government's cautious response in December 1969 to yet another UN resolution condemning South Africa—this time in relation to political prisoners and Pretoria's military intervention beyond its borders—again emphasised Australia's reluctance to act independently or decisively. Accepting realistically that it might be 'in a very small minority' if it

voted against the resolution, its delegation in New York was told: 'You may abstain if the United States and the United Kingdom do so and if there is a representative group of other Western countries doing likewise, but should cast a negative vote if the United Kingdom and United States do so'. This instruction was consistent with wider Australian foreign policy in the years of military involvement in Vietnam. It was also consistent with Australia's responses to apartheid across two decades. It reflected a characteristic level of policy compliance with its 'great and powerful allies', as well as the primacy of 'tangible interests' in relationships with South Africa.[61] Most controversially Gorton supported the 'right' of the UK to sell maritime arms to South Africa, ostensibly because this was anticipated under terms of the Simonstown naval agreement of 1955 designed to ensure the security of trade routes and promote the defence interests of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In the face of growing Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean, Australia was unmoved by the overwhelming antagonism of Commonwealth members, other than the UK and New Zealand. Gorton's position aroused bitter complaint from African representatives and from anti-apartheid organisations everywhere. At home, leaders of the ALP, including Gough Whitlam, Don Dunstan in South Australia and premier John Tonkin in Western Australia, were openly critical, signing with 50,000 others a petition condemning proposed sales of British maritime arms to Pretoria.[62]

Most countries in the UN and the Commonwealth interpreted the sale of arms to the apartheid state as 'an essentially racial question'. For Coalition governments in Australia, relations with UK and wider strategic interests were of primary importance and overrode uneasiness about possible isolation in the UN or concern that the Commonwealth might break apart if 'racial questions' were not resolved. In October 1970, Gorton's Cabinet was unmoved when the General Assembly, by a vote of 94–2, demanded that all countries abide by Security Council resolutions and end arms sales to Pretoria. Australia was one of seven countries that abstained. In contrast to hardening international opinion, Canberra's position had not changed since 1968 when it refused in the UN to support the watershed sanctions Resolution, no. 2396.[63] Throughout 1971 Australia continued at the UN to follow its allies in resisting efforts to end arms' sales or the export of

military technology to the white regimes in Southern Africa, and joined with most European powers in voting against resolutions calling on Britain to use force if necessary to end Ian Smith's minority government. Australia endorsed the position of Britain's Conservative prime minister, Edward Heath. Both governments resisted lobbying by newer Commonwealth member countries and the anti-apartheid movement for effective sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa; the immediate release of political prisoners; and termination of the Simonstown security agreement.

The unresolved crisis over race issues in Southern Africa threatened the very survival of the Commonwealth. Nowhere was this more evident than at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Singapore in January 1971. Eventually a Declaration of Commonwealth Principles was agreed—albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm by member countries. It expressed opposition to 'colonial domination and racial oppression' and suggested that all efforts would be made to further 'the principles of self-determination and non-racialism'. Anti-racism advocates were encouraged by the pledge that 'No country will afford to regimes which practice racial discrimination assistance which in its own judgement directly contributes to the pursuit or consolidation of the evil policy'. But if the voice of the emerging post-colonial Commonwealth found expression in these words it was all but silenced by an accompanying clause 'rejecting coercion as an instrument of policy'. For conservative leaders, notably Heath and Gorton, this caveat reiterated principles of non-intervention and the sanctity of domestic sovereignty. Like Menzies and Holt before him, Gorton was unmoved by majority opinion within the Commonwealth on white minority rule, whether in Southern Rhodesia or South Africa. In the Commonwealth, Australia remained isolated from the overwhelming majority of member countries, with the predictable exception of traditional friends New Zealand and, when under Conservative Party rule, the UK.[64] Gorton vigorously defended sporting contacts with South Africa, emphasising that his country would not act against apartheid simply because it 'did not like the colour of some particular government abroad' or because it 'did not like the policies that some particular governments followed'. In Australia's 'own judgement', Gorton asserted, sporting exchanges had

the potential to bring change to apartheid and would not consolidate this alleged 'evil'.[65]

Yet Canberra did not fully share Pretoria's assessments of strategic risk or racial vulnerability.' South Africa's public assessments of the dangers of Communist penetration in Africa and the Indian Ocean' were 'obsessive', ambassador Bill Cutts reported in 1969. The two countries 'have strongly divergent policies on the basic question of relations with Afro/Asia', and are likely to 'differ in their assessments as to what constitutes a threat to their interests', he observed. Pretoria's security 'obsession', he concluded, is based on extreme anxiety about threats to South Africa's racial policies rather than on the sound judgement of the dangers of communism, 'great as they may be'. Despite veiled criticism of Pretoria, the 'future initiatives' suggested by the ambassador were untroubled by deepening international protest and efforts to impose economic sanctions. Reflecting routine government policy, Cutts blandly noted: 'We should seek to maintain unimpaired existing contacts and associations which have been built up through our former Commonwealth connections, through normal commercial intercourse and through the tradition of sporting competition between our two countries.'[66]

Assessing 'the intimacy of Australia and South Africa' apparent at the end of the decade, Kenneth Good wrote: 'Australia is already much more closely associated with white South Africa than is usually and conservatively recognised'. His conclusions contradicted a decade of government denials about the character and extent of the multi-layered relationship. 'These relations are of many dimensions, both bilateral and multilateral', and they have developed in a geopolitical environment 'that is highly politicised and dynamic'. They had developed also in a mutually accommodating bilateral environment. Commenting on the 'binding' influences of commerce, communications, tourism and sport, Good suggested controversially—but accurately—that shared 'racism and an obsession with military defence and anti-Communist alliances are deepening and activating' bilateral 'links'.[67] Ironically, at the same time international opposition to apartheid threatened to fracture, or at the very least further complicate, the bilateral relationship. 'Similarities of history, outlook and interests' still conditioned this enduring association, Good

wrote. Ambassador Cutts, who served in Pretoria from 1968 until 1972 reported that Australia 'is regarded as one of South Africa's few possible friends in a hostile world'. 'Even so', his diplomatic advice late in 1969 conceded, Australia desired 'to avoid a close association, or the appearance of a close association, with South Africa'. Yet throughout the 1960s Australia did little to camouflage its support, prompting some Liberals to tell Gorton, in private, that his irresolute posture made Australia itself appear to be 'a white supremacist nation'.[68]

Gorton, who openly defended white Rhodesia, was replaced as prime minister on 10 March 1971 by the more conciliatory (and indecisive) William McMahon. While ambivalent about sanctions, McMahon did not overtly endorse the rogue minority government of Ian Smith. But his faltering administration did not attempt to counter the propaganda activities of the Rhodesia Information Centre (a *de facto* propaganda arm of Smith's regime) or limit the lobbying activities of the Rhodesia–Australian Association (which maintained offices in most state capitals). Apart from Pretoria, no national government was more willing to sustain relations with the illegal minority government, or more hostile to the nationalist movement struggling against it. Subverting international sanctions, Australian exports increased annually, making it the second largest exporter to Rhodesia by 1971. Expanded trade was justified by 'special humanitarian circumstances' that conveniently were never defined. And, within the wider Commonwealth, Australia joined with the United Kingdom and New Zealand to undermine plans to expand sanctions and impose a total ban on all trade with the breakaway government. As Richard Hall commented in an article appropriately titled 'Australia and Rhodesia: Black Interests and White Lies', Canberra's 'characteristic ambivalence in accepting sanctions formally but stretching the terms of "humanitarian exemption"' damaged 'the respectable image it set out to achieve'.[69]

White supremacy remained deeply entrenched in Southern Africa— despite repeated UN resolutions against apartheid; despite rulings in the International Court against South Africa's colonial hold over South West Africa; despite putative international agreement over arms sales and economic sanctions; despite mounting pressure from African states

and collaborative resistance under the outlawed ANC; despite widespread condemnation and protest action by a broad international Coalition of anti-apartheid activist organisations; despite diplomatic pressure, especially from non-aligned countries and Western Europe; despite collective sanctions and boycotts reaching into sport and trade. Indeed, throughout the 1960s the extremes of apartheid were further extended and even more coercively enforced.

Coalition policies remained unresponsive to world opinion. Exasperated, Gough Whitlam told parliament that when voting in the General Assembly or at committee level on 'all controversial questions of colour and colonies' Australia never voted progressively or directly against South Africa, or Portugal. Indeed, Australia abstained or 'consistently voted' differently from all her 'neighbours in Southeast Asia and the Asian Commonwealth and the Indian Ocean'. Australia voted in favour of less than 10% of all resolutions on sensitive international questions, including decolonisation in New Guinea and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and Pretoria's control of Namibia. Throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s no Coalition administration took any action that might further isolate Pretoria. Such inaction was excused as necessary if the West was to 'influence … more moderate attitudes towards racial relationships' and encourage internal reform; but more importantly it helped sustain Pretoria's war against liberation movements in Southern Africa and confirmed its wider role as an ally in the Cold War.[70]

Shortly after Sharpeville high commissioner Owen Davis had warned that Australia must distance itself from racism or face acute foreign policy difficulties in Africa and Asia. In newly independent countries anxiety about 'racial questions' was extreme.[71] Issues linked to apartheid continued to highlight the contradictions complicating Australia's regional ambitions. Summarising this dilemma a prominent Australian journalist observed at the end of the decade that his country seemed determined to further antagonise people in Asia and the Pacific by refusing to reduce its ties to apartheid South Africa.[72] As a tired Coalition government struggled to retain public support, a leading national newspaper lamented that Australia remained 'tarred twice over with the brush of apartheid and white Australia'.[73]

Australia's benign policies reflected its own deep racial anxieties as well as cultural empathy for European minorities living in post-colonial Africa. 'If the solution to the South African problem is postulated as being multiracialism, which in point of time must mean eventual Black supremacy', Charles Kevin had earlier observed from Pretoria, then 'the essential question is how under such circumstances the position of the white minority could be ensured'. But 'Partition' on a racial basis, 'in whatever form', would not be accepted by Afro-Asians, Africans, or whites. The 'possibilities of compromise … are remote'; the ambassador concluded with uncharacteristic hyperbole: 'the South African situation [is] a Greek tragedy moving to an inevitable climax'.[74]

Unsporting Fields:
Playing with Apartheid

No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on the grounds of race, religion or political affiliation.

The Olympic Charter

Australia openly constitutes itself in the eyes of the sporting world as South Africa's white friend and greatest ally.[1]

Anti-apartheid campaign leader Peter Hain, 1971

South African sport mirrored apartheid's vast mechanisms of discrimination. In unique ways international competition connected the nation to the outside world. Isolation from the highest levels of contest became the most effective lever of action against the apartheid regime (in large part because UN sanctions resolutions failed so dismally in the economic, strategic and diplomatic fields). The white regime was especially vulnerable to efforts to exclude it from competition in traditional 'Empire sports', notable cricket, rugby and tennis, or from the international Olympic Movement. Isolation from such competition might undermine the political authority of the ruling National Party. But it was impossible to predict whether this would oblige Pretoria to begin reform, leave discrimination untouched or further intensify repression against those advocating change.

As we have seen, although international condemnation of apartheid intensified throughout the 1960s, South Africa's diplomatic, economic and

security ties with the West expanded. This contradiction expressed the fundamental obstacle confronting countries and organisations determined to undermine white rule in South Africa. The prospect of 'moral isolation' was of little concern to the leaders of the National Party or its supporters, provided this did 'not lead to isolation in other fields'. From the early-1950s however, non-white organisations in South Africa had launched a direct challenge to apartheid in 'other fields', demanding integrated multi-racial sport. Here, as in more conventional political areas, resistance to apartheid began in local communities. Sport became the central and most visible arena of contest. In the absence of effective international action, white South Africa's opponents attempted to reform the organisation of domestic sport while collaborating with anti-apartheid activists to leverage deeper changes. Isolation from international sport became the focus of 'a larger struggle', US tennis star Arthur Ashe commented on the eve of the Mexico Olympics, because it was the tactic most likely 'to put a crack in South Africa's racist wall'.[2]

Inseparable: Sport, Politics and Nation

White Australia

The standard formula that defined Australian government policies towards South Africa also guided sporting relations with it. Extended to the fields of sport, the pragmatic approach combined expressions of moral opprobrium with political neutrality and non-intervention. It was premised on the apparently self-evident assertion that politics and sport were not mixed and should be kept separate. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Australians who played in or against South Africa argued, as did Rugby international Rupert Rosenblum, that 'sport [is] separate from politics'. This claim was always strongly contested. Jon Gemmell wrote dismissively that 'it is one of the common clichés associated with sport that "sport and politics should not mix".' And he concluded, 'the naivety of such a distinction' fast became 'a sport in its own right'. Most commentary agreed that the chorus of public demands to keep politics out of sport camouflaged a desire to keep the politics of sport unchanged. In

the arena of sport from the late 1950s Australian policy and government rhetoric did not change appreciably. Canberra's compromised political responses to apartheid paralleled its protection of sporting contacts with it. In 1963, at the very time when Australia had finally agreed to publicly support a UN resolution condemning apartheid, a Cabinet submission reiterated the Coalition's pragmatism. 'Our attitude to all … moves against South Africa', it acknowledged, is 'to deprecate apartheid' while trying 'to limit pressure and actions against' the South African government.[3]

The convenient assertion that politics and sport were not mixed—and should not be conflated—prevailed in much of white Australia. As is evident in later pages, support for this view declined very slowly, despite South Africa's exclusion from the Olympic movement; disruptive 'halt the tour' protests in the UK, Australia and New Zealand; UN resolutions on sporting sanctions; and the progressive isolation of white South Africa from most international sporting competitions and organisations. Coalition administrations, from Menzies to McMahon, maintained the fiction that unlike 'less advanced countries' government in Australian 'was not directly concerned' in arranging or controlling sport or recreation; that 'sporting activities' were organised by independent associations acting separately in the interests of different sporting communities. As government did not directly influence representation in major international competitions, including the Davis Cup, the Commonwealth Games or the Olympics, such activities could not be said to be the subject of political influence or control. Nor, this argument implied, did the staging of sporting events or sporting success have wider political implications. But informed opinion spoke of a country's sporting profile as an important influence on its national identity and its image on the world stage.[4]

The politics of sport were manifest in myriad ways. International competition—from the Olympics down—was never conducted in an isolated social sphere conveniently separated from the cross-currents of international politics or competing nationalisms. Nazi Germany's efforts to use the Munich Olympics in 1936 to confirm its doctrines of racial superiority symbolised the extreme interrelatedness of politics and sport. Twenty years later the politics of decolonisation and Cold War brought

division to the Olympics Games in Melbourne. 'Blood in the Pool' during the water polo match between Hungary and the USSR was for at least one newspaper commentator a colourful symbol of politics at the Olympics. The games were severely disrupted by a series of boycotts that focused separately on the Suez crisis, the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary, and participation by the 'second China', Taiwan. Rumblings over South Africa's presence did not give rise to any boycott. Divisions over racism remained submerged—although at future Olympics the politics of racism, not Cold War rivalries, provoked strongest division. In the eyes of the Menzies government, and most Australians, the Melbourne Olympics was a unique national triumph that left a glowing image globally. Subsequent commentary was less nationalistic, more realistic. As noted sports journalist Gary Linnell wrote fifty years later, 'playing games' is 'always political'. The Melbourne Olympics demonstrated unequivocally that 'games are not just sporting contests; they never have been' and 'never will be'.[5]

In post-war Australia, sport enjoyed the imprimatur of all federal and state governments. Sporting culture and sporting successes were interpreted patriotically. They were at the core of jingoistic stories of nation, shared community, egalitarian opportunity and 'national character'. As in most other democracies after the war, in Australia participation in organised sport and recreation was a bedrock of local community. Success reflected not only individual or team success but translated implicitly into much broader community achievement and identity. It expressed individual and community aspirations and was conscripted by the state as embodiment of national progress and democracy. In modern Australia, albeit in ways very different from South Africa, sporting culture and political culture were interwoven. Successful images of the distinctive, or 'exceptional', sporting nation were projected on to an international canvas. Despite its relatively small population, Australia was recognised as a major sporting power. Britain's *Daily Express* commented in 1961, for example, that 'Australia is a nation of only 10 million people and yet it is the world's leading sporting nation'. Success, especially on the international stage, embodied the country's aspirations, strengthening unity and promoting its favoured image abroad. Donald Horne suggested, without exaggeration, that 'To

play sport, or watch others and to read and talk about it, is to uphold the nation and build its character'.[6]

Sporting success was a metaphor for the small country's wider achievements. In this nationalist narrative, race and culture were implicitly linked. Individual sporting prowess—in swimming, tennis, cricket or track and field—displayed physical attributes and athletic achievement unique to the people of the white nation. Champions, like swimmer Murray Rose, runner Betty Cuthbert, cricketer Neil Harvey, or tennis player Lew Hoad, embodied the young nation's sporting superiority. Australia's remarkable medal count at the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, along with the affluence and openness of the host city, reinforced a distinct sense of nation, place and way of life. For those who equated national identity with assumed racial character, sporting success confirmed the value—and superiority— of demographic unity reflected in individual and national 'whiteness'. Sport was at the heart of national culture and political identity. From the early 1950s, especially, the sporting achievements of democratic Australia were embraced by the nation and displayed with growing confidence to an international audience. A uniquely successful sporting culture underpinned growing national maturity as ties to the mother country weakened and white Australia's borders slowly opened. Sporting success became a celebrated measure of the importance of the small nation on the international stage. Victories in cricket's Ashes series or Davis Cup tennis brought constant attention abroad and jingoistic celebration at home. As Jeff Kingston has argued 'the capacity of sports to ignite and amplify nationalist passions and prejudices is as extraordinary as is their power to console, unify, uplift and generate goodwill'.[7]

Uncomfortably, recognition of the achievements of white Australia inadvertently exposed the marginalisation of Indigenous communities. Political obstacles, discriminatory laws and deep social barriers commonly denied Indigenous Australians opportunities to participate fully in virtually any sporting code, at virtually any level. Most Australians who denied the connections between sport and politics, equally ignored the brutal reflections of racism and discrimination evident throughout every level of sport and recreation. In a pioneering work, published in 1995, Colin Tatz documented the 'obstacles'—political, legislative, social and

cultural—that denied or limited sporting opportunities for Indigenous Australians. Discriminatory laws and social segregation were built into the very fabric of white Australia, denying most Indigenous people equal access to recreational facilities or educational institutions. And, while the nation's sporting successes were visibly celebrated, Aboriginal achievements were, in Ernie Dingo's words, 'like the dark side of the moon … there, but so little known'.[8] At the 1956 Olympics Australia welcomed South Africa's participation free from any reservations about apartheid or its own deep culture of racism. White Australia's troubled history remained submerged: Indigenous Australians largely invisible, their stories and cultures unacknowledged. Not until the Mexico Games, was an Indigenous Australian selected as an Olympic representative. In these games three Indigenous athletes, Michael Ahmatt, Adrian Blair and Frank Roberts, competed. Charles Perkins observed that promising athletes, such as running champion Wally McArthur, were denied Olympic selection because they were Aboriginal—an observation that applied to many talented Indigenous sports people in many areas of sport after the war.[9]

White South Africa

Sport in South Africa, Nobel laureate J.M. Coetzee wrote with only slight exaggeration, is 'the opium of the masses'.[10] When isolation 'loomed in the mid-1960s', Christopher Merrett remarked more subtly that 'International contact was interpreted as approval: victories were regarded as vindication of the white South African way of life; and defeat was akin to national tragedy.'[11] The politics of race shaped every aspect of sport under the apartheid regime and influenced all spheres of international sporting contact with it. For white South Africa, as *Die Volksblad* acknowledged, 'every international sporting success … is a blow against our political enemies'.[12] Culture and sport were embedded in rigid ideologies of genetic difference and racial order. The sporting achievements of white teams and individuals were seen as reflections of distinct racial attributes. Writing at the outbreak of the Soweto uprising in 1976, Joan Brickhill observed: 'defeat in the sports field is treated as a national humiliation for whites; success confirms their worldview of the master race, the heroic image of

themselves, and justifies to themselves the position of superiority they claim and hold'.[13] Paradoxically, 'racial separation' ensured that claims of 'superiority' could not be tested in open competition or in competitions between particular social groups.

In South Africa 'the races do not mix on the sports field [as] social mixing leads inexorably to miscegenation', the arch-conservative *Die Transvaler* editorialised in 1965; 'to uphold the white race and its civilisation not one single compromise can be entered into—not even when it comes to a visiting rugby team'.[14] At every level, organised sport in South Africa reflected racial separation. Dennis Brutus observed that segregation was so deeply embedded that the government did 'not actually' need to legislate 'against mixed sport'. Separation was enforced by bannings, warnings, surveillance, and 'severe' policing (most notably by the notorious Special Branch). Sportspeople and administrators 'who fought for the removal of all race barriers', were targeted. Throughout the apartheid era no integrated sporting team ever represented South Africa abroad. Non-white South Africans were denied the right to compete in the Olympics or to represent their country in any international competition.[16]

A deeply symbiotic relationship existed between apartheid's explicit political framework and the less formal racial practices customary across all sporting codes. Sport was organised and played within a culture of racial separation that, Verwoerd asserted, could not be compromised. Restrictions against interracial sport applied separately to various racial groups. 'Local sports authorities all over South Africa', an Australian diplomat reported, were pressured by government 'to separate the three non-white races' from playing alongside 'each other'. It was the 'declared policy' and the 'custom' of South Africa, the minister of the interior Jan de Klerk stated when defending apartheid in 1962, 'that White and Non-White organise their sport activities, in whatever sphere, separately'. The rationale for this policy was unapologetically racist. 'Within our country's borders whites must compete against whites and non-whites against non-whites', de Klerk asserted. With unintended irony he stated: 'This policy is a continuation of the republic's traditional policy … aimed at ensuring … that one race is not dominated by another'.[15]

Where legislation fell short of ensuring separation in any area, social traditions and 'race memory' were widely recognised. Rugby, a strongly Afrikaner sport, expressed the deep interconnections between the powerful Afrikaner Broederbond, the South African Rugby Board and apartheid's architects, the National Party. Soccer, or football, was played mostly by non-whites. Cricket was dominant in 'English' communities. The cricketing talents of Indian and coloured competitors were developed on segregated playing fields and organised by segregated administrative bodies.

Just as mixed sport was prohibited, so too were spectators rigidly segregated according to definitions of race. African, coloured, and Indian groups were obliged to use separate entrances, separate seating enclosures, and separate amenities including refreshment outlets and toilet facilities. Some sporting arenas banned all non-whites from attending particular events. At all venues, whites enjoyed privileged access to superior spectator areas and facilities. Visiting teams and supporters shared privileges routinely denied all people of non-European or mixed race.[16]

The politics of apartheid penetrated every aspect of sport—from community rivalries to international competition. Multiracial or mixed sport was prohibited. Only all-white teams were allowed to compete internationally. Teams wishing to visit were denied entry if they included non-white members. White South Africa could not pursue bilateral competition with teams from non-white countries. In cricket, for example, test matches were held routinely with England, New Zealand and Australia, but other important cricketing countries, including the West Indies, India and Pakistan, were denied such elite contests—even though until 1961 all were members of the Imperial Cricket Conference. When South Africa left the Commonwealth it was automatically excluded from the ICC, a body open only to Commonwealth countries. However, white member countries continued to exchange visits with teams from South Africa having, as Mary Corrigal pointed out, previously failed to express 'concern let alone opposition' to the extension of racism to the highest levels of sport. Rugby and tennis exchanges, or golfing competitions, took place in an environment broadly defined by traditions of racism that had dominated the British Empire and remained potent within the post-war

Commonwealth. However, these traditions had much less currency in the global arena of Olympic competition. Here, as in the United Nations, white South Africa confronted an alliance of non-European countries determined use sport as a political leaver against it.[17]

Olympic Movement

The insinuation of race into sport, especially the Olympics, became the principal driver of international movement against apartheid. As at the UN and in the Commonwealth, from the late 1940s membership of the Olympic movement was transformed by decolonisation and rising civil rights demands from newly independent member countries in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. International sport was disrupted by a widening Coalition of countries and organisations demanding the elimination of racism. In the mid-1950s, when advocating an international boycott of South African cricket, Trevor Huddleston wrote prophetically: 'just because the Union is so good at sport such isolation would shake its self-assurance very severely: It might be an extraordinarily effective blow to the racialism which brought it into being'. The Olympic Charter explicitly condemned discrimination 'on the grounds of race, religion or political affiliation'. It is not surprising, then, that the first significant international actions against apartheid were centred on Olympic participation. Summarising the response of the Olympic movement to apartheid, Keba Mbaye, Senagal's distinguished IOC representative, identified two distinct phases: 'one of indifference and hesitation characterised by embarrassed and contradictory attitudes', before the Summer Olympics in Rome in 1960; the other by strong interest in the issue and a readiness to take action'.[18]

In the first year of formal apartheid, 1948, African athletes had attempted to bring their exclusions from open competition to the attention of the IOC. Under president Avery Brundage the IOC stated simply that selection criteria for sporting teams was a domestic matter and thus the province exclusively of national associations. For Brundage, who openly cited the Munich Games as as an expression of the Olympic movement's finest principles, racism was of no concern. Olympic selection was decided independently by individual countries, and the

Olympic movement would accept only delegations authorised by them.[19] During the 1950s and early 1960s efforts to leverage reform by cutting white South Africa's deep trans-national sporting links made faltering headway while confronting resistance from within the IOC (to which SAOGA, the all-white South African Olympic Games Association, was fully accredited). Despite apartheid in sport, South Africa continued to enjoy the support of virtually all European members of the IOC, the USA and most in the 'old' Commonwealth. Not until 1968 did UN resolutions specifically recommend that isolation from international sport be used as a weapon against apartheid. However, many separate sports administrations, including the IOC, were pressured to act long before this. From 1955, Australian sports bodies looked on with some surprise as efforts to disaffiliate white South African sporting associations from international parent organisations began. Complementing this strategy, non-white associations attempted to secure recognition from the IOC and other international competitions, including the Empire-Commonwealth Games. Many international sporting associations supported such efforts. Incremental change began. In 1955 South Africa's all-white table tennis union was expelled from international competition. Although largely symbolic, the Special UN Unit on Apartheid concluded that this decision marked 'the first victory against apartheid-sport'.[20] Other sports bodies initiated similar action, including soccer, fencing, boxing, judo, netball, gymnastics, cycling, athletics, wrestling, and softball (although it was not until 1970 that Davis Cup tennis organisers acted).[21]

Pretoria's response to non-recognition of its 'national' (white) table tennis association anticipated its bitter reaction to initiatives in other sports. Passports of representatives of the multiracial Table Tennis Union were confiscated, denying non-white team members the right to travel or participate in overseas competition. At the same time, the non-racial South African Soccer Federation sought recognition by FIFA and the Federation of International Football Associations, and non-white cricketing bodies appealed to the ICC for full international recognition. Racial separation in sport now drew deeper criticism abroad. Despite this the minister of the interior, Dr T.F. Donges, reiterated in June 1956 that while sport played by non-whites was not illegal, participation must accord with the overarching

policy of 'separate development'. Shortly afterwards, all sporting bodies were banned from permitting any level of mixed-race competition.[22]

Although racism in sport was becoming a significant issue, it was not the source of boycotts, or indeed much adverse publicity, during the Melbourne Olympics. South Africa's participation in 1956 excited virtually no censure—although the embarrassing behaviour of some of its sportsmen and its dismal medal count were condemned at home.[23] However, during preparation for the next Summer Olympics, in Rome in 1960, South Africa was obliged to address fundamental questions. Its very right to remain within in the Olympic movement was threatened by the same international forces working to isolate it in the UN and expel it from the Commonwealth.

As apartheid's regulations prohibiting mixed sport were made more comprehensive, so too were they more bitterly resisted. Disaffected organisations, like the provocatively named Non-Racial Table Tennis Federation, pioneered attempts to win recognition abroad. This tactic was labelled 'subversive' by Pretoria. Dissenting 'non-racial' associations were warned to expect 'retaliation' from government. By 1960, however, they had won considerable backing. Organised collectively under the South African Sports Association (SASA) they demanded that all sport be conducted on a non-racial basis; that merit alone must be the only criteria for team selection or representative honours.

On the eve of the summer Olympics in Rome the IOC discussed, inconclusively, whether apartheid's prohibitions violated the ban on discrimination outlined in the Olympic charter.[24] Controversially, South Africa's right to participate in Rome was defended by the president of the IOC, Brundage. No friend of the 'Third World' or integrated sport, he asserted disingenuously that apartheid laws did not determine individual selection for international competition. Anti-apartheid activists suggested that this view conveniently ignored the fact that non-whites were excluded from any and all teams representing South Africa abroad. And they contested, with equal bitterness, Pretoria's claim that non-whites were excluded simply because none had reached an Olympic standard, as an echo of official propaganda. Prime minister Vorster later conceded this point. He acknowledged openly that 'the standard of proficiency' is not a

criterion for sporting selection 'because our policy' of 'no mixed sport …
has nothing to do with proficiency or lack of proficiency'.[25]

As apartheid in sport hardened, political resistance grew. From the
early 1950s, Andrew Honey has written, 'there was massive mobilisation
by the Black population in the form of political organisation, civil
disobedience, trade union agitation and opposition to forced removals'.
Similarly, the initial impetus for an Olympic boycott came largely from
African and other non-white activists working from within South Africa.
Resistance expressed through sport was bravely led from 1958–59 by
'multiracial' SASA. Guided by writer Alan Paton as patron and activist
Dennis Brutus as secretary, the umbrella organisation of affiliated
sports bodies represented more than 70,000 members. To the chagrin of
Pretoria, it quickly gained a prominent profile abroad. SASA's strategy
focused particularly on the IOC, although it worked tirelessly across
a range of sporting organisations. It advocated that South Africa be
isolated from all international competition until discrimination ended.
In 1959 it petitioned the West Indian government to cancel a pending
cricket tour. Brutus describes this campaign as SASA's 'baptism of fire'.
The West Indies captain, Frank Worrell, refused to accede to Pretoria's
demands and the tour was abandoned. At home, however, apartheid's
grip on every dimension of sport tightened. The 1960 banning and later
jailing of Brutus evidenced the increasing repression of 'subversive'
sports organisations and individual proponents of integration. The rising
challenge from non-white sporting organisations paralleled activities of
resistance groups like the ANC or PAC. International activism aimed
at isolating white South Africa from international sport anticipated
strategies that developed by an alliance of activists working under the
strictures of apartheid.[26]

A broad Coalition of new African and Asian states led the drive
to force South Africa from the Commonwealth and by extension from
the Commonwealth games. It also attempted to deny all-white teams
access to international competition in any field. Within the IOC and
other international sporting bodies, Australia expressed regret over
such moves. It made polite diplomatic efforts encouraging a level
of integrated sport that might reverse the tide of opposition to South

Africa's participation in elite international competition. Consistent with broader government priorities, however, Australian sports officials did nothing that might encourage rejection of South Africa by the Olympic movement.

Excluded from the Commonwealth in 1961, the new republic was automatically excluded from the Empire and Commonwealth Games in Perth in 1962. (Pretoria advised that it did not expect—or wish—to participate in such a public display of multiracial activity.) In the same year interior minister Jan de Klerk provocatively advised the IOC that the newly constituted Republic had renewed a blanket ban on South Africans participating in mixed-race competition inside or outside South Africa.[27] This precipitated action within the Olympic movement. In 1963, as host of a special IOC conference, the Kenyan government refused to grant visas to delegates chosen to represent white South Africa. Instead, it implied that it would recognise representatives from the newly formed South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC)—established by SASA as an alternative national Olympic delegation. Pretoria promptly (again) detained SASA's leader, Brutus, and refused passports for any activists wishing to appear before the IOC in Kenya. South Africa's National Olympic Committee (SANOC) remained a dutiful, if *de facto*, political arm of government, with close ties to the powerful Broederbond. It refused demands to declare opposition to segregated sport. The IOC then voted to exclude South Africa from the 1964 Games in Tokyo. But SANOC was permitted to remain affiliated with the IOC, ostensibly because it undertook to send a mixed team to compete under a single national flag at the next Olympics.[28]

Australia's Olympic delegates were dismayed by the decision to exclude South Africa from the 1964 Games, but welcomed the prospect of its return to the Olympic movement in time for the Olympics in Mexico. Unlike Australia during the Menzies, Holt and Gorton administrations, the UK under Wilson's Labour government, supported moves against South Africa and lobbied also to exclude white (Southern) Rhodesia from the Olympics. Unlike Australia, Britain's policies were broadly in line with those of Afro-Asian countries—especially after 1966 when the Organisation of African Unity established a Supreme Council for Sport

in Africa (SCSA) dedicated to expelling South Africa permanently from the Olympics and other international competitions and denying white Rhodesia entry to the Olympics.[29]

The political divide in sport was revealed most starkly in early 1968. Controversially, when the 71 members of the IOC met in Grenoble in February they voted by a narrow margin to invite South Africa to attend the forthcoming games in Mexico City. The 'Grenoble Resolution' that enabled this vote was drawn-up by the head of the Australian delegation, Hugh Weir. IOC president Brundage and the New Zealand Olympic Association president, Harold Austad, were its most vigorous supporters. Encouraged by exiled leaders of SANROC, many countries from Asia and the Caribbean, as well as the USSR, threatened to boycott Mexico if the Grenoble decision was not overturned. In April the executive board of the IOC intervened. It recommended that South Africa's invitation be withdrawn. A subsequent postal ballot of IOC members voted 46 to 14 to exclude it from the Mexico Games. Brundage was obliged to concede that, 'due to the international climate … it would be most unwise for South Africa to participate'. The Organisation of African Unity greeted the decision as 'a victory for Africa'; as evidence that 'the sports world is at last conscious of its true mission'. Two years later, as Pretoria still refused to introduce genuine reform, the IOC acted more deliberately. On the grounds that apartheid in sport constituted a fundamental violation of the Olympic Charter, the IOC ruled that South Africa be permanently removed from the Olympic movement. The relatively close vote, 35 to 28, indicated a surprising level of support for Pretoria—at least from within the 'First World' that included both Australia and New Zealand.[30]

To highlight racism in sport activists among US athletes organised the Olympic Project for Human Rights. At the Mexico Olympics its campaign attracted unprecedented, if unexpected, global attention. Race politics famously erupted when two African-American athletes, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, raised their fists in Black Power salute when being awarded medals for the 200 metres event. The runner placed second, Australian Trevor Norman, shared the podium. To the consternation of some Australian media and most Australian team supporters at home, Norman controversially received his medal wearing a badge

proclaiming 'Olympic Project for Human Rights'. Carlos and Smith also wore this political label and were surprised that Norman, an athlete from 'whitewashed Australia' so publicly supported them. The protest against racism was played out in front of a huge television audience. Smith and Carlos were immediately expelled from the US Olympic team. Norman's action was widely criticised, but not by civil right advocates.

The politics surrounding racism in sport was unavoidably contradictory, as events in 1968 showed. Apartheid in sport led to white South Africa's exclusion from the Mexico games. Ironically, at these games it was those who protested against racism who were ostracised. The Black Power protest also drew attention to racial segregation in white Australia, inviting comparisons with discrimination in South Africa. As Gianni Mura observed at the time and Riccardo Gazzaniga repeated many years later, 'Norman was a white man from Australia, a country that had strict apartheid laws, almost as strict as South Africa'. Given Australia's staunch support for white South Africa's continuing participation in the Olympics and international sport generally, observations such as these were commonplace.[31]

In the Olympic movement, as in the UN, a substantial majority of countries wanted white South Africa excluded permanently from international contests. In the Olympic movement, however, Pretoria still enjoyed the support of many powerful friends—its trading partners and strategic allies in the free world, and crucially in those countries it met regularly in bilateral sporting competition. Within a shifting Coalition of states, Richard Lapschick and others observed, Western countries 'consistently acted in the realm of sport, as they have in international politics, to defend' the apartheid state.[32]

Acknowledging the 'galling experience' of 'in effect' being 'thrown out' of the Olympics, the *Cape Times* commented with uncharacteristic realism in 1968: 'It is no use trying to disguise the fact that South Africa's race policies permeate all her external relations, whether political or nonpolitical'.[33] Richard Cashman has pointed out, rather politely, that during the 1950s and 1960s Australia 'lagged behind' an emerging movement to exclude white South Africa from the Olympics or other sporting competitions.[34] Australia's reluctance to act against racist

practices in sport mirrored its unwillingness to support meaningful action against it in any international forum.

Blind to racism in sport in their own society, most Australians were untroubled by the insinuation of racial politics into sporting competition against white South Africa. All Coalition governments were fully aware that sport was a core instrument of social control under apartheid. Until the early 1970s, Australia, along with the UK, New Zealand, France and Ireland, continued to play against South Africa's national teams. Occasionally, expressions of moral indignation were accompanied by imprecise encouragement for the introduction of mixed sport. In general, however, major sporting codes refused to accept that competition against teams selected on the basis of race was fundamentally a political act that rendered them complicit in apartheid. Australia was arguably more deeply implicated than any country (apart, perhaps, from rugby-obsessed New Zealand). Until the early 1970s the international movement against apartheid could reasonably claim that Australia was unashamedly South Africa's closest 'white friend and greatest ally'.[35]

Bilateral Contests: Multilateral Consequences

Neither Sharpeville nor South Africa's removal from the Commonwealth disturbed official competition with old sporting adversaries. This was pointedly evident in 1960 when New Zealand Maori were excluded from the All Blacks rugby tour of South Africa. Prime minister Walter Nash vigorously defended the decision to send an 'all-white' team. He later thanked it for the 'great work' it had 'done in the cause of Commonwealth trust and friendship'. Australian Rugby, with the tacit approval of government, was similarly determined to keep playing in South Africa, even if it could no longer ignore the political implications of such decisions. In the UK, however, sport was disrupted by the moral questions raised by apartheid. English fast-bowler Frank Tyson was one of a number of players who spoke out against the politicisation of sport. 'In 1960 when the Springboks landed at London airport and ran the apartheid gauntlet', he recalled, 'I remember feeling very strongly that politics had no place in cricket': 'but slowly' he realised that while he 'was content to leave the

game on that lofty altruistic shelf, South Africa was not'. Contests against South Africa obliged play against white representatives of a 'segregated' political system, Tyson concluded disapprovingly. His comments echoed the more expansive observation of fellow English cricketer, the Reverend (later Bishop) David Shephard. 'I do not regard cricket in South Africa as a nonpolitical game', he wrote on the eve of a visit by its white team to England. 'I believe at this moment that cricket is touching on the most important single issue in the world', and 'I believe that as a cricketer and a Christian, I would be wrong to keep silent'. Increasingly, critics of apartheid made the unpalatable point that sport was integral to South Africa's wider diplomatic efforts. They pointed to the fact that prime minister Vorster openly described sporting representatives as good-will 'ambassadors' responsible for building solidarity between sympathetic societies.[36]

In contrast to cricket, rugby had not been widely played across the Empire. As scheduled, an Australian rugby team toured South Africa in the winter of 1961. Political crises, even those dividing the Commonwealth, did not interfere with rugby customs. Shortly after South Africa became a republic, the International Rugby Football Board, controlled by members of the 'Old Commonwealth', promptly amended its constitution: South Africa would remain a member and international rugby would continue without interruption.[37] Rugby was less exposed than was cricket to anti-racism pressures from within the Commonwealth. Membership of the Imperial Cricket Conference (the ICC, and renamed as the International Cricket Council) was open only to member countries of the Commonwealth. When declared a republic in 1961, white South Africa was automatically excluded. This did not immediately interrupt competition. The Marylebone Cricket Club (the MCC, 'the guardian of the Laws of the game'), New Zealand and Australian boards of control continued to promote test cricket against all-white teams. Although they were members of the rebadged ICC, the West Indies, India or Pakistan had never played against teams selected under apartheid's regulations. Predictably, these non-white cricketing nations led efforts to expel South Africa from the ICC and isolate it permanently from sporting contacts with any country. Their efforts were complemented within South Africa by SASA, the brave non-white organisation. In 1963, for example, Australia's

officials in Cape Town reported that SASA's 'immediate aims were "to attack the South African cricket tour of Australia" and "to challenge the proposed Australian rugby tour of South Africa and insist that it be free from racialism"'. These activities were reinforced in the UK, and later in Australia and New Zealand, by an array of anti-apartheid organisations. From late 1964 these efforts were endorsed in the UK by Harold Wilson's new Labour administration. But conservative governments in Australia and New Zealand wanted regular bilateral contests to continue, and dismissed suggestions that visiting teams made-up exclusively of persons of European ancestry should be not be permitted to play. Despite varying levels of disapproval, throughout the 1960s South Africa regularly participated in international cricket and rugby. Repeating prime minister Verwoerd's opinion, a sympathetic commentator observed that 'as long as South Africa can continue to enjoy the friendship and goodwill of England, Australia and New Zealand' it 'will be quite content'.[38]

The first notable public demonstrations to confront a visiting whites-only Springbok team took place in the UK in 1960. However, in Australia disquiet about apartheid-sport was limited, and did not quickly translate into public protest. The Wallabies rugby tour in 1961 characteristically brought little controversy, other than scathing South African criticism of the visitors' 'inept' and 'ineffectual' play. Defeated 28 points to 3 in the first test and 23 points to 11 in the second, the Wallabies were dismissed as 'not up to international standard'.[39] An improved Australian rugby team played in South Africa in 1963. This time, however, it was apartheid's violence, not the poor standard of play, that attracted most international attention. During the test match in Port Elizabeth the Australia team, like all other visiting international teams, enjoyed the support of non-white spectators who watched the play from segregated areas behind the goal posts. Late in the second half a disputed refereeing decision was loudly criticised 'by Black spectators'. Play stopped and, as Australian winger Jim Boyce later recalled, 'the white crowd and police totally overreacted'. A 'riot' erupted. The conflict spread to the playing field as non-white spectators fled the ground. Four African spectators were killed. 'I'd never seen brutality of that kind before', Boyce recalled. 'South African whites' 'treated blacks like non-persons'; 'racial intolerance was everywhere'. The visiting rugby

players, Boyce suggested, had anticipated playing in a country that was 'quite similar to Australia or New Zealand', but 'as a team we felt we were travelling amongst strangers and the experience became more and more difficult'.[40]

In both cricket and rugby, Australian officials agreed meekly that touring teams would not include non-white players. Lloyd McDermott, the first Indigenous rugby player to represent his country, quietly made himself unavailable for selection in the 1963 team to tour South Africa. His decision avoided public controversy. It was also a disguised statement of opposition to apartheid: McDermott refused to deny his heritage in order to play against teams that represented apartheid. The spectator killings at Port Elizabeth vindicated McDermott's principled stand. Team selection remained a sensitive political question, in all sports.[41]

Within white South Africa, killings such as those at Port Elizabeth, were unremarkable. Reports from local journalists focused not on police violence but on the apparently more important fact that the 'Wallabies became the first touring team to beat the Springboks in two consecutive Tests since the Lions' tour in 1896. Beyond the rugby field, the tour was a tightly organised propaganda exercise. Perversely, it included a widely reported and photographed visit to the township of Sharpeville, where the embarrassed footballers were asked by a hand-picked 'Black committee' to comment on their reception. The Australian rugby players, like all sporting visitors, were conscripted to the cause of white South Africa: their presence used to legitimate apartheid overseas. Christopher Merrett and others have argued that 'sport proved consolatory' at home—'International contact was interpreted as approval: victories were regarded as vindication of the white South African way of life; and defeat was akin to national tragedy'.[42] Regular international competition confirmed acceptance abroad. But in the eyes of activist organisations, any sporting or cultural exchange abetted and strengthened apartheid.[43]

Reports of the killings at the Port Elizabeth had no immediate bearing on the enthusiasm of the International Rugby Board (IRB) or Australian Rugby Board (ARB) for continuing scheduled exchanges with Springbok teams. Nor did fresh newspaper stories or pictures of 'riots' and 'racial violence' dampen the enthusiasm of cricket or tennis officials for playing

in or against South Africa. However, the decision to expel South Africa from the next Olympics indicated that an international tide of opposition to sporting contact was growing, inexorably. Graphic images of violence, against the background of the infamous Rivonia Trials and Mandela's imprisonment, exacerbated criticism abroad. Action to cut all sporting ties intensified. In the summer of 1963–64 anti-apartheid demonstrators confronted visiting South African cricketers at match venues across Australia (a pitch was dug up, missiles were thrown onto fields and letter-writing campaigns to newspapers and politicians accelerated).[44]

Efforts to disrupt sport against apartheid teams coalesced around the Springbok cricket and rugby tours in 1965. Opposition was expressed most profoundly at Lords in the First Test between England and an all-white South Africa team. Both prime minister Wilson and Queen Elizabeth broke with custom and conspicuously did not attend the Opening Day of the match. The British monarch and ceremonial head of the now multiracial Commonwealth was encouraged by the newly elected Labour government to avoid any public action that might imply acceptance of racism. Mass public protests erupted across England against the 1965 tour, foreshadowing later demonstrations in Australia and New Zealand.[45] Despite rising protest, no scheduled international cricket or rugby test was cancelled.

In South Africa, prime minister Verwoerd asserted that apartheid would not be modified despite international pressures: 'Upholding the white race and its civilisation' means that 'not one single compromise can be entered into', 'not even' if this leads to complete isolation from international competition, even in rugby.[46] Encouraged by the willingness of old Commonwealth friends to continue playing, he repeatedly defended his country's laws against 'interracial sport'. 'Teams of mixed races' would not be permitted entry to South Africa, and he warned that his government expected all visitors to abide by 'the traditions and customs' of the host country. Central to these was the dictate that 'Whites and non-White practice sports separately'. In the words of de Klerk: 'within the borders of our country, Whites and non-Whites must not compete against one another, whether in individual events or in teams or as parts of teams'. An Australian External Affairs official commented bluntly: 'this meant

clearly that Maoris would not be welcome in South Africa as members of the New Zealand All Blacks rugby team'. This restriction would obviously apply also to any non-white person chosen to represent Australia, whether in team or individual sport.[47] The Department of External Affairs closely monitored apartheid's sport policy. In typically detached language it commented that stringent restrictions against interracial sport 'cut across efforts by sporting bodies to retain South African participation in international sport'.[48]

Cricket tests were played in 1963–64 and 1966–67. A 'non-European' opening batsmen, Graham Thomas, was selected in the Australian cricket team to tour South Africa, beginning in late 1966. Newspaper reports of his selection prompted polite diplomatic exchanges with Pretoria. The Australian Cricket Board of Control sought government advice 'to resolve the matter'. It feared the talented batsmen 'might not be permitted entry to South Africa as he is reputed to have "mixed-blood" and this may be evident in his appearance'. Negotiation reportedly reached 'prime ministerial level'. Both sides were anxious to avoid a public crisis or unnecessary, 'lamentable fuss'. Pretoria promptly advised Canberra that it was unconcerned about the decision to select Thomas and he would of course be able to travel with the team. Nonetheless, his selection aroused considerable debate in Australia and the wider cricket world. In External Affairs it was viewed as 'a matter affecting relations with South Africa' which should be handled carefully. Unsurprisingly, it raised issues about racial definition or colour under apartheid, and by implication whether Australia endorsed such definitions of race. These questions were dismissed by the *Cape Argus*, at least, as a 'mischievous and unwarranted witch hunt' initiated by anti-apartheid activists. Australian commentary was less dismissive. Terry Smith, a prominent sports columnist, wrote unequivocally that 'Australian cricket officials should move immediately to call off the coming tour of South Africa if there is any possibility a colour bar will force Graham Thomas out of the team'. Smith's comment that 'South Africa should be told quite bluntly that the tour is off if any objection is raised' about Thomas, echoed in sporting communities abroad, especially those within the new Commonwealth. West Indies authorities indicated that they would support any boycott if the colour bar

was invoked to stop Thomas playing. However, some authorities, like Boon Wallace, president of the South Australian Cricket Association, thought the issue trivial: 'this is the first I've heard … about Thomas being off-colour', he said. Commenting on suggestions that Thomas's father was 'half Red Indian', fellow cricketer Denis Lindsay stated with intended irony: 'he is more sunburnt than the average player but not so dark as some members of the South African team'.

Reflecting government advice, newspapers in South Africa acknowledged simply that 'Thomas's colour' was not 'exceptional'; thus he could enter the country without 'an objection' being raised. Nonetheless, Thomas was designated a 'non-European Australian' who might require a special entry visa. The Australian ambassador Charles Kevin advised that questions about Thomas's visa were unique and would be decided in 'a different context from the Maoris' (who were at the centre of a bitter dispute over 'eligibility' for selection in the All Blacks team to tour later in the year). Both governments did 'everything possible to prevent the [Thomas] matter from developing'. Kevin—whose dispatches suggested real affection for white South Africa and sympathy for its unique 'difficulties'—was determined that any compromise not be an example that might destabilise apartheid in any way. Ultimately, quiet diplomacy ensured that further adverse publicity was avoided and Thomas was able to join the 1966 touring party. His selection established no precedent as he was deemed, in effect, to be 'white'.[49]

Consistent with advice from Cabinet, diplomats and bureaucrats in Canberra and Pretoria worked 'flexibly' to ensure that no issue 'disturbed … good relations' or disrupted sporting contests. Not all controversies, however, could be easily managed. Reaction to Verwoerd's reassertion of sports apartheid, made at Loskop Dam during the final match of the 1965 rugby tour of Australia and New Zealand, starkly emphasised this difficulty. The prime minister's untimely statement precipitated—in New Zealand at least—a chorus of condemnation and renewed calls to end sporting exchanges. 'No Maori No Tours' slogans dominated newspaper opinion and re-energised anti-apartheid activities.[50] Future tours by New Zealand were now uncertain. The racial character of teams acceptable to Pretoria had to be negotiated and mutually agreed. Australian sports authorities

and players also confronted this issue and were compromised by it.

On 6 September 1966, Verwoerd was assassinated. The death of the extremist Afrikaner 'architect of apartheid' coincided with a meeting of Commonwealth premiers in London to discuss the crisis of white minority rule in Rhodesia. Determined to avoid total sporting isolation, Verwoerd's successor as prime minister, the slightly more pragmatic John (B.J.) Vorster, outlined changes that he hoped would placate traditional friends. In essence, these accepted that approved non-white sportsmen selected in visiting teams might be designated as 'honorary whites' and thus permitted entry. Under this policy, the new PM announced, some Maori rugby players and supporters would be permitted to join a proposed New Zealand tour. To avoid complete sporting isolation white South Africa was apparently prepared to subvert—albeit temporarily—a central tenet of apartheid and compete against a mixed-race team at home. The All Blacks could be nominally 'all-white'. Individual sports people could, in exceptional circumstances, also be deemed temporarily 'white' and permitted to play in South Africa against white opponents (as, controversially, did champion tennis player Evonne Goolagong in 1971 and 1972).[51]

The language of blood and race-nature, common to the 'semantic acrobatics' that defended apartheid, was repeated by Vorster to justify accepting even a very small number of non-white sporting visitors.[52] 'I know of nothing which can happen which is likely to upset the tour', he stated: 'There have been people with Maori blood here before. Players of this nature will come again'. South Africa would not presume to dictate team selection to competitor nations, Vorster continued, but equally it was not obliged to host national teams or individuals unacceptable to it. Nor would his government relax its 'policy of not allowing competition in sport between South Africans of different races within the country'. Condemned abroad as cynical, offensive and racist, Vorster's 'reform' was greeted at home by the *Rand Daily Mail* under the headline: 'Sport: PM Opens the Door'.[53]

In the short-term at least, New Zealand rugby rejected this unsavoury compromise and cancelled the 1967 tour. Instead, the All Blacks undertook a hastily arranged tour of England, France and Canada. Three years later, to the consternation of anti-apartheid activists everywhere, a New Zealand

rugby team toured South Africa. The 1970 the All Blacks included two Maori and one Samoan.[54] This provocative decision was made while the Wallabies played against the Springboks in South Africa and a reciprocal series was being scheduled for the winter of 1971 in Australia. Dennis Brutus told an Australian audience shortly after the 1969 tour that the 'willingness of Australians to play ball with apartheid is the true gauge of their racial attitudes'. He concluded, prophetically, 'I believe that the tendency in Australia is towards greater, rather than less, sympathy for racialism and apartheid'.[55]

The deep political ramifications of racism in sport were also laid bare during the so-called Basil D'Oliveira affair from 1967–68. This incident was a dramatic echo of issues raised earlier following selection of 'coloured' batsman Graham Thomas for Australia. As a 'coloured player' D'Oliveira was barred from representing his country of birth, South Africa. Obliged to migrate if he was to play top-level cricket, he won selection in the English team and was expected to join it on the forthcoming tour. Predictably, perhaps, P.F. le Roux, the minister of the interior, warned that the 'coloured cricketer would be denied entry to South Africa'. The newly installed Vorster administration interpreted D'Oliveira's selection as an insidious political ploy orchestrated by a Coalition of anti-apartheid activists and radical Labour parliamentarians in the UK. Vorster responded to the prospect of D'Oliveira's selection in uncompromising language: 'We are not prepared to receive a team thrust upon us by people whose interests are not in the game but to gain political objectives'. The MCC initially responded not by cancelling the tour but by excluding D'Oliveira from the touring party. Widespread anger greeted this decision. A petition to cancel the tour was signed by more than two hundred British parliamentarians. Belatedly, the MCC reversed its position and again included D'Oliveira in the proposed team. Within twenty-four hours Pretoria indicated that if he was selected, the series with England could not go ahead. Left with no alternative and under intense pressure from the Wilson government, the MCC cancelled the tour.[56]

In Australia, Labor frontbencher Gordon Bryant spoke for many when he requested that Canberra respond to the D'Oliveira affair and indicate 'strong disapproval of South Africa's vicious apartheid policies'.

Gorton's Coalition government was unmoved and parliament did not act on Bryant's request.[57] However, the 'reforms' mooted by Vorster were widely condemned as cosmetic and patronising; the classification of special visitors as 'honorary whites' labelled hypocritical. Despite bitter criticism, Pretoria clung to its controversial policy. The minister for sport, Frank Waring, repeated a familiar warning: no government would be 'intimidated by demands made for integrated multiracial sport in South Africa'.[58]

The D'Oliveira affair was a watershed victory for the anti-apartheid movement: it put the sporting arena at the centre of campaign strategies. It also put sporting sanctions at the centre of UN calls for action. In December 1968, for the first time, a resolution (GA 2396) requesting that 'all states and organisations … suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime' was approved. Isolation from international sport had become the principal political weapon in the wider struggle against apartheid. Yet a Springbok rugby tour of the UK and Ireland went ahead, as scheduled, in 1969. Games in both countries were played in front of small crowds behind barbed-wire fences, amidst pitch invasions and loud protests. Despite such turbulence, the English Cricket Council refused to cancel a visit by the all-white South African team, scheduled to begin on 2 May the following year. This decision was greeted with threats by most members of the Commonwealth, including India and the West Indies, to boycott the forthcoming Edinburgh Games if the racially-selected team was permitted to play in the UK. Wilson intervened. The scheduled tour was cancelled. This resolute action set a precedent that could not easily be ignored by any country or organisation still playing with apartheid.[59] But it did not immediately persuade rugby or cricket organisations in Australia.

Events in the UK did not have a significant impact on public opinion: survey results suggested that less than 10% of Australians wanted sporting competition with white South Africa to end.[60] A survey conducted by the Norwegian Olympic Committee in the late 1960s found 98% of 'non-white nations' wanted South Africa barred from international competition, while only 32% of Western/European countries supported this goal.[61]

In mid-1969 the Australian rugby team undertook a lengthy scheduled

tour of South Africa and Rhodesia. Dogged by controversy, on and off the field, the tour had a lasting impact at home. Vivid descriptions of apartheid's brutal routines gained wide publicity. Confronting experiences of discrimination and poverty in towns and cities visited by the team were widely reported. Norm Tasker, a leading sports journalist travelling with the Wallabies, thought the visit 'both wonderful and appalling'. While 'we were treated very well' by our white hosts, he recalled much later, we saw 'some horrific examples of apartheid'; we 'couldn't escape seeing Blacks maltreated'. Less obvious was police surveillance of dissenting team members, most notably outspoken Sydney University rugby captain and lawyer, Anthony Abrahams. Between games Abrahams met with local political activists and student groups. On three separate occasions he addressed professional law societies, where he criticised the repressive security laws that enforced apartheid. In many ways the observations and reflections of the rugby tourists echoed those of Jim Boyce six years earlier. But in 1969, far more than in 1963, first-hand reports made a difference 'back home'.[62]

On reaching Rhodesia, Abrahams sent an open letter to the *Sydney Morning Herald* pleading for an end to sporting competition against 'all white teams' from a segregated country. The politics of apartheid defined sport in South Africa, he argued, and this had important 'implications' for all sporting bodies and governments in Australia: it 'infers … Australian acceptance of apartheid'. His letter aroused heated debate. It was endorsed by other Wallabies, notably Paul Darveniza, Bruce Taafe, James Roxburgh, Terry Forman, Barry McDonald and Jim Boyce (who had been a lone voice of protest after the 1963 tour). These players protested strongly. They were applauded not so much for their actions while in South Africa, but for braving hostile rugby audiences and protesting at public meetings when they returned to Australia. As preparations began for the Springbok tour scheduled for the winter of 1971, the dissenting Wallabies advised that they would not again represent Australia against a Springbok team selected under apartheid's rules. To quote Larry Writer: 'this decision was unprecedented in Australian rugby union: no player had ever refused to represent his country on political grounds'.[63]

The Rugby Seven were guided by principle, not individual sporting

ambition. While they were lauded as heroes by the anti-apartheid movement and some journalists, their selfless example was not widely emulated. Lofty anti-racism sentiment did not yet inform the culture of any major sporting code or association in Australia—certainly not 'the game' reputedly 'played in heaven', rugby. Nor were cricket administrators or many players prominent in any other sport troubled about playing in South Africa or against whites-only teams at home.[64]

An Australian cricket team, captained by Bill Lawry, began a hastily arranged overseas tour in December 1969. Following a test series in India, the returning tourists undertook a four-test tour of South Africa. Richard Cashman has observed that this visit 'generated less protest because it was tacked on to a tour of India after the Pakistan leg of the tour had been cancelled'.[65] Nonetheless, following so closely on the heels of the controversial rugby series, the tour reignited controversy in the cricketing world. Echoing criticism from India, the decision to play in South Africa was loudly condemned by all non-white cricketing nations. But it was welcomed in South African circles because it ended 'an unpleasant and totally unnecessary three-year period of isolation imposed on our cricketers—and spectators'. In Australia it was the failure to win any of the matches and uncertainty about the future of international cricket, not ethical concerns about racism, that generated greatest anxiety.[66]

As Lawry's team struggled against its opponents, the Australian Cricket Board made plans to host the powerful South Africans in the summer of 1971–72. At the same time, the Australian Rugby Board confirmed that a test series against the Springboks, scheduled to begin in mid-1971, would go ahead. Australian authorities were encouraged by New Zealand's example. Controversially, an All-black team that included a few Maori players accepted as honorary whites toured South Africa in 1970. Hassan Howa, president of the non-white South African cricket board of control, claimed that competition must end: there could be 'no normal sport in an abnormal society'. Those determined to continue playing with apartheid-based teams did not agree. 'It would take sporting outrage rather than an atrocity against black Africans', Brian Toohey observed caustically, before government policies or public opinion on apartheid would be seriously challenged.[67]

CHAPTER 7

'Parallel Apartheid': Demanding Reform

[We have] apartheid in our own country.[1]
Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement, 1961

[W]e must, without adverting to our own policies, directly distinguish ourselves from the South Africans, if only because … popular … opinion regards them as similar.[2]
Cabinet submission, 1963

'Today', a spokesperson noted as External Affairs officials met to map out ways for 'promoting better understanding and better public relations' on 'native welfare', 'any question involving race or colour can become a political issue internationally'. In 'many countries outside Europe, and especially in Africa and Asia, preoccupation with racial questions has become intense,' a briefing note on 'overseas opinion' had commented earlier. And, it emphasised, 'because of this preoccupation with racialism, there is a risk that educated persons in Asia and Africa will confuse the problem of our Aborigines with the South African racial problem, and our policy with apartheid'. This, in turn, would lead almost inevitably 'to harsh judgement of Australians and Australian policies in general'. Criticism would not be limited to policies 'construed' 'as evidence of an official policy on racial discrimination and suppression'—policy recently labelled as 'apartheid' by the Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement; 'it would also attract and foster emotional overseas

criticism of our restricted immigration policy'. In the aftermath of Sharpeville, Hugh Gilchrist had warned from within External Affairs that the circumstances of Australia's Aboriginal people would probably come under criticism in the UN and the Commonwealth. Indeed, he thought a 'big overseas attack' imminent.[3] Some sections of the press and some community and church groups argued that racialised division must give way to human rights reforms and genuine equality under the law; that 'racial overtones' must no longer define the nation. Advice from within External Affairs was similarly conscious that liberal change would be in the national interest.[4]

The racial assumptions that held sway in white Australia after the war broke down very slowly. As Matthew Jordan has written, the 'inviolable belief that all non-Europeans were unassimilable by virtue of their race' sustained restrictive immigration legislation and systemic discrimination against Aboriginal people throughout the Menzies era. In the 1960s Australia's interests and reputation demanded at least incremental liberalisation of its tarnished policies; but the racial assumptions on which these policies rested were not easily discarded. Indeed, as Sean Brawley and David Dutton have separately emphasised, adjustments to the White Australia policy across two decades from the early 1950s were initially designed to alter appearances rather than initiate real or substantive change. Reform, however modest, reflected foreign policy concerns. White Australia was slowly discarded as the nation sought to negotiate its future in the Asia-Pacific: regional security and economic growth demanded non-discriminatory immigration policies. Australia's reorientation signalled, and was in part premised on, the eclipse of ideologies of race that had long defined the white nation. Writing of the so-called collapse of white Australia Neville Meaney has observed, somewhat generously, that 'without any disturbance to the social and cultural fabric, and within a relatively short period of time, Australian ideas of Asia and of race and, as a consequence, of Australia itself', underwent 'a remarkable metamorphosis'.[5] From the early 1960s demands for immigration reform and Indigenous rights could no longer be ignored.[6]

An(other) State of 'Apartheid'

As South Africa was forced to leave the Commonwealth, Hugh Gilchrist observed that race relations in his home country were now described 'indiscriminately' by the pejorative 'term *apartheid*'. In a similar though far more public vein, a letter from Doreen Trainor to *The Times* in 1961 asserted that the 'plight of the Aboriginal people' was 'parallel with apartheid'. This letter was echoed in a resolution agreed by the Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement in April calling for an end to 'apartheid in Australia'. The FCAA and most reform advocates defined 'apartheid' in very general terms, usually as 'discrimination within a country on the grounds of colour'. Racism and racist attitudes were commonly interpreted as evidence that 'apartheid was prevalent' in local institutions and society. The council warned that unless action was taken to establish equality Australia might be exposed to international action similar to that sanctioned by the UN against South Africa.[7]

Identification with apartheid sharpened efforts to confront the realities of racism at home. In the very early years of Malan's apartheid government prominent churchmen in both Dominions had campaigned against 'Apartheid in Australia', advocating that the World Council of Churches submit to the UN a report focusing on the 'welfare of Aborigines'. The Rev. Walker endorsed this suggestion and asserted that 'Australia appears to be in sympathy with the most reactionary and ruthless racialism in the world'—with the 'tragic racial policies' of South Africa. Some progressive politicians, including Kim Beazley Sr., implied that the elimination of racialised inequality was necessary to avoid 'race war'.[8] More soberly, Paul Hasluck, the minister for territories for 1951 to 1963, acknowledged that systemic Aboriginal disadvantage must be addressed or Australia's human rights reputation would remain deeply compromised, impossible to defend on the international stage. An unreformed white Australia would inevitably fall under the spotlight of international opinion, Gilchrist cautioned from within External Affairs. Maverick Liberal MP Edward St John, who a few years earlier had acted as an official observer at treason trials in South Africa, made a related point. 'South African problems could be regarded as our problems, too',

he wrote: 'think of what is happening in New Guinea and of our white Australia policy'.[9]

Racism in Australia was already subject to sustained attack from within—by the Immigration Reform Group, various Aboriginal rights organisations, academics, church leaders, trade unionists, politicians in the ALP, and less commonly, the ruling Liberal–Country Party administration. A growing number of magazines, student newspapers and some major city newspapers advocated reform. The magazine *Nation* 'came into existence', its founders wrote in 1959, primarily to work for the abolition the white Australia policy. The plight of Indigenous Australians— euphemistically referred to as 'the Aboriginal problem'—interested Hasluck and the Department of External Affairs because 'it might well come before critical United Nations and other eyes'.[10] Newspaper, radio and television reports ensured that it would. Most notably and disturbingly an address to the Anti-Slavery Society in London by Jacquetta Hawkes (a well-known archaeologist and writer and also the wife of J.B. Priestley) in October 1961 was given wide publicity. Hawkes spoke in informed detail of Aboriginal 'dispossession' across the nineteenth century; of 'the policy of extermination … that gave way to segregation' and 'assimilation'; of forced removal, reserves and coercive labour under 'conditions of semi-slavery'. Privately, Australian diplomats had expected that Hawkes would 'say some critical and officially obnoxious things' to her London audience, but they were nonetheless surprised by her damning commentary. In reply, official government publications—notably the External Affairs-sponsored booklet *Australian Aborigines*—lamely defended 'assimilation' and anticipated (gradual) reform. Hawkes' concession that 'Australia, unlike South Africa, was moving in the right direction' was welcomed in Canberra and by Australia's delegation to the UN (even though her observation implied that 'apartheid' was common to both countries).[11]

In heated parliamentary debate over Australia's formal response to 'the shooting down of native men, women and children' at Sharpeville, Arthur Calwell, the ALP leader, warned that South Africa would seek to mute international criticism by drawing comparisons with Australia. And those using such arguments found an unlikely ally in Menzies. During parliamentary debates over censure of South Africa Menzies had

acknowledged that a 'parallel' existed between South Africa's 'treatment of the natives … and Australia's treatment of the Indigenous inhabitants'.[12] Everyday references to 'apartheid in Australia' were little dented by efforts to reform white Australia or by Menzies' 'outright condemnation of apartheid' in parliament in April 1961. Occasionally, newspaper headlines proclaimed 'Apartheid at Home' while demanding equality for Indigenous residents.[13] Government leaders and anti-racism activists equally understood the implications for white Australia of identification as another state of apartheid. The 'world community' is inclined 'rightly or wrongly to associate' Australia with 'racism and apartheid', founding member of SADAF Edward St John commented: 'this is strongly inimical to our standing in the world and to our relationships with neighbouring states'.[14] This unwelcome association compounded the consequences flowing from routine comparison of white Australia with white South Africa and, by extension, with white supremacy. Unwittingly, Menzies' controversial efforts to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth acknowledged that race relations in the two countries had much in common. 'I felt that I was defending my own country, its sovereign rights and its future' he stated.[15] All Liberal–Country Party Coalition governments refused to acknowledge that Indigenous rights or immigration policy were policy matters with international implications. Naïvely, or disingenuously, they held that these were domestic matters quarantined from discussion in international forums or action by any international body.

The politics of race in Australia received prominent publicity internationally—especially in Black Africa. One typical example, a Reuters report published in the Accra press in 1961, was headed 'End Apartheid in Australia'. Colonial administration in Papua New Guinea was also likened to Apartheid. In practice, the UN Trusteeship Committee was advised in 1961, this policy was 'reminiscent of theories of development which have found their apotheosis in the Afrikaner Republic'. Reports speaking of the existence of apartheid in Australia were common. Government representatives were obliged to contest any negative 'publicity either in Australia or overseas', especially if it was of an 'adverse or sensational nature'. Diplomatic posts communicated about 'how to handle criticism of the Australian policies, especially when raised in the context of South

Africa'.[16] At home, placards proclaiming 'No Apartheid for our Aborigines: give them full citizenship and education' supported the 'Yes' vote in the constitutional referendum on Indigenous political rights. As civil rights movements gained momentum internationally, so too did the perception that race relations in Australia were a variant of apartheid.

South Africa's defenders sought to disempower opponents by claiming that practices similar to apartheid were followed by other Western governments, most obviously Australia and the United States. Thus, South Africa was neither exceptional nor different, and it should not be singled out for international sanction. Painting Australia with the brush of apartheid undermined claims that South Africa was an exceptional country, that apartheid had no international equivalent. A constant refrain of South Africa's white apologists was that all settler nations shared difficult histories. David Yudelman wrote, for example, that the image of contemporary South Africa as 'a bizarre exception' conveniently avoided comparisons with the dark pasts of other countries. In a related vein, Jennifer Clark, who has written most perceptively about white Australia and the international politics of race, has suggested that 'racism, or racialism as it was known, was as entrenched in Australia in 1960 as anywhere'.[17]

The historical specificity of apartheid, and the particular character of racism in other white settler nations, including Australia, was often lost in general comparisons. Recent scholarship has given more nuanced descriptions, implying that segregation in Australia overlapped aspects of the deceptively labelled 'petty' apartheid, including street curfews, unequal access to schools, employment and public community facilities including toilets, swimming pools or sporting clubs. Deeper historical patterns of dispossession, forced removal, reserves, coercive labour and non-citizenship in Australia were evident also in Southern Africa. However, 'grand' apartheid—comprehensively legislated racial separation that forced Africans to live as non-citizens in impoverished Homelands under migratory labour controls—was essentially distinct to 20th century South Africa. Some scholars have labelled the patterns of segregation and inequality that persisted across 20th century Australia as constituting, at the very least, 'unofficial apartheid'. Penelope Edmonds and others,

including historian and activist Ann Curthoys and Moree elder Lyall Munro, have argued convincingly that customary aspects of apartheid were deeply embedded in country towns and rural areas, but less evident in large cities or urban communities.[18]

The FCAA's claim that 'we have apartheid' aroused numerous stories in the international press. F.R. Dalrymple reported from the high commission in Bonn that 'rather unfortunately from our point of view', newspapers in Germany had run stories under headlines 'ranging from "Protest Against Racial Policy" through "Separation of Races Exists also in Australia" to "Apartheid also in Australia".'[19] While often inaccurate and general, polemical accusations of apartheid carried great political weight. As demand for Indigenous equality grew, references to 'apartheid at home', 'Australian apartheid', or 'unofficial apartheid' peppered public discourse and media stories. Usually, the use of these terms was premised on very general assumptions about race politics in each society. Often they also incorporated references to civil rights protests or segregation in the American South. The most extreme condemnations of Australian racism spoke not only of the apartheid conditions controlling Indigenous communities, but of 'concentration camps' and 'black ghettos' that shaped Aboriginal disadvantage and exclusion. Apartheid was not only invoked to describe the plight of the Australian Aborigines. It was also invoked in stories about migration policy or, in the words of an AAP-Reuter correspondent in Manila, 'the hated white Australia policy'. People in Asia, it was reported, saw 'little difference between South Africa's and Rhodesia's apartheid policies and that of Canberra's white Australia policy'.[20]

Comparisons were often implied, not overt. To the chagrin of officials in External Affairs, policies were often 'unfairly' claimed to resembled apartheid. Gilchrist bemoaned the 'tendency of Australian well-wishers of the Aborigines to apply the term *apartheid* indiscriminately'. He concluded that 'public interest' in 'Australia and overseas' focused largely on 'instances of "exploitation", "racial discrimination", or "withholding of rights".'[21] Diplomatic advice from New Delhi, for example, stressed that 'educated Indians' were 'extremely sensitive to what they would regard as discrimination against non-Europeans in Australia'. Discrimination in white Australia was based 'more-or-less exclusively on the ground of

skin colour', the high commission reported, and this has left an indelible impression which 'no amount of publicity … is likely to dispel'.[22] Indeed, the response to Professor Zelman Cowen's paper in the *Journal* of the International Commission of Jurists in 1961, suggested that publicity, even if informed and scholarly, would simply confirm negative international opinion (and, as the legal adviser in External Affairs warned, 'perhaps unfortunately' 'come before critical United Nations' and other eyes').[23] Newspapers in Karachi and Dacca ran a series of articles that consular officials said 'tended to portray the existence of an "apartheid" situation in Australia'. (They also acknowledged that the articles were 'reasonably objective', and conceded that this perhaps made their impact greater.)[24]

Adverse comment was an inevitable by-product of debate over apartheid and international covenants against racism, but it also reflected global geopolitical tensions. By the early 1960s External Affairs advised that such criticism had become an important instrument of 'communist propaganda', orchestrated by Moscow. 'Adverse references' to 'the Aboriginal question now appear regularly in the Soviet and Communist Chinese press and radio', it reported. Khrushchev's accusation, voiced in the UN, that 'extermination' attempts and 'treatment of Aborigines' brought 'eternal shame' to Australia's 'ruling class', represented the extremes of such commentary. 'Overseas interest' and criticism was 'stimulated by Australian references', the External Affairs Department report concluded, most notably 'press stories about the treatment of Aborigines', 'publications in international journals critical of government policy on Aborigines', and individual efforts 'to interest overseas governments in the question'. Against this background, the high commissioner in Pretoria reported, 'it is possible very easily to awaken the interest of the Europeans here, as with so many other subjects, by making comparisons between the South African and Australian racial situation'.[25] His observation applied equally to Commonwealth countries. To Menzies annoyance, Trainor's letter to *The Times* describing 'parallel apartheid' drew the attention of president Nkrumah, who promptly placed the issue on the agenda of the next Commonwealth leaders' meeting.[26]

Rather than openly address overseas criticism consular officials were advised to 'discreetly try to discourage' discussion of Australia's policies

in 'international meetings'. To date 'publicity, official or voluntary', had sought to avoid political comment 'on Aborigine matters', a disgruntled diplomat reported from London, by 'either hiding … material from view or having displays, posters, or pictures that portray the quaint, primitive or colourful aspects of the Aborigines'. Without more honest publicity, he concluded with bureaucratic understatement, 'the impression left is that there is something to hide'.[27]

In the lead-up to voting rights reform in 1962, overseas posts were advised that 'in principle, we ought not give undue gratuitous publicity to the Aboriginal question at this stage'.[28] If obliged to defend Australia's reputation, officials were instructed to emphasise that 'progress has recently been made towards the assimilation of Aborigines into the Australian community', despite the fact that 'individual Aborigines are living at all stages of change from a wholly primitive life to a modern one'. Remarkably, it felt it was necessary to emphasise that 'official policy is utterly opposed to ill-treatment and has always been utterly opposed to "genocide"'. The justification for 'such discriminatory legislation as exists' should emphasise that it is' designed to protect backward tribal groups from exploitation' and will be abolished 'as soon as possible'. Related confidential External Affairs documents, including submissions to Cabinet, referred to 'Aborigines' of 'full blood and those of lesser blood'. If unable to offer reasons that might justify 'restrictions on the right of Aborigines to vote', bureaucrats warned 'it will … be difficult to argue that the right is not granted because of intellectual or educational deficiencies'. The very effort to defend white Australia inadvertently betrayed the paternalistic assumptions about race and rights that were often at the centre of foreign criticism of discrimination in Australia.[29]

As East–West tensions increased, the assault on racism intensified. Anti-racism and liberation politics were conscripted to the ideological contests of the Cold War. Fears of Communist expansion internationally, and of communist infiltration domestically, shaped Australian alliance policy throughout the 1960s, encouraging it to join the US, its ANZUS partner, in war against communism in Indo-China. In Southern Africa, the ANC and nationalist liberation movements were variously influenced by Marxist ideas and were generally supported by newly

independent Third World states and Soviet-bloc countries. ASIO advised that 'Communist or extreme Anti-Colonialists' were keen to exploit Australia's vulnerability on racial questions by highlighting the plight of the Aborigines and criticising their treatment. Cabinet was advised that members of the Communist Party of Australia were 'infiltrating existing Aboriginal welfare organisations' and trade unions working against racism.[30]

While adverse comment by Communist Bloc countries could easily be ignored, wider criticism that implied white Australia was another state of 'apartheid', could not. Gilchrist, as head of the information branch of External Affairs, advised Cabinet late in 1961 that 'all aspects of the condition and treatment of the Aborigines' had 'implications for Australia's external relations'.[31] Two years later a submission to Cabinet stated with greater urgency 'We must ... directly distinguish ourselves from the South Africans', as race relations in the two countries were popularly regarded as 'similar'. This judgement did not please the prime minister or his Country Party colleagues. But it was promptly endorsed in other submissions to Cabinet that reflected opinion from within External Affairs. There is 'an urgent need to remove … instances of racial discrimination in Australia', a special Inter-Departmental Committee on Racial Discrimination advised, 'in order to ensure that Australia's international reputation and influence are not seriously endangered'. It was broadly accepted that 'in the overall national interest' international pressure and criticism, however 'undesirable and unnecessary', must be addressed. And further reforms must be countenanced.[32]

In the years immediately after Sharpeville South Africa dramatically increased the size and number of its diplomatic missions. Its embassy in Canberra, no longer a high commission after it left the Commonwealth, grew quickly, and incorporated an aggressive information or propaganda arm. (Rhodesia in the 1960s similarly used its controversial 'information office' to distribute partisan propaganda and lobby political organisations and media.) Australia was perhaps uniquely receptive to such activities and publicity, but Pretoria's propaganda and information activities were expanded also in other Western countries. Predictably, the anti-apartheid movement was anxious to counter Pretoria's publicity. As a representative

of the South African Defence and Aid Fund (SADAF) established in Sydney in 1962 told the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the newly established advocacy organisation was determined to 'place before the public' information that might 'countervail persistent propaganda from South Africa and Rhodesia'.[33] Ironically, consular dispatchers also suggested that a media campaign be developed to counter negative information spread by Pretoria.[34] Not all officials shared this view. Overt propaganda might draw unwarranted attention to unequal treatment of Aborigines, Australia's representative to United Nations, James Plimsoll, advised Menzies and Hasluck in 1961: thus 'it is better to let sleeping dogs lie'. More realistically, ambassador Owen Davis advised that 'it would be unwise to hope that we can avoid criticism … simply by lying low'. While uncertain about how to respond to international criticism, throughout the 1960s all Coalition governments agreed, if reluctantly, that race politics at home could not be separated from the question of apartheid or a widening current of anti-racism.[35]

Media reports of civil rights struggles abroad aroused contradictory concerns. Moral outrage was tempered by customary anxieties that repeated Menzies' desire 'to preserve a homogenous population and so avert the troubles that bedevilled some other countries'.[36] Abrupt social change would create disharmony and should be avoided. Yet if global media conversations and images of racial disharmony sometimes provoked moral panic, the assumptions implicit in such reports seldom went unchallenged. Throughout the 1960s alternative voices argued and organised for immigration reform, Indigenous rights, and a more open and tolerant pluralism. If examples of racial unrest warned of unwanted social conflict, they also highlighted the need to reform social policy at home. In this view an open democracy was best able to avoid conflict, or at least manage social change peacefully.[37]

In 1963, amidst reports of mass arrests of African-Americans protesting against segregation in Alabama, Australia's 'treatment of Aborigines' was debated in UN human rights committees. Two years later, as the Freedom Ride exposed entrenched segregation in rural Australia, and race riots erupted in Los Angeles (described in *Die Transvaler* as 'America's Sharpeville'), the UN commissioned its first detailed world-

wide study of race relations. South Africa, Australia and the US were specific targets of this survey and were compared and strongly criticised in subsequent reports.[38]

Cracks in 'White Australia'

During the 1960s Australia moved hesitantly and incrementally to dismantle the legislative apparatus that had long defined the white nation. The twin pillars of immigration and settlement policies—preference for Europeans and pressures for assimilation—were gradually reformed. Racial assumptions were disrupted. The biological absolutes reflected in Menzies' much earlier claims that Australians 'are basically a different race', and that international society comprised 'basically different races', were very slowly displaced by more inclusive narratives of nation and more subtle interpretations of identity.[39]

Indigenous Rights

Until the Commonwealth Constitution was amended by referendum in 1967 'Aboriginal affairs' policy differed considerably across the states and in the territories under Commonwealth jurisdiction, the Northern Territory and the ACT. The Commonwealth did not have power to legislate matters directly affecting most Aboriginal people— those living in the six states. At most it could distribute funding in ways that encouraged states to follow particular policy directions. Despite variations in implementation, 'assimilation' was a goal common across all jurisdictions (even if, as Tim Rowse points out, public opinion from the 1940s was 'evenly divided' on whether 'tribal' Aborigines should be 'educated to live like "white men"').[40] Defending assimilation, Paul Hasluck, as minister for territories, defined it as a 'treasured' 'ideal'. 'We should not be a nation with divisions of race or class, or a nation of different levels; we should be one people, with one destiny'. And in 1962 he told parliament 'in matters relating to the removal of legal discrimination on the grounds of race … no government in the history of the Commonwealth has done more'. Hasluck claimed that his government's policies 'will make race meaningless'.[41]

Australia's representatives abroad were obliged to show assimilation policy in the best possible light. But within External Affairs some dissented. Gilchrist noted with dismay that Hasluck's public efforts to defend assimilation spoke of Aboriginal people as a single group (the federal Constitution similarly identified 'the Aboriginal race'). Some critics argued that Hasluck's views were based on the belief that 'cultural genocide is a perquisite for full assimilation of the Aborigines into the non-Aboriginal society'.[42] Government spokesman defended assimilation on the grounds that it avoided segregation and promoted a homogenous nation. However, Gilchrist was convinced that 'uncomfortably for Australia Mr Hasluck's assimilation line is going to strike very rough water in overseas criticism sooner or later and may embarrass us sorely'.[43]

Menzies and most in his Cabinet assiduously defended assimilation policies against 'misrepresentation' abroad. Government-sponsored 'overseas publicity' gave unqualified endorsement to race policies designed to gradually absorb or assimilate 'Aborigines and part Aborigines' into 'a single Australian community'. In contrast, bureaucratic advice to government increasingly argued that assimilation policies and discriminatory laws in different state jurisdictions must give way to programs of integration and cultural recognition; and must be supported by constitutional amendment that ensured uniform national laws. During the early 1960s this view gained momentum. Kim Beazley Sr. stated, for example, that 'at present' our 'policy of assimilation for the Aboriginal people was a more immoral policy than the apartheid of South Africa'. The quest to ensure social homogeneity through immigration restrictions and assimilationist practices was an offence to non-white people everywhere. 'Apartheid at least recognises the right of Africans to exist,' Beazley stated, 'whereas assimilation would mean the eventual nonexistence of the Aborigines'. Well-meaning comment, like that by conservative commentator Peter Coleman, sometimes reinforced overseas complaint. Having failed to destroy Aboriginal societies physically, he wrote, it was ironic 'that the only recompense we seem to be able to give this race for what we have done to it is to help it to disappear' under policies labelled benignly as 'assimilation'. Such arguments interpreted assimilation as

the unconscionable final chapter in a white narrative that spoke of 'the Aborigines' as 'the dying race'.[44]

'Blatant racial discrimination' could not be hidden from international scrutiny, the *Sydney Morning Herald* editorialised in 1963, as the Anti-Slavery Society brought Australia to the attention of the UN Seminar on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council. Hasluck, who was responsible for Indigenous issues at federal level, later wrote bitterly that international pressures greatly influenced 'public interest in Aborigines … during these years'. Like most commentators, he spoke of 'the Aboriginal problem', not of the shortcomings of government policy (or, to use another phrase common at the time, of government 'treatment of the Aborigines'). Reflecting the paternalism of conservative Australia, he suggested that unwarranted international pressures 'helped to shift the emphasis from a social problem to a racial problem and helped to bring about the situation in which so much of the public discussion concentrated on Australia's "shameful" record instead of on Australia's attempt to do something better in the future'.[45] But what Professor J.D.B. Miller described as 'embarrassing' 'international interest' was only one driver of change. Reform was always mediated by Aboriginal political engagement and leadership; by acts of resistance that refused to accept, as Ted Docker observed in the mid-1960s, 'every attempt to make … the Aborigine … white'.[46]

The political and civil rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people were deeply compromised in provisions of the federal Constitution. In 1962 the Commonwealth Electoral Act was amended, repealing a subsection that excluded Aboriginal people from voting in Commonwealth elections. But the right to exercise the vote in federal elections was in effect denied to many by section 127 of the Constitution which stipulated that 'Aboriginal natives should not be counted' in 'reckoning the number of people of the Commonwealth'.[47] The 1962 voting rights reforms did not ensure political equality and did little to reduce concerns about Australia's compromised 'international reputation and influence'. An interdepartmental committee advised Menzies' Cabinet that there still remained 'an urgent need to remove, as far as practicable, instances of racial discrimination in Australia'. Advice that reform would be 'in the overall national interest' increasingly shaped government policy.

Anticipating future constitutional change, Cabinet implied that reform would be guided by the federal government, and implemented in ways that were 'steady, as distinct from spectacular'.[48] Shortly before Menzies retired, the Coalition 'endorsed the general principle of removal of discrimination', provided this was 'on a quiet and gradual basis and not on the basis of a considerable body of legislation at the one time'. Indigenous reform would in effect replicate the gradualism—'modification by degree'—that governed immigration law reform.[49] Under Menzies' successor, the far more modern and pragmatic Liberal Harold Holt, long overdue constitutional reform began. And, as the conservative side of politics countenanced change, explicit reference to 'White Australia' was removed from the platform of the Australian Labor Party.

In 1967 a national referendum endorsed removal of section 127 of the Constitution that prohibited Indigenous Australians from being counted in the population census. It thus reduced the ambiguity that resulted from amendment of the 1962 Electoral Act. Approved overwhelmingly—by more than 90% of the electorate—the referendum empowered the federal government to legislate on matters affecting Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. It ensured that all Indigenous people were counted as citizens in the nation's census and could thus exercise full voting rights. In combination with the 1962 amendment, the 1967 referendum enabled the granting of uniform national political rights for Indigenous citizens, regardless of state or territory jurisdiction. For census purposes 'Aborigine' was defined as someone with more than '50% Aboriginal blood'—a definition that changed after 1967 to refer to 'racial origin' and later to 'Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander origin'.[50]

The results of the 1967 referendum were both symbolic and substantial. An overwhelming majority in white Australia accepted that the federal government must assume responsibility for Aboriginal affairs and by implication agreed that all people, regardless of race, were entitled to equality under national law. With subsequent reform of legislation in all states, Aboriginal people finally won formal equality (but substantive equality remained elusive and illusory). Policies promoting 'assimilation' were gradually discarded in favour of 'integration'. Programs privileging social homogeneity were gradually displaced by an overt politics of ethnic

recognition and what Rowse deemed 'an ensemble of programs that came to be called "self-determination".[51] Shifting identifiers of race and public policy reforms foreshadowed gradual cultural and attitudinal change in mainstream Australia, but constitutional references to 'persons of any race' remained problematic. Overwhelming endorsement of the 1967 referendum, along with less dramatic efforts to reform immigration law, signalled important, if long overdue, democratic reform. Campaigns for political equality were conducted in a climate of international complaint about discrimination in and by white Australia. On the eve of the 1967 constitutional referendum, leading Indigenous rights activist Faith Bandler warned that 'the eyes of the world' were on Australia. Similarly, local anti-apartheid campaigners were determined to 'show the world that there is significant opposition to racism and apartheid in Australia'.[52]

Constitutional reform did not quickly lead to removal of discriminatory legislation across all states and territories. Although under its new prime minister, Holt, Australia had signed the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, it could not ratify the convention until the nation was deemed to be free of all discriminatory statutes. And some states, notably Queensland and Western Australia, were in no hurry to end discrimination. As in many other reform areas, ratification of the convention had to await the end of the long period of conservative Coalition government that began with Menzies election in 1949 and ended twenty-three years later with the election of the Whitlam-led Labor government.[53]

Immigration Reform

However cautiously, after World War II white Australia opened its borders to growing numbers migrants from a widening number of nations and regions. Economic reconstruction and security concerns accelerated demands to liberalise immigration and labour laws. Initially, greatly expanded numbers of new settlers arrived from Southern and Eastern Europe, along with 200,000 refugees fleeing war and the Holocaust. Increasingly, immigrants were drawn from non-English-speaking countries, as well as non-Protestant or non-Christian communities. From the late 1950s the door to assimilable business professional and skilled

migrants from Asia opened slowly. The door to migrants from Africa and much of the Third World remained, however, tightly closed. Members of the 'Brown Commonwealth', under India's guidance, pressed for reform to Australia's immigration laws, although they remained fairly silent about Aboriginal policy. Menzies and most members of Cabinet deflected such criticism, depicting it as annoying evidence of countries 'sitting in judgement' and interfering in domestic affairs. Menzies argued that policy was based on a reasonable desire to avoid conflict that plagued mixed societies. He undoubtedly included not only South Africa in this group, but also India, Pakistan, Malaysia, the USA and perhaps the UK.[54]

'Our destiny as a nation is irrevocably conditioned by what takes place in Asia', the *Sydney Morning Herald* editorialised as early as 1950: 'this means that we must develop 'understanding and friendly relations' with Asian nations and peoples in our region.[55] Immigration laws, not domestic race-relations, had strongest diplomatic repercussions in the 'awakening East'. In 1954 Casey, minister for external affairs, wrote of Australia's need to cultivate friends and neighbours in its own region. References to the threatening, teeming millions of Asia declined, but the fear of a 'community backlash' always limited immigration reform. Australia's geopolitical isolation was starkly emphasised when Afro-Asian nations met in Bandung in 1955. Although geographically close to Indonesia and South and East Asia, Australia was not invited to participate. Immigration policy and white Australia remained barriers to acceptance in the region. A growing number of bureaucrats, commentators, politicians, business leaders and reform groups argued the importance of cultivating friendship with Asian 'neighbours'. Economic and foreign policy interests demanded a more open and tolerant Australia. In 1960, Gough Whitlam, the deputy leader of the ALP, argued that Australia must recognise the importance of relations with emerging nations, including states as different as India, Indonesia and Ghana. In 1964, in words that echoed rhetorically in future decades, Paul Hasluck, now minister for external affairs, proclaimed that 'friendship, reciprocal trade, closer cultural relations and a clear understanding of Asia and its peoples are in the forefront of Australian policy'. His observations prefigured more substantive immigration reform as the nation 'turned

towards Asia'. Ties of Empire and race-patriotism loosened as the nation negotiated its future regionally.[56]

Advocates of immigration reform argued repeatedly that 'Our reputation has a stain on it. Our standing in Asia—and indeed, throughout the world—is immeasurably reduced in consequence'.[57] Increasingly, reform at home became a prerequisite for success regionally. Asian nations—especially India, Malaysia and Indonesia—never tired of arguing that immigration bias undermined Australia's interests. African and Asian nations relentlessly criticised Australia's friendship with South Africa. Relations with societies in its region would not progress unless African and Asian countries 'knew where Australia stood' on Indigenous rights at home and apartheid abroad, Beazley Sr. told parliament shortly after the killings at Sharpeville. Led by the Immigration Reform Group, a growing number of Australians questioned the rationale for maintaining the infamous colour bar. The *Nation* magazine went further, arguing that abolition of white Australia would be an act of 'enlightened self-interest', opening the door to Asia and removing 'the present offensive inference that coloured people are intrinsically inferior to whites'.[58]

Given 'increasing involvement in Asian developments', Harold Holt acknowledged shortly after he became prime minister, there was a need for 'some modification and a degree of liberalisation' of white Australia.[59] Yet, as his cautious reflections implied, reform would be very limited. In part a rhetorical response to liberal international pressures, Holt's policies were ultimately guided by unwillingness to jeopardise privileged entry for Europeans. Consistently, advice to government implied 'no wish to create in Australia … a multiracial or plural society'.[60] Holt endorsed the intent of such advice. He stated that 'our basic policy [which] has been firmly established since the beginning of our Federation' would not be altered. While 'equally determined to maintain our own way of life', both sides of politics came gradually to accept that cultural difference and diversity must replace suggestions of superiority or racial exclusion.[61] Publicly at least, the populist racial underpinnings of white Australia were rejected. Terms like 'changing national interests' and 'regional integration' displaced a protective vocabulary that spoke

of the 'problems' of 'racial differences', 'miscegenation' or 'internecine strife' as inevitable consequences of more open borders. Very cautiously, as Matthew Jordan has demonstrated, 'White Australia' was liberalised by degrees, 'crumbling under the weight of new circumstances'.[62]

From 1957 restrictions on non-European entry and citizenship were cautiously relaxed; the infamous dictation test was abandoned; and entry was permitted for 'distinguished and highly qualified Asians'. Subsequently, small numbers of 'non-European' or 'part-European' settlers were granted permanent residency or citizenship. But 'colour' and 'blood' continued to determine selection. Place of origin remained a criterion— thus *de facto* racial classifications were still reflected in immigration law. 'Being substantially of European origin', or 'not more than 25% non-European in appearance', still guided decisions by immigration officers. Even those working in Mediterranean countries were expected to rule against applicants if they were, for example, 'far too dark', of 'obvious Moorish blood, or 'could be taken for Asian'.[63]

In the early 1960s the Soviet Union led international condemnation of racism in White Australia, suggesting that world opinion regarded as propaganda claims that racism was an internal matter.[64] Menzies' Cabinet quickly dismissed criticism from Communist or Eastern bloc countries as hostile ideology. But it could not easily ignore criticism from African and Asian states within the Commonwealth or the UN. Peter Heydon, a distinguished career diplomat who served as high commissioner in India, 1955–59, and subsequently as head of the Department of Immigration, warned that Afro-Asian bloc opinion was not placated by Australia's recent decision to join in moral condemnation of apartheid. Nor by recent immigration reforms permitting a small number of non-Europeans entry. While Australian laws reflected 'discrimination solely on racial grounds', Heydon warned, they would be condemned unreservedly.[65]

A pragmatic view of national interests, if not changing assumptions about race, brought limited reform. Shortly after Holt replaced Menzies as prime minister, parliament approved the watershed Migration Act, 1966. Explicit racial criteria were replaced by broader indicators of suitability, notably the ability to integrate readily and possession of expertise or

qualifications useful to Australia. Briefing notes from the Department of Immigration confirmed that British migration 'has been and will remain a cornerstone of Australia's rapid population building'—'the British connection has the first interest of the government'. Holt told parliament reassuringly that despite 'some modification' and a 'degree of liberalisation', 'basic policy' in place since Federation would 'not change'; the aim of preserving a homogenous population will 'be maintained'. In practice immigration policy continued to discriminate against non-Europeans, especially people of colour from Africa and other Third World regions, although it did open the door to a small number of better educated migrants from Asia, and shortly after to refugees from war in Vietnam. Critics complained that the 'obligation to remove … all racially discriminatory provisions' from Australian laws and international activities remained. 'As an island nation, predominantly of European inhabitants situated on the edge of Asia,' a dismayed Whitlam commented, 'we cannot afford the stigma of racialism' that accompanies our restrictive policies.[66]

Under the cautiously liberal Holt, Australia's international image improved. Whitlam acknowledged that Holt was 'a much more modern character' than Menzies. Despite Holt's open willingness to 'Go all the way with LBJ' in Vietnam, Whitlam conceded that the new prime minister repositioned Australia within the Commonwealth, 'the old Empire and our neighbours in East Asia'. Holt guided the important 1967 Constitutional referendum, introduced limited immigration reforms, and was the first Australian prime minister to visit Asia. Jenny Hocking has suggested that he 'provided the Liberal–Country Party government with the generational change that Whitlam had been seeking for the Labor Party'. Yet Australia's transition from the conservative Menzies era was slow and uneven, constrained after Holt's sudden death by the idiosyncratic conservatism of successive Coalition prime ministers, John Gorton and William McMahon.[67] The first real cracks in the administration of Australia's race-based immigration policies did not appear until the late 1960s. Not until after the election of the Labor government in 1972 was race ostensibly removed from immigration selection criteria and assimilation policy officially abandoned.

'Vulnerable to International Criticism'

Throughout the 1960s External Affairs officials were obliged to work assiduously 'to counter hostile and critical articles', deemed 'injurious' to Australia's 'reputation' and foreign policy aspirations. Immediately after Sharpeville, Hugh Gilchrist initiated efforts to guide diplomats on sensitive racial matters. After Menzies' retirement, a high-level interdepartmental committee for the co-ordination of overseas information policy in the Information and Cultural Relations branch of External Affairs developed 'confidential guidance papers' on 'Aboriginal affairs and policy' for 'officers at overseas posts'.[68] It was crucial, the committee advised, that 'our information work should stress' what the Holt 'government had done'. Such guidance was largely wasted on officials working in South Africa where, typically, newspapers like the Johannesburg *Star* reported that the 'Aborigines' were 'a tragic people' surviving 'dejectedly' in conditions that would 'make an Afrikaner proud of his Bantu townships'. Australian officials in Pretoria could not guide local publicity, especially the seemingly endless reports comparing race relations in the two countries. Nonetheless, after 1967 some commentary in South Africa—more commonly than in any other country—conceded that white Australia was beginning to change. The *Star* acknowledged that 'very little legislation remains in Australia that deprives Aborigines of full citizenship rights'. Despite this, conditions in Australia provided no 'yardstick' by which to judge race relations. Alongside photographs of a 'shack home' on an 'Aboriginal reserve', the *Star* told its white audience that 'discrimination does exist and often it is as blatant as on a bench in Joberg Park'.[69]

The charge of 'parallel apartheid' remained an important polemical tool in the wider struggles over racism in Australia. It undoubtedly accelerated reform of immigration law and Indigenous rights, and altered—if only in the public domain—bilateral relations between the two white countries. By drawing attention to the evils of apartheid abroad, activists invited comparisons with conditions in Australia. They hoped that embarrassing identification with apartheid might stimulate government initiatives at home. At the same time, the unrelenting propaganda campaign orchestrated by Pretoria portrayed race relations in Southern

Africa as common to many settler societies—most notably Australia—where similar histories of European domination justified the exclusion of other races from equal citizenship. Pretoria's insistent campaign drew international attention to the underside of Australian history.[70]

Generally, Australia's 'pro-apartheid, anti-Black image' continued to arouse unwelcome attention—or, in the words of an Australian living in Wellington, to have a 'damaging effect' overseas.[71] Voiced by activist organisations and news media in friendly Western countries, notably in Great Britain, Scandinavia, the USA and New Zealand, such criticism could not be ignored. Perhaps the most extreme comment came from Scandinavia. Three years after the referendum of 1967, *The Enslaved People*, a study of 'Aborigines in Australia' by Neal Richard, generated considerable controversy. In a preface to the Danish translation of the book, Per Gudmundson described 'Australian policies as being consistent with Nazi brutality and similar to apartheid'. (The fact that Richard's book focused on conditions in the early 1960s, before the 1967 Referendum, did not reduce the impact of his observations.)[72] In the US some civil rights activists also made difficult comparisons, stating bluntly that Australia 'is a country that had strict apartheid laws, almost as strict as South Africa'.[73]

In the old Commonwealth in particular, the concern to avoid 'racial problems' common to 'mixed societies' was widely shared. Expressed most controversially by Enoch Powell in his 'Rivers of Blood' speech to the British Conservative Party in April 1968, open immigration and multiracialism were 'preventable evils' that must be avoided in the interests of social harmony and national cohesion. Powell's concerns mirrored Menzies defence of social, or racial, homogeneity. Made just two weeks after the assassination of US civil rights leader Martin Luther King and the eruption of race riots in many American cities, Powell's contention echoed loudly in the Australian media. Aboriginal activist Roberta Sykes noted disdainfully that 'Black Power' was 'synonymous with blood, fighting in the streets, murder, riots and looting.'[74]

The most strident protest aroused the most inflated social fear. The Freedom Ride against segregation in 1965 was criticised, especially in rural areas, as an unwarranted provocation; a pointless act by 'belligerent' 'publicity-seekers' out to 'agitate and antagonise'. Advocacy was seldom

interpreted as a legitimate expression of a fundamental democratic right. Protests organised against apartheid were widely seen as unjustified disruptions of democratic custom and social order. At the same time, throughout the 1960s Australian media usually identified the banned ANC and its jailed or exiled leaders, including Nelson Mandela, as communists, extremists or terrorists—seldom as legitimate political opponents of an undemocratic white minority government. Against this background, the political rationale of the wider anti-apartheid movement was often confused with threatening left-wing ideology and militant tactics of the ANC, or buried beneath sensational reports of violence that threatened the rule of law and civic order. Commonly, reports emphasised 'racial unrest' or 'riot' and ignored the fundamental causes of African resistance.[75]

The politics of race abroad prompted Australian newspaper items that eschewed dispassionate analyses of racism as systemic or institutionalised. They highlighted instead the 'eruption' of 'racial violence', 'racial conflict' or 'race riots' in societies as different as Great Britain, the United States, Kenya, South Africa, Singapore or Malaya (where in 1969 six hundred 'mainly-Chinese' citizens were killed in communal violence). Overseas examples were drawn largely from the US during the tumultuous civil rights struggles of 1968. But in racially anxious white Australia, urban violence, ghettos, Black Power, multiracialism or multiculturalism, were often seen as warnings of endemic racial problems—of social dislocation that should be avoided or controlled.[76]

Despite legislative reforms, Australian racism continued to arouse awkward 'injurious' commentary.[77] At no time was this more apparent than after the Queen's royal tour in 1970. Summarising British press reaction to the visit, leading journalist Peter Smark expressed 'surprise' that 'it was the discovery of the Australian Aboriginal and his plight not' the significance of the Royal occasion 'which most marked coverage in the UK'. Repeatedly raised in *The Times*, the *Observer*, Sunday newspapers, and most pointedly in a special one-hour BBC documentary by Michael Charlton, was 'the question of Aboriginals and their status'. Typically, reports dismissed as 'remote' the possibility of Aboriginal rights advocates 'making any impression on a white, selfish status quo'. Charlton saw 'no glimmer of hope', just a 'rich cause for Australian shame'. The 'degradation

of the Aboriginals' was a common theme. John Douglas Pringle wrote that those 'who survived the first onslaught of white brutality have lived for the past 100 years in conditions of utter degradation; dispossessed, exploited, despised. Many of them still do'.[78]

Adverse publicity like that following the Queen's visit could not easily be dismissed as the unwarranted opinions of the political Left. Reluctantly, government representatives and bureaucrats accepted that awkward references published overseas were likely to 'recreate doubts', especially in the UN and Commonwealth, about Australia's troubling history. More immediately, they feared such publicity would fuel renewed criticism of policy in PNG, and relations with white South Africa.[79] Perceptions of race relations in Australia as 'parallel' to apartheid—essentially indistinguishable—remained widespread.

Yet no Coalition government was prepared to act separately, or in concert with others in the international community, against apartheid. Indeed, throughout the 1960s consecutive governments took no concrete action that might weaken apartheid. In 1970 Australia tacitly endorsed a controversial proposal by the UK's newly elected Conservative government of Edward Heath (1970–74) to flout international sanctions and sell arms to South Africa. Prime minister Gorton acquiesced on the grounds that this would help protect Australia's strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. Gorton was adamant that 'normal diplomatic relations', commerce, trade, cultural and 'other contacts' would continue. Responding to criticism from Friends of Africa, a newly convened anti-apartheid organisation in Sydney, Gorton repeated a now familiar defence of Australia's position. Sanctions would not achieve 'the objective of influencing or moderating internal policies with which we are known to disagree', he stated; moreover Australia 'cannot intervene in matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of another country'. Bilateral friendship was not compromised or eroded by international efforts to isolate white South Africa.[80]

From the late 1960s the 'xenophobia, isolationism, and racism' that troubled ALP leader Whitlam 'withered away'. But it did so very slowly. Speaking at CHOGM in Singapore early in 1971 Gorton declared that Australia could become the 'world's first truly multiracial society'.

Such lofty sentiment was undermined by the prime minister's further observation that it could do so while remaining 'homogeneous'. As Gorton's confusion implied, many of the assumptions and practices underpinning white Australia outlived legislative reform. They were uncomfortably exposed during nation-wide struggles over apartheid—especially those aroused by sporting contacts from the late 1960s. On the anniversary of Sharpeville, the Australian Council of Churches' *Statement on Racism* denounced racism current in Australia. 'This is racism', it declared, 'when Aborigines are denied access to swimming pools, cinemas, hotels and hospital wards because they are Aboriginal'; when 'rights and privileges in housing and employment' are 'denied' because of 'racial origin'; when sport is played with 'teams chosen on a racial basis'; when 'people believe that because they have white skin they are superior'.[81] Despite changes to some race policies, Dennis Brutus told anti-apartheid activists in Sydney that Australia continued to be 'known all over the world as a nation which accepts racism'.[82] Local commentary was equally blunt. 'In relation to racial policies' Australia remained 'vulnerable to international criticism', the *Australian Financial Review* editorialised in June 1970: 'increasingly cosy relations between Australia and South Africa can only lead to Australia being tarred twice over with the brush of apartheid and white Australia'.[83] Racialism remained endemic. It could not be hidden from international view or judgement.

Early Movement Against Apartheid

Australia would not have any authority to speak to its neighbours outside Australia until it could speak to its neighbours inside Australia—the Aborigines.[1]

Kim Beazley Sr., *Canberra Times*, 1960

It is not enough to say, in effect, that we're doing nothing about Aboriginal rights so let's do nothing about Apartheid. Let's do what is in our power to make both right.[2]

Garth Nettheim, SADAF, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1971

At the heart of domestic civil rights struggles and international contests over decolonisation and apartheid, anti-racism was by the early 1960s a pervasive global issue. In Australia, more than in any other country, anti-apartheid initiatives filled an awkward gap left by an inactive state and docile diplomacy. Coalitions of activist groups demanded that bilateral links with the apartheid regime be severed. In highlighting racism abroad Australian activists, somewhat innocently, turned a searching international spotlight on their own society. Crucially, as transnational networks of opposition to apartheid formed, 'white Australia' became a focus of deepening international condemnation.

After Sharpeville, a 'Movement' formed to combat apartheid. Networks of local, national and transnational groups were coalitions of solidarity built around institutions, activists' groups and individuals, involving churches, trade unions, NGOs, left-leaning political parties, student associations, human rights organisations, Indigenous activists and anti-

racism groups. In most Western societies, dynamic social movements were developing around a cluster of different issues, notably racism, women's rights, gender equality, feminism, sexual politics, peace, environmental protection, civil rights and human rights. Like opposition to apartheid, these issues and the informal Coalitions of activist groups attracted to them transcended conventional paradigms of political contest. In her pioneering study, 'Signals to South Africa: The Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement', Christine Jennett emphasised that it was directed 'towards and against' institutional patterns of politics while simultaneously it 'attempted to remake the cultural understandings about race and human rights which underpin[ned] the thinking of all sectors' of society. Broadly, 'new social movements' challenged, through collective action, established political paradigms. From the mid-1960s the Moratorium Movement against war in Vietnam and the Anti-Apartheid Movement gave fullest expression to the term 'new social movement'. Many in Australia who joined the struggle to end apartheid were radicalised by working against conscription, the American alliance and Australia's military involvement in Vietnam.[3]

It is important, however, that local and transnational organisations working against apartheid not be conflated with the very different nationalist-liberation movements with which they sometimes acted in solidarity. European, North American and Australian anti-apartheid organisations were essentially re-active local protest movements, even if they were heavily influenced by exiled or émigré South Africans. Advocacy networks were very different political formations from the nationalist organisations that waged struggle in Southern Africa, most notably in South Africa itself the ANC, the PAC, the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and Inkatha. Tor Sellstrom has pointed out that as pro-active 'political entities and governments-in-waiting, driven by a quest for state power (in the case of the ANC and PAC, including by military means), the role, agenda, strategy, and tactics of the national liberation movements were … essentially different from those of the international solidarity organisations'.[4]

Domestic political struggles were deeply intertwined with a divisive international politics of race. Pressures for reform came not only from

activist organisations but also from within the Department of External Affairs and liberal factions in the Coalition and the ALP that were variously determined to confront the charge of 'apartheid at home'. Apartheid's most vocal defender, David Tothill, observed caustically: 'Once' anti-apartheid action in Australia 'is stripped of the rhetoric and hypocrisy which surrounds it, the real motivation becomes clear … Australia wants to free itself from the racist image attached to it by the old White Australia policy and present condition of the Aboriginal people'.[5] Rising activism, particularly that expressed through the anti-apartheid movement, was informed at every level by this concern. Apartheid's supporters emphasised the 'affinity between Australia's racial policies' and those of their own country, and bemoaned the willingness of the 'international community' to censure South Africa while failing to acknowledge racism in that other 'white man's country', Australia.[6]

Overseas Roots, Local Expressions

The immediate precursor to an international anti-apartheid movement, the Boycott Movement, was born in London in 1952. Its focus was broadly anti-colonial, with links to anti-imperial organisations in Britain, notably the Movement for Colonial Freedom. Its focus on apartheid sharpened in 1959 following appeals to the outside world by outlawed ANC leader (Chief) Albert Luthuli. Like so much else in the struggles against apartheid, the wider movement gained traction after Sharpeville. Built around émigré South Africans, including Ronald Siegel and Abdul Minty, it found broad support from British churchmen and women, trade unionists, academics, Labour and Liberal MPs and, increasingly, student groups. Initially it was concerned to change UK foreign policy toward South Africa and expose apartheid before the international community and in the UN. It was closely associated with the International Defence and Aid Fund, an outgrowth of Christian Action, which under the guidance of a group of South African refugees provided funds for political prisoners and their families—usually these funds found their way to the outlawed ANC or PAC. The UK-based Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) foreshadowed and heavily influenced the emergence of organised activism

in Australia in the early 1960s and the creation of a more formal anti-apartheid network, the Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement (A-AAM), in the following decade.[7]

The first public demonstration against apartheid was organised by Sydney University students in Martin Place, in response to the Sharpeville massacre on 21 March 1960. It was quickly shut down by the police. Less easily dismissed was a rally of 1,500 people in Sydney in April that endorsed a combined trade union decision to join 'a massive worldwide boycott of South African consumer goods as a protest against racial killings and segregation'. While the Australian Council of Trade Unions led efforts to intervene against Pretoria, Methodist leader Alan Walker moved a resolution that condemned the Australian government for its failure to express 'unqualified opposition to racial segregation'. In 1963 Melbourne University group Student Action protested against visiting Springbok cricketers, initiating a protracted nationwide campaign centred on the politics of racism in sport.[8]

A decade earlier, as Nationalist Party rule hardened in South Africa, actions by Alan Walker, ACTU president Albert Monk, a few Labor politicians and left-leaning trade unions had attempted to draw attention to the extremes of apartheid. Before World War II Walker had condemned the white Australia policy. A consistent opponent of racism (and communism) and frequent visitor to South Africa, in 1953 he preached to large congregations of the South African Methodist Church—'the biggest in the country'—observing that an 'awful, explosive atmosphere exists' and that 'violence is inevitable'. He also preached widely in the United States—on one occasion sharing the pulpit with his idol, Martin Luther King. He remained an outspoken Christian advocate against racism and the 'harm' being done to 'Australian relationships with Africa and Asia' by its benign response to apartheid. But his activism was limited to moral condemnation and peaceful demonstration. The trade union movement, locally and internationally, wanted more concrete sanction. Under Monk's leadership the ACTU forged 'solidarity' links with the South African Congress of Trade Unionists (SACTU) and worked against apartheid with international labour organisations, including the World Federation of Trade Unions, and with other left-wing organisations, including the World

Peace Council. The ACTU also supported attempts by the Waterside Workers' Federation and Seamen's Union of Australia to boycott ships connected to South Africa. In response to Sharpeville, the ACTU renewed its calls for stronger political action, supported boycotts and condemned apartheid—strategies Labor-related organisations followed consistently during the long struggle.[9]

Throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s, organised protest was sporadic and uncoordinated, even in the fields of sport. Aid and support for political victims and liberation movements, notably the ANC and SWAPO, increased. But this, too, was fragmented and uneven, of limited direct benefit. The most significant voices of protest came from within federal parliament. Throughout the 1950s a handful of Labor members condemned apartheid and Menzies' implicit support for the undemocratic regime that sustained it. 'Apartheid' was first named in parliament in 1954 when ALP veteran Don Grant described 'this stupid system' as uniquely 'brutal' and condemned Australia's compromised UN voting record. In 1959 Gough Whitlam argued that 'racial discrimination' and 'slave labour' were the cornerstones of apartheid. He condemned Australian foreign policy that, he argued, not only endorsed segregation within South Africa's borders, but approved the extension of white supremacy into its 'trust territories'. Kim Beazley Sr. and Gordon Bryant were also outspoken Labor Party opponents of racism. After Sharpeville, Jim Cairns, Leslie Haylen, Eddie Ward and Whitlam denounced apartheid's 'inhuman racial policies' and undemocratic rule. Cairns' suggestion that trade boycotts be implemented was rejected by acting minister for external affairs, Garfield Barwick, as aiding 'communist subversion'. In the frigid international climate of Cold War, organisations like the banned ANC and PAC were widely viewed as violent 'liberation movements' closely allied to international communism. Aiding such groups or defending their imprisoned or banned leaders was anathema to most Western governments—synonymous with aiding and abetting subversion. Conservative parliamentarians like Jim Killen and Wilfred Kent Hughes routinely identified the ANC leadership as 'terrorists' and 'communists', while defending the policies and leadership of the National Party as 'moderate' and necessary if order was to be maintained in Southern Africa.[10]

In parliament bipartisanship extended only as far as moral condemnation of police actions. In Opposition throughout the 1960s, the ALP could do little more than criticise government policy and offer vague support for apartheid's opponents, although such backing was always tempered by fears that disruptive protest tactics, sympathy for Mandela, or open encouragement of the ANC, might alienate mainstream opinion. Despite such constraints, Labor politicians bemoaned Menzies' refusal to use his 'position of special influence' with Pretoria to encourage change. Other criticism was less measured. The unique bilateral relationship so evident during all administrations from Menzies to McMahon was condemned from some in the ALP for reinforcing the perception of Australia as 'a white supremacist nation' that was happy to be viewed as 'a junior partner in the policy of apartheid'.[11] (Australia was also at this time a 'junior partner' in the US-led war against Asian nationalism in Vietnam, a conflict described by some in the non-aligned world as a neo-colonial race war.)

Experience of daily life in South Africa shaped the dedicated actions of some activists. This was perhaps best reflected in the work of John and Margaret Brink, émigrés from South Africa who founded the Australian branch of the Southern African Defence and Aid Fund, SADAF, in Sydney during 1962–63. In the wake of Sharpeville, along with Albert Luthuli and others, John Brink was imprisoned for three months, without trial, for protesting against pass laws. The Brinks were prominent progressives and members of the Liberal Party in Pretoria. Margaret also joined women dissenting publicly through the Black Sash movement. Before fleeing, the Brinks had worked with the local branch of the International Defence and Aid Fund, IDAF. Founded in London by Bishop John Collins in 1956, it initially raised funds to defend the 156 people, including Nelson Mandela, imprisoned during the protracted Treason Trial in the late 1950s. (Eventually all those charged were acquitted; but in the Rivona Trial in 1963–64 Nelson Mandela and others were convicted of sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment.) Other political émigrés helped lay SADAF's foundations in Sydney, notably Derek Marsh and Rona and David Ovedoff. The most important—if unexpected—local member of SADAF was Edward (Ted) St John. A 'pathological anti-Communist' and prominent

Liberal Party member and politician, St John had served as an observer representing the International Commission of Jurists at the infamous Treason Trial. From its Sydney office in the Brinks' bookshop, SADAF's activities focused directly on South Africa, rather than Australia's policies towards it. Most controversially, like IDAF, it raised funds to support political prisoners and their families and to 'inform … about apartheid'. This task, as Penny O'Donnell and Lynette Simons have noted, 'was often made difficult by the public perception of the African liberation movements as terrorist organisations run by communists'.[12] Nonetheless, SADAF attracted highly reputable patrons, including Justice Roma Mitchell, radical Anglican Francis James, poet Judith Wright and Gough Whitlam.[13] Its anti-apartheid advocacy was sustained and important. Despite its 'moderate middle-class' profile, SADAF maintained direct contacts with the ANC. In collaboration with the small Melbourne-based organisation South Africa Protest it brought Robbie Resha, the ANC's director of international affairs, to Australia in 1967. Resha spoke at public meetings and on university campuses in Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Adelaide, Canberra and more surprisingly in Tamworth, Taree and Armidale. His visit attracted very large audiences and strong media attention. But, Resha observed, there was needed in Australia an overarching organisation to 'mobilise all the political support'. In a similar vein, SADAF secretary Garth Nettheim noted that a 'nucleus of support' existed in mainland cities, but geography made coordination of activities very difficult.[14]

SADAF was not alone in giving support, both material and moral, to victims of apartheid or in giving aid to militant groups, notably the ANC and PAC, organising from beyond South Africa's borders. 'If SADAF was moderate and middle-class, then Friends of Africa, formed in Sydney in 1967, was left-wing, union based and radical', Peter Limb has commented.[15] FOA used its strong links with some trade unions and labor politicians to 'encourage solidarity actions with the freedom fighters of Africa', including the exiled ANC. Its activities stalled in the face of successful A-AAM-led demonstrations and decisive actions by the newly elected Labor government. But, along with SADAF, it provided some direct assistance to the ANC and more importantly helped lay the foundations of a strong ALP–Trade Union relationship with the ANC, through exiled leaders like Oliver

Tambo, Walter Sisulu, and its representative in Australia, Eddie Funde.[16]

Throughout the 1960s both sides of federal politics openly condemned apartheid on moral grounds. But demands for more tangible action never received significant bipartisan support. At state level, especially where rural and Country Party influences were strongest, no governments other than Don Dunstan's Labor administration in South Australia and briefly John Tonkin's Labor government in Western Australia voiced opposition to apartheid. Relations with South Africa were a federal matter and racism in another country did not trouble state premiers or governments. A notable exception in mainstream politics, Dunstan played a leading role in the movement against apartheid. During the late 1960s conservative Coalition governments dominated state politics in all but South Australia and Tasmania. Dunstan was a progressive Labor leader who swam against the tide of racism, changing state laws and vigorously supporting the 1967 referendum. His rhetoric and actions gave formal political weight to the wider social movement. And uniquely, as is evident below, they merged struggles for Aboriginal rights with efforts to end national links to apartheid.[17]

Overwhelming support for constitutional change in the 1967 Referendum boosted support for organisations working against apartheid from within Australia. More broadly, protest was influenced by the rise of radical social movements—1960s politics—symbolised most powerfully by mass student demonstrations in Paris and Chicago in 1968, and global protests against war in Vietnam. In Australia, the immediate spurs to stronger political engagement came from anti-war campaigns and the example of successful anti-apartheid actions overseas. During 1968–69, protests erupted in England and Ireland against visiting Springboks rugby teams. Labour prime minister Wilson intervened to stop a scheduled Springbok cricket tour. These developments could not easily be ignored by other countries with close sporting ties to South Africa. Lessons from abroad had little immediate impact on conservative governments or sports administrators in Australia; but they dramatically affected community engagement and organisation against apartheid. From the early 1960s sporadic protests were waged against all-white South African teams visiting to compete in rugby, cricket, swimming, basketball, surfing,

tennis, lifesaving and golf. The international drive against apartheid sport surfaced in cities and campuses across Australia, as it had in the United Kingdom, Ireland and New Zealand.

Overseas experiences sometimes had a very direct influence on local activists. Jim Boyce's decision to work against racism was crystallised by his experience of apartheid. As a visiting rugby player, he had witnessed the brutal treatment of segregated African spectators in Port Elizabeth 1963. He played against the Springboks again during their Australia tour in 1965. He studied at Berkeley California during 1966–67 and lived in the UK during 1968–69. Boyce recalled that when he returned to Australia he 'saw things differently': 'I'd come to realise that the South African rugby tours weren't just about sport, they were used to support the apartheid regime' and 'I wanted to speak out against that'. Boyce later commented, with dismay, that 'I was the only player from the 1963 tour to publicly oppose the 1971 Springbok visit'.[18]

Developments overseas had important ramifications at home, encouraging many to speak out against racism. Also important were immediate contacts with liberal émigrés or exiled African activists visiting under SADAF's aegis, most notably Dennis Brutus in 1969 and 1970, and by Robbie Resha two years earlier. The visit by Brutus, the controversial exiled leader of SAN-ROC, had an immediate impact. Brutus 'convinced' campaigners that an organisation should be established 'to focus' on sports boycotts, as anti-apartheid campaigners in Britain had done.[19] John Myrtle heeded this advice and the Campaign Against Racism in Sport— CARIS—was set-up. Meridith Burgmann noted that there was now a 'very effective dichotomy' in the movement between 'the relatively respectable CARIS' with considerable support from churches, the ALP and 'various sportspeople' and the self-proclaimed 'maddies' of the student-based A-AAM. CARIS acted very moderately, presenting petitions to rugby and cricket officials, although many individual members also joined more radical protest actions.[20]

The A-AAM was forged in the wake of protests against the heavily promoted visit in June 1969 by the South African minister for trade, Jan Haak. Demonstrations, some led by local representatives of the Black Sash, greeted apartheid's 'economic ambassador' in Sydney, Brisbane and

Melbourne. Convenor Peter McGregor was 'pleasantly surprised' by the turnout of about 1,000 protesters at a demonstration in Chifley Square. 'This was by far the biggest protest held against apartheid in Sydney and it augured well for the future', McGregor reported in *Honi Soit*. Demonstrators were disturbed by the Gorton government's willingness to openly foster economic ties with the Pretoria—a willingness that defiantly contradicted international moves to sanction the regime. Initiated largely by Burgmann, McGregor and Dennis Freeny, the A-AAM's most prominent early members also included Sekai and Jim Holland, Frances Letters, Helen Randerson, Debesh Bhattacharya and Father Dick Buckhorn. Focused on 'stopping the tours', its impact was boosted dramatically by the very public support of dissenting rugby players recently returned from South Africa—Barry McDonald, Bruce Taafe, Tony Abrahams, Paul Darveniza, Jim Roxburgh, Terry Forman—and 1963 Wallaby Jim Boyce.[21] Centred in Sydney, the A-AAM was more broadly based than CARIS and more militant. Although it represented a rather loose Coalition of activists and political interests the A-AAM became the principal driver of community-based opposition to apartheid.[22] Its overriding objective was to plan and organise campaigns against scheduled visits by Springbok sportsmen or women, especially rugby players and cricketers. It was modelled substantially on the Stop the Springbok Campaign, organised in the UK under the very able leadership of exiled Kenyan-born Peter Hain. In the absence of concerted political action by Western governments, isolation from sport surfaced as a uniquely effective—and controversial—weapon in political struggle against apartheid. Nowhere was this more true than in Australia and New Zealand.[23]

Increasingly, the movement in Australia expressed the tactics and objectives of the well-organised Britain-based movement. Strategies broadly deployed to exclude white South Africa from any code of sport were now concentrated against those few nations that continued to play against it—most prominently Australia, New Zealand and England. Ironically, although perhaps not difficult to explain, the anti-apartheid movement was strongest in countries of the old Commonwealth still linked closely to white South Africa through traditional Empire sports—especially rugby, cricket and tennis.

AFTER GRAPHIC IMAGES OF THE SHARPEVILLE MASSACRE WERE PUBLISHED, pictures and stories 'smuggled' out of South Africa were increasingly common in Western media. Confronting images informed growing moral outrage.

In 1968 the *Sydney Morning Herald* took 'a rare opportunity to publish a pictorial record of apartheid as seen by the black man'. It reproduced startling images by 'the photographer of apartheid', Ernest Cole, from his book titled *House of Bondage: A Study of Apartheid*. Cole's photographs were clustered around five themes: 'Starvation', 'Danger', 'Oppression', 'Servitude', and 'Squalor'. John Brink, representing SADAF, wrote to the *Herald* saying that the pictures 'distilled the truth more forcefully than anything I had ever expected to see' in the Western press, telling 'a story which all but a handful of white South Africans are careful never to see … But some of us have seen each of the scenes they depict, and others just as shameful—hundreds of times over.'

The first documentary broadcast on ABC TV was Allan Ashbolt's 'Report from South Africa', in which renowned writer Alan Paton was interviewed about apartheid and reflected, if indirectly, on race relations in Australia. As sports boycotts against Springboks took effect internationally, images and reports proliferated in Western media, including the influential *Panorama* in the UK and *Four Corners* in Australia. In the early 1970s public debate in the UK, Australia and North America was provoked by the powerful British-made documentary, 'shot illegally in South Africa', *Last Grave at Dimbaza.*

Ernest Cole. A student who said he was going to fetch his textbook is pulled in. To prove he was still in school he showed his fountain pen and ink-stained fingers. But that was not enough; in long pants he looked older than sixteen. 1960–1966. Courtesy of the Hasselblad Foundation, Gothenburg, Sweden. © The Ernest Cole Family Trust

Ernest Cole. South Africa. 1960. Segregated mine workers were exposed to humiliating physical examinations and work regimes. An estimated 10,000 African miners lost their lives working under Apartheid. © Ernest Cole/Magnum Photos

Pretoria was fully conscious of the power of press and television images, and the introduction of TV in South Africa was delayed until 1976, when programs were broadcast to reinforce apartheid: TV1 broadcast in Afrikaans and English for a white audience; TV4 for largely an urban-African audience; TV2 in Zulu and Xhosa; TV3 in Sotho, Tswana and Pedi.

Professor T.B. Millar told an audience in Johannesburg in 1984 that 'many Australians do have a reasonably good grasp of what has happened in South Africa since 1948, and they do not like it … They see a grave impropriety and a fundamental and self-destructive fallacy in the apartheid system … Newspaper or television pictures of bulldozers knocking down shanty houses, while black or coloured women and children with a few pathetic possessions huddle together in the rain, lend credibility and emotional strength to these beliefs.'*

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* 'A Black Man Looks at South Africa', *SMH*, 2/3/1968; Brink in *SMH*, 8/3/1968. Also Nettheim letter, *SMH*, 7/3/1968, SADAF papers Box 6; Millar, 'Australian–South African Relations', p. 6.

The A-AAM and Indigenous Struggle

After Sharpeville race politics in Australia were drawn more tightly into broader international struggle. As Alan Walker observed, 'nothing, for years, has stirred the conscience of Australians more than the massacre of natives in South Africa'. 'No More Sharpevilles' was an emotional rallying point for the movement across the decade. Conservative commentator Peter Coleman suggested that the atrocity ushered in a 'revival of politics' in Australia, on university campuses at least. Jennifer Clark echoes this assessment in her important study of *Aborigines and Activism* but emphasises that images from Sharpeville did little to accelerate movement for Indigenous rights. 'In the early 1960s, apartheid, not Aboriginal affairs, captured the public imagination' and the 'attention of activists', Clark has written (albeit with some exaggeration). In a similar vein, Ann Curthoys has commented that students more eagerly took up the cause of black South Africans or African-Americans than they did the concerns of Aboriginal people. Against this background, anti-apartheid activists were widely criticised as hypocritical; as selectively exercised by racism abroad but little disturbed by discrimination at home.[24]

Assertions that Australia was more like South Africa than was any other country took many forms. They served the interests of apartheid's opponents and defenders alike, but were expressed most pointedly by activists seeking to link Indigenous inequality in Australia with efforts to end racism under apartheid. Beazley Sr. warned shortly after Sharpeville that Australia must address Indigenous disadvantage at home, not least because this might reduce charges of hypocrisy. In the following decade many who championed Indigenous rights endorsed this argument, pointing out that opponents of apartheid could not reasonably condemn racism abroad while ignoring it within their own society.[25] Conspicuous support for the drive to end apartheid 'inevitably provoked questions about racism at home, about white Australia's history of colonisation and oppression', observed Penny O'Donnell and Lynette Simons in introducing their important collection of participant interviews, *Australians Against Racism*.[26] More immediately, as apartheid issues came to dominate the anti-racism agenda in Australia, the relative weakness of demands for

Aboriginal rights aroused bitter criticism across the widest possible political spectrum. Organisationally, at least, different activist groups fighting racism at home or abroad were not united. While some participants have spoken of the 'links between anti-apartheid activism and support for the struggles of Aboriginal people', these developed slowly and unevenly, remaining fairly tenuous until 1971–72.[27]

Emphasising discontinuities in Indigenous activism and the limits of political organisation, Clark has written that 'Aborigines were not a political force in the early 1960s' and struggled to attract white support throughout the decade.[28] Other historians, including Heather Goodall, Ann Curthoys, Richard Broome, Bain Attwood, John Chesterman, and Tim Rowse, have identified a stronger trajectory of Indigenous activism, expressed for example in the 1920s by the Aboriginal Progressive Association, in the 1930s by the Australian Aboriginal League, and in 1938 by the symbolic Day of Mourning. Aboriginal resistance and political agency had deep local roots. In 1949 Aboriginal people who in some states were eligible to vote were permitted to vote in federal elections. A decade later the Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement was formed along with a National Aboriginal Day observance committee. And, as John Chesterman has observed in his perceptive exploration of the roots of anti-racial protest, from 'the early 1960s Indigenous activists became prominent in Australian pro-Aboriginal activist organisations, from state-based Aboriginal advancement groups to the Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement (later the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Strait Islanders)'. During 1960–64, some discriminatory ordinances were overturned in the Northern Territory and Western Australia and South Australia. The Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies was established. The Yirrkala community in Arnhem Land mobilised to protect its land from mining. And in South Australia at least 'integration' challenged 'assimilation' as preferred social policy. Movement against racism accelerated dramatically after the 1965 Freedom Ride in NSW. Loosely coordinated networks of activists drove the campaigns for Aboriginal equality and the anti-apartheid movement. They were united in seeking to end racism. But activist networks remained largely separate. Their tactics and political objectives were specific to each campaign.

Opponents of apartheid had little influence on the Freedom Ride or the campaign for constitutional change. The referendum debates of 1962 and 1967, and the Gurindji strike of 1966, far more immediately than overseas example, invigorated demands for reform locally. Campaigns for Indigenous recognition and rights were guided in the generation after the war by a range of activists, including Faith Bandler, Ken Brindle, Pearl Gibbs, Jessie Street, Doug Nicholls, Bill Onus, Kath Walker (Oodgeroo Noonuccal), Lyall Munro Jr. Billie Craigie, Lyn Thompson, Gary Williams, Bobbi Sykes, Bruce McGuinness, and Charles Perkins.[29]

Throughout the '60s civil rights struggles in the US also greatly encouraged antiracist activism in Australia, especially across university campuses. Most notably, the 'huge demonstration' in support of the 1964 civil rights bill that took place outside the US consulate in Sydney, led directly to formation of the Sydney University Organising Committee for Action for Aboriginal Rights. It promptly planned a rally to celebrate National Aborigines Day. Shortly afterwards Student Action for Aborigines (SAFA) was set up with Indigenous leader Charles Perkins as president, and planning began for demonstrations against segregation in country towns. Historian and Freedom Ride organiser Ann Curthoys has recalled that protests in Australian cities directed against apartheid or against civil rights abuses in the American South 'brought considerable criticism' because they did not focus 'on racism at home'. Others who championed Aboriginal rights during the years of constitutional reform from 1962 have expressed dismay that they were given only limited support by local organisations that focused on racism overseas. O'Donnell and Simons noted that Indigenous activists voiced strong concerns about the myopic politics of the anti-apartheid movement. Aboriginal campaigners were at times outspoken in their criticism. That white Australians could be 'so blind' to racism at home, so 'hypocritical', provoked 'a lot of righteous anger amongst Aboriginal people', Indigenous activist Lilla Watson recalled, 'I [too] 'felt very angry'.[30]

Yet it would be misleading to ignore the symbiotic links between the two movements or to underestimate their shared achievements. In the decade after Sharpeville the two movements ran largely in parallel while following essentially different political agendas. In somewhat

separate ways each contributed to a newly progressive culture of anti-racism. The precursors of movement against apartheid were substantially international; the movement for Indigenous reform was rooted in the dry earth of discrimination and exclusion in—to use the words of Indigenous activist Lilla Watson—Australia's 'own backyard'. Struggles for Indigenous rights always had an overwhelmingly 'local character', Pat O'Shane argued, yet 'the principles underlying those struggles were universal in nature'—part of a much wider 'struggle against colonialism'. In broad terms movement against apartheid in South Africa brought greater pressure for Indigenous recognition and reform in Australia. This was perhaps most uncomfortably revealed in the special UN seminar on Human Rights in 1963 where Australia's delegates were obliged to defend the charge that its Aboriginal people were 'the victims of blatant racial discrimination', and 'white Australia' was a version of apartheid. Demands for Aboriginal rights were subsumed within wider international pressures against racism. Four years later, the overwhelming vote for constitutional reform in Australia reflected in no small measure a changing climate of international opinion about racial equality and democratic practice generally.[31]

Throughout the 1960s campaigners for Aboriginal equality recognised that, in Chesterman's words, 'the best hope for advancement of Aboriginal rights lay with international exposure of Australian practices'.[32] While this perhaps exaggerates 'the matter … of Australia's international reputation', most scholars including Bain Attwood acknowledge that 'it was a constant theme' in Aboriginal rights campaigns throughout the 1960s. 'Justice' for 'the Aboriginal people' demanded that Australia 'live up to international standards'. Struggles overseas were translated into stronger demands for change at home. The 1967 Referendum was a giant step towards Aboriginal political equality. But it was also an important step for European Australia. The 'whole world' would watch how Australia voted, Indigenous leader Faith Bandler had predicted. A 'yes' vote in 1967 would show that mainstream Australia rejected its racist past. 'Now even the most … isolated Aborigine in this country is able to know what is going on in the world', Barrie Pittock reported to FCAATSI a year later: 'News bulletins inform … of progress everywhere'.[33]

Only in South Australia under Labor administrations in the decade from 1965 was there fruitful cooperation between the anti-apartheid campaigners and those working for Indigenous reform. Under Dustan as minister for Aboriginal affairs and from 1970 as premier, South Australia set about, in Dunstan's words, 'removing all discriminatory legislation concerning Aborigines from the statutes'. All 'Protection provisions' and special 'reserve regulations' were repealed. The first Aboriginal Land Rights Act was approved and an Aboriginal Lands Trust established. At a federal level Dunstan influenced the decision of the ALP national conference to remove the words 'maintenance of a white Australia' from its immigration policy. The South Australian experience was unique. In no other state jurisdiction were reforms as exhaustive or support for the anti-apartheid cause as strong.[34]

Activism—most notably the widely reported Freedom Ride of 1965—exposed 'segregation' and 'unofficial apartheid' as customary and routine in many country towns. The evidence of deep racism highlighted by local campaigners undoubtedly strengthened public support for the 1967 Referendum proposals, even if it provoked abuse in rural areas. But such evidence also provided fodder for apartheid's apologists: It confirmed white Australia's hypocrisy as it, too, was built on racism and thus unqualified to pass moral judgement on countries similarly divided. As a story in the *Women's Weekly* bluntly proclaimed, 'Australians are hypocritical in judging South Africa on apartheid when we practice it ourselves'. Such charges dominated Pretoria's public propaganda, although they were expressed more discretely in diplomatic exchanges with Canberra.[35]

In the face of mounting international pressure centred on sport apartheid, the Verwoerd government further expanded 'publicity' activities overseas. Diplomats, political supporters, media and newspapers stories repeated claims described in a lengthy article in the Fairfax press as 'wild paeans of praise for white South Africans and their apartheid policy'. South Africa's 'propaganda offensive' dominated its interaction with a largely hostile 'outside world'. Under Verwoerd an elaborate rationale defending 'Separate Development' formed the basis of a 'massive and consistent propaganda campaign on which South Africa staked her future as a White Supremacist state,' John Lawrence wrote in 1968. At the same time Pretoria

asserted that its ideas of racial difference and practices of social separation were common in other settler societies. Misinformation, described by a Canberra journalist as 'South Africa's new kind of "facts"', was promoted at every opportunity. 'More and more White South Africans in positions of responsibility, both in South Africa and overseas, are providing information about South Africa which simply has no relation whatsoever to documents of history' or to 'the realities of South African life'. Glowing descriptions of the economic success of resource-rich South Africa were repeated in virtually all publicity, as were claims such as those made in 1965 by Dr Carel de Wet, the South African ambassador to Britain, that 'Apartheid is a Christian policy which, without doubt, the Black peoples of Africa want'. The ambassador to Australia, I. Maree, told an audience in Melbourne that 'integration worked nowhere in the whole world; therefore, apartheid was the only answer in a country composed of different races'. Broadly, white South Africa justified apartheid by invoking the doctrine of 'separate but equal' (a doctrine rejected in the landmark US Supreme Court decision *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954). So-called 'Homelands' or 'Bantustans', fundamental to apartheid, were justified as providing equality through 'separate nationhoods' and 'separate freedoms' for different 'races' who should live within separate borders.[36]

Pretoria's elaborate propaganda campaign was not relaxed after Verwoerd was succeeded as prime minister by the reputedly 'more liberal' John Vorster. In 1967, amidst growing controversy over sport, white South Africans travelling abroad were issued with propaganda booklets enabling them to '"correctly answer" all questions and allegations about South Africa with "the truth"'. Official visitors to South Africa, like Western Australia's premier-in-waiting, the minister for industrial development, Charles Court, returned even more convinced that apartheid was a reasonable political solution to an intractable racial problem. (Along with Queensland premier Bjelke-Petersen, Court remained a conspicuous supporter of white South Africa, hostile to apartheid's critics and opposed to Indigenous land rights.) Throughout the protracted struggles over racism, those seeking to understand apartheid, or the reasons for campaigns against it, were obliged to wade through an unpalatable swamp of misinformation, contradictions and 'incompatible images'. Publicity

campaigns and political tactics advanced by apartheid's opponents added other ingredients which its defenders, at least, found impossible to digest.[37]

Across decades of political argument, charges of hypocrisy or insincerity were grist to the mill of all who defended white South Africa. 'Not until every Aboriginal family has been properly housed and fed and given the opportunity to acquire education and emancipation, not until every Aboriginal has been granted full citizenship and equality with his white neighbours', a correspondent to the *Canberra Times* wrote heatedly in 1963, 'can any Australian lover of freedom and human justice claim the right to denounce the policies at present operating in South Africa.[38] Related criticisms were voiced by powerful newspaper magnate Frank Packer, and by a range of Country Party members, state premiers and Coalition politicians, especially those representing rural electorates. Defence of South Africa's right to domestic sovereignty and, by implication at least, its right to practice apartheid, dominated their assertions. Packer, for example, angrily condemned SADAF for ignoring 'plenty of worthy causes in Australia' while interfering against the interests of 'the white people living in South Africa'. He was equally scathing of the lengthy International Commission of Jurists' paper on *South Africa and the Rule of Law*, saying 'it is not for us to intervene' or judge. Apartheid's defenders essentially shared Menzies' views. Reiterated constantly while prime minister and repeated in his 1970 memoir *The Measure of the Years*, Menzies stated that apartheid 'simply means separate development'; and 'it surely must be conceded that every nation must have the right to its own form of government or social structure'.[39]

Often, arguments in defence of white South Africa went beyond asserting its right to protect its sovereignty from outside interference. As critics pointed out, the veracity of such arguments was undermined by Pretoria's military involvement in border wars and efforts to extend apartheid into former Trust territories—areas that the UN deemed to be 'illegally' controlled by Pretoria. And from 1964, as Australia's military involvement in the US-led war against Vietnam escalated, Canberra's convenient defence of non-interference was similarly exposed.

Frank Packer's arguments epitomised the less sanitised views expressed by apartheid's defenders in both countries. They underpinned

Pretoria's elaborate propaganda campaigns abroad, although they were sometimes expressed in veiled language. 'The attitude of many Australians is based on a complete misconception of what life is like in Africa and I think many Australians would have an entirely different view if, in Australia, there were 20 or 30 million black people and 11 million white people', Packer wrote.[40] Racialised anxiety underpinned his concerns about the future of white South Africa should it fall under majority (African) rule. Such undemocratic warnings were commonplace. With varying levels of sensationalism, they dominated reports reaching Australia after Daniel Malan's National Party won office in 1948. It was now 'One Minute to Midnight' in South Africa, Australian journalist Douglas Wilkie had reported from Johannesburg. In the 1960s, as in the '50s, 'racial fear', not compromised democracy or state repression, preoccupied many reports reaching Australia. Writing in the *Sydney Morning Herald* in 1952 Wilkie had been at pains to tell his Australian readers that white South Africans were 'not amused by rebukes' from a 'self-vaunted "White Australia" … which did its best to exterminate its own blacks'.[41] Similar accusations of historical amnesia were levelled repeatedly against Australia in the following four decades of struggle over apartheid.

In a more pragmatic vein supporters of Canberra's hands-off policy condemned the activities of anti-apartheid groups like SADAF (which raised funds for those prosecuted for opposition to apartheid) as naïvely giving comfort to neo-communist liberation groups and violent African organisations seeking to overthrow an elected government with strong ties to the West. Activists were portrayed as ignorant of history; as politically and morally inconsistent. 'While vociferous in their demands for South Africa to adopt measures which the majority of white South Africans regard as suicidal,' a correspondent to the *Canberra Times* wrote bitterly, 'the self-proclaimed champions of equality for the Bantu … ignore the sorry history of our own treatment of the Aborigine, and when reminded of this they blandly claim that such mistreatment lies in the past'.[42]

Related arguments were occasionally expressed more cautiously. As expatriate T.B. Millar, Professor of International Relations at ANU, advised a white South African audience: 'Irrespective of whether some Australian critics may be ill-informed, sanctimonious or hypocritical', their views can

be explained by the fact that they 'do not have South Africa's problems, or its history' (or he implied, its unique demography).[43] Veiled references to the precarious circumstances of the white minority underpinned virtually all arguments advanced in defence of apartheid and white minority rule.

Not until after the 1967 Referendum did movement for Aboriginal rights at home and organised opposition to apartheid abroad substantially overlap. From the early 1970s the relationship was essentially symbiotic— although any interrelatedness was more a result of initiative from Aboriginal activists than from anti-apartheid organisers. As we have seen, this lack of reciprocity attracted considerable public criticism. Nonetheless, Lilla Watson spoke for a growing number of Aboriginal activists when she claimed to have had 'no hesitation in joining' in the protests against apartheid'. Gary Foley also acknowledged the important, if largely symbolic, cooperation that developed between a range groups fighting against racism. Struggles for Indigenous rights and opposition to apartheid were accepted as complementary arms of a wider movement against racism.[44] On the eve of the Springbok rugby tour prominent SADAF member Garth Nettheim conceded that opponents of apartheid had been slow to confront discrimination much closer to home. 'Let's do what is in our power' to right the wrongs in both countries, his campaign advice emphasised. Some Indigenous activists, disillusioned with the level of support they received during the first years of anti-apartheid activity, later acknowledged that it helped to 'raise the consciousness of white Australians' and to mobilise support for Indigenous causes.[45] Despite systemic Indigenous disadvantage, SADAF could claim after the 1967 Referendum, with perhaps some justification, that 'the plight of Australia's Aborigines' is no longer 'a matter of government policy, whereas apartheid in South Africa—and its intrusions into sport—is'.[46]

In the 60s anti-racism protests were influenced by the struggles against segregation in America and Apartheid in South Africa

Freedom Ride, 1965. Students from the University of Sydney formed a group called the Student Action for Aborigines, led by Charles Perkins
Photography kindly supplied by Ann Curthoys

Confronting White Supremacy, 1971–75

On the question of race and Southern Africa, the West has a special responsibility because so far it has stood squarely on the side of white domination.[1]

<div align="right">UN Centre Against Apartheid, 1975</div>

Whereas South Africa has been condemned, denounced, and excluded by almost every international sports Federation, including the Olympic Movement, some countries, notably Australia, continued to defy world opinion [and invite] sports teams—always all-white—to tour their country.[2]

<div align="right">Peter Hain, 1971</div>

Apartheid was at the centre of 'a major paradox' in international politics, the ANC's Director of International Affairs, Robbie Resha, noted after campaigning with SADAF in Sydney: 'The links with the apartheid system have increased simultaneously with wider support for resolutions calling for an end to collaboration with that system'. Resha's observation became orthodoxy in the anti-apartheid movement. 'A major paradox of our time', the UN special committee observed in 1970, 'is that increased international condemnation of apartheid is being accompanied by a growth rather than a reduction of South Africa's economic, diplomatic and political links with the rest of the world'.[3] This observation applied conspicuously to the contradictions underlying Australian policy, most egregiously when it continued to strengthen tangible links with Pretoria while openly denouncing apartheid.[4] But the paradox presented the anti-

apartheid movement with a powerful tactical opportunity. South Africa's growing dependence on the global economy, and its close strategic links to the West, made it particularly vulnerable to international sanctions. Martin Luther King suggested succinctly that the 'extensive economic relations of the great Powers with South Africa' were an avenue for potent nonviolent resistance through 'a massive international boycott'.[5]

CHAPTER 9

Division: Anticipating the Springboks

… South African apartheid is not invulnerable. The sports boycott is practical, highly visible, and in a sensitive area.[6]

[Rob Resha] Chairman of the
UN Special Committee against Apartheid, 1972

This is racism—when Australia takes part in sport with teams chosen on a racial basis …. It is too late to 'keep politics out of sport'.[7]

Australian Council of Churches, 1971

Ongoing cooperation with the West are the bricks 'in the wall of our continued existence', long-serving South African prime minister B.J. Vorster acknowledged. Opponents of apartheid were equally aware that mutual interests, *realpolitik*, sustained white South Africa's relationships with the outside world. Assessing the bilateral relationship from Menzies to McMahon, W.J. Hudson concluded that the 'conventional wisdom' of all Coalition governments 'demanded that tangible interests, whether of a security or an economic nature, should not be sacrificed on the altar of dominant world opinion'.[8] An anti-apartheid activist observed bluntly that 'when in power' Coalition governments took 'every action' possible 'to assist the Pretoria and Ian Smith regimes'. Prime minister Gorton suggested, if somewhat disingenuously, that 'normal relations' were maintained because 'it seems doubtful that the severance of diplomatic and trade relations would achieve the objective of influencing or moderating … internal policies with which we are known to disagree'. However, in

the face of mounting international division over apartheid in sport, the 'standard formulas' guiding Coalition policies on South Africa came under unrelenting challenge.[9]

Political Sport

Opposition to apartheid in sport was premised on the claim, voiced succinctly by Hassan Howa, that 'there can be no normal sport in an abnormal society'. Critics of Australian foreign policy argued similarly that there could be no normal political relations with an abnormal government.[10] Sporting boycotts provided unique tactical opportunities for activists determined to rupture the supportive relationship. They 'prove that South African apartheid is not invulnerable', the Chair of UN Special Committee against Apartheid proclaimed confidently. They are uniquely 'practical, highly visible, and in a sensitive area'. And, he might have added, they had become a singularly successful political tactic. 'Within South Africa apartheid presses heavily on all aspects of the life of the African, the Coloured and the Asian', the Adelaide *Advertiser* noted. Sport is 'the main way in which Australians come into contact with apartheid' and, it stated unequivocally, 'we either accept sport with teams selected on a basis of racial discrimination or we reject it. Either way we make a comment on apartheid'. Opponents exploited what one advocate called 'racist' South Africa's 'Achilles heel'—its desire 'to come out and play white men's games', especially rugby and cricket. In the view of most activists sports boycotts had 'more potential to change racial policies in Southern Africa' than did economic blockades, lobbying, or the 'diplomatic soft shoe'. This premise was well founded, but only because conventional diplomacy and sanctions initiatives had largely failed. 'Suspending sporting exchanges with the racist regime of South Africa and with organisations in South Africa which practice apartheid', the *Advertiser* advised, in forthright language seldom used in the mainstream press, is the only avenue open to effect real change.[11]

No country fought harder to defend South Africa's sovereignty, protect its security interests, or maintain sporting and cultural exchanges with it,

than did Australia. Security and police forces in each nation collaborated (or in the words of activists, colluded) to suppress dissent and protect mutual security interests. The controversy over surveillance of individual rugby players in South Africa during the 1969 Wallabies tour, and ASIO's related surveillance of dissenting rugby players and anti-apartheid campaigners, signalled the extent of covert collaboration. 'Approved' newspapers, including the Johannesburg *Star*, the *Sunday Express*, the Afrikaans paper *Die Beeld*, had reported the activities of their government's security organisation, especially its 'close watch' on Anthony Abrahams. His meetings with 'non-white' groups and 'leaders of opposition parties', including Helen Suzman from the Progressive party and Alan Paton from the banned Liberal party, were widely reported. Abraham's activities were reported to ASIO and the Department of External Affairs in Canberra.[12] In turn, Australia's security and intelligence agencies were deployed to protect relationships with white South Africa.[13]

ASIO worked closely with the Information and Cultural Relations Branch of External Affairs, maintaining an ongoing interest in activities across many political organisations, especially anti-war activists and the Anti-apartheid campaign in Australia. Like the concerns of the government it served, issues highlighted by the peak intelligence body were shaped largely by Cold War anxieties. The security significance of the current campaign within Australia derived from its links to the international movement against apartheid—a political movement that sought to isolate South Africa from the world community and, by implication, undermine South Africa's role as a Western ally. ASIO was convinced that the success of the anti-apartheid movement 'serves Soviet strategic interests in Africa and the Indian Ocean, particularly if relentless criticism of South Africa makes the sales of naval or military equipment to the Republic politically unacceptable'. It was persuaded that the anti-apartheid movement was infiltrated by communists, Maoist, Trotskyists, Anarchists and New Left activists and that this 'could eventually lead to a greater radicalisation of the Aboriginal Rights Movement' and 'anticolonial' forces in Papua New Guinea. The 'risk of violence' during rugby and cricket tests and the expanded influence of what it identified as 'the Radical Protest Movement', alarmed ASIO, as it did government at

federal and state levels.[14] Conservative parliamentarians like James Killen and Wilfred Kent Hughes, who actively promoted the interests of white settlers in Rhodesia and white rule in South Africa, had long asserted that ANC leaders including Robert Resha and Winnie and Nelson Mandela, and all other resistance fighters, were 'communists' or 'terrorists', or both. They declared that the local movement was a dutiful child of its subversive overseas parents. One Liberal parliamentarian described the fledgling A-AAM as 'purely a communist front'.[15] Like ASIO, most members of Cabinet understood international race politics as enmeshed in the contests of a global Cold War.

By 1970 the Olympic movement, Commonwealth sport and all major sporting codes were split by the politics of apartheid. Australian sporting organisations and individual competitors were more willing to play in South Africa or to host visiting Springboks than were those from any country, other perhaps than New Zealand. Australia's representatives had defended white South Africa's right to remain in the Olympic movement and resisted efforts to isolate it from any field of sporting endeavour. Reflecting the views of cricket and rugby organisation generally, sympathetic politicians claimed that sporting contact, not isolation, was more likely to produce change in South Africa. Sporting bodies were determined that rugby and cricket tests scheduled in Australia during 1971–72 would go ahead. They were reassured by strong government backing at national, state and city levels. Continuing to play with apartheid was consistent with Australian foreign policy from the early 1950s until the early 1970s. It was also supported by a substantial majority of citizens. Consistently, under prime ministers Gorton and McMahon, Australia's UN delegations were instructed that 'having regard to the government's previously expressed views on apartheid and sport', they should abstain from voting on any resolution hostile to white South Africa.[16]

In May 1970 South Africa was expelled from the Olympic movement. A few days later the MCC cancelled the Springbok cricket tour of England scheduled for later in the year. Cricket and rugby tours of Australia now also faced 'possible cancellation', the *Cape Times* conceded. And, it pronounced angrily in banner headlines, South Africa's 'exclusion from world arenas' is 'nearly complete'.[17]

The success of the Stop the Tours movement in the UK 'dealt … a traumatic blow' to Pretoria, the Australian ambassador Bill Cutts reported. Its impact was 'probably unequalled since this country's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961'. Reactions of 'shock and anger' were evident across 'all sections' of press and society in white South Africa. But Cutts reported, realistically, any change to apartheid policy was 'most unlikely'. Rather, it was most likely that the 'Afrikaner nation will "laager-up" against this new threat and defy the world—relying on "a strong economy and moral toughness".'[18] Cutts' realism was informed by Verwoerd's infamous assertion that 'no black man will ever wear a springbok jumper'. Statements by Vorster, and before him Hertzog and Verwoerd, critics stated, 'made it clear that world supremacy' in rugby or cricket 'is an important manifestation of the "master race ideology" which is the basis of apartheid'. Given such outrageous claims, some overseas posts repeatedly warned of further difficulties should Australia continue to be identified as apartheid's strongest international friend. Indeed, to support their recommendations some diplomats simply quoted the views of leaders of the international movement against apartheid, notably those of its most prominent advocate, Peter Hain, that condemned Australia's defiance of 'world opinion'.[19]

Cutts's advice from Pretoria was precise and prescient. A decision regarding possible cancellation of the Springbok rugby tour scheduled for mid-1971 and the cricket tour scheduled to commence in late 1971 should be 'taken as soon as possible to avoid the damaging effects of a massive build-up of anticipation followed by a sudden cancellation in the face of pressure', Cutts advised. The proposed visit of the Australian Ballet to South Africa gave rise to similar advice. Given 'world opinion about South African policies' it was important that the ballet company not be used to appear 'to support the policies of apartheid', the respected Chair of the Council for Aboriginal Affairs, Dr H.C. Coombs, asserted.[20] The international movement against apartheid warned that Australian would 'be branded by all nations that oppose apartheid as being pro-apartheid' if it did not follow Britain's lead and immediately end 'all future sports exchanges with white South Africa'.[21] The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, and most Commonwealth countries, also joined calls to cancel the

rugby and cricket tours. At the height of protest clashes, the UN's Special General Assembly Unit on Apartheid drew added attention to Australia, declaring that 'while South African sporting teams are selected on a racist basis no Australian sporting body should issue or accept invitations for tours to play with such teams'. It went so far as to suggest that it would be 'in the interests of relations with Asian and African nations that Australia in no way appear to support or condone a policy of apartheid'. Support within the Unit on Apartheid for this protest was unanimous: none of its 17 members dissented.[22]

Local opinion, not the rhetoric of non-aligned states or predictable pronouncements by the UN, guided Coalition policy. Gorton's unsteady government and the unpopular McMahon administration each refused compromise. Both were explicitly 'reluctant to intervene in international sporting activities', and constantly defended the principle of 'non-interference'. Both asserted that 'politics and sport should not be tied together'. Both endorsed the right of sporting authorities to arrange sporting fixtures at home or overseas 'with a minimum of political interference'. They would not intervene to stop the rugby tour. Nor did any Coalition government attempt to dissuade national teams from playing in South Africa. They also refused to take action that might stop individual sports people from playing abroad in segregated tournaments. Occasionally, however, Australia's actions were consistent with international policy and opinion. It did not compete in the so-called South African Games organised defiantly by Pretoria in 1970 in retaliation for exclusion from the Olympic movement. Conspicuously, New Zealand sent athletes to the widely condemned 'apartheid games'. Australia's refusal to participate was welcomed by activists. But it did not foreshadow deeper changes in government policy or indeed by any major sporting association. Neither South Africa's increasing isolation in sport, international criticism, or campaigns decrying Australia's refusal to intervene against apartheid, brought significant change to the priorities of the Gorton or McMahon governments.[23]

The UN designated 1971 as the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. Newer members of the Commonwealth and non-aligned states in the UN exploited the largely

symbolic proclamation to focus pressure on South Africa. For example, the government-owned *Ethiopian Herald,* in an editorial about the 'Evil of Racism', condemned the proposed sporting tours of Australia. Echoing wider African opinion it observed that apartheid survived because of 'support and encouragement' from western powers that was 'spilling over into Namibia and Rhodesia among other places'. Australia continued to be out of step with the overwhelming majority of countries that most influenced the global campaign against apartheid.[24] 'The Australian government should deny visas to all members of a national team selected on racial grounds', Opposition leader Gough Whitlam stated: 'Australia cannot survive' if it 'condones any racial discrimination by our cousins in South Africa'.[25] Whitlam's observation, and trade union actions, were consistent with a rising tide of international opinion (if not with local sentiment). Nkrumah's caustic earlier observation resonated with many on the political left: It is 'not sufficient to condemn apartheid', it is 'necessary to take action against it', Ghana's leader proclaimed.[26]

Building the Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement, A-AAM

If principle did not induce foreign policy action, it did excite public protest. Writing on the death of Mandela under the headline 'Why Mandela Mattered to Australia' A-AAM founder Meredith Burgmann observed: 'The Vietnam war and the anti-apartheid movement were the twin issues that formed our political views and activities in the 1960s and 1970s'. Conscription and Vietnam dominated protest movement from 1967. By 1970 Australia's military role in Vietnam had greatly expanded, as had the Moratorium movement against it. Australian governments from Menzies to Gorton willingly intervened in Southeast Asia but refused any level of action that implied intervention against the white minority government of South Africa. Political and ethical issues merged in both campaigns. Apartheid was morally reprehensible; its underlying racism 'abhorred' by the public and politicians alike. The Labor activist Jim Cairns told a mass rally in Melbourne in May 1970 that the Vietnam war was an affront to decency, 'an atrocity' that had 'killed

more than one million people, mostly civilians, and must be stopped'. Like the Moratorium movement, the campaign against apartheid was fuelled by a rejection of policy that put narrow national interests above principle. Mass protests against the war in Vietnam largely prefigured wide protests against apartheid. In 1970 more than 200,000 citizens joined anti-war protests. In the largest demonstration, in Melbourne, an estimated 100,000 marched. ASIO warned that the campaign to stop the rugby tour was planned to culminate in 'massive' demonstrations, along the lines of the recent Vietnam Moratorium Campaign.[27]

Anticipation of the Springbok rugby tour brought unprecedented energy to the anti-apartheid movement. A broad coalition of groups developed in major cities and on university campuses to confront the 'representatives of Apartheid' when they played in Australia. In NSW the campaign was dominated SADAF, CARIS, the A-AAM, groups linked to the Australian Union of Students (AUS) at Sydney University and, after October 1970, the Australian Citizens Campaign to Oppose Racial Discrimination (ACCORD). In Victoria leadership came from HART (Halt All Racial Tours), a group linked to Melbourne University which protested against South African tennis players and its surf lifesaving team early in 1970; the Association against Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, a relatively small activist group; and a more radical Students for a Democratic Society–Movement Against Racialism (SDS–MAR). Loosely affiliated anti-apartheid groups also organised in South Australia, Western Australia, and the ACT, where student groups painted slogans on walls of the South African embassy and threatened to deploy 'any means short of personal violence to make the stay of the South African rugby union team uncomfortable'. In Queensland, the Campaign On Racial Equality (CORE) led the protests. Separate anti-apartheid organisations were clustered loosely under the umbrella of the A-AAM and from early April 1971 under the anti-racist movement, ARM, a loose association supported by 30 or more groups campaigning to halt the rugby and cricket tours.[28]

It was perhaps ironic that organisations defined by opposition to visits by South African sportsmen and women were themselves heavily influenced by visitors or émigré Africans, including Brutus and Resha

from the ANC, activist Bishop C.E. Crowther, New Zealander Jim Gale, Zimbabwean Sekai Holland and, most prominently Peter Hain, the leader of Britain's Stop '70s Tours Committee. Crowther, the 'banished' Anglican Bishop of Cape Town, launched the No Springbok Tour. Hain was able to join the campaign only after the McMahon government belatedly decided not to prevent his entry to Australia. The participation of these activists was organised by groups described by ASIO and the mainstream press as 'respectable' arms of the A-AAM—SADAF and CARIS. Organised under slogans of 'peaceful' and 'non-disruptive' protest, these moderate groups were endorsed by such prominent figures as author Patrick White, poet Judith Wright, the formidable Rev. Alan Walker, and Gordon Barton, founder of the iconoclastic *Nation Review*. Activism was strengthened by the reasoned advocacy of émigrés and the influential Rugby Seven. By the late 1960s the international Movement was promoted by a sophisticated transnational Coalition of organisations that included activists from Scandinavia, Germany, Holland, the UK, the US, New Zealand, and Australia.[29]

The global profile and media presence of the international A-AAM should not obscure the fact that campaigns to eradicate apartheid from sport, like the wider resistance movement symbolised by the ANC and PAC, originated in Southern Africa during the very first years of National Party rule. Within Australia, as we have seen, the precursors of organised movement lay in the activities of progressive citizens working within traditional local institutions—the ALP and Labor-led state governments, the trade union movement, the Australian Council of Churches, law reform groups and universities. But the A-AAM was not itself embedded in established political organisations. Nor did it reflect conventional party affiliations. It was not shaped by 'old left' groups clustered around the Labor Party and or trade unions. Rather it comprised a collection of activist organisations employing a range of leadership styles and protest tactics. Most leaders, including Peter McGregor, Gregor McCauley, Meredith Burgmann, Dan O'Neill, Chris Swinbank, Tim Morris, Julius Roe, Phil Maclagan, Jim Boyce and other outspoken rugby internationals, were not strongly identified with other political organisations or aligned with other causes. They represented all parts of the political spectrum. For example,

McGregor's undergraduate anarchism was a far cry from the considered human rights values of Boyce or the difficult personal experience of apartheid that shaped the activism of John Brink and many others. Nonetheless, ASIO suggested that 'subversive organisations continue to exert considerable influence on the campaign'. It identified some individual members of the Communist Party of Australia within the A-AAM and CORE, most prominently Denis Freney. ASIO's secret surveillance reports highlighted fears that any expansion of what it termed the 'Radical Protest Movement' 'could eventually lead to a greater radicalisation of the Aboriginal Rights Movement' and to 'a radicalising affect' in Papua/New Guinea. But it was a measure of the mainstream character of the movement that ASIO found few Reds under the anti-apartheid bed. Indeed, it was obliged to concede that in 'every strata of society' there was a 'considerable body' of opinion opposed to the apartheid policies of South Africa.[30]

In the eyes of anti-apartheid activists abroad, ASIO acknowledged, the imminent Springbok tour symbolised Australia's 'blatant disregard' of the UN declaration of 1971 as the International Year to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. In the eyes of local activists, ASIO conceded, the tour was confirmation that Australia 'condoned apartheid'. Even the spy agency, as it searched with little success to find communists, Marxists, Trotskyists or New Left radicals in the A-AAM, conceded that anti-apartheid views were genuine and widely held. Sometimes, groups loosely associated with the A-AAM endorsed more radical aims. But intervention and aid that might directly help African resistance received little support. A motion adopted by a poorly attended meeting of the A-AAM in December 1970 sought: '(a) Withdrawal of all diplomatic, trade, political and sporting links with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal'; and '(b) Full support for South African liberation movements fighting for freedom from racial, economic and political oppression'. But within the wider Australian movement immediate 'mass opposition' to sporting tours expressed the limits of agreed action. ASIO reported that apart from 'revolutionary Marxist' Denis Freney, only two other Communist Party members attended the A-AAM meeting, and it observed that there was no support for Freney's idea that the anti-apartheid movement should be used as 'a catalyst for further issues, such as Aboriginal rights and independence

in PNG'. Relatively few activists gave sustained support to anticolonial liberation movements or indeed to the ANC and its imprisoned or banished leadership.[31]

Opinion Matters

Progressive South African politician Helen Suzman suggested optimistically that 'world attitudes had changed tremendously' by 1970.[32] But this observation did not apply with equal force to opinion in Australia or New Zealand. Until the early 1970s at least, most Australians refused to endorse government policy that might encourage Pretoria to embrace genuine reforms. And they opposed any action that might tangibly strengthen African resistance, including that led by the ANC. Coalition policies were always reinforced by sympathetic public opinion. They were little influenced by diplomatic or bureaucratic advice, hardening world condemnation, or the 'permanent protest' strategies of a powerful transnational anti-apartheid movement. An unprecedented 'level of civil uprising and violence' fractured Australia during the Springbok tour. Although exaggerated and ahistorical, this claim by the National Archives, made under the heading 'Your Story, Our History', does capture the splintered political landscape of the nation in 1971.[33] But mass protest did not reflect majority sentiment. Nor did it dramatically shift public opinion.

Australia's 'treatment of the Aborigines has been appalling', a leading newspaper editorialised in 1970, but in contrast to South Africa 'the Australian people are aware of their past mistakes and have begun the long and painful task of restoring to the Aborigines their basic rights'. The fact that more than 90% of voters endorsed constitutional change in 1967 was a measure of changing attitudes. But if opinions were shifting, this did not translate into support for measures against South Africa. Australia's policies on the related issues of apartheid, colonialism and white-minority rule in Southern Africa were, in the words of controversial left-wing ALP parliamentarian Eddie Ward, 'out-of-step with world-wide opinion'. It is, however, difficult to support Ward's further observation that Coalition

policies were 'also out-of-step with Australian opinion'. Australia's tangible relationships with the South African state strengthened while publicly Australian governments continued to describe apartheid as 'reprehensible'. A similar contradiction defined public opinion.[34]

Views held by controversial Liberal Party leader Gorton, and by his ponderous successor McMahon, were symptomatic of majority opinion. Described by Jenny Hocking as 'a most unusual Liberal', Gorton was 'an ardent conservative in international affairs'. Undisturbed by the moral or political implications of white supremacy, he defended both the South African and Rhodesian regimes. Gorton was not unusual because of his views on race or Southern Africa, but because he was untraditionally an economic nationalist, environmental progressive, and uncertain about the benefits of the American alliance or Australia's involvement in Vietnam.[35] He rejected pressure from Washington and refused to increase Australia's commitment of troops to the unpopular war. McMahon was equally unsympathetic to any action which might destabilise either white minority regime or disrupt the bilateral relationship. The American alliance and Vietnam Moratorium, not South Africa or the anti-apartheid movement, were the most volatile issues facing all administrations until 1971 when McMahon, following the US, announced that Australian troops would also be gradually withdrawn from Vietnam. Gorton and McMahon were unmoved by public protests and anti-apartheid advocacy, voicing predictable 'moral disquiet' while defending the apartheid regime with familiar arguments centred on sovereignty, non-intervention, and the need to keep politics out of sport.[36]

All federal governments adhered to 'the view that sport and politics should be kept separate'. This familiar Coalition mantra found expression as late as May 1970 at a special foreign Commonwealth ambassadors' meeting in Cairo.[37] Conservative state premiers were equally unambiguous, if not about the ethics of apartheid then about need to maintain sporting contacts with it. Victorian Premier Bolte described protests as 'rebellion against constitutional authority'. Queensland's Bjelke-Petersen—the Premier most outspoken in support of apartheid and most reluctant to remove state-specific laws that discriminated against Aboriginal citizens—controversially imposed a state of emergency to control anti-

Springbok demonstrations. New South Wales Premier Robin Askin's attitude to political demonstrations was captured by his 'ride over the bastards' response to anti-Vietnam protesters on Sydney's streets. Labor Premiers, Tonkin and Dunstan, along with most prominent figures in the ALP during Whitlam's leadership, supported the aims (if not always the tactics) of the A-AAM.

The *Sydney Morning Herald* noted approvingly in 1971 that 'an overwhelming number of Australians detest apartheid'.[38] Publicly, all governments after 1961 expressed similar disdain. Irrespective of whether some 'Australian critics may be ill-informed, sanctimonious or hypocritical', T.B. Millar wrote for a South African readership, 'the general tenor of the views expressed by successive Australian governments about apartheid represents the feelings of a great many Australians' who have a 'reasonably good grasp of what has happened in South Africa since 1948, and they do not like it'.[39] Disapproval might have been widely shared, but this did not necessarily translate into support for intervention or sanctions.

Public opinion remained remarkably constant from 1960–61 to 1974–75. A Gallop poll conducted amidst debate over South Africa's future in the Commonwealth indicated that apartheid was 'approved' by about 22% of Australians; a slightly smaller percentage neither approved nor disapproved. About 60% of those surveyed was prepared to morally condemn white South Africa—an attitude similar to that expressed publicly by Menzies and by all subsequent Coalition prime ministers, Holt, Gorton and McMahon. In 1964, on the eve of Menzies' retirement, a poll indicated that 73% of Australians opposed the use of any economic pressure against South Africa, despite varied levels of expressed moral concern. At the end of the decade, as plans firmed for the Springbok rugby tour, public attitudes were arguably more deeply felt, but the proportion of the community seeking to sanction South Africa, or sever sporting contacts with it, still hovered around 20–25%. By winter 1971, against a background of mass anti-Springbok protest, between 74% and 85% of respondents in different polls supported the right of the racially selected team to play in their country. Nonetheless, in September 1971, after images of 'pitched battles' against the Springbok rugby players had reverberated around the world, support for the planned cricket tour at the end of the year

hovered around 60%, with many respondents undecided. Fewer than 15% wanted the series cancelled. Three years later, as community memories of the anti-Springbok rugby protests dimmed, almost 80% of those surveyed approved the Cricket Control Board's controversial decision to ignore the Labor government and authorise a team to play a test series in South Africa. This decision received strong bipartisan support: 82% of Liberal-Country Party voters, and 74% of ALP voters endorsed it.[40]

Anti-apartheid successes in the UK and hardening UN and Commonwealth decisions did not quickly transform local opinion. Nor were attitudes significantly changed by civil disobedience and protest at home. Polls were always a blunt gauge of opinion. If, as was consistently claimed, most Australians thought apartheid morally repugnant, it did not follow necessarily that they wished to sever ties with white South Africa—especially on the sporting field. Critics of government policy complained that the high levels of moral disquiet reported in all surveys repeated familiar platitudes about the 'evils of discrimination' while conveniently circumventing serious political discussion of 'the brutal, corrupt and unjust treatment of Black South Africans by their white overlords'. In white South Africa such moral platitudes were dismissed, to cite a headline in a leading Johannesburg newspaper, as yet more evidence of 'Hypocrisy in Race-Conscious Australia', a country built on 'race policies … no better than those of South Africa'.[41]

Australians working against apartheid were fully aware of this double standard. Responding to McMahon's offer of RAAF aircraft to ensure that the Springbok rugby tour was not disrupted by strikes, the leader of the ACTU, Bob Hawke, criticised the 'absurd length to which the Australian government is prepared to go to identify itself with the racist government of South Africa'. Many shared Hawke's view that 'it is the height of hypocrisy for the government, on one hand to declare its abhorrence of apartheid and then use the Australian military forces to transport sporting teams chosen on discriminatory racial basis.' Some newspapers and most on the political left deplored government policies that 'compounded our position as a racist country'. But, ultimately, concerns about the evils of apartheid weighed lightly on the Australian electorate.[42] Journalist and protester Jack Waterford observed that at 'the time the [rugby] tour was mooted, a

tone of slight official disapproval of South African apartheid policies was more than balanced by a feeling that white South Africans were cousins and like us'. Canberra journalist David Solomon observed caustically that McMahon's actions 'simply confirmed the impression of many', in Asia and Africa especially, 'that the Australian government does not put opposition to racism anywhere at all amongst its priorities'. Equally troubling, he suggested, support for the tour at federal and state levels expressed—albeit obliquely—'racist ideas' which are still 'held by many Australians'.[43]

Political realities quickly undermined the stirring public rhetoric of apartheid's opponents. Confronted by overwhelming approval for the forthcoming Springbok tour, Hawke and Whitlam in effect withdrew from the acrimonious public debate. ACTU-sponsored transport bans were watered down, prompting Jack Waterford to claim that these caused the rugby tourists only 'trifling inconveniences'. Hawke and the union movement 'played no role of any consequence' in the political struggles against apartheid's sporting ambassadors. The contributions of Whitlam and others prominent in the ALP were similarly muted by hostile public opinion. Waterford later concluded that the political left, 'fearing losing out in the sort of law and order campaign that some of the conservative leaders were plainly itching for', was 'conspicuously inactive, whatever the current legend'.[44]

Australia remained deeply divided over efforts to isolate South Africa culturally or economically; over the legitimacy of white minority rule; and over the (im)morality of apartheid. Opinion on these related questions changed only slowly over time. It was always differentiated by demographic factors such as age, gender, education and, importantly, also by links to state or region, or to life in a rural or an urban community. Obviously, public opinion is difficult to gauge, and its bearing on political decision-making is even more difficult to demonstrate. Questions, such as the extent to which support for continuing sporting contacts overlapped support for apartheid, cannot be answered accurately. The extent to which opposition to meaningful sanctions reflected support, albeit implicit, for apartheid is equally difficult to decide. The extent to which shared ideas of race and racial or cultural affinity for white South Africa shaped policy in Canberra is similarly impossible to determine. Yet, as was always apparent

throughout the protracted struggle, unqualified support for sporting and economic ties did not necessarily reflect ethical or political endorsement of apartheid or the undemocratic regime that sustained it. The *Canberra Times* expressed a widely held view when, as the Springbok tour ended in July 1971, it editorialised: 'this newspaper … does not, however, believe that playing rugby with white South Africans implies either condemnation or approval of the detestable policy of apartheid'.[45] Some who wrote to the paper expressed a more cynical view. 'Prime minister Vorster has himself described the Springboks as ambassadors of South Africa', P.A. Hartigan, argued: 'To receive the Springboks favourably [is] interpreted in South Africa, and the world generally, less as hospitality to individuals than as support or at least sympathy for a regime'.[46]

Despite widespread expressions of moral censure, about 80% of all public opinion polls conducted across four decades (well beyond the limits of this study) showed a significant majority of respondents were happy that economic, cultural and sporting contacts with the apartheid regime should continue.[47] If approval of sporting exchanges with teams selected according to racial criteria is accepted as implied approval of apartheid more generally, then support for measures to end apartheid remained very much a minority concern. And, from 1972—whether under Coalition or Labor administrations—political action to isolate white South Africa arguably ran well ahead of majority opinion at home.

Mass demonstrations against the visiting Springboks divided Australian cities in 1971

END ALL SPORTS TIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA

THE U.S. TENNIS
ASSOCIATION SUPPORTS
APARTHEID TENNIS
(See back)

SCORE A POINT FOR FREEDOM, BAN SOUTH AFRICA.

PROTEST SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID TENNIS PLAYERS AT THE U.S. OPEN.

SPONSORED BY A.C.C.E.S.S. (American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport & Society)

FOREST HILLS
Sept. 11 - Noon

WEST SIDE TENNIS CLUB
(Stadium, Main Gate)

TAKE F., N. OR E. TRAINS TO
CONTINENTAL AVE. QUEENS.
STADIUM IS 3 BLOCKS SOUTH
TOWARDS AUSTIN ST.

By the early 1970s the Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement was at the centre of a vast transnational network struggling to end all sporting contacts with white South Africa

CHAPTER 10

Arenas of Conflict

The spotlight of the world campaign against apartheid is now focused on Australia.[1]

Peter Hain, 1971

Why was the anti-apartheid struggle so important for Australians? Because we were seen as apartheid South Africa's great white brother across the sea.[2]

Meredith Burgmann, 2013

Organising to Stop the Tours

Geopolitics, not changing attitudes or stronger protocols on human rights, would decide apartheid's future. Pretoria was always conscious of its vulnerability to sanctions or boycotts, but equally it was confident 'that measures recommended by the UN would remain ineffective as they will not be implemented by Member States which have the closest relations with the Republic'. These powerful Western states accounted for more than two thirds of its trade. Australia was a prime economic partner. By the early 1970s South Africa was ranked fourth, behind only the UK, Japan and the US, as a market for Australian manufactured goods. The bilateral trade balance favoured Australia by a factor of more than four-to-one.[3] Western countries, including Australia, remained white South Africa's significant Cold War allies. Given such multi-layered interconnections, Robbie Resha noted pessimistically that South Africa might confront

moral isolation but concerted international action against it would remain deeply compromised by economic interests and alliance politics.[4] Despite the harsh light of international scrutiny, spokesmen for the South African government remained confident that moral isolation and sporting difficulties, while unpalatable, would not lead to isolation in other fields, economic, diplomatic or strategic.[5]

Peter Hain, now in effect the leader of an international movement against apartheid, concluded bitterly in early 1971 that Australia continued 'to defy world opinion' and invite 'sports teams—always all-white—to tour their country'. Given a political climate broadly sympathetic to white South Africa, Australian sporting bodies could act with the imprimatur of government. Hain's condemnation of Australia's sporting relations with Pretoria echoed assessments of the broader bilateral relationship and cynicism about the 'standard formulas' that rationalised it. Advocates highlighted a widely agreed judgement: 'Australia openly constitutes itself in the eyes of the sporting world as South Africa's white friend and greatest ally'.[6]

Some anti-apartheid activists went so far as to claim that by ignoring the pernicious consequences of the international 'colour problem', Australia's political leaders 'will be open to serious questions at the bar of history'. Such lofty sentiment was of little concern in Coalition ranks. Ian Clark commented succinctly that 'Black Africa was regarded with varying degrees of indifference' by the McMahon administration, while white South Africa 'was regarded with varying degrees of sympathy and embarrassment'. During 1971–72, amidst a cacophony of sound and fury about sporting contacts, the McMahon government slightly modified, in both the UN and Commonwealth, Australia's support for South Africa. But unsurprisingly, it refused to break trade or diplomatic links, end sporting contacts or support an arms embargo. However, it did vote for a series of General Assembly resolutions that condemned apartheid, Bantustan policies, and maltreatment and torture of political detainees. David Lee has pointed out that Australia's slightly more flexible position on apartheid and decolonisation, along with its efforts to assist Papua New Guinea's transition to Independence, boosted Australia's reputation. (Australia's successful bid to serve as a non-permanent member of the Security

Council, during 1973–74, perhaps reflected its improved standing.)[7]

McMahon was more flexible than Gorton and appears to have accepted advice from UN delegation leader, Lawrence McIntyre, that intransigence in the UN had not helped the country's image or interests. During 1971–72 Australia supported six of ten resolutions against apartheid, condemned Portugal's colonial obstinacy, and briefly joined non-aligned states in criticising Washington for defying UN sanctions on Rhodesia. In general Australia supported its Western allies, Britain, France and the US, and occasionally sided with Portugal. However, in late 1971, after the anti-Springbok rugby protests, Australia was one of a very small group of nations that abstained from voting on a series of Assembly resolutions that attempted to impose stronger economic sanctions, an arms embargo, and a comprehensive sports boycott on South Africa. The Coalition also refused to condemn Pretoria's rigid opposition to Namibian autonomy.[8]

The No Tours campaign categorically asserted that merit alone, not race or colour or culture, should define eligibility to play sport at any level in any code. Nor should race define eligibility for national representation. Unless and until sporting participation was not contingent on racial definitions, South Africa should be excluded from all international competition. Apartheid was not a game. By playing with it other countries wittingly or unwittingly condoned systemic racial discrimination. Vorster's predictable response to the prospect of complete sporting isolation was to imply that apartheid was being reformed. South Africa would now differentiate between 'multiracial' and 'multinational' sport. Multiracial sport would not be permitted locally; nor would multiracial teams be permitted to represent SA internationally. But so-called multinational sport would permit teams comprising members of a separate race—for example so-called coloureds or Africans—to compete against each other at home and, if invited, play as single-race teams abroad (although never as representatives of South Africa). In rugby and cricket multi-racial teams from other countries could tour the republic and would be permitted to compete against separate white and non-white teams, but only at separate venues. The fundamentals of sports policy were untouched. Reforms applied only to international competition: sport at club, provincial, and national levels remained segregated.[9]

Vorster's cynical suggestions did not foreshadow genuine change. In early April 1971 the South African Cricket Association, acting on the direction of the South African government, rejected an Australian proposal that two non-white players should be included in the team scheduled to tour in summer. The McMahon government also suggested other compromises. It briefly entertained the possibility of approving teams to play in South Africa if, as NZ Rugby had agreed, these included a small number of eligible non-whites, who would be categorised as honorary white. However, the Australian Rugby Union also refused such reforms. President Charles Blunt dismissed the suggestion that a coloured team, separate from the approved all-white national team, be invited to tour. His opposition was based, ostensibly, on practical considerations: 'the coloureds over there are simply not good enough. It would only be a token gesture and they themselves could take it to be an insult', he stated frankly. He might have conceded that apartheid had virtually ensured that 'no coloured players had sufficient ability to be included' in any team that might represent South Africa. Segregation in sport was a self-fulfilling prophecy; unequal access to competition and resources meant unequal player-ability and this in turn justified exclusion from national—white—teams.[10]

McMahon attempted to placate international opinion, claiming clumsily that 'my government abhors racism which is not acceptable to the Australian way of life'.[11] Less ambiguously, McMahon stated simply that 'sporting tours are something for the sporting bodies to organise and arrange themselves'. But government at every level understood that without political and logistic support no visiting teams could play in Australia. And with Coalition governments in power federally and in all three large Eastern states, Springbok visitors were confident that protests would be overridden by government intervention. All Coalition-led state administrations worked collaboratively with Canberra, undertaking to protect visiting Springbok players and to facilitate their movement around the country. In the turbulence of 1971 conservative state governments intervened to stifle dissent and control protest. Premiers Askin, Bolte, Bjelke-Petersen and, after late 1973, Court were prepared to invoke special police powers and emergency regulations to maintain law and order and suppress

demonstrations—actions easily rationalised as a legitimate response to violent protests and guerrilla tactics of demonstrators. In Queensland special state of emergency legislation gave a level of power to the police and armed security forces that was unprecedented in Australia (and possibly in any Western democracy). The question of racism in sport was buried beneath political confrontation and division. On the eve of the Springbok tour McMahon reiterated that government policy was 'not to intervene in sporting matters between this and any other country'. His threat to deploy the RAAF to break proposed union bans was decisive. It convinced South African authorities that the tour had strong support and should go ahead.[12]

The trade union arm of the labour movement imposed bans on hotels, postal services and wharfs, and most dramatically on the two major airlines, TAA and Ansett, forcing the Springboks to use smaller private carriers and the government to keep an RAAF Hercules was on permanent standby. McMahon welcomed a public confrontation with Hawke and the ACTU and eagerly told a press conference that Whitlam had become 'rather silent' in the face of strong public support for the tours. The A-AAM did not enjoy unanimous support from within the ALP or organised labour. Pragmatism did not compromise the A-AAM, even if it compromised the ALP. Stopping the tours is 'more important than the problem of alienating public opinion', Meredith Burgmann stated dismissively; 'the public is always alienated by university students, anyway'.[13]

Individuals and groups organised under the A-AAM umbrella generally endorsed goals similar to those expressed by the international movement and by opponents of apartheid in the UN and Commonwealth. Boycotts in the UK, and the very public advocacy by the dissenting Wallabies, greatly boosted the local movement. Shortly after returning to Australia the Rugby Seven published their reflections on playing under apartheid, *Australia–South Africa: An appeal from some Wallabies*, and refused selection in any future team scheduled to play against the Springboks. They became leading spokesmen for the A-AAM. Australian rugby's 'elder statesman', international selector and coach Brian Palmer, also gave strong support and boycotted the forthcoming Springbok tour. Coming from within the established rugby community, such committed opposition was as surprising as it was encouraging to the wider anti-

apartheid movement. It added political respectability to the protests, especially those organised by the Halt All Racial Tours Committee in Melbourne, and the Campaign Against Racialism in Sport (CARIS) in Sydney. Similarly, participation by a broad range of church groups, social and sporting organisations, trade unions and the ALP, along with routine advocacy by SADAF, gave the movement a broad community base.[14]

Most who identified with the A-AAM endorsed community advocacy, political lobbying, media campaigning and peaceful protest. But the 'riots' and confrontational violence that erupted on sports arenas and city streets in the winter of 1971 spoke of division and polarisation, not of orderly democratic dissent. Ugly images of confrontation greatly distorted the outcomes of mass protest and undermined the achievements of the local movement.

Sound and Fury: Rugby

'There's trouble ahead if the planned 1971 Springbok rugby tour of Australia eventuates', the New Zealand *Sunday Times* predicted. During 1970 Australian swimming and netball teams competed in South Africa, attracting little criticism. However, reciprocal sports visits to Australia aroused strong protests. In early 1971 demonstrators confronted the touring South African Surf Lifesaving team at carnivals in Adelaide, Lorne and Coogee, carrying placards reading 'Smash Apartheid', 'Stop Racialism in Sport', and 'Free African Nationalists'. Early protests had no more than mild symbolic importance and were largely ignored by government. Typically, they were described—to quote the *Sydney Morning Herald*—as counter-productive 'nonsense'. 'All the attempts to isolate South Africa so far have strengthened the Nationalists and reinforced their siege mentality', the *Herald* editorialised in March 1971: 'if apartheid is at last beginning to break down, it is not because of international action let alone pricking protest campaigns abroad, but because of its own inconsistencies'.[15] However, campaigns against the rugby tour in the winter of 1971 could not be easily dismissed. Polarising clashes erupted wherever the Springboks played, or stayed. Federal and state governments

struggled to contain protests, deploying huge numbers of police and security forces and, even more controversially, invoking new emergency measures and security protocols to control demonstrators. Scenes of pitch invasions, smoke bombs, police cordons and surveillance, paddy wagons, mounted police, physical struggles and mass arrests, were headline news at home and abroad. Yet if images spoke of a community mobilised against racism, they also revealed a nation determined to continue playing team sports against white South Africa.

The disruptive strategies of the A-AAM were anticipated—and advocated—as Stop the Boks plans were drawn-up. Campaigns would be built on 'direct tactics' of intervention and protest at sporting arenas. As Peter McGregor told *The Australian,* 'rather than with peace and placards, we will discourage South African visitors by giving them a nasty time when they are here'. Foreshadowed during the UK boycotts, the A-AAM's tactics would include field invasions, smoke bombs, 'throwing tacks' and vandalising playing fields.[16] The nasty confrontations anticipated by McGregor duly erupted on playing fields across Australia. The sea of community complaint they aroused quickly drowned out more conciliatory voices, deflecting public attention and potential support away from the anti-apartheid cause. The 'pitched battles' that followed the Springboks 'robbed much of the anti-apartheid display of its supposedly high moral purpose', one newspaper commented. Within weeks of the Springboks' arrival 'the burning issue' had changed from opposition to racism to widespread disquiet about the 'ugly spectacle' of 'open confrontation between the state and the demonstrators'.[17]

The first tour match played by the Springboks, in Perth on 26 June, attracted a small student-led protest. Four days later in Adelaide, violent side-line and on-field incidents led to the arrest of 88 demonstrators. Hundreds of noisy protestors maintained a three-day vigil outside the team's motel, prompting *The Australian* to comment that the protests were 'designed to ensure that the Springboks are not only harassed wherever they go but have little sleep as well'.[18] At the third match of the tour, on the Melbourne Cricket Ground on 3 July, 3,000 demonstrators shouted 'paint them black and send them back'. Five policemen were hospitalised and 130 protesters arrested. The following day violent confrontations

continued outside the South African Trade Commission on St Kilda Road. In two weeks from 7 July the Springboks played five matches in Sydney, rural NSW and the ACT. The second of these games was played in Sydney on Saturday 10 July against a New South Wales team. It attracted a large crowd and thousands of demonstrators. Protests at the ground 'reached new heights of violence' threatening its cancellation. Against a chorus of side-line chants of 'go home racists', the field was constantly invaded by protesters; smoke bombs and stink bombs were thrown; more than 140 demonstrators were arrested on charges ranging from possessing illegal missiles to violent behaviour. An unprecedented police presence—a force of more than 700 officers—was deployed to ensure that the game was completed as scheduled. Commentators labelled the riot as the blackest day in Australian sport. The protest movement thought it a dramatic statement against apartheid.[19]

After the chaos of Sydney, the game played a few days later against NSW Country in Orange was a welcome respite for the harried Springboks. They were noisily supported by a crowd of 10,000 and a large contingent of police, while a handful of demonstrators braved the abusive locals. The pattern of disruptive protests, mass arrests and public outrage was repeated in Canberra on 21 July, where barbed-wire barricades and a combined ACT–NSW police contingent of more than 800 officers guarded the rugby field and other targets, including the Springboks' hotel and the South Africa Embassy. More than 200 demonstrators were arrested over three days of protest in the national capital. Images of protester aggression and brutal police responses were broadcast internationally as demonstrators chanted, with some justification, that 'the whole world's watching'. But most who viewed television coverage in Australia agreed with the *Canberra Times* that the 'Barbed Wire Madness' did nothing to further the campaign against apartheid.[20]

In Queensland the rugby clashes brought an exceptional reaction from the Country Party-dominated state government. Premier Bjelke-Petersen gave police extra powers to suppress protests and declared a state of emergency. In conservative Queensland, the use of exceptional powers was generally excused, if not welcomed. Beyond his own state, however, the premier's unprecedented actions were widely condemned as 'a gross

and misleading abuse of power'—actions as damaging to Australia's image abroad as was the country's traditional friendship with white South Africa. Leading figures in the ALP, including Bill Hayden, Don Dunstan and Bob Hawke condemned Bjelke-Petersen for aiding and abetting apartheid. The ANC's representative in India, Mendi Msimang, and the visiting AAM leader Peter Hain joined a chorus of condemnation, labelling the Queensland government's actions as morally indefensible; as disturbing evidence of its racist support for apartheid.[21]

If progressive Australians anticipated that protests might help to erase images of their country as 'one of the principal allies of apartheid', they were to be disappointed. Playing sport against Springbok teams was the litmus test of racism. The 'willingness' of Australians 'to play ball with apartheid is the true gauge of their racial attitudes', Dennis Brutus stated bluntly.[22] The 'riotous clashes' and 'atmosphere of political and industrial confrontation' that accompanied the Springboks wherever they played were seen by some as evidence that governments across Australia were determined to protect the sporting ambassadors of white supremacy. In contrast, some others thought the struggles over apartheid sport of little international consequence. The *Canberra Times* argued as the Springbok tour ended that 'there is so far no evidence that our Asian neighbours saw the South African rugby tour, as anti-apartheid people allege, as proof that Australians condone racialism'. Most were concerned about the 'violent tactics' of the anti-apartheid movement, not the much deeper violence underpinning apartheid. As the final Springbok game was played a leading newspaper suggested that while apartheid might be reprehensible, 'playing with a white South African team' was not 'an immoral act'. Moreover, it concluded in language widely used to report the campaign, 'the noisy rhetoric of the iconoclasts and the arsenal of smoke bombs and assorted missiles … will convince no one that they have a monopoly on wisdom or morality'. Rugby crowds certainly weren't convinced. When the Springboks defeated Australia 19 points to 11, spectators at the Sydney Cricket Ground 'enthusiastically' gave police 'three cheers' for controlling hostile demonstrators.[23]

Assessing what it labelled 'this tragic tour', one newspaper argued: 'It is unacceptable that an unscrupulous minority should dictate' to a

majority. Like most Australians at the time it held that 'playing with a white South African team' was not tantamount to condoning racism. 'Whatever the aura of respectability its views may have, no violent coterie has the right to decide who will play in Australia, who will attend a sporting match, where the visiting players will be billeted, whether hotels receive supplies, or whether airports will be allowed to function', the *Canberra Times* editorialised. And it asserted that 'no civilised community' should be obliged 'to compromise' its democratic freedoms in the face of protest action by a disorderly minority of citizens. The fractious events of 1971 obliged many prominent supporters of the anti-apartheid movement to distance themselves from the tactics of the A-AAM, if not from its agreed aims. *The Australian*, which had earlier expressed some support for the anti-apartheid cause, now condemned the movement. Increasingly, newspapers bemoaned the collapse of public order, repeating claims that 'hooliganism' and disruption had 'robbed much of the anti-apartheid display of its supposedly high moral purpose'.[24]

Ironically, the suppression of protest in Queensland added weight to the view that Australia was South Africa's greatest friend, uniquely unwilling to take any action against the representatives of white supremacy. Dramatic images of protest confrontations were sometimes interpreted as the A-AAM had hoped: as further evidence of government willingness to suppress dissent and, by extension, to defend white South Africa. Most newspapers concurred, if somewhat reluctantly. 'The action of the Queensland Cabinet, and the publicity it is getting in the Australian and overseas press', one editorial read, 'will distort the nature of what is happening and give credibility to the claim … that Australia as a nation is supporting racialism by receiving the Springboks'.[25] Indigenous activists agreed, portraying the state of emergency as consistent with the Bjelke-Petersen government's refusal to remove racial discrimination from state laws—action anticipated by the 1967 referendum. Aboriginal author Kevin Gilbert stated that Australia 'is not a down-under South Africa … with the exception of Queensland'. Activist Roberta Sykes also drew comparisons with apartheid. 'Blacks in Australia do not live under South Africa-like conditions', she stated: 'but Blacks in Queensland definitely do'.[26]

It was generally agreed that the rugby riots were ultimately counter-productive and harmful to the anti-apartheid cause. Most news media identified a backlash sympathetic to the Springboks and spoke of polarisation and division. 'The more moderate and better-informed opponents of racialism must be greatly dismayed' that violence has turned 'a rational moral protest' into a statement 'of sympathy for the South Africans', a typical story suggested. It was a measure of growing public support for the visitors that McMahon could openly label the Rugby Seven's No More Tours campaigners 'a disgrace to their country'. Rugby riots greatly exacerbated community division—a development that McMahon thought might be exploited electorally. Shortly after the acrimonious tour ended, the unpopular prime minister considered calling an early 'law and order' election to capitalise on the backlash to the demonstrations and pitched battles they provoked.[27]

The consequences of the polarising events of 1970–71 were messy and contradictory. However, observers as different as local anti-apartheid activists and visiting South African journalists agreed that the confrontations signalled the end of international team competition against white South Africa. The relatively liberal Johannesburg *Sunday Times* editorialised as the Springboks arrived home that 'it is now open to question whether any country is prepared to be host to a sporting team if it has to be guarded' under 'fortress conditions'. With a pragmatism not shared by the ruling National Party it suggested that 'overseas hostility' would remain unless 'unnecessarily restrictive' sports policies were reformed. The wider implications were more difficult to gauge. South African newspapers, if the views of the *Sunday Times* are representative, interpreted the Springbok tour as 'little short of a disaster for both countries'. 'South Africa won the rugby series, but lost a good friend in the process', correspondent Ernest Shirley wrote. But his explanation for this was as simplistic as it was ill-informed. 'Before the Springboks arrived six weeks ago apartheid was just a strange word that has something to do with South Africa's complex racial problems', he claimed: 'Today it is a dirty word'. The keenest observer of the Springboks in Australia, journalist and author of *Political Football* Stuart Harris, thought the result of the tour ambiguous. Many correspondents believed the protest violence had done irreparable damage to Australia's

image overseas. Harris was more considered in his judgement, suggesting that in some respects the tour had improved its image internationally, as it implied that many Australians cared passionately about universal moral and political questions. Jack Waterford suggested in a similar vein that 'At the time the tour was mooted … a tone of slight official disapproval of South African apartheid policies was more than balanced by a feeling that white South Africans were cousins and like us' ... 'by the time the tour was over the demonstrators might have won few admirers, but hardly anyone would publicly defend the South African regime'.[28]

More concretely, although no games were abandoned during the 1971 tour, Australia did not again play South Africa in rugby until apartheid was broken. Leading sports journalist Spiro Zavos later wrote that activism from within the Wallaby community 'saved the integrity of Australian rugby'. But if the code's reputation was revived, political pressures, not moral suasion, were largely responsible for halting future tests between the two countries. A similar balance of influences obliged cricket authorities to abandon plans to host a South African test team in the summer of 1971–72.[29]

'Honorary Whites': Tennis

Australia's willingness to compromise with apartheid was also starkly revealed in non-team sporting competitions, most notably international tennis. By December 1970 South Africa was suspended from Davis Cup competition; its national championships excluded from the Grand Prix circuit. Australia's officials opposed these decisions and supported UK-led moves that kept South Africa in the International Lawn Tennis Federation (and thus the Wimbledon championships). As in rugby, cricket and the Olympics, Australian tennis officials did not want to sever team contests against South Africa. Many individual players were equally determined to compete in the republic, regardless of apartheid. In 1971 and again in 1972, champion tennis player Evonne Goolagong agreed to play in segregated competition as an 'honorary white'. In January 1970 African-American tennis champion Arthur Ashe was denied entry to South Africa because

he had openly condemned apartheid and refused the label 'honorary white'. Goolagong was not swayed by the international furore surrounding Ashe. It seems, however, that she was influenced by New Zealand Rugby's plan to send a mixed-race All Blacks team to South Africa and Rhodesia, with Maori players granted token representation as temporary whites. This decision was defended on the grounds that it did not technically breach apartheid's stricture that visiting teams must not include any non-white players. Like the All Blacks plan, Goolagong's willingness to play excited bitter controversy, including open rebuke from the special UN committee on apartheid and some Aboriginal rights activists.[30]

Goolagong reached the final of the 'unofficial' South African Open on two occasions, losing to compatriot Margaret Court (née Smith) in 1971 and defeating Englishwoman Virginia Wade the following year. Other tennis champions, including Fred Stolle and Ken Rosewall, also played in South Africa. A significant number of players from various countries similarly ignored criticism and participated as 'individual' competitors in all-white fixtures. Competing in South Africa, Goolagong believed, would help break down discriminatory barriers, but her decision to play under apartheid contrasted with the actions of Ashe, the first African-American male to win the US Open (1968), or the Australian Open (1970) and Wimbledon (1975). Ashe, a tireless civil rights activist, campaigned openly against apartheid. Prominent sports journalist Alan Trengove predicted scathingly that that Goolagong would 'destroy herself' as playing in a segregated tournament condoned racism. Goolagong's decision drew unfavourable comparisons with the principled stance taken by Lionel Rose, the first Aboriginal boxer to win a world championship. Rose was critical of apartheid and rejected lucrative offers to fight under it. Indigenous activist John Newfong said of Goolagong's decision to allow herself to be categorised as an honorary white: 'one shouldn't have to elaborate on what an insult this is to her, and to her people at home and to Black people everywhere'. Charles Perkins voiced similar criticism. In January 1972 Black Power activists, led by Paul Coe, openly confronted Goolagong and condemned her decision. ALP Senator Douglas McClelland stated in parliament that the 'badge of honorary white' was 'reprehensible'; an 'insult to Miss Goolagong and Australian Aborigines'.[31]

In South Africa, however, Goolagong's presence and much-publicised handshake with an architect of apartheid's sports policy, Frank Waring, provoked unexpected reactions from white spectators and some media. The English-language *Sunday Times* reported with some relish that the minister for sport 'suffered a long red-faced half-minute' of noisy 'booing'. The crowd's 'angry mutter' was disguised criticism of rigid policies that had isolated the country from top-level international competition in virtually all sporting codes. The congratulatory hand-shake with 'the Aborigine tennis star' was an 'historic moment in South African sport', the newspaper suggested optimistically. Despite its symbolism, the moment did not foreshadow genuine reform. Waring promptly reiterated that the Vorster government, like all National Party governments before it, would 'not be intimidated by the demands made for integrated multiracial sport'. He dismissed such demands as attempts by the nation's 'political enemies' to bring South Africa 'to her knees'. When Goolagong competed in 1972 local press reports emphasised that she was again delighted with the reception accorded her. Pretoria openly justified granting her a visa on the grounds that her presence 'would not be politically exploited', prompting a headline in the *Age* that proclaimed with deep irony: 'She's not "political"'.[32]

The divisive, often gratuitous commentary that shrouded Goolagong's decision to play under apartheid contrasted with the muted media response to the selection of cricketer Graham Thomas four years earlier. However, criticism of Goolagong's tacit acceptance of segregated sport did not advance the anti-apartheid cause at home: if anything, it generated greater support for the uniquely distinguished Aboriginal sportswoman. Nor was Margaret Court's much cited endorsement of apartheid widely condemned. 'I love South Africa' and 'I will keep going to play', Court stated during her visit: 'It is a tragedy that politics has come into sport, but if you ask me, South Africa has the racial situation rather better organised than anyone else'.[33] If the policy of the Australian Davis Cup committee is an accurate guide, Court's views were shared by many Australians. Late in 1972, after the rugby protests and cancellation of the 1971–72 cricket tour, the committee voted to readmit South Africa to the prestigious Davis Cup competition. Four other nations—Britain, USA, France and Argentina—also voted to

defy UN sports boycott resolution, 2775D. However, a majority of European zone member countries refused to compete against South Africa, and it was obliged to join the South American zone of the Davis Cup.[34]

Bradman's Gift? Cricket

The fractious politics excited by the rugby tour bled into other sports. As anti-Springbok protests erupted, Peter Hain predicted with justified confidence that 'the cricket tour must now be a non-starter—the massive momentum … against the rugby tour has forced the Australian cricket authorities against the wall'. Following cancellation of the tour of England, the International Cricket Council ruled that South Africa should be excluded from competition until its team became multi-racial. However, the Australian Cricket Control Board (hereafter the ACB, Australian Cricket Board) and its legendary chairman, Donald Bradman, equivocated. Despite trenchant international criticism, the McMahon government refused to put pressure on cricket authorities to abandon the cricket tour, scheduled for summer 1971. The anti-apartheid movement had no such reservations. Hain stated bluntly: 'My advice, which is the same as that given in similar circumstances to the MCC two years ago, would be to cancel the tour and arrange an alternative non-racist series'.[35]

McMahon and Bradman clung to the view that a compromise that included some non-white players in the visiting team would break the impasse. Though it had been previously rejected in Afrikaner-controlled rugby, they hoped that this gesture would be made by South Africa's largely 'English' cricket players and officials. A compromise, however symbolic, was widely supported at home, especially by the majority of Australians angered by the anti-apartheid movement's 'divisive' tactics and by the looming prospect of a summer without customary test matches. It was argued that anti-apartheid action would be more productive and less damaging to the true ideals of international sport if it sought the inclusion of non-whites in international South African teams, instead of seeking to 'disrupt all sporting contacts' with 'the rest of the world'. Within South Africa a 'dignified protest' by white cricketers gave this idea

tangible backing. Led by two star cricketers, Barry Richards and Mike Procter, players delayed the start of a Currie Cup match in Cape Town, abruptly walking off the field to express their dissent. Bradman welcomed this action, believing that South African cricketers must be 'encouraged to pursue their opposition to racism in sport'. Subsequently, an all-white group of players issued a statement of support for the inclusion of non-whites on the tour of Australia, provided those chosen were 'good enough' (as 'merit should remain the only criterion on the cricket field'). This heavily qualified statement, Natal bowler Vince van der Bijl later conceded, stopped well short of saying 'we will not play cricket unless there is multi-racial sport'. But the statement and the earlier protest at an important game—held, ironically, to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the South African republic—attracted great media attention internationally. To the chagrin of activists it was an opportunity for Australian Cricket Board and the federal government to claim that racism in sport was under challenge internally and that reform would follow, provided South Africa was not further isolated from competition.[36] This compromised view had much less support in the home of cricket, than in Australia. A 'successful tour', famous English cricket commentator John Arlott argued, would offer 'comfort and confirmation to a completely evil regime'.[37]

Limited concessions along the lines suggested by the ACB had been mooted earlier by Vorster and Waring, but their government took no significant action. On the eve of the Springbok rugby team's departure, Pretoria formally ruled that only white cricketers could be included in future national teams. Expressing 'bitter disappointment and regret' the McMahon government delivered a formal complaint to South African officials in Canberra. In parliament, however, the prime minister merely reiterated that his 'government did not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries'. Unsurprisingly, conservative state premiers, Bjelke-Petersen, Bolte, Askin and Tasmania's Bethune, welcomed McMahon's statement. Dunstan, in contrast, encouraged nation-wide union action and a state-wide boycott. (However, he was careful to reassure his constituents that any visiting team would have the full protection of the police force and law and order would be maintained during any visit.) ALP leader Whitlam asserted that visas should be denied members of any team selected on racial

grounds. To do otherwise, he stated, would 'condone racial discrimination by our cousins in South Africa'. But with the rugby tour imminent, protests against sports apartheid fell on deaf ears. As Whitlam called for cancellation of the proposed cricket tour, the International Council of Surf Lifesaving met in Sydney to finalise plans to set-up a World Championships. Most provocatively the council decided that the initial round of competition would be held on South Africa's segregated beaches.[38]

Meanwhile, Bradman exhausted all avenues to find an outcome acceptable to cricket lovers and government, both federal and state. Accompanied by the South African ambassador, he watched the Springbok–Wallaby test match in Sydney in 1971. He was disturbed that barbed-wire barricades and a massive police presence were needed to protect the pitch and the players. It would be far more difficult and expensive to police a five-day cricket game than a short rugby match. But such considerations did not yet sway Bradman. Nor did Hawke's threat to deploy 'as an act of conscience' now familiar strikes and ACTU-authorised union bans dissuade the ACB. The planned summer cricket tests would go ahead. Opinion polls indicated that three quarters of the population accepted that a whites-only Springbok team should be permitted to play in Australia. For Bradman and most ACB members, this view was justified by reports that some South African cricketers were initiating action to modify racial barriers. Like most in the cricketing community he represented, Bradman believed that rugby in South Africa was mainly the preserve of Apartheid-supporting Afrikaners, whereas cricket's supporters were 'basically of English descent', themselves 'a minority group among the whites'. He made explicit a view widely held in white Australia, suggesting that the cricketing community in South Africa was represented by the progressive United Party—a much more moderate association than the extreme Afrikaner-based National Party. Following the Cape Town protest in April, Bradman argued that cricket was a vehicle of reform and should not be discouraged by boycotts or protests abroad. McMahon echoed this view, claiming in parliament that it would be 'a strange thing' to ban South African cricketers from Australia given that 'they dislike this policy of separation in sport just as much as we do'. The federal government did not put direct pressure on cricket administrators.

Cabinet left judgement about the tour to officials and agreed that it 'should not itself take any position of endorsing or opposing the tour'. Subsequently, however, McMahon sought to dissuade Bradman, advising him privately that Canberra 'had no plans for assisting the tour'. The West Indies and other non-white national associations were much less sanguine, telling the ICC throughout 1971 that it should take 'definite action' against 'member countries' that maintained 'cricket relations with South Africa'. Like the ICC and the wider international cricket community, the ACB was itself deeply divided.[39]

Meanwhile Bradman canvassed opinions exhaustively. Burgmann, McGregor and Hain were contacted and the policies of SAN-ROC and UN special committees considered. Remarkably, Bradman flew to the UK, meeting with members of the MCC, former prime minister Wilson and prime minister Heath. Journalist Roland Perry has suggested that Bradman met with Vorster when returning from England. Recent research suggests such a meeting did not take place, although it accepts they did communicate (in writing or by phone). Bradman's exchanges with the arch-Afrikaner prime minister proved critical. Bradman recalled much later, and somewhat hazily, that discussions 'turned sour' when Vorster defended segregated cricket on the grounds that black people were intellectually inferior and unable to cope with the subtleties of the game. (It appears, however, that Vorster's extreme views were expressed in his face-to-face meeting with Bradman in 1974, not in 1971 during communication over the fate of the 1971–72 tour.) Shortly after his return to Sydney on 8 September 1971 Bradman chaired an all-day meeting of the ACB. At a media conference the following day he announced that the Springbok cricket tour was cancelled. The unexpected decision was advised in words welcomed by opponents of apartheid. Bradman stated bluntly: 'we will not play them until they choose a team on a non-racist basis'. The Board expressly hoped that Pretoria would soon 'relax its laws so that the cricketers of South Africa may once again take their place as full participants in the international field'. Realistically, the decision also acknowledged that Australian society would be further polarised and its police forces would again confront a 'severe ordeal', if another Springbok team visited.[40]

Roland Perry later wrote, under the headline 'Bradman Opposed Apartheid', that his surprise announcement was 'a massive international blow to apartheid'; that he had 'succeeded where politicians and protesters failed'. Perry's uncritical assessment exaggerated Bradman's conviction and ignored the pragmatism that most influenced the ACB's change of heart. South African sports historian Bruce Murray has rejected Perry's suggestion that Bradman acted because of a principled concern about apartheid, suggesting it was an 'exercise in myth-making … based on fiction'. Respected cricket-writer Mike Coward has noted more soberly that 'cancelling the tour was one of the most distressing duties' of Bradman's life. The decision was taken reluctantly. Nonetheless it was a welcome, if unanticipated, gift to the anti-apartheid movement. Especially applauded was Bradman's condemnation of the racist structure of sport in South Africa. For the ANC and the international anti-apartheid movement the decision was welcomed as a powerful political blow against white supremacy. Overlooked in such congratulatory euphoria was the fact that at the time of the decision the ACB subtly foreshadowed replacing the cancelled tour with an alternative series against a so-called World XI (that might include some star South African cricketers). And additionally the ACB deferred but did not cancel a final decision on the resumption of scheduled tests in 1975–76.[41]

Like that of most in the ACB, Bradman's distaste for racism in sport was not, it seems, deeply felt. The Johannesburg *Star* reported he had stated privately that the tour would have gone ahead 'had Vorster allowed two coloured players to join' the team, a gesture decried by activists as blatant tokenism. Vorster, however, was never likely to accept even this limited concession. He reacted saying angrily that Bradman had been 'talking through his hat', as he 'knew the South African cricket Association represented whites and whites only'. Vorster's language was as uncompromising as his policies. 'It is therefore senseless to even consider letting non-whites into a sports team simply because of political pressure', he stated. The criticism of apartheid implied by Bradman's celebrated statement could not hide the fact, as Murray and others have emphasised, that it was the 'sheer impossibility of staging cricket matches in siege conditions that prompted the ACB to cancel'. It reflected a combination

of pragmatism and principle. It was taken grudgingly to avoid a renewed wave of protest violence, trade union boycotts and political division—conditions Bradman later conceded made a tour 'impossible'.[42]

Sports historians Gideon Haigh and David Frith have identified the 'clinching argument' in the debate over cancellation. Using Australian cricket archives, they have shown that McMahon and Vorster reached a tacit, confidential agreement that the tour should be aborted. Bradman acknowledged in 'total confidence' that the leaders of both countries made it plain to him personally 'they do not want the tour to proceed'. The ACB was briefed accordingly. Bradman told its September meeting 'that he had no choice but to accept this advice'. The secret agreement between Vorster and McMahon, although revealed decades later, implicitly acknowledged the rising political effectiveness of the anti-apartheid movement. Neither government wanted to again be the focus of bitter demonstrations or fractious conflicts that drew world attention to issues of racism and white supremacy. Regardless of the wider reasons behind the ACB's belated decision, its impact was immediate. The *Rand Daily Mail* lamented that 'South African cricket, at the height of its brilliance, has been destroyed'. In cricket, as in rugby, South Africa was now isolated from international competition—although both New Zealand and Australia continued to search for compromise arrangements that would permit tours to South Africa even if incoming tours were no longer possible.[43]

The shallow roots of the ACB's celebrated decision were exposed less than a year later. Although sport under apartheid remained rigidly segregated—unchanged despite isolation from international competition—in June 1972 Bradman wrote to McMahon seeking support for 'a resumption of cricket contests between Australia and South Africa'. The reasoning of Bradman and the ACB had not appreciably changed since September 1971 when this prospect was foreshadowed. The current situation 'is highly detrimental to cricket in both countries' Bradman wrote, and steps should be taken to enable a tour in the summer of 1975–76. Cabinet Secretary E.J. (John) Bunting observed privately that Bradman 'is anxious to get progress with South Africa towards the resumption of cricket and in fact to leave no stone unturned for this purpose'. To allay concerns over ALP or union opposition Bradman contacted Dunstan and

Whitlam and was assured that 'so long as the Australian team was picked on merit without regard to race, as it would undoubtedly be, there would be no objection'. Sending a team to South Africa might be possible even if no Springbok team could be received in Australia. Bradman repeatedly suggested that opposition to a tour would evaporate if any visiting squad included 'one or two non-whites' and this 'relaxation' of selection criteria might be achieved by direct negotiations with Pretoria. 'One would assume that the resumption of such sporting contests' would be in the political interest of both countries', he suggested. His pragmatism was welcomed by many of his countrymen, but decried by those working against apartheid.[44]

'Not Apartheid Alone'

Charles Perkins watched the Springboks play New South Wales in Sydney in July and came away disgusted by the 'incidents' and 'atmosphere' he confronted. 'I really thought' that race relations in this country had improved since the Freedom Rides and advances of the past few years, he wrote, but 'racial intolerance is still rampant'—it 'seems' even 'more sophisticated and deep-seated'. He and his friends were abused by several sections of the rugby crowd, taunted as 'dirty niggers' and 'black bastards'. The 'racial intolerance and hatred displayed' by 'the overwhelming majority … in the section of the crowd where we stood', Perkins stated, 'was horrible to witness'. The worst excesses of white Australia endured not only, as was widely assumed, in country towns, but equally in cities and urban communities. If the anti-apartheid protests expressed a determination to end racism in sport they also unwittingly exposed the dimensions of racism at home.[45]

Visiting activists observed what Perkins so painfully felt. As the 'whole world watched', Hain used his brief time in Australia to appeal for racial equality everywhere. Addressing a Young Liberals student group at Sydney University, the international campaign leader chose not to talk about apartheid. Instead he outlined in stark detail the current situation of Aborigines in Australia. Hain's damning 'allegations' were described by government officials as 'sketchy' but damaging. They aroused a storm of a

debate, especially after they were repeated in an interview on BBC *Radio Today*. Most controversially Hain spoke of 'Aborigines on reserves' being controlled by 'a reign of despotism'; of leprosy in remote communities; of shanty-towns; of systemic discrimination in education, healthcare, and wages; of disturbingly high levels of infant mortality and short life expectancy. Intentionally, or inadvertently, Hain painted a disturbing picture of segregation and discrimination reminiscent of formal apartheid so trenchantly condemned by the movement he represented. Two years earlier an Aboriginal delegation brought similarly disturbing information to the attention of the secretary general of the UN. In the wake of the anti-Springbok demonstrations, local anti-apartheid activists could no longer disregard racism in their own backyard.[46]

In the frustrating aftermath of the 1967 referendum Indigenous demands focused increasingly on land rights, self-determination and empowerment. With unintended irony Peter Howson, who assumed responsibility Aboriginal Affairs from W.C. Wentworth at the end of May 1971, warned that if approved this agenda would result in a 'sovereign' Aboriginal 'state', reminiscent of 'separate development' under 'apartheid'. The indefatigable Wentworth had been virtually a lone voice in Cabinet, arguing that 'traditional association' should be the principal criterion 'for granting land rights to Aboriginal communities'. Like the federal Labor opposition, Wentworth cited the 1967 referendum to demonstrate that there was 'widespread and deeply [held] emotional support among the community for the claims of the Aborigines to land'. However, McMahon rejected as 'utterly alien' any policies that promoted 'separate development'. The prime minister gave only qualified support for growing demands to jettison assimilationist policies and to instead foster integration, self-determination and cultural diversity.[47]

Nor in the less contentious field of equal rights did McMahon exploit the mandate of 1967 and encourage reform in recalcitrant states, most notably Queensland and Western Australia, or even in the Northern Territory for which his government was directly responsible. A variety of laws still contained 'provisions that could be regarded as discriminatory', the Office of Aboriginal Affairs acknowledged. International scrutiny drawn by Hain's BBC interview obliged McMahon to concede that some

important Commonwealth legislation was discriminatory, notably the Migration Act and Navigation Act. Indigenous rights campaigners saw such laws as the tip of a vast iceberg of hostile customs and practices and law. When Hain spoke of the plight of Aborigines in Australia he introduced an international audience to a bleak situation well-known but seldom acknowledged in white Australia. His decision to highlight Aboriginal disadvantage amidst the tumult of the anti-Springbok protests obliquely criticised the local anti-apartheid movement's narrow reluctance to challenge racism at home. The 'average rugger-lover' at the NSW game jeered and yelled criticism that, ironically, complemented that voiced soberly by Hain to his audience at Sydney University. Burgmann recalled crowd abuse that had so disturbed Perkins: they taunted protesters with the accusation 'What are yer doing about the Aborigines, eh?'[48]

Mindful of long-standing criticism of the A-AAM's apparent reluctance to fight for Indigenous equality, Burgmann later commented that 'it was exactly the right time' for Aboriginal activists to become involved, as 'they had become radicalised'.[49] In Sydney and Brisbane especially, Indigenous campaigners and Black Power activists, including Gary Foley, Paul Coe, Billie Cragie and Denis Walker and Isobel Coe, worked closely with anti-apartheid groups. As the special branch of ASIO looked on, four men from the Redfern-based Black Caucus demonstrated in Springbok jerseys, wearing in Foley's words 'the sacred colours of the football ambassadors of apartheid'. Equally surprising—from a Springbok perspective at least—a group including writers Kath Walker, Judith Wright and Rodney Hall confronted the visiting rugby players in a hotel restaurant, projecting joyful images of race mixing that denied apartheid's enforced social boundaries. Queensland campaigners Lilla Watson and Walker joined rugby protesters in Orange and Sydney, using their visits to encourage activists to travel north and join marches and demonstrations against the repressive Bjelke-Petersen government. Aboriginal participation strengthened the anti-apartheid protests and in turn boosted collaboration between the many organisations working to end racism at home.[50]

Indigenous activists learnt a difficult lesson from the tumultuous events of 1971. Increasingly, they claimed to represent a wider movement

against racism, adopting the slogan 'not apartheid alone'. Local struggle was part of a larger international movement. Black Power advocate Foley emphasised that most Aboriginal groups 'were conscious of the "winds of change" sweeping through Africa and other parts of the colonised world': they saw 'the Koorie situation in the context of decolonisation'. Fellow advocate and radical Aboriginal leader Coe challenged the anti-apartheid movement to work in solidarity with aboriginal rights campaigners. Drawing attention to the A-AAM's willingness to fight *en masse* against oppression overseas while allegedly ignoring conditions at home, Coe charged 'You want to kill us with your hypocrisy'.[51]

Cancellation of the Springbok cricket tour 'left us with this fantastic sense of exhilaration', Burgmann recalled. 'I remember thinking: Oh we've won; what do we do now?' James Murray, the respected religion columnist in *The Australian* answered this question emphatically: 'when the Springboks have gone back to their segregated society', the protests should continue and they should focus on Aboriginal disadvantage. Coordinator of the Victorian Halt All Racial Tours committee, Gregor Macaulay, acknowledged that it was difficult to sustain public attention and grassroots participation on racial issues other than apartheid. Indigenous activist Watson noted what others feared. 'When the Springbok tour was over many white Australians thought that was all they had to do', she observed, but now 'Aboriginal people themselves stepped' forward to fight what was 'happening here'. Despite obstacles and waning enthusiasm for protest, after Bradman's announcement on apartheid cricket, Foley and others helped mobilise 'the large Australian anti-apartheid movement' through 'joint demonstrations with Koori activists'. Sporadic, sometimes violent, Black Power confrontations erupted in Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne.[52]

Publicity for a planned national March Against Racism openly conceded what critics had long argued: the demonstrations against the Springboks this year won a notable victory, but wider action was needed— 'now, we believe, it is vital for anti-racists to turn their attention to racism here, in Australia, especially as it is practised against the Aborigines'. McMahon's rejection of Aboriginal demands in the Gove Land Rights case had 'triggered widespread outrage in Indigenous communities

nationwide'. The *New York Times* reported that protest from dissatisfied, militant young Aborigines was 'stirring Australia'. Indigenous poet Tony Coorey wrote succinctly: 'the PM's statement has effectively declared us aliens in our own land: If so, we should have an embassy like all the other aliens'. In December 1971, plans were finalised for an Aboriginal Embassy in Canberra. Most provocatively, the Tent Embassy established in January 1972 was erected on the lawns of Parliament House. Newspaper and TV report about this novel political act were dispatched to over 30 countries, including many in South and East Asia as well as the US, UK and Western Europe. While the anti-apartheid movement, and media responses to it, reflected the global reach of anti-racism, the Aboriginal Embassy uniquely expressed more immediate, local priorities. Some newspapers warned that the embassy risked sparking 'another Sharpeville'. Government attempts to forcefully dismantle it evoked renewed perceptions of a white Australia determined to shackle opponents of racism. Aboriginal activism was winning unprecedented attention. The theatre and ceremony of the Tent Embassy quickly came to symbolise the paradox of the oldest custodians of the country being denied a status equal to those recently arrived foreign embassies occupying grand residences in the nation's capital.[53]

Jack Waterford commented years later that the 'last great series of demonstrations was in the middle of 1972'. Focused on the Aboriginal Embassy, they 'captured national and international attention', and were supported by many activists associated with the campaign against apartheid. In the wake of the anti-Springbok turmoil in 1971 the problem of racism in Australia's own backyard was, if belatedly, confronted. Symbolically, at the suggestion of prominent South African exile Neville Curtis, a broad-based organisation, the Campaign Against Racial Exploitation, was established. Working initially from Canberra it quickly encompassed 16 participating organisations across all states. CARE was the first explicitly national anti-racism and anti-apartheid network. The umbrella organisation worked closely with the Southern African Liberation Centre to support the ANC and SWAPO, as well as Indigenous groups and land councils, peace groups and student organisations. Its early publicity stressed that 'no anti-apartheid organisation has credibility if it is not involved in support of Aboriginal

struggle'. The lessons of 1971 had been heeded; the long-standing charge of hypocrisy belatedly assuaged.[54]

Celebratory suggestions that anti-Springbok protest 'became a watershed in Australian sporting and political life, the ramifications of which are still felt today', are commonplace in surveys of the anti-apartheid movement. Yet such 'ramifications' remain largely unexplored and unspecified. Almost half a century after the protests of 1969–72, anti-apartheid leader Burgmann told the author of *Pitched Battles* that 'we put the issue of racism on the agenda in this country—racism as regards non-white South Africans and our own Indigenous people as well as the White Australia policy that was then in place'. This partisan ahistorical view greatly exaggerates the legacy of the local anti-apartheid movement. It ignores, or at the very least diminishes, a long and bitter narrative of Indigenous struggle against racism—a struggle briefly amplified by the sound and fury of the anti-apartheid campaign. More grounded in historical reality than Burgmann's assessment is the narrower view that protest brought civil uprising and violence rarely seen in Australia, and ended traditional sporting contacts with teams selected under apartheid's discriminatory laws.[55]

Revisiting journalist Stewart Harris's exhaustive observer reports published as *Political Football* in 1971, Larry Writer's recently published *Pitched Battles* forensically details the 'frightening and chaotic events' surrounding the Springbok rugby tour. These events sharpened the drive against racism at home and accelerated reform under the Whitlam government from December 1972. Writer's narrowly focused book is captivating. Unfortunately, his broad suggestion that the turmoil of 1971 'ultimately contributed to the abandonment of apartheid' and became 'part of the fabric of the new South Africa' is not explored. This suggestion confuses the short-term political impact of the A-AAM at home with its possible influence on the much wider struggle against the racist regime in South Africa. Writer is on firmer ground in stating simply that, like many countries, 'Australia did its bit' in hastening the end of apartheid.[56]

While the anti-Springbok crisis was a catalyst for reform in Australia, it did little to encourage the dismantling of apartheid. Even if the demonstrations in cities and towns across Eastern Australia are evaluated

as part of the achievements of the global anti-apartheid movement, they had virtually no lasting impact on Pretoria, failing to encourage significant change in any area, including in the narrow field of apartheid sport. Indeed, in mid-1973 McGregor, then national director of the World University Service, acknowledged openly that protest and 'dialogue' with white South Africans 'have led to a hardening of their racist attitudes and even harsher oppression for the black majority'.[57] The fractious anti-Springbok campaign did help to join Australia to a sustained transnational movement against white South Africa, but the combined forces of a global anti-apartheid movement, UN and Commonwealth initiative, sporting isolation and limited economic sanction did little to hasten reform—although in combination these influences gradually helped to destabilise the apartheid regime. Mounting state repression and mass civil resistance—expressed unambiguously during the Soweto Uprising from 1976—gave rise to ever widening international pressure for change.

Some whose reflections are shaped by participation in the protest excitement of 1969–72 have tended to overstate the significance of these fractured events. Time and nostalgia can distort memory.[58] While the rugby demonstrations led directly to the cancellation of the cricket tour, no compelling evidence supports, for example, Burgmann's recollection that the protests 'created a climate in which Australians, many for the first time, thought hard about apartheid, and within a short time a majority did not want sporting or trade contact with South Africa, which was a major reversal in the opinion polls in just a year or so'. Certainly, very few participant assessments were this positive. Members of the Rugby Seven—the 'rugby heroes' who were 'figureheads for the anti-apartheid movement'—while proud of the stand they took were never comfortable with exaggerated praise. Boyce commented 'we certainly have never considered ourselves heroes'. Roxburgh reflected that '"heroes" is a bit of a stretch' that overstated their role (and, he might have added, boosted broader claims by others that overstated the achievements of the anti-apartheid movement generally). Writer's more considered assessments are suitably modest. He establishes the importance of the movement in ending further sporting contacts with apartheid's ambassadors and appropriately credits the A-AAM with bringing Australian racism under stronger

scrutiny.[59] Broadly, Writer's conclusions echo the sober observations made at the height of the tours by leaders of the international movement.

Cancellation of the cricket tour, Hain commented, 'put the seal on white South Africa's isolation from international sport'. The bitter contests in Australia marked 'a historic victory for non-racialism'. However, while they had a significant impact locally, accelerating a broader movement against racism, these events did not initiate meaningful reform in South Africa. Nor did they strengthen South Africa's isolation—economically, politically or strategically. From 1971, in the wake of unprecedented international fury against it, Pretoria initiated a 'massive propaganda offensive' and greatly expanded the activities of its surveillance agencies. Its security forces doubled in number from 50,000 to more than 100,000 members.[60] The apartheid state was further consolidated. It had been shaken by international protest in the decade after Sharpeville, but the repressive architecture of apartheid endured.

New Directions:
The Whitlam Interregnum

The priority [of] the government [was] to initiate the visible process of ridding Australia of its racialist image and enhancing its general international image and respectability.[1]

Gough Whitlam, 1973

The government's opposition to apartheid is probably best expressed where South African reactions can do least harm to our interests.[2]

Ambassador Moodie, Pretoria, 1974

A generation of conservative government in Australia ended on 2 December 1972. The election of a progressive Labor administration under prime minister Gough Whitlam foreshadowed the formal end of White Australia. 'Australia must be absolutely strict in avoiding giving the impression of racial discrimination', he emphasised. Domestic reform must complement foreign policy. In Whitlam's view 'the evil of racism' lay deeply embedded in colonial dependency and notions of white supremacy. While working to end discrimination at home 'we must be unremitting' in working also 'to break the illegal regime in Rhodesia, to end South Africa's unlawful control over Namibia, and to end apartheid'.[3] His government would seek to achieve an Australia that was no longer 'open to suggestions of racism'. If the reputation of a 'white Australia' was to fade, the nation must project a more modern, open and

compassionate image to the world. 'It was the concern of my government that Australia should show a clean face to the world in terms of racial matters', Whitlam declared.[4] His vision was deeply shared by his Labor colleagues and welcomed, especially, by a younger generation born after the war. Whitlam hoped that a more independent government could be a bridge 'between the habits and fears of the past and the hopes and demands of the future'. In the words of his accomplished speechwriter, Graham Freudenberg, Whitlam wanted to 'crash through the barriers of intolerance and prejudice about birth or background, race or religion'.[5]

As Labor took the reins of government, and before a full Cabinet was sworn in, the country was briefly governed by a 'duumvirate'—an interim ministry comprising only Whitlam and deputy ALP leader Lance Barnard. They assumed responsibility for all Cabinet portfolios. Whitlam felt this action was necessary to avert 'intolerable' delays as his party agreed the make-up of the Cabinet and election results were finalised. The infant administration was determined that domestic reforms be matched by foreign policy change. Within days of winning office Labor ended conscription. Conscientious objectors imprisoned for resisting the draft and war in Vietnam were released. All remaining Australian troops were withdrawn from Vietnam. Diplomatic relations were established with the People's Republic of China and other significant communist states, notably two Cold War enemies, North Korea and Vietnam. 'Good neighbour' aspirations brought a dialogue partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Regional relationships and good international citizenship were to be promoted. A new-found independence, and liberalism, was expressed through constructive participation in the UN and the Commonwealth. An outward-looking government now spoke of constructive engagement and multilateral endeavour. Cold War allegiances and traditional friendships were reassessed—'rebalanced' but not rejected. Relations with white South Africa, and support for organisations working against apartheid were transformed.[6]

From its very first days in office the Labor government projected a radical—some claimed dogmatic—posture on questions of race. However, as is evident in this chapter, policy action often fell short of posturing rhetoric. Throughout much of Labor's turbulent three years in power,

anti-apartheid activists would contend, a credibility gap separated stated aspirations from policy implementation, even in the core areas of sport and trade sanctions. Whitlam was far more outspoken than his predecessors in opposing white minority regimes in Southern Africa. Yet Labor did not act consistently against them. Policy statements were not always matched by execution. Australia behaved cautiously on most major policy questions and was always reluctant to act if this set it apart from its major allies on important strategic or economic issues. Consular advice from Pretoria anticipated that a more moderate road would be followed by Labor, but cautioned pointedly that wider national interests should not be undermined by gratuitous expressions of moral concern on racial questions.[7]

Apartheid and Decolonisation

The new Labor government's stated policies closely mirrored those of the anti-apartheid movement. Richard Higgott suggested that the protests that disrupted Australia in 1971 'paled into insignificance with the advent of the Whitlam government'.[8] Whitlam took immediate action to end sporting contacts with white South Africa and to rebalance bilateral relations. He announced that visas would no longer be issued to racially selected sporting teams travelling to, or through, Australia (a decision enforced by all subsequent governments, Labor and Liberal, until the end of apartheid in 1994). Whitlam chose Human Rights Day, 10 December, to advance a central goal of his government, announcing that it would expedite ratification of the Racial Discrimination Convention and relevant International Labour Organization conventions, and remove the last legislative remnants of white Australia. In the UN Australia expressed a fresh voice against racism and colonialism, announcing that independence would be granted promptly to Papua New Guinea. In Commonwealth meetings, the inflexible policies of its Coalition predecessors were replaced by statements of support for decolonisation, the drive against white minority rule and greatly improved relations with Black Africa.[9]

Whitlam served as prime minister and minister for foreign affairs during the first year of his administration; he remained the dominant voice of his country's new-found independence in world affairs during Labor's two short terms in government. Throughout, the question of race and the nation's racialist image were overriding drivers of policy. Senator Don Willesee, who succeeded Whitlam as foreign minister, was similarly determined that Labor 'throw off the stigma of racism'. Whitlam was more expansive, albeit in private. 'Major changes' to renounce white Australia, he maintained, do 'not rest on moral considerations alone'. Rather, as he advised Australia's ambassador in Pretoria, 'we cannot afford to appear insensitive' to demands for decolonisation or the international drive against racism, for only by such a change in attitude could foreign relations be reoriented and Australia's 'international reputation' be improved.[10] Newly arrived, ambassador Colin Moodie attempted to advance this argument in meetings with representatives of the Vorster administration. 'We have underlined that we have no special relationship with South Africa and don't desire one', he stated bluntly. Yet most in white South Africa were still reluctant to accept that Australia was sincere in its criticism of apartheid. Equally, Australia's ambassador reported, they were reluctant to dissociate themselves from Australia, a white society and people 'just like themselves'.[11]

Labor leaders were little constrained by geopolitical pressures of the Cold War or influenced by the racial anxieties that had long defined the nation. From the party's first week in office they spoke in ways emphatically different from their timid predecessors, especially on apartheid. Labor, as commentators observed, 'was prepared to take an avowedly anti-South African line'. Relations with Pretoria deteriorated dramatically. Privately, Whitlam intimated 'support' for economic sanctions to 'bring-down' 'the present South African government if it does not change its ways'. Interviewed by Lord Chalfont in London, he went further, bluntly justifying the use of violence against apartheid while stating that the white supremacist leaders of South Africa and Rhodesia were 'as bad as Hitler'. More significantly, Whitlam implied that humanitarian principles could override the legalisms of non-intervention that had rationalised his predecessors' approach to South Africa.[12]

The Interminable Politics of Sport

Whitlam's abrupt announcement banning 'racially-selected' Springbok teams from entering or transiting Australia stopped short of severing all bilateral sporting exchanges. South African teams chosen under apartheid's rules would be denied entry to Australia, as would its sports officials. 'Racially selected teams' could not transit through Australia (effectively banning teams from South Africa transiting to New Zealand via Australia). But to the dismay of the anti-apartheid movement and many on the political Left, teams from Australia were not formally banned from playing in South Africa. Moreover, individuals who were not official sporting representatives of South Africa were free to visit and play in Australia and, reciprocally, Australians were not stopped from competing in South Africa. Whitlam's announcement on apartheid sport was carefully qualified. 'I should point out', the new prime minister stated, 'that the government does not place restrictions on the rights of [individual] Australians to play whatever form of sport they like where they like'.[13]

Although an exercise in compromise, the new government's apparent militancy nonetheless took the wind from the sails of the anti-apartheid movement. As Keith Sutter pointed out, with the ending of Springbok team visits anti-racism 'groups were, ironically, robbed of a direct way of drawing attention to the evils of apartheid'. Protest no longer put South Africa in the public spotlight or attracted strong media attention. Peter McGregor complained that the decision to ban racially selected teams from coming to Australia did not 'effectively complete the isolation of racist South Africa' from international sport. Indeed, this policy did not even 'prevent Australian teams from going overseas to compete' against racially selected teams. Similarly, it gave a green light to individuals wishing to compete in South Africa under apartheid's rules. Nor did it encourage reform in South Africa. Despite the expectations of some anti-apartheid activists, the South African government proved intractable. 'Sports Policy will not be the thin edge of the wedge to force integration in South Africa', the minister for sport stated in May 1973. He concluded emphatically that 'teams to play abroad carrying the name Springbok will always be

white'. Outspoken Wallaby Paul Darveniza observed disappointedly that policies ensuring that 'representative sport was the prerogative of the whites' implied the 'inferiority' of 'non-whites' and would continue to be used by Pretoria to 'bolster the white supremacy myth'. The international anti-apartheid movement, encouraged by black South African founders of the non-racial South African Council on Sport, advocated that Australia should extend the isolation of South Africa from all sporting competition. Australia could only do this if it went 'further than just preventing racially selected South African teams from coming to Australia; it must also stop Australian sports people *going from* Australia to compete against racist teams elsewhere'.[14]

Despite continuing criticism at home, from December 1972 Australia's actions complied for the first time with UN resolutions seeking the cessation of exchanges with teams selected in violation of the Olympic principle of 'non-discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or political affiliation'. But the Labor government could not or would not comply fully with related UN resolutions seeking 'to end all cultural, educational and civic contacts and exchanges with racist institutions in South Africa'. Australian sportsmen and women continued to play in South Africa, occasionally as members of national teams. In the following months teams of surf-lifesavers, trampoliners, and squash players competed in South Africa. Reciprocally, individual white South African sportspeople, most controversially golfer and apartheid apologist Gary Player, were able to compete in Australia. Rather lamely, Whitlam stated that his government would attempt to dissuade Australians from travelling to South Africa, and sporting organisations and officials, regardless of the particular sporting code involved, would be pressured by government to cancel all exchanges. Officially, the government would neither 'condone nor condemn' individuals wishing to compete there, while it would publicly 'deplore' and 'dissociate' itself from any team prepared to visit. Official policy requested, somewhat wishfully, that any sporting organisation anticipating playing in South Africa be guided by specific criteria: (1) Will opposing teams be selected on a racial basis? (2) What facilities exist for non-whites to develop their skills in the relevant sport? (3) Will teams share common—not segregated—facilities

at sportsgrounds and elsewhere? And (4) Will spectators be segregated according to race.[15]

At times, the government was persuasive. In 1973–74 a South African Davis Cup Tennis team was refused entry to Australia, and the Lawn Tennis Association persuaded not to participate in the Coup de Nations in Johannesburg (a tournament that, like the infamous South African Games, was designed to circumvent sports isolation). Most significantly, Canberra foreshadowed its disapproval of the Australian cricket tour of South Africa mooted for the summer of 1975–76. Predictably, Pretoria's minister for sport, Dr Koornhof, was 'very anxious' that the cricket tour proceed and repeated the claim that mixed sport was under consideration. Australian officials were by now inured from such hollow promises. They accepted that apartheid would not 'succumb to external pressure unless it were to come from major powers acting in concert'. Cricket Australia was dissuaded from going ahead with the proposed official team tour. However, from 1973 top international cricketers from England and Australia organised 'unofficial' or 'rebel' tours to both South Africa and Rhodesia.[16]

White South Africa welcomed these plans, as did the insecure Smith regime in Rhodesia. Pretoria suggested, as it had often done, that such visits acknowledged that the country was on 'the verge of a major breakthrough in attempts to develop multiracial sport'. Predictably, it also claimed that such visits 'demonstrate that South Africa is not isolated in sport', and that it implied international contests would act as a spur to reform. Canberra was unmoved by these claims. Foreign Affairs detected no evidence 'of a grass roots change'. Don Willesee and ACB chair Tim Caldwell told the press that it was 'unlikely' any change of heart in South Africa would result from attempts 'to force' it 'to adopt a multi-racial sporting policy'. Anti-apartheid activists were similarly realistic, pointing out correctly that substantial reform would never be approved by the ruling National Party. However, the Whitlam government's compromised policy denied it the 'power to stop a visit by either a private or official team' to South Africa.[17]

Against this background Ian Chappell, captain of the Australian cricket team, happily ignored disapproval and went ahead with plans for an unofficial tour. Made up of Australians and a few players from other

countries, the team was tentatively named an 'International XI'. (Critics suggested it should more accurately be called an 'Invitation XI'.) By late 1975 a host of Australia's most famous cricketers, including Ian and Greg Chappell and Dennis Lillee, had agreed to participate. A few months later they joined the controversial International Wanderers team in South Africa. It was not scheduled to play any official test matches and defended its presence as a 'peace trip' as all games played would be against 'teams of mixed races' (although details of actual selection criteria or the likely number of non-whites selected were not widely publicised). During March–April 1976, shortly before the watershed Soweto uprising, the Wanderers played eight matches: seven against 'mixed' teams that included three non-white players and one against a Black IX, played in Soweto. Somewhat disingenuously, tour manager Ritchie Benaud claimed the 35-day tour 'achieved more for coloured South African cricketers … than 20 years of boycotting of cricket tours could achieve.' Although widely condemned, such invitation teams were defended on the grounds that they might include some coloured players, promote mixed sport and encourage reform. Ian Chappell more honestly conceded the political undertones of rebel tours. 'It's about time somebody stuck up for South Africa instead of being fair weather friends', he stated. Outraged opponents argued that international teams were self-serving attempts to undermine agreed sanctions regimes, while validating segregated competition, separate spectator venues and separate amenities.[18]

Despite the Whitlam government's limited powers of persuasion, after 1972 a number of governing bodies in sport, most significantly in cricket and rugby, did not openly defy government policy advice. No official national teams from these codes visited either South Africa or Rhodesia. But many sporting bodies and prominent players continued to promote unofficial exchanges. Public opinion remained deeply polarised. Polls consistently indicated that the decision to ban sporting visits was not agreed by most Australians. Sport continued to frame public contests over apartheid and Australia's relations with South Africa.[19]

In November 1975, shortly after Malcolm Fraser replaced Whitlam as prime minister, the United Nations unanimously agreed that sports boycotts against South African teams should be maintained. Australia's

official position was unchanged. It remained in place under Fraser's Coalition administration. The ban on team visits was enforced. In contrast to Australia, a number of countries continued to accept apartheid sports teams during 1974–75 and beyond. These included Argentina (rugby), Denmark (yachting), France and Germany (yachting, tennis, golf), Sweden (yachting), United Kingdom (yachting, golf, tennis, water skiing, skating, squash) and the United States (yachting, tennis, hockey). Most controversially, a New Zealand All Blacks rugby team—which included honorary whites—toured South Africa in 1976.[20] This highly controversial visit was encouraged by the newly elected Muldoon government and was widely condemned internationally. In protest, 29 countries, mainly from Africa and Asia, refused to attend the Montréal Olympics scheduled to begin in mid-1976. International boycott action coincided with escalating protest in South Africa. The Soweto Uprising, in which hundreds died or were forced into exile, unmasked anew the brutality of apartheid. And it revealed an international fault-line over what action should be taken against it.

Against Racialism: UN and Commonwealth

The speed of Whitlam's initial move against apartheid in sport was matched by actions in the UN. Deliberations in the General Assembly allowed Australia to demonstrate its new foreign policy resolve. Debate centred on a bold resolution (2979) which the McMahon government had earlier refused to support. In essence, it condemned 'foreign economic and other interests' for impeding efforts to 'eliminate apartheid and racial discrimination in Southern Africa'. When this was considered in plenary session on 14 December 1972 the new Australian government voted in favour. It also supported a more moderate resolution (2946) that anticipated sanctioning South Africa and Portugal for refusing to comply with UN-imposed sanctions against Rhodesia. And it endorsed resolution 3031 condemning Pretoria's 'continued illegal jurisdiction' in Namibia. (In 1974 Australia was elected to the UN Council for Namibia.) At home Labor began attempts to close the Rhodesian Information Centre in Sydney and announced that Australia would no longer represent South Africa in the International Monetary Fund. Official intelligence links with BOSS,

the controversial South African Bureau of State Security, were quietly discontinued (although intelligence sharing continued through covert channels in Washington and London). Instructions to ambassador Moodie emphasised that there should be no acknowledged defence arrangements or military contacts with Pretoria, and no further cooperation on nuclear matters, although collaboration might continue in less controversial areas of science.[21]

Racism abroad and at home remained interwoven strands of a single rope. Labor accepted that the external affairs power provisions of the Constitution permitted it to ratify international conventions that in effect overrode principles of non-intervention and domestic sovereignty. Just ten days after Labor took office Whitlam foreshadowed in principle approval of agreed UN covenants on human rights and racial discrimination. The implications of this went well beyond hollow symbolism. To pave the way for ratification, discrimination would be removed from all offending statutes, not only in national jurisdictions, but at state and territorial levels as well. A few weeks later Australia joined with the New Zealand Labour government to condemn publicly 'South Africa's policies of racial discrimination and apartheid'. Significantly, Whitlam emphasised that 'discrimination' and 'apartheid' were not interchangeable terms, as apartheid was uniquely a comprehensive system of social separation and political control. At the same time, he was conscious of the complex implications of the term 'race'. Thus when announcing that under international law Australia was obliged to remove from domestic jurisdictions any 'hint or suggestion that it favours policies, decrees or resolutions that seek to differentiate between people on the basis of the colour of their skin', he avoided speaking of race.[22]

Subsequently, Labor endorsed a number of UN covenants on human rights and labour rights, including the very significant International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Reforms long overdue at state level—most controversially in Queensland and WA—were enacted. The Racial Discrimination Act, which in effect ratified the 1963 UN draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, could now be approved. Symbolically, perhaps, its ratification in June 1975 was the final grand gesture of Whitlam's now fraying administration.

Although Whitlam acted decisively during his first few weeks in office, he was more circumspect in the following years. In late 1973 Labor refused to support a draft UN convention that sought to define apartheid as a 'crime against humanity' under international law. On 16 November it refused to support a double-barrelled motion calling on all member countries to end all contacts with South Africa—economic, military and cultural—and to recognise liberation movements, most notably the ANC, as the authentic representatives of South Africa's people. This motion obliquely justified the use of force against apartheid. Australia joined 23 other nations in abstaining but did not join United States and Portugal in voting against the resolution. Eighty-four countries, typically those identified in Cold War terms as non-aligned, supported the resolution. Labor's non-committal position drew international criticism and local complaint. SADAF was particularly scathing. 'Despite Whitlam's claims of a new policy on South Africa', John Brink wrote, 'Australia has displayed its half-hearted and hypocritical attitude to apartheid by abstaining, not voting for this motion'.[23] However, subsequent actions by the government were more resolute. They were also more closely aligned with strategies advocated by the most prominent activists groups, SADAF, CARE and ICARIS.

Although generally sympathetic to the interests of Black Africa, Labor initially refused requests for direct material support for liberation groups arrayed against Pretoria. Like most Commonwealth countries, Australia openly criticised Pretoria's military intervention in neighbouring areas. Whitlam maintained that Pretoria's control over Namibia was unlawful and should end. Labor accepted that the 'aspirations' of national liberation movements, notably the ANC, were 'legitimate'. Despite pressures from some sections of SADAF and CARE, however, it refused to 'accord them status equivalent to governments' or to 'encourage or assist the use of violence to effect political change'. Labor explicitly endorsed 'non-violence' and refused to approve funds that might help arm or militarise liberation groups. But it did give limited support. In 1973 it gave some funding to UN programs supporting black communities in South Africa and Namibia. Two years later it provoked Pretoria's ire by providing a substantial 'humanitarian aid' grant of $150,000 to liberation groups in Southern

Africa. Using UNICEF projects in Zambia as a channel, this assistance was distributed to SWAPO, the ANC, Zanu/Zapu and the MPLA.[24]

Australia also took important, if indirect, action to aid 'front-line' states. In April 1973 the South African defence attaché was withdrawn and not replaced, ending, Whitlam said, 'the last link in any form of defence exchange'. Labor severed consular links with Namibia and recognised, in effect, the UN Council for Namibia as the *de facto* representative of its people. A year later it committed to support agreed international action on Southern Africa. It jointly sponsored a UN resolution on the release of political prisoners in South Africa and contributed funds to assist their release. Australia's in principle support for liberation movements was essentially intangible, but it was more publicly assertive in its support than were any of its major Allies.[25] Whitlam defended his government's UN record as balanced diplomacy. Critics claimed Australia was behaving like a non-aligned state.[26]

Many in the national parliament, including a few prominent in the of the ALP, thought Whitlam's preoccupation with anti-colonialism was distorting foreign policy, as it threatened good relations with traditional partners and allies. Whitlam was unmoved by such criticism. Twelve months after Labor came to power its UN delegation reported that Australia had established itself 'as one of two or three Western countries most sympathetically disposed towards the anti-colonial causes that are a principal attraction for the third world'. Mirroring Whitlam's inflated sense of the nation's new-found 'middle power' status, the delegation suggested that it now had the 'capacity also to influence other Western countries to modify their attitudes' on colonialism and racism. Whitlam welcomed such an encouraging assessment of his policy ambitions. Pretoria was dismayed by his rapid swing to an 'almost Afro-Asian position' and sudden disavowal of the unique bilateral friendship. Instead, new friendships with black Africa were reflected in the visit in early 1974 of charismatic Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere to Australia, and Willesee's visits to a number of African countries, not all of which were members of the Commonwealth.[27]

While Australia accepted the 'inevitability of intensified armed struggle' in southern Africa, it rejected urging by some African countries

to directly support military action. Like Britain it refused to approve military aid to 'freedom fighters'.[28] This prompted strong complaints by neighbouring states increasingly alarmed by Pretoria's willingness to provide white Rhodesia with financial support, armed manpower and military equipment. The UN special committee on apartheid observed caustically that Western powers continued to supply technology and weapons to Pretoria that it deployed in Namibia and in support of the illegal regime in Rhodesia. Ironically, 'liberation groups' were denied Western support ostensibly because they alone threatened 'peaceful change' in the region.[29] By 1974–75 Pretoria was ready to compromise its support of white rule in Rhodesia in return for a free hand to consolidate military bases and Bantustan policies in Namibia. Despite strong reservations about this, Canberra did not openly oppose it.[30]

Australia's international role and Whitlam's international profile were elevated during official visits to New York and London, participation in CHOGMs, and by the fact that during 1973–74 Australia served as one of five non-permanent members of the Security Council. Enjoying his time on the world stage and his government's new role in the UN, Whitlam continually urged it to concentrate on the 'evil of racism', particularly its manifestations in southern Africa.[31] In his own words, Whitlam 'made it clear' that, while his government would not necessarily disregard the policies of the US or the UK, it would always seek to 'ascertain the views of countries in the Indian and Pacific Oceans such as Canada, Japan, Indonesia, India and some of the African countries'. The Labor administration accepted that the imposition of apartheid had regional and international implications: that Pretoria's actions in Namibia, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and neighbouring southern Africa constituted a threat to peace and security in the region. The UN branch in Foreign Affairs somewhat reluctantly recognised 'the fact' that 'the prime minister is hot and strong on colonialist issues, and anxious for us to stand up and be counted as often as possible on the anti-colonial side'. This concern framed Australian policies in the UN during Whitlam's two short terms as prime minister. He had earlier told Lawrence McIntyre in New York that in general Australia's UN delegation should vote against South Africa and

Portugal on any question related to decolonisation, and by implication, racism. Integral to this strategy, Whitlam stated, was action 'to oust South Africa from its illegal occupation of Namibia' and to end white minority rule in Southern Africa.[32]

While it refused to vote in the UN for the direct use of force against apartheid, Labor endorsed all resolutions against racial discrimination; backed UN efforts to expel South Africa from Namibia; and supported black African-led activism against the white regime in Rhodesia. It co-sponsored a number of resolutions encouraging international trade union action against Pretoria and condemned the imprisonment of hundreds of SWAPO activists in Namibia. Aware, perhaps, that its radical posture in the Security Council would always be overridden by more cautious permanent members, Australia supported all 45 draft resolutions on colonial questions. In contrast, its major allies in the Council, the US and the UK, vetoed or abstained on eight and six such resolutions respectively. Whitlam defended his government's record in the Council and the Assembly as demonstrating 'diplomatic even-handedness'. Conservative critics repeated charges that Australia had joined the 'non-aligned bloc'. In contrast, anti-apartheid advocates were dismayed by Labor's inconsistency and willingness to compromise.[33]

The Whitlam government's most ostensibly important anti-apartheid action was initiated in the Security Council shortly before Australia's two-year term expired. In October 1974 it controversially voted with nine other members to expel South Africa from the United Nations—a move condemned as hostile to the very principle of universality on which the organisation was founded. In New York during these debates, Whitlam defended Australia's position on the grounds that white South Africa had 'constantly defied United Nations' rulings'. No action more strongly identified Australia with mainstream Afro-Asian or non-aligned sentiment. The decision ran against the grain of public opinion at home, supported by only 19% of people surveyed (although a significant 25% were 'undecided').[34] Nonetheless, McIntyre defended Australia's position as reflecting 'moral considerations' that 'must be decisive' in deciding international responses to apartheid. Somewhat cynically, the decision was taken in the knowledge that any move to exclude South Africa from

the world body would be vetoed by permanent members of the Council. Labor's ostensible support for expulsion of South Africa from the UN was arguably no more than a shallow political gesture, taken in the secure knowledge that major Western powers would reject it.[35]

The Labor government behaved with greater conviction in the Commonwealth. Here especially Australia's racist image remained a barrier to foreign policy ambition. As Britain withdrew progressively into Europe, Menzies and his conservative successors had paid less attention to matters in what they disdainfully called the 'Brown Commonwealth'. In contrast, Whitlam was keen to resuscitate Australia's role in the multicultural association. As at the UN, the self-assured prime minister could promote policy free from differences with Westminster or Washington. The CHOGM in Ottawa in 1973 was its first meeting after Britain's entry into the European Economic Community. Deliberations focused on international trade as well as the intractable problems of Southern Africa. Disturbed by criticism from prominent black African leaders, including Nkrumah, Nyerere and Obote, Whitlam worked assiduously to remove the cloud cast by policies of earlier Australian governments. Namibia and Rhodesia remained burning issues. Australia sided with black African states, condemning Britain's indecision on both territories as implicit support for white colonial interests. Two years later, at the CHOGM in Kingston, Jamaica, Australia again worked to end Pretoria's 'illegal' occupation of Namibia and undermine white-minority rule in Rhodesia. Aid was extended to Mozambique in an effort to tighten sanctions against Rhodesia. Humanitarian aid was approved for Namibia. Economic sanctions, which Australia and virtually all Commonwealth members supported, had a far greater effect in Rhodesia than in South Africa.[36] Whitlam was reluctant, however, to act unilaterally on Rhodesia. Claire Clark suggested, with some exaggeration, that Whitlam's policies towards Southern Africa departed little from those of the conservative McMahon administration—that they were essentially 'differences in emphasis'. In 1975, with support from the returned Wilson government in the UK, stronger action was foreshadowed against apartheid. Canberra encouraged Britain's new-found willingness to enforce a UN arms

embargo against Pretoria and to terminate the controversial Simonstown agreement.[37]

Whitlam was wedded to the principle of decolonisation and accepted the need to expedite independence in Australia's own significant colonial possession, Papua and New Guinea. 'Australia is no longer willing to be the ruler of a colony', he stated bluntly: 'and my government is determined to divest itself of that role in the lifetime of the present Australian Parliament'.[38] Decisions were made irrespective of Australia's particular interests. Canberra recognised Guinea-Bissau well ahead of its formal independence, and took some credit for the announcement in April 1974 by a newly elected government in Portugal that it would no longer attempt to stop its colonial possessions in Africa from gaining full independence.[39] Indeed, Labor actively encouraged independence for, in Whitlam's words, 'the large African territories, Angola and Mozambique'. Whitlam told president Suharto, during discussions on the difficult question of Portuguese Timor's probable incorporation into Indonesia, that 'to be consistent Australia ought to apply the principle of self-determination to all territories, even the smallest colonial territories'. Ultimately, developing 'good relations with Indonesia' compromised the principle of self-determination and Whitlam conceded that East Timor was 'part of the Indonesian world'. (In late 1978 Fraser's government gave *de jure* recognition to incorporation of the Territory into Indonesia.) Despite this concession, Australia's anti-colonial reputation in the UN remained high, reflecting its record on Nauru and Papua New Guinea, support for independence in Namibia and Rhodesia, and wider policies on decolonisation.[40]

Accelerated independence for its own colony brought Australian policy into line with virtually all countries, except South Africa. The transition to self-government in Papua New Guinea was commenced a year after Labor won office. Independence was granted on 16 September 1975. For Whitlam and most in the ALP the independence ceremony in Port Moresby symbolised the end of a difficult colonial chapter in Australian history.

Limited Sanction

'Official encouragement and promotion of economic relations with South Africa should cease', the Whitlam government announced almost a year after it won office. No new trade missions or trade fairs would be permitted, and no South African businessman could visit 'at official expense'. Government-to-government consultations should 'if possible' take place in third countries. High-level negotiations should be avoided, most particularly if they might be exploited by Pretoria for political purposes. Trade commission staff working in South Africa were banned from making official visits to Namibia. Attempts to close the Rhodesian Information Centre failed. Belatedly, the ALP caucus agreed that all trade with South Africa should end, Qantas flights cease, and the embassy be closed. But action on these matters stalled and was not considered by Cabinet. The trade union arm of the labour movement also baulked at taking unilateral action against apartheid. ACTU president Bob Hawke spoke in favour of banning trade; but in the absence of international union support this was not pursued.[41]

Australia's policies on sanctions and trade were a metaphor for wider foreign policy ambivalence. Acting on government advice Lawrence McIntyre had encouraged the UN to take 'more drastic steps' to ensure that 'financial, economic, technical and other assistance' was withheld from Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal; that sanctions resolutions of December 1972 be enforced. But as anti-apartheid leaders pointed out, 'specific legislation' to 'make such sanctions an integral part of Australian law' was never enacted. Powerful speeches supporting sanctions were followed by a refusal to introduce legislation necessary to ensure enforcement. Sanctions were not rigorously pursued. Implementation fell far short of agreed UN stipulations. Peter McGregor, representing the newly formed International Campaign Against Racism in Sport, ICARIS, charged that Labor's opposition to racism was demonstrably not 'genuine'. In words frequently used to summarise Whitlam's foreign policy uncertainty, McGregor claimed there was a vast gulf 'between what the government has said it believes in, concerning sanctions, and what in fact it is doing to implement them'.[42]

Australia's bilateral economic leverage against apartheid was similarly compromised and largely ineffectual—an outcome deplored by activist groups SADAF, CARE and ICARIS. Throughout the Whitlam years 'normal economic relations' were 'permitted to continue', provided they did not have obvious 'official assistance'. Bilateral trade continued without serious disruption. While Australia maintained diplomatic personnel in nine African cities—Accra, Cairo, Dar es Salam, Lagos, Lusaka and Nairobi, as well as Pretoria, Cape Town and Johannesburg—'The deployment of staff alone would indicate the extent of Australia's close ties with South Africa vis-à-vis the rest of the continent', Keith Sutter, president of the UN Association of Australia, concluded. And he repeated the charge that Canberra since 1972 had made no concerted attempt to discourage bilateral trade or reduce economic linkages.[43]

From the vantage point of SADAF, John Brink observed with dismay that commercial relations continued to grow at a 'phenomenal' rate. Direct investments were not significantly reduced, ostensibly because Australia had adopted a 'neutral position' consistent with others in GATT. Trade figures for 1972–75 revealed a balance of 3:1 in Australia's favour. The volume of trade with South Africa was greater than with black Africa combined. In the five years from 1970 imports from South Africa doubled, while exports to South Africa rose in value from A$65 million annually to almost A$100 million. South Africa was the fifth largest importer of Australian manufactured goods. A number of powerful multinational corporations used Australian subsidiaries to penetrate the South African market.[44]

Our government will support a 'total ban on trade', Whitlam advised, only if 'other significant trading partners' take similar action. 'You cannot stop trade with countries because you don't like their policies', a prominent left-wing Cabinet colleague stated: 'if we did that, we would stop trading with just about every country except Sweden and Switzerland'. Foreign Affairs spokesmen went further, claiming that unilateral restrictions on trade would 'not result in any effective degree of economic pressure or inconvenience' to Pretoria. Public opinion was closely in step with government: fewer than 25% of people surveyed in 1973 believed Australia should 'stop trading with South Africa'.[45] Despite 'continuing

normal commercial relations', it was argued by officials in Whitlam's administration that Australia's policies against apartheid were 'in advance of most, if not all, other Western countries'. White Rhodesia was uniquely the subject of a UN trade embargo and Commonwealth sanctions, but it was the only country with which Australia refused to trade. Regrettably, Keith Sutter wrote later, 'no Australian government' has ever seriously contemplated a comprehensive economic boycott of South Africa: 'all have lived with the contradiction of opposing politically and socially a nation with which they are willing to trade'.[46] Richard Higgott's bitter assessment of Whitlam's policies was peppered with a cynicism widely shared. 'The government's very public 'abhorrence of apartheid and condemnation of white minority regimes', he wrote, 'went hand-in-hand with continuingly strong economic links', 'token support for the liberation movements', and a refusal to introduce the legislation necessary to enforce UN resolutions on Rhodesia or sanctions on South Africa. The 'general principles' that governed economic relations under Labor were to continue virtually unchanged after 1975 under Coalition governments.[47]

During the Whitlam years, as before, policy changes were moderate, broadly in keeping with public opinion on most issues.[48] In South Africa, Vorster dismissed the ostensibly hostile Whitlam era as no more than 'a bad memory'. Australia, like its Western allies generally, did little to undermine the foundations of apartheid, but bilaterally the consequences of Australia's actions were more far reaching. They marked the abrupt end of what ambassador Moodie and others described as the 'special relationship', and helped greatly to distance Australia from identification with the apartheid state.[49]

After 1975 the Coalition government led by prime minister Malcolm Fraser, with Andrew Peacock as minister for foreign affairs, gave greater weight to combined Commonwealth initiatives through CHOGM, actively promoting the Gleneagles agreement forged in London in 1977 and contributing at Lusaka in 1979 to an eventual settlement of the Southern Rhodesia issue. At the same time the Fraser government adhered broadly to the firm, if pragmatic, position on sanctions and sport adopted by Whitlam. Addressing the legacies of the Whitlam era, Higgott, Millar and others have commented that

foreign policy successes of Fraser were based on groundwork laid for him by Whitlam. Goldsworthy has observed that 'far from reverting to pre-Whitlam attitudes, Mr Fraser took a considerable interest in Africa and proved to be very much a liberal on the key questions'. Like Whitlam, Fraser spoke forcefully against the deplorable racial violence that sustained undemocratic minority rule in South Africa. Speaking at the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid in Lagos in 1977, Peacock outlined policies that had become bipartisan orthodoxy. Visas were denied visiting teams and individuals representing South Africa; trade continued unabated despite limited sanctions; Bantustans were condemned as a repressive extension of segregation. Peacock repeated an opinion that was by then widely held. His strident words were a measure of Australia's now liberal international posture against racism. He told an audience in Nigeria that apartheid was 'an unjustifiable and repugnant system': an 'affront to human dignity' and democratic principle that was built on 'fraudulent' arguments, repression and denial of political rights to the 'large majority of South Africans'. But the Campaign Against Racial Exploitation, CARE, complained that words defending the Fraser government's policies were 'utterly empty', for they carried 'no promise of action'. Continuing ties with Pretoria smacked of 'blatant hypocrisy'. In defiance of the UN, Australia continued to trade with white South Africa; the Rhodesian Information Centre continued to operate in Sydney; formal diplomatic ties went virtually unchanged; 'rebel' white South African cricketers were allowed to visit and play in Australia; and pro-apartheid racist propaganda continued to be distributed through the South African Embassy to schools, community groups and media outlets. The contests over apartheid remained, in part, a struggle over information and propaganda.[50] Nonetheless, the gaps between political rhetoric and government initiative reduced dramatically after 1972, and during the administrations of Fraser and his successor Hawke they narrowed further.

Erasing 'White Australia'

Whitlam's precipitous action on sport resuscitated accusations from Pretoria of white Australia's 'hypocrisy', but domestic reform under Labor openly addressed this charge. Diplomats attempted, in ambassador Moodie's words, 'to demonstrate, regularly and publicly to African and Asian countries that we are with them in the struggle' against racism. Whitlam spoke proudly of the 'major changes' his government would pursue. Action against apartheid was but one arm of a much wider strategy. As Whitlam advised Moodie, the nation's integrity depended ultimately on reforms in immigration law and Indigenous affairs.[51]

Cautious immigration reform and significant constitutional change had in the 1960s begun the retreat from a white Australia. These reflected broad, if uneven, ideological shifts on questions of race and racism, political rights and democratic practice. And as we have seen, domestic political contests over apartheid, Indigenous rights, and immigration were themselves important agents of change—both symbolic and practical.

The acceptance of cultural pluralism and its formal political reflection, multiculturalism, developed symbiotically with pressures to end discriminatory immigration practices. During 1965–67 references to white Australia were removed from the policy platform of the ALP. In 1971, the minister for immigration in the McMahon's administration, Phillip Lynch, foreshadowed a nation more accepting of cultural diversity. 'The earlier desire to make stereotype Australians of the newcomers has been cast aside', he proclaimed: The 'use of the word "integration" instead of "assimilation" is not mere semantics—it is the outward sign of a fundamental change of attitude of the Australian government and people'.[52] But if a more open society was foreshadowed during the final years of Coalition government, until the early 1970s change had been hesitant; attitudes fairly rigid; and political action uncertain, restrained by the enduring legislative legacies and racial assumptions embedded in a putatively white Australia.

Like engagement with Asia, progress towards multiculturalism was arguably less a reflection of anti-racism than it was a vehicle for advancing the nation's image and interests. Australia's prejudiced reputation had

to be mended by deeds, as well as in words. Immigration reform under prime minister Holt in 1966 allowed a small number of non-Europeans to enter Australia permanently. More liberal policies were introduced carefully; possible long-term effects were understated. The 'primary aim' of policy was always cautious, designed to retain a 'generally integrated and predominantly homogenous population'. The annual intake of 'non-Europeans', usually classified as people of 'mixed race', hovered around 6,000 per year. Until the 1970s, as Tony Palfreeman noted, 'there was very little indication that any of the major parties wanted to do any more than open a tiny crack in the barrier to permanent non-European entry'.[53]

Labor's 1971 election campaign committed it to 'the avoidance of discrimination on any grounds of race, or colour of skin or nationality'. Under Whitlam, basic criteria for entry included acceptable 'standards of living', 'traditions' or 'cultures', and 'integrative capacity'. Distasteful references to 'assimilation' and 'race' were removed from statutes. Diversity and integration were now the welcome results of immigration openness and disavowal of discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds. From 1973 all residents, regardless of country of origin, were eligible for citizenship after three years. More importantly, overseas posts were instructed that race must be totally disregarded in selecting suitable migrants. Reforms ostensibly removed practices that favoured European or British applicants. By early 1975, immigration officers could grant non-Europeans permanent entry without case by case approval from Canberra. However, change came slowly. The number of settlers arriving from Europe remained 'very much larger' than from non-European countries. A decade after the Whitlam reforms the national census indicated that people of non-European background, including people of Aboriginal ancestry, comprised less than 6% of Australia's population.[54]

Changes to immigrant reception policy complemented more liberal entry criteria. *A Multicultural Society for the Future*, a book published in 1973 by the minister for immigration, A.J. (Al) Grassby, anticipated fundamental change built on a formal acceptance of 'ethnic' pluralism. Assimilation was rejected. A wealth of initiatives to foster cultural diversity and social harmony were developed as part of an official policy of multiculturalism. An office of community relations was created and ground-breaking anti-

discrimination legislation gained parliamentary approval. In the following decades the purposeful celebration of a successful multicultural society gradually overrode difficult narratives of a nation built on homogeneity and whiteness. (In 2018 the Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull deflected criticism of his government's treatment of asylum seekers by repeating a familiar, congratulatory claim: Australia is, he told the media, '*the* most successful multicultural society'.)[55]

In the months before he won office, Whitlam visited the Aboriginal Tent Embassy on the lawns of parliament house. He promised protesters that if elected he would 'absolutely reverse' existing policies on land rights and permit 'ownership of land by tribal communities'. He foreshadowed 'native title' and civil rights legislation that would override discriminatory state and territory laws.[56] In response, the minister for Aboriginal affairs in the McMahon government, Peter Howson, claimed that freehold ownership of land was 'alien to Aboriginal thought and custom'. Nonetheless, the Coalition had permitted the Yirrkala people to acquire pastoral leases over small parcels of land at Wattie Creek (Daguragu) in the Northern Territory. McMahon was adamant that this did not constitute a precedent and certainly did not constitute recognition of land rights based on traditional ownership. Nor did it imply any rights to compensation for dispossession.[57] Yet in the final months of McMahon's faltering administration, a Commonwealth department of Aboriginal Affairs was established. Hesitantly, policies of 'protection' were displaced by limited recognition of the right to self-determination. Federal legislation anticipating more substantial rights to maintain Indigenous cultures and languages, and to protect and manage natural resources on Aboriginal land, were anticipated. Assimilation policy was challenged but not yet formally discarded.

In sharp contrast to the Coalition's ambivalence, Whitlam's 1972 campaign speech committed a Labor government to 'legislate to give Aborigines land rights—not just because the case is beyond argument, but because all of us as Australians are diminished while the Aborigines are denied their rightful place in this nation'. Past injustices should arouse in all Australians an 'unrelenting', 'deep determined anger', he stated. In power, Whitlam and his Aboriginal affairs minister, Gordon Bryant,

sought to advance self-determination. Labor announced that it would 'not make decisions on behalf of Aborigines': paternalism would end. Whitlam immediately upgraded the office of Aboriginal Affairs to the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, the DAA, insisting that self-determination would govern policy-making and that discrimination in state jurisdictions must end. All states, except Queensland, transferred responsibility for Aboriginal policy and administration to the new department. Although legislative achievement fell short of policy ambition, some commentators later suggested that the removal of Aboriginal affairs from state jurisdictions constituted 'one of the most revolutionary' changes ever adopted by an Australian government.[58]

Establishing the DAA was perhaps the most important measure in a wider cluster of initiatives at national, state and community levels. A National Aboriginal Consultative Committee was set up. Although an advisory body, all members were elected by Indigenous communities. Federal Aboriginal policy sought improved medical services and education, while community controlled health and legal services were established in some cities. Migration law requiring Indigenous people to apply for special permission to leave Australia was abolished. The Aboriginal Land Fund Commission was established with authority to buy land for Indigenous communities. In New South Wales, an Aboriginal Land Trust was granted freehold title to former Aboriginal reserves. The Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, known as the Woodward Royal Commission, was established. Its reports to the federal government outlined a basis for land rights and community control of mining on Aboriginal land. Principles outlined by Justice Woodward had a lasting influence on Indigenous struggle. He stated unequivocally that Australia was occupied without consent or compensation, and land rights legislation should be enacted to ensure long overdue restorative justice.[59]

On 11 June 1975 the Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act came into force. This legislation made racial discrimination unlawful. It conferred full equality under the law for all citizens, regardless of background. Importantly, given the variability of state and territory laws, it bound all jurisdictions to terms of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and anticipated

ratification of this convention a few months later, on 31 October. It greatly qualified resort to principles of sovereignty and non-interference to defend domestic practices from international sanction. It permitted the external affairs power contained in Section 51 of the Australian Constitution to override any conflicting or inconsistent territory or state law. (Challenges to the constitutional validity of the Act, mounted by the Bjelke-Petersen government in Queensland in 1982, and in *Queensland v. Mabo* in 1988, failed.) With passage of the Racial Discrimination Act, Australia's white walls were demonstrably broken. Mark Lopez has commented accurately that it 'had the effect of providing a legislative underpinning for the multicultural society' and the pursuit of Indigenous equality. The Racial Discrimination Act also had less tangible consequences. As Tony Palfreeman and other commentators have suggested, its introduction, along with more relaxed immigration laws, reflected Whitlam's determination to 'to kill' the 'image' of 'a white Australia'. 'Ultimately', Sean Brawley has written, foreign policy considerations 'forced consecutive Australian governments to act—first to attempt to disguise and later to abolish this policy of racial discrimination'.[60]

Emblematic of wider cultural shifts, Harold Thomas designed an Aboriginal Flag which flew proudly over the Tent Embassy in Canberra. It became an enduring rallying point of protest after 1972, dramatically symbolising prior Indigenous ownership of the vast continent. Also symbolic were media images of prime minister Whitlam acknowledging traditional rights to land by pouring sand through the fingers of Aboriginal elder Vincent Lingiari, when visiting Gurindji country in the Northern Territory on 16 August 1975. Whitlam famously stated that the 'deeds' handed to Lingiari were 'proof in Australian law that these lands belong to the Gurindji people'. Interpreted as anticipating wider land rights for Indigenous people, in reality Whitlam's gesture marked the start of a long and difficult negotiation between white Australia and its original owners. Reflecting on the significance of this defining moment, academic and commentator Elizabeth Farrelly observed that the Gurindji people had in fact received only a fraction of their rightful claim to Wave Hill station (now Daguragu); and it was 'no more' than 'a lease'. Shortly afterwards, in October, the first Commonwealth land rights legislation, the Aboriginal

Land (Northern Territory) Bill was introduced in parliament. Passed subsequently by the Fraser government it made possible the grant of crown land to Indigenous communities, provided they could demonstrate traditional connection to that country.[61] The long struggle for land rights was being recognised as the ALP's brief period in power came to an end.

Systemic racialised disadvantage persisted. Discredited references to race remained in the Constitution, while demands for amendments recognising original ownership went largely unheeded. In sentiment shared in much of mainstream Australia, Farrelly mused forty years after Whitlam lost office that 'progress' on Indigenous affairs 'has been glacial to the point of retrograde'; 'that's what saddened me; that Gough could change so much and yet change, in fact, so little'. Influential Aboriginal leader Noel Pearson was more forgiving of 'Australia's greatest white elder and friend', stating that Whitlam 'gave a charter of unfinished business for all Australians and our politicians: It remains salutary today'. The National Congress of First Peoples was also generous in its praise. 'Though labelled controversial,' it observed, prime minister Whitlam 'brought Australia into the modern world by reforming many policies and laws that had lingered from the British colonial past'.[62]

The formal demise of white Australia was at the centre of a much broader cultural transformation. As journalist Mark Kenny observed, the strident actions of the Whitlam government constituted 'a leap from a timid, often literalist Anglo-Celtic inwardness to something risky, more modern and, eventually, more alive'.[63] Labor initiatives touched virtually every aspect of Australian life. Universal health insurance, dramatic education reforms, human rights legislation, environmental and heritage protections, electoral reforms, equal pay for women, promotion of the arts, and an assault on racism were weighty markers of domestic change. Non-discriminatory borders encouraged a formal legislative program supporting multiculturalism. Integration, not assimilation, guided migrant reception and Indigenous social policy. An insular, monochrome, putatively white nation was gradually transformed by greater openness and accelerating diversity. Racial discrimination was formally rejected, although, of course, endemic racism endured. Traditionalists resisted Whitlam's cultural initiatives,

just as conservatives disliked his independent signature on foreign policy. The level of their disquiet was an ironic measure of the transformative change wrought by Whitlam's short-lived administrations.

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'On the question of race and Southern Africa, the West has a special responsibility', the special UN Committee on Apartheid bemoaned in 1975, 'because so far it has stood squarely on the side of white domination'. This criticism applied in equal measure to Australia and its allies. Beyond the largely symbolic arenas of sport and the UN, bilateral engagement with South Africa was always sensitive to the play of national interests; to the need to avoid unnecessary harm to a multi-layered economic and strategic relationship. The Labor government was ultimately obliged to concede that it had 'little prospect of influencing South Africa by a policy of frontal attack unless' it was 'joined by states on which South Africa is heavily dependent', most notably its powerful Cold War allies. Realistically it accepted that neither Washington nor Westminster would sever security ties with Pretoria.[64] And, equally, it was aware that as the threat of isolation grew, so too did white South Africa's resolve and military preparedness.

Intransigence, not reform, marked white South Africa's responses to international actions against it. In the absence of enforceable sanctions regimes—economic and military—external pressure was ineffectual. The UN special committee continued to deplore the fact that countries with significant links to South Africa inevitably worked to preserve the status quo on apartheid. 'Western economic, political and military support for the Pretoria regime only gives it more confidence to persist in its aggressive posture towards neighbouring African countries', it complained shortly after Labor was voted out of office. 'And, at the same time', the committee emphasised, Western backing greatly strengthens Pretoria's capacity to retain, unchanged, 'the policy of apartheid internally'.[65] Despite the Whitlam government's generally encouraging support for decolonisation and overt criticism of apartheid, it could not fully escape this bitter judgement.

From the early 1970s the legislative architecture of White Australia was finally dismantled. The rigidities of the Menzies era were gradually displaced by a more open nation: by a country more diverse and more at

ease both in its region and globally. Paul Keating has commented that 'there was an Australia before Whitlam and there was a different Australia after Whitlam'. The achievements of the Whitlam administration were both real and symbolic. Historian Geoffrey Bolton saw them as 'a shining aberration'; contradictions in an essentially conservative nation.[66] Whitlam could claim with some justification that the early 1970s had witnessed 'the withering away of xenophobia, isolation and racism' as Australia's long overdue international realignment gained momentum. The South Africa specialist T.B. Millar, professor of international relations at the Australian National University, told an audience in Johannesburg a decade after Whitlam was dismissed: 'there are still racist or racialist-minded Australians; but in the law and in much of the practice of it race is not a factor; Australian society has undergone a revolution'.[67] In contrast, white South Africa had followed a very different trajectory. As anti-apartheid leader and South African émigré' Neville Curtis observed in 1974, 'conditions in South Africa are getting worse and not better'. The republic remained locked in the grip of revolutionary conflicts far more fundamental than the political contests that anticipated a multicultural future in a once defiantly 'white' Australia'.[68]

Epilogue

The past is never dead. It's not even past.[1]

William Faulkner, 1951

'If European imperialism intensified and to some extent actually created the problem of race relations, it also provided its own solution', H.V. Hodson wrote astutely in *International Affairs* shortly after the World War II: 'The solution was white or European supremacy … This system, of course, bore the seeds of its own defeat.'[2] Harold Macmillan's Wind of Change warning to South Africa's white parliament a decade later echoed Hodson's insights. In the aftermath of world war, the politics of race, both globally and domestically, reached unprecedented levels of crisis and uncertainty. Newly independent states in Asia and Africa constituted a 'rising tide of colour' that anticipated a fundamental re-balancing of an international system built overwhelmingly on European and American power. It also anticipated movement for civil rights and political equality within the outposts of Empire.

'Racial' policies were 'a negation of everything every civilised government should stand for', India's prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed shortly after the Sharpeville massacre: they were matters that 'affected not merely Africans but people all over the world'.[3] But as the struggles over Apartheid so disturbingly revealed, equal rights were not easily won. Systems of white supremacy, and the racialised privileges they reflected, were deeply entrenched. As international pressures against colonialism and its divisive legacies intensified, the apartheid regime erected even stronger protective walls. Post-war Australia, too, remained deeply anchored to its racialised past. Gradually it responded to the mounting international pressures against discriminatory white

privilege—although, as is evident throughout this study, it did so in ways very different from South Africa.

The shadows cast by apartheid and the incessant international assault against colonialism and racism were powerful if unexpected catalysts for change in white Australia across a generation after the war. Similarities in the patterns and extremes of discrimination in the 'Sisters of the South' were widely assumed—and increasingly condemned. Australia's image and reputation were clouded by its unique bilateral friendship with the apartheid state: its foreign policy aspirations were confounded; its sense of nation compromised.

As immigration restrictions were gradually dismantled and formal Indigenous equality won in Australia, apartheid in South Africa remained a persistent, unwanted and uncomfortable reminder of Anglo-Australia's own racialised past and discriminatory present. Contests linked to apartheid revealed and encouraged competing narratives of nation and citizenship. Ideas of race and nation, of race as nation, were fractured as Australia re-evaluated its awkward relationships with the apartheid state and confronted the difficult consequences of its identity as a white nation.

As links with the United Kingdom weakened and Europe's Empires were overturned, Australia searched anxiously for new friends and regional partners. The racism that stained its reputation had to be rejected if it was to negotiate its place successfully in a post-colonial world.

While the international movement against racism itself did little to hasten the end of apartheid in South Africa,[4] it had dramatic implications for white Australia, disrupting assimilation practices and encouraging constitutional reforms that belatedly granted Indigenous people political equality under federal law. The assault on white supremacy quickened acceptance of multiculturalism as social policy and encouraged efforts to dismantle the discriminatory walls that had since Federation symbolised the nation.

White Australia adapted pragmatically to the wind of change blowing against colonialism and racism. White South Africa obstinately pursued a different route. There, a rigid minority government was essentially unmoved by decades of challenge from a vigorous transnational anti-apartheid movement, and concerted international pressure. African

resistance—symbolised most dramatically by the jailing of Nelson Mandela, the unflinching actions of ANC and the Soweto Uprising—ruptured the political surface of the state, exciting mass protest at home and powerful expressions of solidarity from abroad. But as confrontation widened, the resolve of the white government hardened. Repression intensified.

The currents of anti-racism that assaulted the apartheid regime brought no significant relaxation of racial oppression, even in the narrow field of sport, but from the first months of student protest in Soweto in the mid-1970s the political foundations of white rule were shaken, permanently. Although the collapse of apartheid in the late 1980s lies outside the scope of this study, it is implied throughout that widespread political pressures from the ANC and other nationalist liberation forces destabilised the minority regime, but *realpolitik* ensured its survival. Only when, unexpectedly, Cold War tensions thawed and the Berlin Wall fell was South Africa isolated, systemic white supremacy dismantled and minority rule ended.

'I don't moralise about South African policy', Menzies wrote. 'My view of apartheid is "pragmatic". All I say is that I don't think it will work.'[5] After Sharpeville, at least, a growing number of Australians rejected Menzies' moral ambivalence and refusal to act against apartheid. They accepted that ethical compromises over racism clouded their nation's reputation and identity and must end. Whitlam captured this concern, asserting that that 'fear, prejudice, conformity' should no longer define the nation.[6] Post-war Australia remained, as Indigenous elder Lyall Munro lamented, 'just a stepping stone away from apartheid'.[7] Ultimately, the ideas and policies that sustained white Australia were undermined by a combination of moral opprobrium and political pragmatism: by a recognition that if the nation was to redefine its place in the world it must distance itself from the shunned apartheid regime and reject the racism it symbolised.

In the seminal *Mabo* land rights decision of 1992, High Court Justice Gerard Brennan wrote that a European Australia had not yet openly addressed 'a national legacy of unutterable shame'. The Stolen Generations report made a similarly troubling claim, although it emphasised institutionalised disadvantage and discrimination rather than

the unspeakable consequences of dispossession and conquest. The formal dismantling of White Australia was arguably the most critical step in the redefinition of the Australian nation after Federation. During 1962–75 incremental reform had largely removed the legislative apparatus that institutionalised racial discrimination. The nation was formally redefined as tolerant open and diverse. But, as Justice Brennan observed, political reform did not end the racialised inequalities that relentlessly followed the spread of Europe's Empires, dispossession and settler colonialism. Nor did legislative change in post-war Australia quickly erode the deeply embedded ideas about race that had for so long abetted and rationalised white privilege, racial exclusion and demands for social homogeneity. Bitter residues of racism continued to confound the definition of the nation as truly democratic.

Notes

Introduction

1 Hodson, 'Race Relations …', p. 308.

2 RT Foster, 'Apartheid is popular but …', *SMH*, 27/9/1952.

3 Thorne, *Allies of a Kind …*, pp. 7–13, 42; *The Issue of War …*, pp. 27–32; Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line …*, pp. xii, 3.

4 Soper, *Racism—A World Issue,* generally.

5 Hudson, *Australia and the Colonial Question …*, p. 54.

6 Said, *Culture and …*, p. 341.

7 Lowe, *Menzies and …*, p. 108, n. 34.

8 Said, *Culture and …*, pp. xii–xiv, 230–315.

9 Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes …*, p. 226.

10 Hodson, 'Race Relations …', p. 308.

11 Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies ….*, especially pp. 3–10.

12 Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America,* pp. 53–75; Wolpe, 'The Theory of Internal Colonialism …', pp. 249–52; Roger Bell, *Multicultural Societies …*, especially pp. 15–24; Said, *Culture and …*, especially pp. 1–72. Blauner's thesis has been widely deployed by historians and social scientists. Since the civil rights movement in 1960's America, paradigms drawing on the study of colonialism have infused virtually all studies of racial oppression and inequality. However, ideas of 'race' have undergone radical scholarly revision (even if in public discourse they have changed very slowly). Jennifer Clark's pioneering study of *Aborigines and Activism* and the *Coming of the Sixties to Australia* embraces Blauner's 'language of colonialism' (pp. 2–4). Even more recently Jim Davidson, writing of relations between the 'Sisters of the South', stated simply that in Australia, at least, Indigenous people 'are still experiencing colonialism'. See Davidson, 'Not Just "Sisters of the South" …', p. 14.

13 Cited by Legum, 'Colour and Power …', p. 209.

14 Tothill, 'Trying to sell apartheid …', p. 145.

15 UNESCO, 'Apartheid in Operation', in UNESCO, *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa* (Paris 1974), especially pp. 45–76.

16 King, 1965, in Bernice King, 'Nonviolence: a Valid Weapon Against Apartheid', in '*Sanctions against Apartheid*: record of the special meeting of

the general assembly for the International Year of Mobilisation for Sanctions against South Africa …', UN Special Committee on Apartheid, [1978], p. 26.

17 Australia Department of Immigration and Border Protection, website 2014, fact sheet 8.

18 McQueen, *A New Britannia*, generally.

19 Russell Ward, *The History …*, pp. 51–2; Indian HC, Canberra, Report 1951, cited in Meadows, '"He no doubt felt insulted" …,' p. 91. Casey in *SMH*, 26/11/1949; see also *Australian*, 2/1/1988 (cites Cabinet papers from 1950).

20 Coleman, *The Observer*, 13/6/1959, 2:12, pp. 361–63, 25/7/1959, 2:15, p. 475, and 27/6/1959, 2:13, p. 411; Beazley (Sr.), *Canberra Times*, 26/10/60; *Hansard* (HR), 25/10/1960; *Bringing Them Home*, Ibid.; Kath Walker (Oodgeroo Noonuccal), *We Are Going: Poems*, p. 16.

21 Bringing Them Home. Report … 1997, National Overview, chapter 2, especially pp. 33–5; Walker, *We Are Going*, p. 16; Note: It would be misleading to interpret the Stolen Generations Report as a comprehensive historical record of Indigenous Australia, or Australians, in the 20th century. The recent works of a number of scholars, not least Rowse and Attwood, provide nuanced correctives to the necessarily narrow *Report*'s emphasis on the brutal and often debilitating legacies of systemic discrimination and disadvantage. Rowse, *Indigenous and Other Australians* for example, subtly explores—and critiques—the way some post-war scholars and newspapers routinely characterised Indigenous Australians 'as habitually invisible as people with a potential for corrective action'; as a people who adopted a 'mask of apathy' and lacked 'fixed centres of political organization or potential resistance' (especially pp. 66–8). The question of Indigenous agency and local political initiative is discussed in relation to claims by Clark and others in chapter 8 of this study where I explore movement against apartheid and Indigenous struggle as 'complimentary', and linked, political 'contests'.

22 Grant, Stan, *Talking to My Country*, pp. 2–6.

23 Menzies, June 1949, in Joske, *Sir Robert Menzies …*, pp. 172–3. Grant, *Talking to My Country*, pp. 2–5, 29–53. Assimilation policy and the quest for an 'homogenous' nation are discussed in chapter 7, 'Parallel [with] Apartheid'.

24 King, *Race, Culture and …*, pp. 1–2.

25 Montague, *Man's Most Dangerous Myth …*. Montague's then controversial assertion of the fallacy of 'race' was first published 'when Nazism flourished; when African-Americans sat at the back of the bus; and when race was considered a determinant of people's character and intelligence'. Publisher's summary, p. 3 of 1974 edition.

26 King, *Race, Culture and …*, pp. 1–4.

27 Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man*. In his very recent book *A Brief History of Everyone Who Ever Lived—Stories in Our Genes*, Adam Rutherford, concludes that modern genetics, most prominently the Human Genome Project, has not altered the claim of 'race' as myth. '"Black" is no more a race than "long distance runner is"', he writes. Rutherford, *A Brief History*

…, p. 267. See also Bell, Philip, 'The Limits of Semiotics—Epistemology and the Concept of "Race" …', pp. 51–66.

28 Philip, Bell, 'Race, Ethnicity …', pp. 26–31. See also, his 'The Limits of Semiotics …', especially pp. 51–9.

29 Robert Redfield, 'Race and Human Nature', cited Soper, *Racism* …, Introduction.

30 Shils, 'Color, the Universal …', p. 1.

31 Banton, *Race Relations*, p. 3. Recent argument overwhelmingly accepts this premise: See for example Ta-Nehisi Coates, *Between the World and Me*, generally, especially p. 105.

32 Coates*, Between the World …*, pp. 7–8, 55–7, 149.

33 Isaacs, 'Group. Identity and Political Change' …, p. 76.

34 see generally, Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk*.

35 Marx*, Making Race and Nation …*, p. xii.

36 *Die Transvaler* [1965], cited *Canberra Times*, 'Dark Cloud Over South African Sport', 5/2/1966.

37 Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line …*, especially pp. 2–9. This pioneering work integrates studies of 'race' as ideology into a fresh transnational perspective. Lake's subtle understanding of the invention of 'whiteness' can be found also in ''The Discovery of Personal Whiteness …', pp. 320–7. For an informed consideration of 'assimilation' 'whiteness' and 'nation' see Russell McGregor, 'Making One People …', pp. 71–9.

38 Kolchin, 'Comparing American History', p. 65.

39 Yudelman, The Emergence …, in Dollery, 'Economic Sanctions …', p. 49; John Nieuwenhuysen and David Dunstan eds., Southern Worlds …, generally; Jim Davidson, 'Sisters of the South: South African Connections and Comparisons' …and '"Same Difference": Australia and South Africa'; see also, note 25 below.

40 Malan to Menzies, [n.d.]1953 in Meadows, 'He no doubt felt insulted …', p. 95. *Times* (London), 11/7/1953; *Herald* (Melbourne), 13/7/1953.

41 T. Godfrey-Smith lr., *Canberra Times*, 18/7/1963.

42 Throughout this study I acknowledge—and reference—important scholarship. that qualifies this perhaps ungenerous historiographical claim. Various aspects of domestic race-politics and changing ideas about race and rights are explored through an international or trans-national lens in the diverse works of a number of scholars, most significantly Jennifer Clark, John Chesterman, Matthew Jordan, Sue Taffe, Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Peter Limb, and Sean Brawley. An important collection of essays, *Southern Worlds: South Africa and Australia Compared*, edited by John Nieuwenhuysen and David Dunstan (Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2010), does not explore in detail the issues at the centre of my study. However, the contributions of Jim Davidson, Norman Etherington, Marilyn Lake, Anna Clark and Bruce Murray, especially, raise important historical questions about trans-national and bilateral relationships and

comparative study of the so-called 'white' countries.

43 The burgeoning historiography of 'whiteness' is explored by Jane Carey and Clair McLisky in their sophisticated exploration 'Creating White Australia …', Introduction, pp. ix–xxiii; see also note 39.

44 De Costa, *Indigenous Transnationalism*, pp. 2–15; Gurtov, *Global Politics …,* especially pp. 6–11.

Part I

1 Menzies, June 1949, in Joske, *Robert Menzies…*, pp. 172–3.

2 Davies, *Europe…*, p. 1068; Australia, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Fact Sheet 8, 'Abolition of the "White Australia Policy"', p. 2.

3 Churchill, US State Dept, cited Thorne, *Allies of a Kind…*, pp. 7–9; Also, Weston, *Racism in…*, pp. 3–5.

4 Tothill, 'Menzies and South Africa', p. 24; *SMH*, 22/5/1959.

Chapter 1

5 *West Australian*, 23/11/1950.

6 R.T. Foster, 'Apartheid is popular', *SMH*, 27/9/1952.

7 *Northern Times*, 28/10/1948.

8 *West Australian*, 1/10/1952.

9 R.T. Foster, 'S. Africa's Problem of "We" and "They"', *SMH*, 25/9/1952, p. 2; 'Segregation Policy', *Townsville Daily Bulletin*, 25/1/51, p. 7.

10 Ballinger, 'South Africa: A Problem…', pp. 15–28. Ballinger was a member of the South African Parliament, 1937–60 'representing the natives of the East Cape'. Compare 'Grim Trend in South Africa's Race Unrest' [n.a.] *SMH*, 15/11/1952.

11 'That "White Australia" Slogan: picturesque phrase, but popular misnomer', NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1; Joske, Robert Menzies, pp. 171–2, 310–11. Also, notes 22 and 30 below.

12 Foster in *SMH,* 25/9/1952 and 'Apartheid is popular but…', *SMH*, 27/9/1952 Compare Frederick Alexander's articles, especially, 'South Africa's perplexing pattern of racial antagonism', *SMH*, 20/2/1951. See generally Peter Limb's perceptive article on Alexander, 'An Australian Historian at the Dawn of Apartheid …'

13 'Master race creed', by 'A Staff Reporter', *SMH*, 27/3/1952; Douglas Wilkie 'As I See It', *Adelaide Advertiser*, 30/5/1950.

14 *SMH*, 16/5/1949. A series of extensive articles by the distinguished professor of History was published in the *SMH* and other major newspapers from December 1949. Alexander's article in the *West Australian* 22/4/1950 made brief reference to Nazi Germany but evaded any reference to race politics or racist ideology.

15 Cyrus Townsend Brady Jr, *Africa*, pp. 3, 11, 13.

16 Bean, 'Hatred Between Races', *SMH*, 3/5/1952.

17 Ibid. Also, Foster's numerous articles, *SMH*, 20/9/1952; 25/9/1952; 27/9/1952. Reports from Foster and Alexander were widely read.

18 In Joske, *Menzies…*, pp. 172–3.

19 Strydom in *Argus* (Cape), 22/1/1951.

20 *Argus* (Cape), 22/1/1951.

21 Joske, *Menzies…*, pp. 171–3.

22 Andrews, 'New Guinea and Papua', pp. 338–9.

23 MacCrone, *Race and Reason* …, pp. 3, 309–10. MacCrone's book is a critique of the idea of race as identifiable physical group difference. Published in 1945 its scholarly arguments contradicted popular European opinion especially in settler-colonies and the United States.

24 '50% Aboriginal blood' was used to categorise people as Aborigines under Australia law until 1965.

25 *West Australian,* 23/11/1950; *Townsville Daily Bulletin*, 25/1/1951; *SMH*, 25/9/1952, 27/9/1952; *Argus* (Cape), 8/1/1951; *Die Burger,* 91/1952, in Tothill, 'White Man's …', p. 191.

26 *West Australian,* 2/10/1952; *SMH*, 18/9/1952.

27 *SMH*, 3/4/1952; *West Australian*, 23/11/1950; *Courier Mail*, 9/12/1952.

28 *SMH*, 27/9/1952.

29 McCall, *Blood and Race …,* pp. 10–11.

30 Foster, 'Fear is behind …', *SMH*, 1/10/1952.

31 'Racial Provocation in SA', [n.a.], *SMH*, 31/5/1951; Foster, 'South Africa's problem of 'We' and 'They', *SMH*, 25/9/1952; *SMH*, 15/11/1952 and 27/9/1952; *West Australian*, 2/10/1952; [Gilchrist, Acting HC] 'South Africa, Annual Report (1958)', 4/2/1959 NAA A1838, 201/10/6/pt 1.

32 Ibid.; *Townsville Daily Bulletin*, 25/1/1951; *SMH*, 20/4/1953.

33 Ballinger, 'South Africa: A Problem …', pp. 21–2.

34 Brown, *Against the World …*, pp. 202–3.

35 'Racial Feuds in a Prosperous Land: the South Africa Mr Menzies Will See', [n.a., probably Foster] *SMH*, 6/7/1953; *Argus* (Cape), 10/7/1953 editorial 'Friends and Foes'; Editorial 'Shadows Over South Africa', *SMH*, 12/8/1952; Foster, *SMH*, 27/9/1952.

36 Ross Dunn, 'Menzies says Australia could be like Apartheid', *Age*, 05/06/1991.

37 Guy Harriott, 'Question Mark over Africa', *SMH*, 8 May 1954, p. 11; Foster, 'Gateway to wealth, squalor…', *SMH*, 20/9/1952; Foster, *SMH*, 27/9/1952; 'Racial provocation in South Africa', *SMH*, 31/5/1951; *SMH*, 1/10/1952 and 2/10/1952.

38 Delaney, *Adelaide Advertiser*, 2/10/1952; also Andrews, 'New Guinea and Papua', pp. 338–9.

39 *West Australian*, 25/11/1954; *SMH*, 1/10/1952.

40 Fred Heselwood in *Courier Mail*, 9/12/1952; Douglas Wilkie, 'One Minute to Midnight', *SMH*, 3/4/1952.

41 *SMH*, 16/5/1949. Reporting these 'native riots' the *Herald*'s 'special correspondent' advised that 'the only sure way of solving' such conflict was for Pretoria to 'institute a complete ban on immigration from India'; in short, to follow the example of White Australia.

42 Brady, *Africa Astir*, p. ix.

43 *SMH*, 27/9/1952.

44 See Barbara Ward, 'Colour Bar Could End White Rule in Africa', *Courier Mail*, 12/9/1952.

45 *SMH*, 27/9/1952. Also *SMH*, 31/5/1952, 1/10/1952.

46 *SMH*, 15/11/1952; *SMH*, 16/5/1949.

47 MacCrone, *Race and Reason …*, pp. 3–5.

48 *SMH,* 25/9/1952.

49 Gillespie, 'Information … for the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit', 20/6/1953 and HC Pretoria to Minister Immigration, 20/3/1953, NAA A1838, 201/10/6/1 pt 1.

50 See for example, *Northern Times* (WA), 28/10/1948, or *SMH*, 18/9/1952.

51 *SMH,* 1/8/1952.

52 See for example, Alexander, 'South Africa's perplexing pattern of racial antagonisms', *SMH*, 20/2/1951; and Alexander, 'As a West Australian Sees South Africa', *West Australian*, 22/4/1950 and 3/5/1950; Foster, *SMH*, 25/9/1952 and *SMH*, 1/10/1952.

53 *SMH*, 'Racial provocation in South Africa', 31/5/1951.

54 *SMH,* 27/9/1952. Also *SMH*, 6/6/1953.

55 *SMH*, 1/19/1952.

56 In the 1960's civil rights issues in the US were also very heavily reported. Roger Bell '"Race"/Ethnicity: Cultural Difference', in Bell, *Australia and…*, pp. 207–32. Also, Jennifer Clark, *Aborigines and Activism …,* generally.

57 DEA 'Native Welfare Conference', Item 2 [n.d.] 1961 and Draft, 'Overseas Opinion on Aboriginal Welfare', [n.d., May 1961] no author [Gilchrist?], both in NAA A1838 557/2 pt 2.

58 Dept Immigration to HC Australia Pretoria, 29/3/1965 and HC Pretoria to Minister Immigration, 20/3/1953, NAA A1838, 201/10/6/1 pt 1.

59 Consular Circular No 103/59, 21/12/1959, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1.

60 Beazley, 28/4/1955, *Hansard*.

61 Alexander Downer 4/12/1959 and Calwell 11/11/1966, both in London, *Non-white Immigration…,* pp. 77–81, 98–102; *Hansard* (HR), 16/6/49; Cabinet submissions 1956–57, in Jordan, 'The Reappraisal…', pp. 235–8. Also, *Age*, 22/1/1959 and 23/1/1959; *SMH*, 22/1 1959.

62 See, for e.g., Brady, *Africa Astir* and for official 'myopia' see R.G. Casey to O.L. Davis, 29/5/1959, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1.

63 David Tothill, 'South African-Australian…', p. 36; Verwoerd, 'Appeasement or Co-existence' [March 1960], and Menzies, 'Apartheid', 6/5/1960, both in Menzies Papers, MS 4936, Box 422, Folder 9. See also Menzies, *Afternoon Light…,* p. 202.

64 Verwoerd, 'Appeasement or Co-existence', and Menzies, 'Apartheid'.

65 Menzies, *Hansard*, 11/4/1963. For a representative survey of ideas about Aborigines current from the 1930s to the 1970s, see Mitchell Rolls, *Australian Cultural History*, 28, 2–3, 2010, pp. 179–200.

66 Brett, 'Robert Menzies…', pp. 167–70. Russel Ward, *Concise History…*, pp. 298–9.

67 Tothill, 'Menzies and the South Africans', p. 24.

68 Hazlehurst, *Menzies Observed*, p. 366.

69 Martin letter to Tothill, 27/8/1995, in Tothill, 'South African-Australian…', p. 242.

70 Sauer, South African press telegram, 20/8/1952 in NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1.

71 Tothill, 'South African-Australian…,' p. 36 and Tothill, 'Early Australian South African …', p. 76.

72 Ibid.; Hudson, 'Australian diplomacy…', p. 165.

73 Ibid.; and *Die Transvaler,* 14/11/1957.

Chapter 2

1 Foster, 'South Africa's Dramatic Politics', *SMH*, 27/9/1952.

2 Menzies, *The Measure of the Years*, p. 279.

3 Tothill, 'South African-Australian…', p. 36. Also Tothill, 'Early Australian …', p. 76.

4 Ibid.

5 Casey, 'Australian Interests in South Africa', 22/5/1959 and O.L. Davis to Casey 4/8/1959, NAA A1838 NAA 201/10/6/1 pt 1; A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 1.

6 Ward, Casey cited in Philip Bell and Roger Bell, *Implicated …,* pp. 137–9. For a wider discussion, see also pp. 8–13, 134–55.

7 Lowe, *Menzies and the Great World Struggle*, pp. 7–8, 182–3; Philip Bell and Roger Bell, 'Cultural Shifts, Changing Relationships', pp. 283ff.; Bolton, *The Middle Way, 1942–1948*, pp. 119–230; Menzies in Benvenuti, *Anglo-Australian Relations …* p. 17.

8 Porter, John 'Will South Africa Go Fascist', *Nation* (SA), 28/5/1948, pp. 1–2; 'South African–Indian Relations', 25/6/1946, in Meadows, '"He no doubt felt insulted" …', pp. 87ff. …; Tothill, 'Menzies and the South Africans', pp. 26–4.

9 'For the Press: Appointment of Australian High Commissioners', 8/5/1946, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1pt.1. Tothill, 'Early Australian …', and Tothill, 'South African-Australian …, pp. 144–6, 262.

10 Menzies Papers, ms 4936, box 27, folder 'SA 1952'. Compare, 'Pretoria posting', 30/1/1952, NAA, A 1838/1, 1348/2; Hasluck in *Hansard*, 27/9/1950;

Hudson, 'Australian diplomacy and …', p. 170; Caute, *The Great Fear ...*

11 *The Statesman*, 24/2/1949 in Meadows, '"He no doubt felt insulted" …', p. 87.

12 Meadows, '"He no doubt felt insulted" …', pp. 87–91. See also Jordan, 'The Reappraisal of the White Australia …', pp. 231–3.

13 Crocker, in Meadows, '"He no doubt felt insulted" …', p. 94.

14 *West Australian*, 19/9/1953, 20/10/1953.

15 Memo for Sec. EA [n.d.]1950, NAA A1838 201/5/4 pt 10.

16 Gemmell, *The Politics of South African Cricket,* p. 121.

17 Ministerial Dispatches, 2/9/1952, 19/9/1952, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt.1. 'Welcome Bob' from *Cape Times,* 9/7/1953; Hodson, Ministerial Dispatch, 17/2/53, NAA 1838 1/6/8/4–3/4/3/8, and Hodson, 'Information for Prime Minister during forthcoming visit', 20/6/53 NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1.

18 Nauright, *Sport, Culture and …,* p. 37. *Courier Mail,* 15/7/1953; NAA Hodgson to Casey D 'Confidential' no. 4/53, 11/4/53 NAA A9421 224/1A; Cashman, *Australia's Role …,* p. 21.

19 Ibid.

20 'South Africa's fear of Indian penetration', *Adelaide Advertiser,* 18/7/1953; *Cape Times,* 10/71953.

21 Menzies Papers, ms 4936, box 339; *Times* (London), 11/7/1953; *Herald* (Melbourne), 13/7/1953.

22 Hodson to Casey, 4/8/1953, NAA 1838 201/10/10/3 pt 1.

23 'Alan Walker attacks PM on S Africa', *Courier Mail,* 15/7/1953.

24 High Commission, Pretoria, Despatch, 8/8/1950, NAA A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 1; Gilchrist, 'Australian Publicity in South Africa', 13/8/1957, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1; editorial, 'Sisters of the South', *Die Transvaler*, 14/11/1957.

25 Brawley, *Vigilant and Victorious …,* pp. 194–6.

26 Nauright, 'Reclaiming Old and Forgotten …', pp. 131–9. See generally Gemmell, *The Politics of South African Cricket* and Williams, *The Politics of Sport.*

27 HC to EA 8/8/1950, no. 13/50, NAA A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 2; Gilchrist, Memo, 'Australian Publicity in South Africa', 13/8/1957, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1; Editorial, *Die Transvaler*, 14/11/1957.

28 Gilchrist Memo [n.d.] [HG/ET], NAA A9421 224/2B. Also, Director News and Information Bureau, Dept Interior, to Gilchrist, 13/8/1957, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1.

29 MH Marshall, HC Pretoria, Dispatch, 8/8/1950 NAA A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 1; Gilchrist, 'Australian Publicity in South Africa', Memo, 13/8/1957 NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1; Editorial 'Sisters of the South', *Die Transvaler*, 14/11/1957.

30 'Ministers' Goodwill Flight to Australia', *Cape Argus*, [n.d.]/11/57.

31 Menzies Papers, ms 4936, box 27, folder 'SA 1952'. Compare, Marshall, 'recently returned from Pretoria', to Casey, 20/1/1952, NAA, A1838

A9421 224/2B. Tothill, cites SA officials 1957, 'South African–Australian Diplomatic …', pp. 174–9.

32 Marshall, Dispatch No.13/50, 8/8/1950, NAA A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 1; Gilchrist, 'Australian Publicity in South Africa', 13/8/1957, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1; Gilchrist to ET (Tange), [n.d.], NAA A1838 A9421 224/2B.

33 Tothill, 'South African–Australian Diplomatic …', especially pp. 178–9.

34 Gilchrist, 'Australian Publicity in South Africa', 13/8/1957, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1pt.1; Gilchrist to ET (Tange), NAA A1838 A9421 224/2B

35 It is now generally agreed that a generation of post-war bureaucrats in Canberra—rather than elected politicians—led immigration reform (and policy change in Indigenous affairs). See especially Sean Brawley, *The White Peril* … and Matthew Jordan, 'The Reappraisal of the White Australia Policy …', pp. 224–43.

36 Casey, Guidance Notes 'Australian Interests in South Africa', 22/5/1959, NAA A1838, 201/10/1 pt 2.

37 Ibid.; Barwick, Acting Minister EA, *Hansard,* 31/3/1960; Gilchrist, 13/8/1957, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1; Tothill, 'South African–Australian Diplomatic …', p. 36. See Graham, 'Cold War in Southern Africa', pp. 131–9 and generally Onslow ed., *Cold War in Southern Africa …*

38 Casey to Davis 29/5/1959, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1.

39 Tothill, 'Early Australian–South African …', pp. 75–6.

40 *SMH*, editorial, 22/5/1959.

41 Evatt, *Hansard*, 10/9/1957; *Cape Argus,* 23/11/1959. Limb, *A Shared History* …, especially pp. 14–15, 86. Limb's implied suggestion of distinct and strong ALP opposition to apartheid before the turning point of Sharpeville is less than convincing. The image 'Anyone Disobeying …' was adapted by the anti-apartheid movement as part of campaign material used internationally after the Sharpeville massacre.

42 Ibid.; Tothill, 'Trying to Sell Apartheid …', pp. 143—71; Gilchrist 'Living in South Africa', 11/4/1960, NAA A1838, 201/10/6/1 pt 1.

43 Gilchrist to Tange, 3/3/1959. Also, Gilchrist to Tange, 5/4/1957, NAA A1838 201/10/1 pt 2.

44 Goldsworthy, *Losing the Blanket* …, pp. 77–9.

45 *SMH*, Editorial 'School Lectures on Apartheid', 22/5/1959.

46 Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation* …, p. 23. Also, generally, Tom Lodge, *Sharpeville …*

47 *Canberra Times*, 24/3/1960.

48 *Sunday Telegraph,* 3/4/1960; *Canberra Times*, 24/3/1960 and 19/4/1960.

49 Menzies, *Afternoon Light* …, p. 202.

50 *Canberra Times*, 24/3/1960.

51 Greenwood, 'Australian Foreign Policy in Action', especially pp. 51–5; *Sunday Telegraph,* 3/4/1960; *Hansard*, 29/3/1960, 31/3/1960, 28/4/1960.

52 Hamilton to Jooste, 22/4/1960, in Tothill, 'Australians and South Africans', p. 242; *Canberra Times*, 4/4/1960.

53 E.g., *SMH*, 19/8/1952; *Canberra Times*, 19/4/1960, also Evatt in *Hansard* 10/9/1957; *Cape Argus*, 23/19/1959; Limb, *Shared History* …, pp. 14–15, 86.

54 Menzies, *Hansard*, 11/4/1963.

55 SA diplomat H.H. Woodward, quoted Tothill, 'White Man's Country …', p. 192.

56 *Sunday Telegraph*, 3/4/1960; *Hansard*, 29/3/1960, 31/3/1960, and 28/4/1960.

57 *Sunday Telegraph*, 3/4/1960.

58 Tothill, 'South African–Australian Diplomatic Relations …', pp. 36–8; Tothill, 'Early Australian–South African Connections', p. 76.

Chapter 3

1 Alexander, 'South Africa's perplexing pattern of racial antagonisms', *SMH,* 20/2/1951.

2 Grant, *Hansard* (Senate), 7/6/1955.

3 Gilchrist, 30/1/57, NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1. The progressive Gilchrist served as acting HC, South Africa, during 1957–59. His policy advice from Pretoria contrasted markedly with that of H.C. Hodgson (1952–57) and, later, ambassador Kevin (1962–68).

4 R.G. Neale, 'India', pp. 337–9.

5 Evatt, in Hudson, *Australia and the New World Order …,* pp. 114–15; Menzies Papers, ms 4936, box 27, folder, 'SA 1952'. Compare, M.H. Marshall, 'For the Secretary and the Minister', 30/1/1952, NAA A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 1.

6 Australian Delegation, UN to DEA, various cables, *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937–1949*, XVI, especially pp. 193–96; 202–7; NAA A1838, 201/10/11/3 pt 1; Ozgar, *Apartheid, the United Nations and …'*, pp. 3–11; Devereaux, *Australia and the Birth …*, pp. 15–19. Devereaux's comprehensive work is informed by exhaustive research and keen historical insights.

7 Ibid.; NAA A1838, 201/10/6/1 pt 1. In late 1960 the UN adopted a resolution that condemned 'all manifestations and practices of racial, religious and national hatred'. Related resolutions in the following months called for education against intolerance and the end of discriminatory laws and practices in all countries. Not until November 1963 did the General Assembly adopt a draft Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. Ratified two years later, it sought to oblige all signatories 'to undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms', and specifically condemned apartheid and racial segregation. In 1966 a comprehensive International Bill of Human Rights was approved. Its broad objectives found expression in three related documents—the UDHR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),

and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

8   Ibid.; Neale, 'India', p. 263.

9   Greenwood, 'Australian Foreign Policy in Action', p. 51; Also Hudson, *Australian Diplomacy* generally.

10 Ibid.; Neale, 'India', p. 263; See also Bridglal Pachai, *The South African Indian Question …,* pp. 184–271; Joan Battersby, 'New Zealand, Domestic Jurisdiction, and Apartheid …', pp. 101–17.

11 *Adelaide Advertiser*, 30/4/1950 and 23/11/1950; *West Australian*, 23/11/1950; *Townsville Daily Bulletin*, 25/1/1951.

12 *Argus*, 8/1/1952.

13 *Overseas Hindustan Times*, 2/10/1952 and 13/19/1952, in Neale, 'India', pp. 264–7.

14 *Argus*, 8/1/1952; *Riverine Grazier* (Hay, NSW), 21/11/1952, compare *Mercury* (Hobart), 5/11/1952; *SMH*, letters, 'Australian attitudes to apartheid', 29/10/1952.

15 Hudson, *Australian Diplomacy*, pp. 165–8.

16 *Mercury* (Hobart), 5/11/1952; *West Australian*, 1/11/1952, 2/12/1953.

17 See generally, Thompson, *US foreign policy …*, pp. 1–30.

18 *Mercury* (Hobart), 5/11/1952; *West Australian*, 1/11/1952, 2/12/1953; Thompson, ibid., p. 25.

19 Santa Cruz to Mission UN, 2/3/1954; Mission UN to EA 3/3 1954; KCO Shann (EA) to Mission UN, 17/3/1954; all in NAA A1838 201/10/6/1pt1.

20 J.D.L. Hood, 'Apartheid' statement to Special Committee UN, 4/4/1961, NAA A1838, 201/10/14; Limb, *A Shared History …*, p. 15; Menzies, *The Measure …*, p. 279.

21 Ozgur, *Apartheid …*, especially pp. xv–xvii, 159–62; *West Australian*, 2/12/1953; Hudson, 'Australian Diplomacy and …', pp. 167–73; Greenwood, 'Australian foreign policy in action', pp. 51–60; Whitlam, *Hansard*, 14/5/1959.

22 Greenwood, ibid., p. 5; 'Australian Foreign Policy in Action' …, p. 5; Limb, *A Shared History …*, p. 15; Menzies, *The Measure …*, p. 279.

23 Ozgur, *Apartheid …*, especially pp. xv–xvii, 159–162; *SMH*, 16/3/1961, I/4/1961, 6/4/1961.

24 Ibid.; Hudson, *Australian Diplomacy* generally.

25 Ibid.; J.D.L. Hood, Australian representative UN, 4/4/1961, NAA A1838, 201/10/14; 'Speech Notes', Robert Menzies, PM's Conference 1961, Menzies Papers, ms 4936, box 422, folder 10.

26 Embassy Paris to EA, 28/11/1948, in 1960 EA doc. NAA A1838 929/4 pt 18; Ozgur, *Apartheid …*, especially pp. xv–xvii, 78–9, 159–62.

27 Ozgur, *Apartheid …,* pp. 78–9.

28 *SMH*, cited W.J. Hudson, *Australia and the Colonial Question …*, p. 28.

29 Forde and Evatt to Chifley, 18 May 1945, and Evatt to DEA, 28 May 1945,

in Hudson, W.J. and W. Way (eds), *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: 1937–49*, pp. 169, 178. Evatt's position was consistent with his wartime determination to strengthen the rights of small or middle powers as the peace settlement was negotiated. In the controversial Anzac Agreement of 1944 Australia and New Zealand declared—somewhat ambitiously—that no changes could be made to existing trusteeship. arrangements in the South Pacific without their explicit consent. Roger Bell, *Unequal Allies* (Melbourne, 1977), pp. 146–71; 'East West Clashes Predicted', *SMH*, 15/10/1952.

30 See Segal, *South West Africa …*, pp. 15–17.

31 Sawer, 'The United Nations', pp. 159–61, 240–1.

32 Holland, 'Ends of Empire …', *The Round Table*, 317 (1991), p. 83.

33 Whitlam, 12/11/1959, *Hansard.*

34 Sawer, 'The United Nations', pp. 160–1.

35 This concern was widespread as early as 1949. See for example 'Natives in three protectorates fear South African policy', *SMH*, 16/3/1949; Jordan, 'Decolonisation', pp. 105–40, has written scholarly, thoroughly researched articles on the wider question of Australian policies on decolonisation after World War II. Jordan's research and arguments have informed some important aspects of my study, most notably in Chapters 3 and 5. See also Sawer, 'The United Nations', pp. 145–55; Hudson, *Australian Diplomacy*, pp. 165–75, and Hocking, *Gough Whitlam …*, pp. 186–7, notes 27, 28.

36 Cabinet Decision no. 707, 29/3/1960, NAA A5818/2, vol. 26; Tothill, 'Trying to Sell Apartheid …', pp. 143–6; Menzies various in Menzies Papers, ms 4936, box 422, folder 9, 'South Africa—correspondence 1954–1960'; Menzies to MacMillan 15/1/1962 and 18/4/1962, Menzies Papers, ms 4936, box 22 folder 187; Menzies address Australia Club, London, 20/3/1961, in Menzies Papers, ms 4936, box 422, folder 10; *Canberra Times,* 19/4/1960; Cabinet decision no. 1361, 10/5/1961 NAA A5818/2, vol. 26.

37 EA memo to African Missions, 3/8/1961, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 3; Dexter, memo 'Significance of Africa ….', 4/3/1960, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 2. Also, Bolton, *The Middle Way*, p. 153, and Goldsworthy, 'Australian External Policy …', pp. 22–3.

38 UN Delegation to PM's Office, 3/5/61, Menzies Papers, ms 4936, box 422, folder 10.

39 Hamilton to Tange, 13/3/1962, and Plimsoll to Menzies, 24/2/1961, 1/61 NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1. Also, Hudson, "Australia and the Colonial Question …', pp. 71–2; Goldsworthy, *Losing the Blanket …*, pp. 42–43; and Sawyer, 'The United Nations', pp. 242–3.

Chapter 4

1 Casey, 22/5/1959, 'Guidance Notes … Australian interests in South Africa' NAA 201/10/6/1 pt 1; also A9421 224/2B, [n.d.] Casey to Davis (HC Cape Town), 29/5/1959 NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1.

2   *Bombay Free Press Journal*, 26/3/1961, from Meadows, '"He no doubt felt insulted" …', p. 95.

3   Russell Ward, *A Nation for a Continent …*, pp. 51–2; Indian HC, Canberra, Report 1951, cited in Meadows, '"He no doubt felt insulted" …', p. 91. Casey in *SMH*, 26/11/1949; See also *Australian*, 2/1/1988 (cites Cabinet papers from 1950).

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5   In Searle, '"Godzone" …', pp. 239–42.

6   See R. Bell, 'Shifting Alliances …', pp. 113–21.

7   Goldsworthy, "Australia's External Policy …', pp. 17–29.

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12 Pemberton, 'An Imperial Imagination …', p. 164. See especially Goldsworthy, *Losing the Blanket* …, especially 15–31, and Bongiorno, 'The Price of Nostalgia …', pp. 400–17.

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38 Ibid.; Davis to Menzies, 25/1/61, Menzies Papers, ms box 4936, box 422, folder10. Goldsworthy, *Losing the Blanket …*,' pp. 110–15. Davis to Tange, 16/12/1959 NAA A1838 201/10/6/1 pt 1.

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9 Mayall, *Africa: the Cold War …*, p. 9.

10 Dexter, 'Significance of Africa South of the Sahara', 4/3/1960, and EA to Missions Cairo, Pretoria, Lagos, Accra, 3/8/1961, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 2.

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16 Editorial, 'Principles and Pieties', *Canberra Times*, 3/8/1963.

17 *Hansard* (HR), 11/3/1964 and 6/5/1964; *Current Notes,* 34 (December 1963), pp. 10, 38.

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20 Good, 'The Intimacy of Australia and …', pp. 417–21; Noone 'Australian economic ties …', pp. 1–6; Richard Johnstone and Peter Richardson, 'Australia's South African connection …', pp. 6–7.

21 For a sober discussion of the emotional issue of exploitative labour controls over un-free African labour, see Witton, 'Australia and Apartheid …', pp. 20–3. See also Hall, Australia and Rhodesia …, pp. 175–81; Child, 'Apartheid, Economic Collaboration and …', pp. 21–2; Richard Johnstone and Peter Richardson, 'Australia's South African connection …', pp. 6–7; Vorster in *SMH*, *Saturday Review*, 31/7/1987.

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32 *Current Notes* 34 (December 1963), pp. 10, 34 and (October 1963), p. 38; 'UN adopts censure of colour bar', *Canberra Times*, 22/11/1963; 'Barwick Failed in Bid to Review Apartheid', *Age*, 1/1/1994 (annual review of Cabinet papers, 1963); Cabinet decision no. 1012, 10/9/1963, NAA A5819/2, vol. 22. Also, decision no. 1361, 10/5/1961, NAA A5818/2, vol. 26 and, Shepherd, *Anti-Apartheid …*, p. 87.

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35 Hasluck, *Hansard* (HR), 6/5/1964.

36 Nkrumah to Menzies, Commonwealth PM's Conference, 1964, in Hasluck, 'secret' policy statement, [July 1964] NAA A1838 201/10/14. In contrast to Australia, the newly elected British Labour government in 1964 banned arms exports to South Africa; but this was never rigorously enforced and was ignored by later conservative administrations.

37 Kevin, 'Post Review 1962–63', (Pretoria) 5/11/1963, NAA A1838 201/10/14.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.; Ozgur, *Apartheid: The United Nations …*, pp. 67–83.

40 Farrah, UN Press Release 26/2/1970, in Skuse, 'Australia's Voting Behaviour …', pp. 215–17.

41 Djermakoye, *The UN and Decolonisation*, pp. 5–9.

42 Greenwood, 'The International Background', pp. 16–19; Djermakoye, *The UN and Decolonisation,* pp. 5–9; Resha 'Apartheid: The International Aspects', in UN Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, Number 12:73.

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50 Resha 'Apartheid: The International Aspects', in UN Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, Number 12:73.

51 Goldsworthy, *Losing the Blanket* …, pp. 89–93, especially notes 50, 51, 54; Hudson 'The United Nations', pp. 217–20.

52 Hall, 'Australia and Rhodesia …', pp. 175–83; Solomon, *Canberra Times*, 12/1/1971; Gorton to Jones, Sec. of FOA, 10/6/1969, FOA Papers, Box 1.

53 Solomon, *Canberra Times,* 12/1/1971.

54 US NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa, 1969, quoted in B. Cohen and M.A. El-Khawas (eds), *The Kissinger Study* …, pp. 84–94.

55 Gilchrist in *Current Notes* 34 (Dec. 1963), p. 10.

56 Skuse, 'Australia's Voting Behaviour …', pp. 214–15. Greenwood, 'Australian Foreign Policy in Action' …, pp. 119–21.

57 Butler, 'Summary on Australia and South Africa's relationship', 27/12/1969, and Cooper, 'Correspondence: South Africa', 29/4/1970, NAA A1838 201/10/1 pt 19.

58 ASIO, background brief 13/71 'Anti-Apartheid Campaign in Australia', 16/4/1971 (secret, 59/5/46), NAA A6122 2521; *Hansard* (HR), 2/6/1970. *SMH*, 23–24/1/1971.

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West Australian Premier John Tonkin.

63 Solomon, 'A Crisis of confidence in the Commonwealth', *Canberra Times*, 12/1/1971 and 14/1/1971.

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Chapter 6

1 Australian HC Lagos, cable no. 229, 'Australian Sporting Competition with South Africa', 11/5/1971, NAA A9421 206/17/ pt 1. HC cites, approvingly, anti-apartheid leader Peter Hain.

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3 Cabinet submission, no. 883, 'Apartheid', 'secret', 10/9/1963, and decision no. 1012, 'secret', 10/9/1963, NAA A5819/2, vol. 22; Rosenblum, in Writer, *Pitched Battle*, pp. 29–30.

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5 Gary Linnell, 'Stop Playing Games …', *Daily Telegraph*, 11/5/2008.

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8   Tatz, *Obstacle Race* …; Ernie Dingo quoted in title page.

9   *Koori Mail*, 'Our Competitors at the London 2012 Olympics', 8/8/2012; Perkins quoted in Tatz, *Obstacle Race …,* p. 102, see also pp. 328–9. Tatz's perceptive, exhaustively researched work, filled a vast gap in Australian historiography.

10   Coetzee, 'Playing total(itarian) Rugby …', p. 84.

11   Merrett, 'We don't want crumbs …', p. 83.

12   Editorial *Die Volksblad* 28/10/69, in Lapchick, *The Politics of Race* …, p. 204.

13   Brickhill, *Race against Race* …, p. 8.

14   *Die Transvaler*, 7/9/1965.

15   See generally Black and Nauright, *Rugby and the South African Nation*; Merrett, 'We don't want crumbs …', pp. 81–3.

16   Ibid. See also Corrigall 'International Boycott …', pp. 1–6 and Lapchick, *The Politics of Race* …, especially introduction and chapters 1 and 2; Brutus, 'Sport and Apartheid', generally.

17   Australian Embassy to EA 7/2/1963, NAA A1838 201/5/4 pt 10; press statements, 30–31/3/1962, de Klerk (translation), and de Klerk, 4/2/63, NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1. Also Corrigall 'International Boycott …', pp. 4–6.

18   Huddleston, letter, *Times*, 8/78/7/1955 cited Merrett, 'We don't want crumbs …', p. 81; Mbaye, in Honey, 'South Africa and the Olympic Movement', p. 177; in this excellent paper Honey's principal concern is to trace readmission of post-apartheid South Africa into the Olympics—see pp. 179–84.

19   See Lapchick, *The Politics of Race* …, pp. xv–xvii and Brutus, 'Sport and Apartheid', generally.

20   Corrigall, 'International Boycott of Apartheid Sport', p. 2.

21   EA, 'South Africa: Sport Policy. Chronology: 1961–1970', p. 1–12, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt. 1.

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27   Espy, *The Politics of the Olympic Games*, pp. 85–6.

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32; Lapchick, *The Politics of Race …,* p. XI; EA, 'South Africa: Sport Policy. Chronology: 1961–1970', pp. 1–12, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1.

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30   Ibid.

31   Riccardo Gazzaniga, 'The White Man in That Photo', 3/10/2015, in www.griotmag.com/en/…

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33   'The Final Count: Olympics '68', in *Background-to South African and World News,* June 1968, pp. 1–5, in NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1. Published by the South Africa Foundation, *Background …* was established to provide 'objective commentary on South African and foreign affairs … normally not available overseas'. It was, like many other semi-official publications at the time, an instrument of state propaganda. See also Caplbianco, *Voices of Discontent* …, especially pp. 1–7; editorial *Cape Times,* 23/4/1968.

34   Cashman, *Australia's Role …,* p. 10.

35   Hain cited Australian HC Lagos, Cable no. 229 'Australian Sporting Competition with South Africa', 11/5/1971, NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1.

36   Tyson in Scott, *Black Ban …,* p. 8; Shephard, 1960, in UN Unit on Apartheid, 'International Boycott …', *Notes and Documents*, no. 16/71 [n.p.]; P.A. Hartigan, letter editor, *Canberra Times*, 22/7/1971.

37   Nash, in Lapchick, *The Politics of Race …,* p. 33 (n. 54).

38   Vorster in Lapchick, *The Politics of Race …,* pp. 144–5; Menzies, *Hansard* (HR), 8/5/1963; Embassy (Cape Town) to EA, no. 3/63, 7/2/1963, NAA A9241 224/2B.

39   *Cape Argus*, 13/9/1961.

40   Lapchick, *The Politics of Race …,* pp. 67–9; Boyce in O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism …,* pp. 19–21.

41   Daniel Lane, 'Rugby's Magnificent Seven', *SMH*, 21/8/2011.

42   Merrett, 'We don't want crumbs …', pp. 83–4.

43   '1963 Wallabies against South Africa', in www.RugbyTalk.com …, reissued 3/9/2010. See also, writer, *Pitched Battle …,* pp. 12–16.

44   Limb, 'The Anti-Apartheid Movement …, p. 916.

45   EA, 'South Africa: Sport Policy. Chronology: 1961–1970', pp. 1–12, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1.

46   *Die Transvaler*, 7/9/1965.

47   Embassy (Cape Town), 'Sport and the South African Government', no. 3/63, 7/2/63, NAA A1838 201/5/4 pt 10.

48   EA, 'South Africa: Sport Policy. Chronology: 1961–1970', pp. 1–12, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1.

49   57 Louis Duffis, 'Aussie Test Man Bogy', *Cape Argus*, 21/1/1966; Attaché, Cape Town, to Minister External Affairs, copy Dept. PM, 25/1/1966, NAA A1838 201/10/10/3 pt 5; Kevin to EA, 'Graham Thomas', 14/3/1966, NAA

A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 2; Hay to Renouf, 17/2/66, 'Australian Cricket Team to South Africa', NAA A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 2; 'Call Tour Off …' *Australian*, 20/1/66.

50 Ibid.; also, Richards, *Dancing on our Bones …*

51 Ibid.

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53 'Sport: PM Opens Door', *Rand Daily Mail,* 12/4/1967.

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55 Brutus, 'Sport and Apartheid', pp. 187–8.

56 Le Roux quoted EA, 'South Africa: Sport Policy. Chronology: 1961–1970', pp. 1–12, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1. Also Le Roux, Embassy to EA, 'South Africa: 1968 MCC cricket tour-ban on Basil Oliveira', 3/2/67, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1; Merrett, 'We don't want crumbs …', pp. 82–6; Hain, *Don't Play with Apartheid,* generally; Corrigall, 'International Boycott …', pp. 59–70.

57 *Hansard*, 19/8/1968. Also EA, 'South Africa: Sport Policy. Chronology: 1961–1970', pp. 1–12, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1.

58 Waring quoted EA, 'South Africa: Sport Policy. Chronology: 1961–1970'. Also Thompson, *Retreat from Apartheid …,* pp. 53–4, 59, 83; Corrigall, 'International Boycott …', pp. 59–70.

59 Corrigall 'International Boycott …', pp. 62–70; Merrett, 'We don't want crumbs …', pp. 82–5.

60 Brian Toohey, 6/12/13 in www.news.com.au … See section on public opinion Chapter 9 below, and Writer, *Pitched Battle …*, pp. 53–86.

61 Brutus, 'Sport and Apartheid', pp. 187–9.

62 Writer, *Pitched Battle …*, especially pp. 46–57.

63 'Police Trail Wallaby', *Australian*, in Writer, *Pitched Battle …*, pp. 50–1; 'South Africa and Sport', *SMH*, 8/10/1969. See also *SMH*, 12/6/2001, Debra Jopson, 'Honour for Wallabies who bravely tackled apartheid', and Writer, *Pitched Battle …*, especially pp. 20–87. Writer deals at great journalistic length with rugby under apartheid, the influence of sport on the anti-apartheid movement, and the mass protests against the visiting Springboks in 1971. His vividly detailed book, *Pitched Battle*, was published in 2016. Based on participant recollections and memories, it complements an earlier important collection of participant interviews, O'Donnell and Simons (eds), *Australians Against Racism: Testimonies from the Anti-apartheid Movement in Australia*' (1995) and exhaustive reports from the anti-apartheid front-line in *Political Football: The Springbok Tour of Australia, 1971* (1972) by Stewart Harris.

64 Writer, *Pitched Battle …*, Jopson, 'Honour for Wallabies who bravely tackled apartheid'.

65 Cashman *Australia's Role …*, pp. 18–22.

66 G.A. Chettle, 'Australia in South Africa, 1969–70', in *Wisden Home Almanack* (1971,), pp. 1–2. Vorster in EA, 'South Africa: Sport Policy. Chronology: 1961–1970', NAA A9421, 206/17 pt. 1.

67 Toohey, 'As Mandela Served Time in Prison …', 6/12/2013 in www.News. com.au. Toohey was one of only a handful Australian journalists openly disturbed by apartheid in the late 1960s–early 1970s, and one of very few who openly criticised Australian policy towards South Africa. Howa, cited Cashman, *Australia's Role …*, p. 21.

Chapter 7

1 The Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement: [April] 1961 Federal Council Resolution seeking abolition of 'apartheid in our own country'. Reports and Resolutions received by 4th National Aboriginal Conference, 31/3/1961–2/4/1961. This decision and the controversy it aroused were widely referred to in EA documents, including Gilchrist, 'Treatment of Aborigines', Memo to all Australian High Commissions, 31/5/1961; [Gilchrist] 'Australian Aborigines—External Affairs Interest', 29/8/1961 and Draft 'Overseas Opinion on Aboriginal Welfare', [8/1961]; HC Accra to EA, 'Aborigines', 19/4/1961. All in NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2.

2 Cabinet Submission no. 883, 10/9/1963, NAA A463 1963/4940.

3 EA 'Native Welfare Conference' [n.d.] 1961 Item 2 and Draft, 'Overseas Opinion on Aboriginal Welfare', n.d. [May 1961] no author [Gilchrist], NAA A1838 557/2pt. 2; Gilchrist, memo, 16/1/1962 and 'Draft' memo [n.d.]/2/1961, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 3.

4 *Age*, 25/5/1954, *Age*, 27/9/1957, ed. *SMH*, 25/9/1957, ed. *Age*, 24/4/1961, ed. *SMH*, 7/4/1968. Davis to EA, 'Racial overtones …', 12/9/1961, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 3. The evidence and arguments marshaled here in Part II broadly endorse findings advanced—separately—in important work by Jennifer Clark and John Chesterman. Despite slightly different emphases, they accept that civil rights reform in 'Australia was led by international pressure, or the fear of it, to bring its laws into line with the international principles it publicly supported'. My argument centres on pressures 'encouraged'— paradoxically—by apartheid and white supremacy in South Africa, but I obviously accept. that a combination of forces, both external and internal broke down 'White Australia'. See Clark, *Aborigines and Activism …* especially pp. 66–7, 266, and Chesterman, *Defending Australia's reputation …*', pts 1 & 2.

5 In 1965 United Nations adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Two years later an overwhelming majority of Australians voted 'Yes' in the watershed Constitutional Referendum on Aboriginal Rights, see below.

6 Jordan, 'The Reappraisal …', pp. 224–7; Also, Brawley, *The White Peril*, pp. 1–3, 303–5; Dutton, 'One of Us? …', pp. 71–85; Meaney, 'The End of "White Australia" …', p. 171, passim.

7   Trainor, letter, *The Times,* 25/3/1961, in NAA 1838 557/2 pt. 2; Edward St John, *Nepean Times*, 11/8/1960.

8   Clark, *Aborigines and Activism …,* especially chapters 2 and 3. Gilchrist memo, 4/5/1961, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2 in Clark, 'Something to Hide' …, pp. 74–5. Gloria Phelan, member Aboriginal Schools Committee, NSW, in *SMH*, 23/12/1964. See also, *Australian*, 23/12/64; Kim Beazley (Sr.) in *Canberra Times*, 26/10/1960; *Hansard* (HR), 25/10/1960.

9   Edward St John, 'Apartheid's inhuman policy', *Nepean Times*, 11/8/1960.

10 Gilchrist, memo, 4/5/1961, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2; Trainor, letter, *The Times*, 25/3/1961, in NAA 1838 557/2 pt. 2; FCAA, *Australian*, 23/12/64; 'Apartheid in Australia', *West Australian* 29/91953; 'Australian Attitude to Apartheid', *SMH*, 29/10/1952. The term 'unofficial apartheid' was later used, by James Walter and Margaret MacLeod in *Citizens Bargain: a Documentary History of Australian Views* (Sydney, 2002), p. 179, to highlight similarities in the two countries. See also Edmonds, 'Unofficial Apartheid …', pp. 167–9.

11 'The Aborigines of Australia', 'Summary of talk … Hawkes to the Anti-Slavery Society in London', 23/9/1961, and Marshall HC London, 26/9/1961, NAA 1838 555/2 pt 2. See also Draft Guide, Australian Aborigines' booklet UNGA 16/35 Annex C, NAA 1838 557/2 pt 2.

12 Calwell, *Hansard* (HR), 31/3/1960. The Opposition leader when seeking strong censure of South Africa used these words to summarise Menzies' statements to Parliament. *Hansard* (HR), 29/3/1960.

13 Fred L Strutt, letter, *Canberra Times*, 5/11/1963.

14 St John, draft letter [9/67] in SADAF Papers, SLNSW, box1.

15 In *Current Notes*, 32/4/1961, p. 28.

16 Gilchrist, 'Treatment of Aborigines', Memo to Australian High Commissions, 31/5/1961; [Gilchrist] 'Australian Aborigines—External Affairs Interest', 29/8/1961 and Draft 'Overseas Opinion on Aboriginal Welfare', [8/1961]; HC Accra to EA, 'Aborigines', 19/4/1961. All in NAA A1838 557/2pt. 2; Trainor, letter, *The Times*, 25/3/1961, in NAA1838 557/2 pt 2; and FCAA in Clark, 'Something to Hide …', pp. 74–5, 'Apartheid at Home', Fred. L. Strutt, letter, *Canberra Times*, 5/11/1963; Clark, 'The "Wind of Change" …', p. 90.

17 Yudelman, *The Emergence* ….; Clark, 'The "Wind of Change" …', pp. 89–91.

18 Edmonds, 'Unofficial Apartheid …', pp. 167–9; Bird, *The Stolen Children …,* p. 116; Chesterman, 'Defending Australia's Reputation …', pp. 201–21; Lyall Munro [Australia] 'was just a stepping stone away from apartheid', SBS NITVNEWS [5]/2/2015—refers to Moree 1965. Also notes 9, 10, 14 above.

19 Dalrymple to EA 'Treatment of Aborigines in Australia', 14/4/1961, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 2.

20 *Nation*, no. 22, 18/7/1959, pp. 15–17; and *Nation*, no. 24, 15/8/1959, pp. 7–8; and *Observer*, 3/3/1960 and 6/2/1960; *Canberra Times*, 5/11/1963, 30/8/1961.

21 EA 'Native Welfare Conference' [n.d.] 1961 EA 'Native Welfare Conference' [n.d.1961 Item 2]; Gilchrist, 'Treatment of Aborigines', Memo to Australian

High Commissions, 31/5/1961; [Gilchrist] 'Australian Aborigines—External Affairs Interest', 29/8/1961 and Draft 'Overseas Opinion on Aboriginal Welfare', [8/1961]; HC Accra to EA, 'Aborigines', 19/4/1961. All in NAA A1838 557/2 pts 2 & 3.

22 HC New Delhi to EA, 'Indian Opinion on Australian Aborigines', 7/8/1961, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 1.

23 Body EA 'Aborigines in Australia', 5/7/1961, EA doc prepared for Plimsoll, UN Delegation, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 3.

24 HC Karachi Memo 'Aboriginal Welfare', 23/2/1961, NAA A1838 557/2 pts 2 & 3.

25 HC Pretoria, memo EA 11/8/1961, NAAA1838 557/2 pt 2.

26 Gilchrist, 'Treatment of Aborigines', Memo to Australian High Commissions, 31/5/1961; Cowen and Richards, cited Body memo 'Aborigines in Australia', 5/7/1961, both in NAA A1838 555/1/53/1.

27 Gilchrist to Heydon Draft 'Aborigines', 21/8/1961 and EA 'Native Welfare Conference' [n.d. 1961, Item 2], NAA A1838 A557/2 pt 2.

28 Peters EA memos 'Aborigines–Publicity' and 'Aborigines-Overseas Publicity', 10, 13/10/1961, NAA 557/2 pt. 2.

29 Gilchrist to Heydon Draft 'Aborigines', 21/8/1961; Plimsoll UN report to EA [n.d., 1961] re UNGA16/Item35; Gilchrist, 'Australian Aborigines: External Affairs Interest', 29/8/1961; Gilchrist for EA 'Australian Aborigines: Overseas Opinion' 8/9/1961; all in NAA A1838 557/2 pts 1 & 3.

30 Draft, 'Overseas Opinion on Aboriginal Welfare', [n.d., May 1961] no author [Gilchrist] and Gilchrist memo, 16/1/1962, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 3. Draft, EA 'Treatment of Australian Aborigines', UNGA 16/Item35; body EA 'Aborigines in Australia', 5/7/1961 document prepared for Plimsoll, UN Delegation; Plimsoll UN report to EA [n.d. 1961] re UNGA16/Item 35; Gilchrist to Heydon Draft 'Aborigines', 21/8/1961 and C.H. Brown, Regional Director ASIO, 'Aboriginal Affairs and Policy', 7/8/1969, in NAA A1838/557/2 pts 3 & 7.

31 [Gilchrist] 'Australian Aborigines—External Affairs Interest', 29/8/1961 NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2.

32 Notes, Cabinet Submission no. 883, 9/9/1963 and Committee Report (March 1964), cited Chesterman, 'Defending Australia's Reputation', part 2, pp. 204–7. Taffe, 'Australian Diplomacy …', pp. 161–7.

33 St John letter to editor, *SMH*, 25/9/1967.

34 Kevin to EA 12/9/1961, NAA A1838 A557/2 pt. 2.

35 Plimsoll, UN, to Menzies and Hasluck, 31/5/1961, Davis, memo 12/9/61, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2.

36 Menzies, June 1949, in Joske, Sir Robert Menzies …, pp. 172–3, 310–11.

37 Jones in Laksiri Jayasuriya et al. (eds), *Legacies of White Australia …*, p. 115; Roger Bell, '"Race"/Ethnicity', especially pp. 208–21.

38 'South African Attitude to Los Angeles Riots', *Canberra Times*, 30/8/1965.

39 Menzies, *Hansard* (HR), 16/6/1949; Cabinet submissions 1956–57, in Jordan,

'The Reappraisal …', pp. 235–8.

40 Rowse, *Indigenous and other Australians,* pp. 264–72.

41 Hasluck, *Hansard* (HR), 6/5/1964.

42 Taffe,'Australian Diplomacy …', p. 164; EA 'Aborigines: the Hasluck Philosophy' [n.d., n.a.], NAA A1838/557/2 pt. 1.

43 Gilchrist to Peters, 11/1/1962, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 3. For a particularly sophisticated interpretation of 'assimilation' 'whiteness' and 'nation', see McGregor 'Making One People …, pp. 71–9.

44 Beazley (Sr), *Canberra Times,* 26/10/1960, Coleman, *Observer,* 13/6/1959, 2:12 pp. 361–3, 25/7/1959, 2:15 p. 475, and 27/6/1959, 2:13 p. 411. Charles Rowley was equally damning, identifying assimilation as 'socially destructive'—a uniquely 'complete case of racial exclusion and discrimination'. Government leaders at the time saw it very differently. Rowley, 'Aborigines and Other Australians', *Oceania,* 1962, p. 247. Assimilation policy and objectives are widely studied. See, for example, Marilyn Lake, 'Citizenship as Nondiscrimination: Acceptance or Assimilation? …', pp. 566–92, and Rowse, *Indigenous and Other Australians*, especially 264–72. Rowse's title echoes Rowley 50 years earlier.

45 *SMH*, 4/5/1963. Also Hasluck, *Shades of Darkness …*, cited in Chesterman, 'Defending Australia's Reputation …', pt. 2, pp. 201–7.

46 Miller, *Australian Government …,* p. 18 and Docker, 'The Popular Image: Aborigines and the Newspapers', both quoted in Rowse's important work, 'The Reforming State …', pp. 66–8.

47 Chesterman itemises these laws in 'Defending Australia's Reputation …', pt 2, pp. 201–7; Cowen and Richards, cited EA memo 'Aborigines in Australia', 5/7/1961; Gilchrist HC Pretoria, cited cable [n.d.] South Australian Institute of Race Relations, 'The treatment of Australian Aborigines' …, pp. 2–5; all in NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2. Also, Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Year Book Australia* (Canberra, 1998), pp. 156–8.

48 Clark, 'Something to Hide …', pp. 73–5, 81–2; *The Bulletin*, 14/8/1971, p. 27; Chesterman, 'Defending Australia's Reputation …'.

49 Cabinet Minute, 1/9/1964, NAA A463 1972/6575.

50 Chesterman itemises these laws in 'Defending Australia's Reputation …', pt 2, pp. 201–7; Cowen and Richards, cited EA memo 'Aborigines in Australia', 5/7/1961; Gilchrist HC Pretoria, cited cable [n.d.] South Australian Institute of Race Relations, 'The treatment of Australian Aborigines' …, pp. 2–5; all in NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2. Also, Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Year Book Australia* (Canberra, 1998), pp. 156–8

51 Rowse, *Indigenous and Other …,* p. 272.

52 St John, draft letter, [9/67] in SADAF Papers, box 1.

53 International Covenants on Human Rights, Annex no. 3 & 4 [n.d.]/1/70, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2.

54 Menzies, in May, 'Political Review', p. 96; Menzies, in Taffe, 'Australian

Diplomacy …', p. 158.

55 *SMH,* 3/1/1950.

56 Quotes in Bell, 'Managing Diversity …', pp. 65–7; *Current Notes* 39:10 (October 1968); Hawkins, 'Multiculturalism in two Countries …', p. 67.

57 Immigration Reform Group, *Immigration …',* p. 153.

58 Gilchrist to Brook, Embassy Pretoria, 14/7/1961, and Brody, Internal Memo EA, 5/7/61, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2; Yarwood, *Race Relations …,* p. 266; Whitlam, Beazley (Sr) in *Canberra Times* 26/10/1960; *Nation*, 47:2, p. 3.

59 Holt, *Hansard* (HR), 8/3/1966.

60 See Holt, Heydon, cited in Jordan, 'The Reappraisal of the White Australia Policy …', p. 241. Drawing heavily on archival sources, Jordan's paper is scholarly, detailed and nuanced.

61 Calwell, Holt cited *Hansard* (HR), 8/3/1966, p. 233.

62 Jordan, 'The Reappraisal of the White Australia Policy …', and generally pp. 224–43. Jordan cites, Heydon to Casey, 1/7/1966 and *Hansard* (HR), 8/3/1966.

63 London, *Non-white Immigration* …, pp. 125–6. Decrying these administrative changes as superficial and cynical, the Immigration Reform Group proclaimed: 'Our reputation has a stain it. Our standing in Asia—and indeed throughout the world—is immeasurably reduced in consequence'. Immigration controls remained, in effect, a colour-bar. Immigration Reform Group, *Immigration …,* p. 153.

64 Moscow Embassy to EA, 24/1/1962, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 3.

65 Gilchrist to Heydon Draft 'Aborigines', 21/8/1961, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2.

66 Bell, 'Managing Diversity …', p. 67. Heydon to Casey, 1/7/1966 quoted in Jordan, 'The Reappraisal of the White Australia Policy …', p. 224ff. Holt, *Hansard* (HR), 8/3/1966, 8/9/1966. Official documents from Meaney, 'The End of "White Australia" …', pp. 179–80.

67 Hocking, *Gough Whitlam …,* pp. 297–300.

68 See notes 36, 37 above. Truelove, 'Information Policy on Aboriginal Affairs and Policy', 5/5/1970, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 7.

69 *Star*, 23/9/1969.

70 Ibid.; Foley, *A Short History …,* pp. 2–9; Chesterman, *Defending Australia's Reputation …',* pt 2, especially pp. 202–4.

71 EA 'Publication of Material on Aborigines Overseas', 4/8/1969, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 7.

72 Cumes, 'Racialist Image of Australia in New Zealand', 26/5/1969; Embassy Stockholm, 'Aborigines', 21/1/1970, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 2. DEA Files contain numerous references to Australia's tarnished reputation and image abroad, including articles in *Ottawa Journal,* 26/5/1970, (Stockholm) *Expression,* 23/6/1970, *Jeune Afrique* [n.d, 1970], *Jerusalem Post*, 27/8/1970, *Bangkok World,* 27/1/1970, Amnesty International Reports, and numerous 'articles critical of Australia's treatment of its Aboriginal population …

published in Denmark and Sweden'. Embassy, Stockholm to EA,15/7/1969, NAA A1838 557/2 pts 2 & 7.

73 Riccardo Gazzaniga, 'The White Man in That Photo', 3/10/2015, in www. griotmag.com/en/…

74 *Telegraph* (UK) 21/4/1968. Powell was Professor of Philosophy at University of Sydney in the early 1960s before returning to the academic work in the UK. Sykes, in Roger Bell, '"Race"/Ethnicity: Cultural Difference …', pp. 207–32. This paper discusses US 'influences' on racial politics in post-war Australia.

75 Edmonds, 'Unofficial Apartheid …', pp. 167–86. Edmonds' sophisticated study focuses on Walgett (rather than Moree or Kempsey) as 'The high watermark of racism', 'segregation' and exclusion'; Curthoys, *Freedom Ride* …; Gilchrist 'Overseas Opinion on Aboriginal Welfare' draft [August] 1961, NAA A1838 555/1/53/1; Bell, '"Race"/Ethnicity', especially pp. 212–20.

76 Bell, '"Race"/Ethnicity', especially pp. 214–15.

77 Truelove, 'Information Policy on Aboriginal Affairs and Policy', 5/5/1970, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 7.

78 Ibid. Smark, 'The View from Fleet Street: Reports on British press reaction to the Royal tour', *Australian,* copy in Truelove, 'Publication of Material on Aborigines Overseas'. 4/8/1969, NAA A1838 552/2 pt. 7.

79 HC, Accra, to FA, [n.d.]/4/70, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 7.

80 Gorton to Jones, Secretary FOA, 30/6/1969, FOA Papers, box 1.

81 Roger Bell, 'Managing Diversity …', pp. 67–9, 77; Gorton, in Lopez, *The Origins of Multiculturalism …*, pp. 59, 73; Australian Council of Churches, *Statement on Racism …, Documents,* pp. 105–14.

82 HC, Accra, to FA, [n.d.]/4/70, NAA A1838 557/2 pt. 7. Brutus, 'African charges racism in Australia', *SMH*, 6/4/1970.

83 Editorial, *Australian Financial Review,* 23/6/1970.

Chapter 8

1 Beazley, in *Canberra Times*, 26/10/1960.

2 Nettheim, [draft] letter, *SMH*, May 1971, in SADAF Papers, Box 6.

3 Thorn, *Anti-Apartheid and …*, pp. 1–13; Jennett, 'Signals to South Africa …', pp. 98–105.

4 Sellstrom, review of Thorn, *Anti-Apartheid and …*, on H-SAfrica (October 2007), p. 2, www.H-net Reviews. Compare Limb's *A Shared History …* (p. 5 passim) which explores the ostensibly 'strong bond between Africa's oldest liberation movement [the ANC] and Australia's oldest political party [the ALP]'.

5 [Gilchrist] 'Australian Aborigines—External Affairs Interest', 29/8/1961, and draft 'Overseas on Aboriginal Welfare', 8/1961, NAA A 1838 557/2 pt 2. Tothill, 'South African–Australian …', p. 22. 'Apartheid at Home' became a familiar polemical tool of apartheid's opponents (Strutt, letter, *Canberra*

Times, 5/11/63).

6 Tothill, 'South African–Australian Diplomatic Relations …', p. 22; Tothill, 'White Man's Country …', pp. 165–95.

7 For the definitive history of the UK movement, see Roger Fieldhouse, *Anti-Apartheid: A History*.

8 'Unions to join World-Wide Trade Boycott', *Canberra Times* 4/4 1960; 'Walker Involved in Africa Clash', *Canberra Times*, 1/10/1960; 'Australians Urged to Adjust', *Canberra Times*, 10/4/1961; 'Dr Walker Refused in S Africa', *Canberra Times*, 27/8/1963. Also Limb, 'The Anti-apartheid movements …', p. 910.

9 Ibid. Limb's exemplary, detailed work, 'The Anti-apartheid Movements …', builds on Jennett's important earlier work. It is informed by extensive new research and recent scholarship, both historical and sociological, on transnational social movement and international struggle against apartheid.

10 Limb, '*A Shared History...*', pp. 15–19.

11 *Hansard* (HR), 22/3/1961, 6/5/1964 and 19/9/1968.

12 O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism* …, p. 107. The SADAF Papers, SLNSW, are an excellent resource on Australian anti-apartheid activities from the early 1960s.

13 O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism* …, p. 112.

14 Resha, interview [October] 1967, in Nettheim to Finlay, 1/6/1967, Friends of Africa (FOA) Records, MS 6629/1.

15 Limb, 'The Anti-apartheid movements …', pp. 915–17.

16 Limb, *A Shared History* …. pp. 17–19, notes 21–34. Limb's book advances a difficult thesis. His claims of the ALP's 'shared history' are well supported in relation to the anti-apartheid movement from 1971 to 1975. They are less convincingly demonstrated in relation to the ANC except, significantly, in the years of Bob Hawke's government when the conduct of foreign policy rested with Bill Hayden and Gareth Evans and a sympathetic prime minister. Nonetheless, when read in conjunction with his 'The Anti-apartheid Movements …', Limb's scholarly work (re)assesses the role of the A-AAM within a broad political framework and in doing so provides a more sober evaluation of the organisation's significance than that often advanced in participant recollections and published interviews with anti-apartheid activists.

17 Dunstan, interview, O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism* …, pp. 145–52.

18 Boyce, interview, pp. 19–23.

19 Myrtle quoted in Limb, 'The Anti-apartheid movements …', p. 920.

20 Myrtle and Burgmann in Symonds and Cahill, *A Turbulent Decade* …, pp. 59, 64–5; Jennett, 'Signals to South Africa …', pp. 106–9; Limb, 'The Anti-apartheid movements …', pp. 918–20.

21 Burgmann interview in O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism*

…, pp. 14–15.

22 Jennett, 'Signals to South Africa …', pp. 108–9.

23 Limb, 'The Anti-apartheid movements …', pp. 918–20; Jennett, Signals to South Africa …', pp. 106–9.

24 Walker in *SMH*, 1/4/1960, and Coleman in *Bulletin*, 11/8/1962, from Clark, *Aborigines and Activism*, pp. 122, 276; Peter McGregor, 'No More Sharpevilles', *Honi Soit*, 19/3/1970; also *Honi Soit*, 25/3/1970, from Honey, 'Australian–South African Relations …', [n.p.] notes 47 & 48, chapter 7; Curthoys, *Freedom Ride*, pp. 2–9.

25 Beazley (Sr) and *Canberra Times*, 26/10/1960. Skeuse, 'Australia's Voting Behaviour ...', pp. 216–18.

26 O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism,* jacket summary and pp. 158–9.

27 Clark, '"The Wind of Change" …', especially pp. 95, 113.

28 Ibid., pp. 95–6, 113. However, this observation is qualified, implicitly at least, by the body of evidence that Clark presents in this article and in her later book *Aborigines and Activism* …., especially chapter 4.

29 Chesterman, *Defending Australia's Reputation …*, pt 2, especially pp. 202–4. See, also, for details of political organisation and resistance, Attwood and Marcus, *The Struggle for Aboriginal Rights*; Rowse, *Indigenous and Other Australians*; Attwood, *Rights for Aborigines*.

30 O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism*, pp. 145, 158–9; Curthoys, *Freedom Ride*, p. 3.

31 Watson in O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism*, pp. 145–9; *Age*, 4/5/1963; O'Shane, 'Aboriginal Political Movements …', pp. 10–11.

32 Chesterman, *Defending Australia's Reputation …*, pt 2, p. 202.

33 O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism*, pp. 158–9; *SMH*, 4/5/1963, *Age*, 4/5/1963, and Attwood, *Rights for Aborigines*, pp. 295–312, 315.

34 O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism,* pp. 145–9.

35 'The National Party government of South Africa repeatedly accused Australians of hypocrisy', O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism,* pp. 145, 158; *Australian Women's Weekly*, 26/4/1973, p. 103.

36 Laurence, *The Seeds of Disaster,* pp. 11–17; 229–31; 'South Africa's New Kind of "Facts"', *Canberra Times*, 11/1/1966, pp. 2–5, and 'Apartheid and Mr Court', editorial, *Canberra Times*, 14/1/1967.

37 Ibid.

38 Watson, in O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism*, p. 153; Fred L Strutt, letter, *Canberra Times,* 5/11/1963.

39 See letters Packer and Lomas, September 1965, SADAF Papers, box 1.

40 Ibid.

41 Wilkie, 'One Minute to Midnight', *SMH*, 3/4/1952.

42 See letters Packer and Lomas, September 1965, in SADAF Papers, box 1, and

Strutt letter, *Canberra Times*, 5/11/1963.

43 Millar, 'Australian-South African Relations', p. 6. The veiled but constantly repeated suggestion that if Australia shared South Africa's demography it too would have found an undemocratic 'solution' to compensate for the problems confronting a white minority often resurfaces—even in scholarly commentary. In 2010, for example, David Dunstan wrote in *Southern Worlds: South Africa and Australia Compared*: 'With Australia [*sic*], unlike South Africa, where Indigenous and minority populations are so outnumbered it could not be assumed that democracy would be a solution'. Dunstan was commenting on and implicitly comparing (excusing?) 'racial politics'. Compare Jim Davidson who, writing in this same book, eschews hypothetical comparisons and counterfactual claims. Dunstan 'Introduction' and Davidson, 'Not Just "Sisters of the South" …', both in Nieuwenhuysen and Dunstan (eds), *Southern Worlds: South Africa …,* pp. 3, 14.

44 Burgmann 'Why Mandela Mattered to Australia', *SMH* 7–8/12/2013; Watson in O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism.*

45 Foley, *A Short History …,* pp. 2–9; Watson in O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism,* pp. 158–9.

46 Nettheim, [draft] letter to SMH [May] 1971, SADAF Papers Box 6. Watson in O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism.*

Part III

1   UN Centre Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents, 35/76, November 1976, p. 119.

2   Hain quoted in Australian HC Lagos cable no. 229 'Australian Sporting Competition with South Africa', 11/5/1971, NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1.

3   Gorton to Jones, Secretary to SADAF, 30/6/1969, re pending visit J. Haak, SA Minister for Economic Affairs, in SADAF Papers box 1; UN Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, number 17/70, 'Statement Before the Special Committee Against Apartheid', 20/5/1970 [n.p.]; Butler FA memo 11/5/1970 for Deputy PM Anthony, NAA A1838 201/10/1 pt 19. Resha, the first Black South African to campaign in Australia, left a 'lasting impression', disrupting stereotypes as he helped forge more direct links between the political left and Mandela's oppressed ANC.

4   UN Unit on Apartheid, notes and documents, number 12/73, May 1973, 'Apartheid: the International Aspects' [p. 1, n.p.]; 'Labor Backs Boycott', *Canberra Times,* 5/5/1960; Clark, *Aborigines and Activism...*', especially, pp. 27–39, 132–5.

5   Martin Luther King's speech before the 'American Committee on Africa' in 1965 included the statement 'apartheid is mediaeval segregation and a sophisticated form of slavery', quoted in Bernice King, 'Nonviolence: a Valid Weapon Against Apartheid', in 'Sanctions against Apartheid: record of the special meeting of the general assembly for the International Year of Mobilisation for Sanctions against South Africa …, UN Special Committee on Apartheid [1978], p. 26.

Chapter 9

6   Chairman, UN Special Committee against Apartheid [1972], in Scott, *Black Ban* ..., p. 15.

7   Australian Council of Churches, 'Statement on Racism...', pp. 105–8.

8   Hudson, *Australian Diplomacy*, pp. 164–5 and 'The United Nations', pp. 217–20; Ian Clark 'Indian Ocean', pp. 310–11, 314–17; Jones to Altman, IDAF, London, [n.d.] 11/72, SADAF Papers, box 1.

9   Butler, 'Summary on Australia and South Africa's relationship', 27/12/69, NAA 201/10/1 pt 19; Cutts, Report 'Australia's relations with South Africa', 1/5/1968–30/4/1969, NAA A1838 201/10/1 pt 19; Butler, EA memo 27/12/69, Cooper to PM, 'Correspondence—South Africa', 29/4/1970, Butler FA memo for Deputy PM Anthony, 11/5/1970, all in NAA A1838 201/10/1 pt 19. Gorton to Jones, Secretary to SADAF, 30/6/1969, SADAF Papers box 1.

10 Hassan Howa, quoted in Cashman, *Australia's Role …*', p. 21.

11 Chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, [early 1970] in Scott, *Black Ban*, p. 15; Moore, 'Racialism and Sport', *Canberra Times,* 13/6/1971; editorial, *Advertiser,* 30/6/1971.

12 Cotton, Embassy Pretoria to FA, 6/10/1969, A1838 201/10/1 pt 19. Also, 'Security Men Tailed Wallaby...'**,** *Star* (Johannesburg), 9/9/1969.

13 Writer, *Pitched Battle* …, especially p. 246; Hain quoted in Australian HC Lagos cable no. 229 'Australian Sporting Competition with South Africa' 11/5/1971, NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1.

14 Brown, Regional Director ASIO, 'Aboriginal Affairs and Policy', 7/8/1969 and Truelove, Information and Cultural Relations Branch FA, 'Publication of Material on Aborigines Overseas', 4/9/1969, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 7; ASIO, background brief 13/71, 'Anti-Apartheid Campaign in Australia', 16/4/1971 (secret, 59/5/1946) NAA A6122 2521; UN Unit on Apartheid, 'Australians oppose racist South African sports teams', background note no. 12, April 1971, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 7; Draft, FA 'Treatment of Australian Aborigines', UNGA 16/Item35, Annex A, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 7.

15 *Hansard* (HR), 26/10/1970; 29/4/1969; 26/3/1968.

16 Cabinet minute 9/11/71, decision A5909, 524 (also in NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1); Bailey, *Conflicts in Cricket*, p. 48.

17 Editorial, *Cape Times*, 10/4/1971.

18 Cutts to FA and PMs, 25/5/1970, in NAA, A1838, 201/10/10/3 pt 1.

19 Hain quoted in Australian HC cable no. 229 'Australian Sporting Competition with South Africa', 11/5/1971, NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1.

20 Coombs to Shann, Department Secretary FA, 11/5/1970, NAA A1838, 201/10/10/3 pt 1.

21 Hain quoted in Australian HC cable no. 229, 'Australian Sporting Competition with South Africa', 11/5/1971, NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1.

22 Stuart 'Sport: African Attitudes to Australia', 25/6/1970, NAA A1838, 201/10/10/3 pt 1; Ashwin UN Mission, 'South Africa: Apartheid and Sport',

11/5/1971, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1; *Canberra Times,* 'Criticism at UN …', 28/7/1971.

23 Cooper, 'Representations to the Prime Minister on South Africa', 12/5/1970, NAA A1838 201/10/1 pt 19; 'Press Statement by PM: Springbok Tour' [July] 1971, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1; Stuart, 'Sport: African Attitudes to Australia', 25/6/1970, NAA A1838 201/10/10/3 pt 1; ASIO, Background Brief 13/71 'Anti-Apartheid Campaign in Australia', 16/4/1971 (secret, 59/5/1946) NAA A6122 2521.

24 Hearder, HC Nairobi to FA, 30/9/71, NAA A463 1972/2657.

25 *Advertiser*, 1/5/1970; *Bulletin*, 10/7/1971, p. 21—this article also suggests anti-apartheid links to anti-Vietnam protests; Brown, Regional Director ASIO, 'Aboriginal Affairs and Policy', 7/8/1969, and Truelove, Information and Cultural Relations Branch FA, 'Publication of Material on Aborigines Overseas', 4/9/1969, both in NAA A1838 557/2 pt 7; Whitlam 3/4/1971 in UN Unit on Apartheid, 'Australians oppose racist South African sports teams', background note no. 12, April 1971, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1.

26 Solomon 'Snap Election', *Canberra Times*, 6/7/1971; Nkrumah to Menzies, Commonwealth PMs' Conference [July] 1964, in Hasluck, Minister EA, (secret) policy statement 201/10 [July 1964], NAA A1838 201/10/14.

27 Burgmann 'Why Mandela Mattered', *SMH*, 7/12/2013; O'Donnell and Simons, *Australians Against Racism*, p. 14; *Advertiser*, 1/5/1970; *Bulletin*, 10/7/1971, p. 21.

28 UN Unit on Apartheid, 'Australians Oppose Racist South African Sports Teams', background note 12 [April] 1971, in NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1.

29 Ibid.; ASIO, background brief 13/71, 'Anti-Apartheid Campaign in Australia', 16/4/1971, (secret, 59/5/1946), NAA A6122 2521.

30 Ibid.

31 ASIO, background brief 13/71, 'Anti-Apartheid Campaign in Australia', 16/4/1971 (secret, 59/5/1946) NAA A6122 2521; Brutus, 'Sport and Apartheid', pp. 178–80.

32 *Cape Times*, 13/5/1971.

33 Similar hyperbole is often repeated. Margaret O'Hara; 'Political Football' from James Middleton's 2005 book of this title, NAA 'Australia and the issue of apartheid in sport—fact sheet 255', http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs255.aspx. See also notes 110 and 111, below.

34 *Hansard* (HR), 31/3/1960: Ward was speaking after Sharpeville, but his claims resonated in subsequent public and parliamentary debate.

35 Hocking, Jenny, *Gough Whitlam …,* p. 367; 'Protest at PM's arrival', *Canberra Times*, 8/1/1969.

36 Writer, *Pitched Battle* …, especially p. 246; Hain quoted in Australian HC cable no. 229, 'Australian Sporting Competition with South Africa', 11/5 1971, NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1.

37 Australian Ambassador Cairo to FA 15/5/1970, NAA A1838 201/10/1 pt 19.

38 Editorial, *SMH*, 4/3/1971.

39 Millar, 'Australian–South African Relations', pp. 6–7.

40 Gallop Poll, SA, April 1961, in NAA Menzies Personal Papers, correspondence 1954–1965, M2576, 1. Editorial 'The Superior White', 24/4/1970 and 16/4/1971, *Canberra Times*; '80% Approve South African Tour', *SMH*, 1/12/75; John Pitts, 'SA Tours Big Talking Point in Australia', (Johannesburg) *Star*, 19/5/1971. Also Toohey, 6/12/2013, www.news.com.au; *Courier Mail*, 12/7/1971; Perry in Beed, *Australian Opinion Polls*, p. 13.

41 Hartigan, *Canberra Times*, 22/7/1971; *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 22/4/1971.

42 'Mr Hawke Postpones …', *Canberra Times*, 26/6/1971; Solomon, 'Snap Election …', *Canberra Times*, 6/7/1971.

43 ASIO, background brief 13/71 'Anti-Apartheid Campaign in Australia', 16/4/1971 (secret, 59/5/1946) NAA A6122 2521; Stuart, 'Sport: African Attitudes to Australia', 25/6/1970, NAA A1838 201/10/10/3 pt 5; Cooper, 'Representations to PM on South Africa', 12/5/1970, NAA A1838 201/10/1 pt 19; 'Press Statement by PM: Springbok Tour' [July 1971], NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1.

44 Ibid. Whitlam's pragmatism is not acknowledged in Limb, *A Shared History*, pp. 30–1, but his study does convincingly illustrate the strength of antiracism within the left of ALP. at federal and state levels and within the ACTU under Hawke.

45 Editorial 'This Tragic Tour', *Canberra Times*, 21/7/1971.

46 Hartigan, letter, *Canberra Times*, 22/7/1971.

47 Bruce Ruxton, President Victorian RSL, host to Tothill, Melbourne Club 13/7/1990, in Tothill, 'White Man's Country…', p. 51.

Chapter 10

1 Hain quoted in Australian HC Lagos cable number 229, 'Australian Sporting Competition with South Africa', 11/5/1971, NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1.

2 Burgmann, 'Why Mandela Mattered to Australia', *SMH*, 7/12/2013.

3 Good, 'The intimacy of Australia and South Africa', pp. 417–21; Noone, *Australian Economic Ties* …, pp. 1–6; Johnstone and Richardson, *Australia's South African Connection* …, pp. 6–7.

4 UN Special Committee on Apartheid, '*United Nations Documents on South Africa*', various, 1960s [fifth item, 484/485].

5 Ibid., Resha, 'Apartheid: The International Aspects' [p. 1]. Also 'Africa Calls for Australian Help', *Canberra Times*, 29/9/1966, and UN Special Committee on Apartheid, 'Sanctions against Apartheid …, p. 26.

6 Writer, *Pitched Battle,* especially pp. 246ff. and generally, James Middleton, *Political Football*. Also, UN Unit on Apartheid, 'Australians oppose racist South African sports teams', Background Note 12, April 1971, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1; Brutus, 'Sport and Apartheid…', pp. 78–91. Hain quoted in

Australian HC cable number 229, 'Australian Sporting Competition with South Africa', 11/5/1971, NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1.

7   Ian Clark, 'Indian Ocean', pp. 307–11, 314–17; Claire Clark, 'The United Nations', pp. 126–62, 317; Abdulrahim Abby Farah, UN Special Committee on Apartheid to Gary Jones, Qld Anti-apartheid Steering Committee, 14/9/1971, in Steer, *The Whole World Watched*, p. 3.

8   Ibid.; Cabinet decision 9/11/1971, no. 524 A5909, cited in NAA 201/10/10/3 pt 1; Skuse, 'Australia's Voting Behaviour...', pp. 214–15. In power from December 1972 Labor was far more outspoken than its conservative predecessors, but it too pulled back from ending trade or diplomatic relations with the apartheid regime, or from recognising exiled liberation movements as 'authentic representatives' of the people of South Africa. See Ch. 11.

9   'Aussie Rugby Rejects…', *Cape Argus*, 10/5/1971; Moodie Pretoria, 'Apartheid in Sport', 19/5/1972, and Moodie to FA, 27/1/72, NAA A463, 1972/2657. Moodie refers to 'Further enunciation of sports policy', April 1971. Pretoria privately accepted that such 'reforms' would be rejected abroad. See Koornhof, SA Minister for Sport and Recreation, statement 29/8/72, NAA A463, 1972/2657.

10 Brutus, 'Sport and Apartheid', pp. 78–91; FA doc. 'South Africa: Sports Policy. Chronology: 1961–1970, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1; UN Unit on Apartheid, 'Australians oppose racist South African sports teams', Background Note 12, April 1971, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1; Cooper, 'Representations to the Prime Minister on South Africa', 12/5/1970, NAA A1838 201/10/1 pt 19; 'Press Statement by PM: Springbok Tour' [n.d.] [July 1971], NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1.

11 Ibid.

12 Stuart, 'Sport: African Attitudes to Australia', 25/6/1970, NAA A1838 201/10/10/3; Cooper, 'Representations to the Prime Minister on South Africa', 12/5/1970, NAA A1838 201/10/1 pt.19; 'Press Statement by PM: Springbok Tour' [July 1971], NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1; Solomon *Canberra Times*, 6/7/1971; Waterford, 'War Games of the 70s', *Canberra Times*, 1/8/1993.

13 Ibid.; editorial, 'This Tragic Tour' *Canberra Times,* 21/7/1971; Whitlam's pragmatism is not fully acknowledged in Limb, *A Shared History*, pp. 30–1, but Limb does convincingly illustrate the strength of anti-racism on the left of ALP at federal and state levels and in the ACTU under Hawke

14 Ibid.; *Australian*, 27/2/1971.

15 *Sunday Times* (NZ), 20/9/1970; *SMH,* 4/3/1971; UN Unit on Apartheid, 'Australians oppose racist South African sports teams', Background Note 12, April 1971, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1; Brutus, 'Sport and Apartheid…', pp. 78–91. The Springbok tour in 1971 and the Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement are the subject of numerous studies, both journalistic and scholarly. Most important are works by Stewart Harris, James Middleton, Peter Limb, O'Donnell and Simons, Trevor Richards, and Larry Writer. See

bibliography. Limb's richly detailed study, 'The anti-apartheid movements in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand', in SADET, III, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, remains the definitive work on the A-AAM.

16 *Australian*, 27/2/1971; ASIO, Background Brief 13/71 'Anti-Apartheid Campaign in Australia', 16/4/1971, (secret, 59/5/1946) NAA A6122 2521

17 Ibid.; 'Foolish and Provocative' (ed.), Solomon, 'Snap Election', *Canberra Times*, 15/7/1971, 6/7/1971.

18 *Australian*, 2/7/1971.

19 Ibid.; 'Barbed Wire Madness', *Canberra Times,* 21/1/1971; Waterford, 'War Games of the 70s'; Limb, *A Shared History*, pp. 28–32.

20 Ibid.

21 'Foolish and Provocative' (ed.), *Canberra Times*, 15/7/1971; Waterford, 'War Games of the 70s', pp. 19–20; note 71 *A Shared History*, pp. 28–32.

22 Brutus, 'Sport and Apartheid', pp. 186–8.

23 Editorial, *SMH*, 4/3/1971; editorials, *Canberra Times*, 21/7/1971 and 19/7/1971; summary, *Political Football* (2005) by James Middleton in *Screen Education*, Issue 34, p. 2, at www.metromagazine.com.au/screen.

24 Ibid.; *Canberra Times*, 6/7/1971 and 15/7/1971; Waterford, 'War Games of the 70s'; Limb*, A Shared History*, pp. 28–32; PMs to Cape Town (Embassy), 27/5/1971, 206/17, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt 1.

25 Editorials, *SMH*, 4/3/1971 and *Canberra Times*, 21/7/1971.

26 Ibid.; PMs to Cutts, 27/5/1971, NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1; McGregor, Gilbert and Sykes, in Limb, 'The Anti-Apartheid Movements…', pp. 923ff.

27 'Foolish and Provocative' (ed.), *Canberra Times*, 6//7/1971 and 15/7/1971; Waterford, 'War Games of the 70s'; Limb*, A Shared History*, pp. 28–32; Solomon, 'Snap Election…'.

28 Editorial, *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 8/8/1971; *Canberra Times*, 9/8/1971; Harris, *Political Football,* pp. 58, 189; Waterford, 'War Games of the 70s'.

29 Zavos, 'Wallabies Proud History of Fight against Apartheid', *SMH*, 12/10/2016.

30 Australian Mission UN to FA, 'South Africa: Apartheid and Sport', 11/5/1971, NAA A9421, 206/17, pt 1.

31 *Hansard* (Senate), 8/3/1972; Gordon, 'How the Daughter…', *New York Times Magazine*, 29/8/1971; 'Evonne's Greatest Run' *SMH*, 16/1/1993; *SMH*, 20/1/71; *Age*, 2 0/1/71; 'Lionel Rose', obituary, *Australian*, 8/5/2011; FA, South Africa: Sport Policy Chronology: 1961–1970, pp. 11–12, NAA A9421, 206/17 pt. 2; Cooper to PMs and Cabinet, 4/5/1971, NAA A1838 201/10/11/3 pt.1; Limb, 'The anti-apartheid movements…', pp. 923ff.

32 Ibid.

33 Margaret Court (January 1970), in Lapchick, *The Politics of Race…*, p. 20.

34 Australian Mission UN to PM McMahon, 28/7/1972 and 4/8/1972, NAA

A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 1.

35 PM's to HC London, 22/6/71, NAA A 9421, 206/17 pt. 1; Murray, 'The Sports Boycott …', pp. 219–21.

36 May, *The Rebel Tours*, pp. 31–2; Editorial 'Apartheid in Reverse', *Canberra Times*, 6/4/1971; *SMH*, 7/4/1971; *Hansard* (HR), 6/4/1971; UN Unit on Apartheid, 'Australians Oppose Racist South African Sports Teams' (April 1971), in NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1.

37 Arlott in Merrett, 'We don't want Crumbs...', p. 85.

38 May, *The Rebel Tours…*, pp. 31–2; Editorial 'Apartheid in Reverse', *Canberra Times*, 6/4/1971; *SMH*, 7/4/1971; *Hansard* (HR), 6/4/1971; UN Unit on Apartheid, 'Australians Oppose Racist South African Sports Teams' (April 1971), in NAA A9421 206/17 pt 1.

39 Perry, 'Bradman Opposed Apartheid', *Age*, 23/8/2008; Murray, 'The Sports Boycott and Cricket...', pp. 165–8; Cutts to FA 9/7/1971, NAA 1838 201/10/10/3 pt 5.

40 Cabinet, 'Cricket Tour of Australia…', secret, 24/8/1971, NAA A5882/2; Murray, 'A long but intermittent rivalry…', pp. 191–5. Publication of Haigh and Firth's *Inside Story,* has clarified debate over Bradman's role in cancelling the tour.

41 Perry, 'Bradman Opposed Apartheid', *Age,* 23/8/2008; Harris, *Political Football*, pp. 236–7; Coward, *The Chappell Years…*, p. 117–18; Murray, 'The Sports Boycott…', pp. 168–9. My discussion of Bradman's role in cancelling the cricket tour draws also on Cashman's important archive-based booklet, published by the NAA, *Australia's Role in the Apartheid Sports Boycott in 1977*, especially pp. 12–13, 39; Bradman's 'confidential' correspondence with John Bunting, Secretary, Cabinet, can be followed in NAA A463, 1972/2657. For correspondence from early 1973, see A1209, 1973/6671.

42 Bradman in Harris, *Political Football*, p. 241 and in Murray, 'The Sports Boycott…', p. 220; Greg Baum, 'Bradman and Apartheid', *Age*, 19/10/2007; *Rand Daily Mail*, 9/9/1971; Haigh and Frith, *Inside Story*, pp. 156–7; Perry, 'Bradman Opposed Apartheid', *Age*, 23/8/2008; Cashman, *Australia's Role…,* pp. 13–16; Australian HC London to DIFA and PMs, 22/6/71, NAA A9421, 206/17pt.

43 Bradman in Harris, *Political Football*, p. 241 and in Murray, 'The Sports Boycott…', p. 220; Greg Baum, 'Bradman and Apartheid', *Age* 19/10/2007; *Rand Daily Mail,* 9/9/1971; Haigh and Frith, *Inside Story*, pp. 156–7; Perry, 'Bradman Opposed Apartheid', *Age*, 23/8/2008; Cashman, *Australia's Role…,* pp. 13–16; Australian HC London to DIFA and PMs, 22/6/1971, NAA A9421, 206/17pt.

44 Bradman to PMs 6/6/1972, NAA A1838 20/5/4 pt.10, NAA A463 1972/2657, and 6/6/1972A A1838, 201/10/11/3 pt 5; Cashman, *Australia's Role in the Apartheid*, p. 13; Bunting 'Not for File', 15/1/1972, NAA A463 1972/2657.

45 Perkins in Writer, *Pitched Battle*, pp. 233–4.

46 Hain's address was welcomed by critics of the narrowly focussed A-AAM

and disturbed the McMahon administration which intensified efforts to use diplomatic channels to answer Hain's charges. HC London to FA, 23/7/1971, and FA to HC London, 26/7/1971, NAA A1838 201/5/4 pt 10; McMahon 'Australian Aborigines: Commonwealth Policy and Achievements', 26/1/1972, and Aboriginal Land Rights—Policy, 6/12/1972, NAA A1838 557/2 pt 7.

47 Ibid.

48 In Harris, *Political Football*, p. 244.

49 Limb, 'The anti-apartheid movements...', p. 923.

50 Foley, *Black Power in Redfern*, pp. 9–11.

51 Harris, *Political Football*, pp. 196–98; Foley, *Black Power in Redfern*, p. 5. at www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays–1thtml, 16/11/2004.

52 Burgmann, Watson in O'Donnell and Simons *Australians Against Racism,* pp. 18, 161; *Australian*, cited in Harris, *Political Football*, p. 254; Foley, *Black Power in Redfern* …, pp. 9–11. Also correspondence McGuinness to Macaulay, 10 & 19/9/1971, in Clark, 'The "Wind of Change" …', pp. 115–17.

53 'March Against Racism' pamphlet, in Harris, *Political Football,* p. 254; Foley, *Black Power in Redfern*, pp. 11–17; *Canberra Times*, 21/7/1972.

54 Clark, *Aborigines and Activism…,* pp. 233–43. Clark writes perceptively on the Tent Embassy and its significance, both symbolic and political. Original and convincing, her work remains an important scholarly counterpoint to the insularity of much Australian historiography. See also, CARE Press Release [1972/73, n.d.], in SADAF Papers, box 2, Scott, *Black Ban,* pp. 2–12; Ralph Pearce, Southern African Liberation Centre (Sydney) Press Release, 27/7/1973, in NAA A1838 201/10/10/3 pt 5; Waterford, 'War Games of the 70s'.

55 Waterford, 'War Games of the 70s'; Burgmann in Writer, *Pitched Battle*, pp. 318–23.

56 Writer, *Pitched Battle*; It might be argued that similarly exaggerated claims surface when Australia's wider contributions to the struggles against apartheid and efforts to free Nelson Mandela are assessed. *SMH* journalist Tony Wright has observed that 'Australia's political leaders would have it that Australia—beyond almost any other country—was responsible for leading international condemnation of the apartheid system, and in taking steps to pressure South Africa to the point where it had to abandon its bad old ways'. A typical newspaper story welcoming the release of Cabinet Papers for 1986–87 was headed 'Leading the West in fighting South Africa's apartheid' (even though Cabinet submissions cited in the article acknowledged that 'Australia's capacity to influence South Africa was limited'). Journalists have noted that 'our political leaders take pride in their view that Australia more than anyone else [*sic*] helped end apartheid'. Long-serving Labor PM Bob Hawke has stated that one of his most important achievements was 'bringing an early end to apartheid'. Mandela's death gave hubristic politicians a fresh opportunity to rewrite white Australia's history. ABC TV News expressed what has become orthodoxy when it echoed Hawke's claim, suggesting that

Australia played a 'key role' in ending apartheid and 'led' international efforts to bring democracy to the troubled country. The 'Our Stories Labor Party Blog' announced under the heading 'Vale Nelson Mandela' (June 2013) that 'Australian Labor played an important role in the global movement to end apartheid'. In 2012, an important book, commissioned by the ALP, was published under the surprising title *A Shared History: The ALP, the ANC and the Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement* (Canberra, 2012). Written by accomplished historian Peter Limb it alludes obliquely to the widely shared assumption that Australia played a pivotal role in ending apartheid. Limb writes—without irony—that 'the movement in Australia, by itself, did not bring down apartheid'. Nonetheless, he does avoid much of the celebratory language that has plagued political and activist assessments of Australia's contribution to the global anti-apartheid struggle and the overthrow of apartheid. The dust-jacket to Limb's well-researched book states, perhaps unsurprisingly given its ties to the ALP, that it 'charts the development of an Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement and the critical role the ALP played in breaking the Apartheid regime with international sanctions and pressure'. But Limb's authorial conclusions are far more measured than this publicity statement suggests. He suggests soberly that the A-AAM played a minor role globally although it helped locally to raise awareness, shift the moral ground and 'succeeded in keeping governments on track and tugging them to more effective action'. Limb, in my view, rightly emphasises that a 'conjunction' of 'wider forces helped produce an irresistible movement for change'. With understatement he cautions that 'it is possible to exaggerate the effects of its individual components, but they were part of wider team whose impact … was cumulative'. Gareth Evans, foreign minister during the Hawke government, has also struck a note of realism in assessing Australia's contribution to ending 'white minority authoritarian rule'. 'We can be quite proud of the role that Australia played', he has stated, 'but frankly' its efforts did 'not [make] too much impact on the regime'. It is to be hoped that more considered judgements—not the hubristic reminiscences of some activists or politicians—will inform future evaluations of the anti-apartheid movement and the role of political parties or governments in the global struggle. The recent detailed studies by Limb and Writer, and hopefully my study of the period 1945 to 1975, implicitly address a plea by Wright, made amidst celebrations of the new rainbow nation in 1994. 'Perhaps it is time to apply some qualified judgement to Australia's role in helping to free South Africa from apartheid', Wright wrote, 'before the history is so rose-tinted that it bears little resemblance to reality'. Hawke quoted in Tony Wright, 'Evans happy to yield to … Hawke', *SMH*, 28/4/1994; ABC 7.00pm TV News, 6/12/2013; Damien Murphy, 'Cabinet Papers 1986–87 …' *SMH*, 1/1/2014; Evans, ABC TV Lateline interview 6/12/2013. Also *SMH*, 7–8/12/2013; Limb, *A Shared History*, especially pp. 80–3.; Writer, *Pitched Battle,* pp. 308–24; Wright 'Apartheid and the Wizards of Oz', *SMH*, 27/4/1994.

57 McGregor, 'Racism in S.Africa', letter, *Canberra Times*, 11/1/1973.

58 As a graduate student in Sydney I protested against the tour at the rugby fracas and more patiently at night outside the Springbok's motel in Bondi

Junction. Most who protested accepted that their actions would have at best symbolic significance, as tangible change in South Africa—even in sport— was highly improbable.

59 Burgmann, Boyce, Roxburgh, in Writer, *Pitched Battle,* pp. 318–22.

60 Hain, 'Seal on Isolation', *Canberra Times*, 9/9/1971.

Chapter 11

1   Whitlam, 'Australian Foreign Policy…', especially p. 13.

2   FA, *Annual Review of South Africa*, 13/6/1974, NAA A 1838 201/10/11/3 pt 1.

3   Whitlam to UNGA, 30/9/1974 *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, 45:9 1974 pp. 582–3. Also, Whitlam discussion FA, 2/1/1973, NAA A1838, 905/3 pt 4; Whitlam to Moodie, 'Directive', 25/10/1973, NAA A 1838 201/10/11/3 pt 2.

4   Higgott, 'Australia and Africa', in Legum, pp. A219–23.

5   Freudenberg in *SMH*, 6/11/2014, pp. 22–3.

6   Whitlam to Moodie, 'Directive', 25/10/1973 NAA A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 2, and Moodie, 'Annual Review of South Africa', 13/6/1974, NAA A1838 201/10/11/3 pt 2; Woodberry to Ashwin, FA, 10/4/1973, NAA A1838, 935/2 pt 26.

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8   Higgott, 'Australia and Africa', in Legum, pp. 219–23.

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