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If European imperialism intensified and to some extent actually created the problem of race relations, it also provided its own solution. The solution was white or European supremacy…. This system, of course, bore the seeds of its own defeat.[1] HV Hodson, *International Affairs*, 1950

This policy, known as "apartheid", is the trigger that has fired racial explosions in South Africa and sent the echoes rumbling round the world.[2]
RT Foster, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1952

Dominions of Race

As Europe's 'grab for Africa' drew to a close, Australian soldiers fought to defend Britain's imperial possessions - in the Sudan in 1885 and, more significantly in Southern Africa from 1899, sending 16,000 troops to fight in the Anglo-Boer War. The hard-won victory of Britain and her white colonies left a bitter legacy in Afrikaans-speaking communities. British ascendancy was reflected in the Treaty of Vereeniging that forced the former Boer republics, the Transvaal and Orange Free State, into the Empire. In the decades after Federation of the Australian colonies in 1901 and South African Union in 1910, the new British Dominions consolidated brutal legislative barriers that protected 'white' privilege and 'racial' boundaries. In both countries segregation and discrimination were deeply rooted. Inequality was rationalized by ideas that justified white privilege – ideologies of 'racial purity' and racial hierarchy that expressed colonisers fears of 'race-mixing', miscegenation, racial 'contamination' and social competition.

World War II - the Allies 'war for democracy' - starkly exposed the undemocratic underside of Western civilization. Concepts of 'race' and European (or 'white') superiority were fundamentally disrupted. During the 1940s - as the great evil of the Holocaust was revealed - the very concept of 'race' was challenged. Racialism - the unacceptable face of colonialism – was starkly exposed. Assessing the immediate political implications of the war, officials in the US Department of State acknowledged that the prestige of the British Empire had been 'completely shattered'; that Japan's victories were the 'final blow to any concept of "white supremacy"'. It was a measure of the unanticipated impact of global war - as well as the tenacity of ideas about 'race' - that the terms of the peace settlements explicitly recognized 'the equality of states and all races'.[3] These sentiments were also echoed in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation (UN) negotiated in 1945 and, more forcefully three years later in the draft Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 'Racism' as the title of Edmund Soper's 1947 book suggested, had become 'a world issue'.[4] In a new international order symbolised by the UN and the drive against colonisation, WJ (Bill) Hudson commented, 'anti-racism became almost universal orthodoxy'.[5] Efforts to end colonialism and unravel its racist legacies were intertwined. But imperialism and European or 'white' privilege, to cite Edward Said, 'did not end, did not suddenly become past', once decolonisation had set in motion 'the dismantling of the classical Empires'.[6]

In an unanticipated post-war world, Australia's nervous 'search for security' defined foreign policy. The threat of invasion ended suddenly with Japan's defeat in 1945; but threats to the putative Anglo-Australian 'way of life' were now, unexpectedly, ideological.[7] "White Australia' reluctantly accepted that traditional ties of Empire could never be fully resuscitated. The future had to be secured in a volatile Asia-Pacific – a region divided by contests against European colonialism and deepening Cold War tension. Struggles against racism were deeply interwoven with these broader geo-political currents. Anti-racism, to again cite Said, was linked inextricably to 'the great movement of decolonization' across an emergent "Third World"'.[8] Post-war challenges mounted by 'people of colour' against European colonialism mirrored growing demands for racial equality within settler-countries long divided by discrimination. These challenges were at the heart of the geopolitical conflicts that defined global politics after the war: struggles that in Eric Hobsbawm's words could 'reasonably be regarded as a Third World War'.[9]

Visiting Pretoria in 1960, fifty years after South African Union, Britain's Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan warned that white supremacy could not be sustained in the face of growing anti-colonial nationalism. In colonial settler states traditionally defined by racialism, post-war pressures brought unexpected, contradictory and uneven change - most notably in South Africa and Australia. The assault on 'European supremacy' did not stop at the geographical boundaries of the colonized world. It brought, also, fundamental challenges to 'colonialism within', especially in Australia and South Africa. As Hodson commented shortly after India and Pakistan won independence, colonialism 'of course, bore the seeds of its own defeat.[10] Struggle for self-government and civil rights erupted in the wake of global war. The very oppression that enforced 'white' ascendancy was everywhere confronted by demands for freedom and equality. A powerful transnational movement organized to fight racism in the so-called developed world. In the United States as war in the Pacific ended, desegregation of the armed forces and President Truman's civil rights platform optimistically anticipated the end of segregation. Other countries defined by institutionalised racism - most notably in the 'white Dominions', Australia and South Africa- confronted unprecedented pressure to change.

Here, civil rights struggles within the nation were intertwined with international contests over decolonialism, Indigenous recognition and rights. In both countries a new - but very different - politics of anti-racism was unleashed. Within each the politics of white supremacy were fractured. The drive for 'racial equality' did not quickly disrupt the ideas or practices that had for generations defined, and divided, both putatively 'white' states. But it did dramatically affect each nation, albeit in distinct ways. Trajectories of international engagement and patterns of domestic race-politics increasingly diverged. The institutionalised apparatus underpinning discrimination was hesitantly discarded in Australia while in South Africa it was more brutally elaborated.

'White' Fragments of Empire

Sometimes referred to as 'Sisters of the South', Australia and South Africa were from the early twentieth century widely identified as 'white man's' countries' - societies built overtly on ideas and institutions of 'white supremacy' laid down across generations of colonization. The parts of Europe's vast empires occupied by waves of Europeans were conventionally understood as distinct settler-colonies; known euphemistically as 'fragments' of Europe - transplanted or 'supplanting' societies shaped by colonialism, settlement and immigration. Other narratives emphasised invasion, frontier-violence, wars of resistance, dispossession, settler-violence, Indigenous struggle and survival. Conquest paved the way for occupation and settlement. Ideas, institutions and social practices were transplanted from the Old World to a so-called New World. European privilege, institutionalised racism and inequality were deeply embedded in all settler-colonies from the very first generations of occupation.[11] Writing at the height of the Civil Rights struggles in America, Robert Blauner expressed a view by then widely shared by scholars and activists alike: '[t]here is a[n] historical connection between the third world abroad and the third world within', he wrote. Students of race relations uncovered in settler-societies like Australia and South Africa, or the USA, a persistent form of colonialism in which 'the oppressing white nation occupied the same territory as the oppressed people themselves'. Indigenous communities and unfree 'people of colour' were commonly subjected to 'internal colonialism' - most conspicuously in South Africa, Australia and the United States. The global assault on colonialism, then, was also a drive for racial equality within the fragments of Empire. The term 'colonialism within' summarized enduring patterns of dispossession and discrimination in self-proclaimed 'white countries'. Here walls of exclusion and separation perpetuated 'racial' distinctions and social divisions laid down across many generations of European occupation, settlement and coercion.[12] Yet within this broad historical arc distinct nations grew and endured.

The roots of racism differed greatly in each 'white' country, as did underlying aspects of racial ideology and of social division. Yet like settler-colonies more generally, Australia and South Africa were shaped in important ways by intertwined and sometimes parallel historical narratives. Racialised inequality was laid down in Australia under British colonisation and settlement from the late eighteenth century. In Southern Africa, the roots of racial exploitation lay in a protracted history of Dutch, French and British occupation and settlement. From the turn of the century the newly proclaimed Dominions expressed most bluntly - and brutally - practices that embedded coloniser privilege. Ideas about 'race' and 'races' sanctioned discrimination and segregation - albeit in different ways in each society. Cultural and national identities were constituted by pervasive assumptions about 'whiteness' as 'race' with 'other races' defined variously as 'native', non-white, coloured, or black.

In South Africa, a powerful if uneasy alliance of Afrikaner and English settlers would ensure its privileges by legislating rigid separation of non-white people - who collectively, comprised about eighty percent of the total population. The Union of South Africa was deeply divided by language, history, culture, region, 'race' and 'colour'. It was a fragile state built from British colonies, Afrikaner settler-communities, conquered and dispossessed African societies, and communities labeled Asian or Coloured descended from indentured or immigrant workers from India and other parts of Britain's vast Empire. Unlike most modern nation states, this multi-ethnic/multiracial society embraced no overarching historical story. Relatively few of its people were willing partners in a unifying or unified national community, whether imagined or material. Political and economic power resided overwhelmingly in European hands. Within 'white' South Africa deep divisions persisted between English-speaking communities and generally poorer predominantly rural Afrikaner-speaking communities. Yet after Union a self-proclaimed 'white' South African nation was essentially united by questions of race, power and privilege. White supremacy was consolidated in clusters of legislation affecting, differentially, all aspects of politics and society. The new Union government quickly legislated to further entrench patterns of racial separation and economic domination laid down under colonialism: the infamous Native Land Act of 1913 extended territorial segregation; Indian immigration ended; and the political rights of non-Europeans, although already severely limited, were further reduced. And in 1936, The Native Trust and Land Act provided a brutal blueprint for much of the legislation elaborated as 'apartheid' in the wake of victory by the Afrikaner-controlled National Party in 1948.

Early iterations of apartheid defined it as 'a policy that sets itself the task of preserving and safeguarding the racial identity of the white population', while preserving the identity of 'separate racial groups' through territorial segregation of the 'various races of the country'.[13] '[R]acial purity and self-preservation' are the 'impenetrable armour' of the white state, Prime Minister Daniel Malan proclaimed as the National Party came to power.[14] The newly elected Afrikaner-dominated government promptly legislated to further extend the reach of racial domination It elaborated systems of racial classification, disenfranchisement, segregation, regional separation and migratory labour that were brutally enforced by white minority rule – a racialised apparatus of state control labeled by its architects, as well as its critics, 'apartheid'. White supremacy - expressed through exclusive political power, white privilege, and the routine assertion of 'racial superiority' within an explicit racial hierarchy - defined the apartheid state. Complex ethno-racial classifications buttressed the vast apparatus of apartheid: groups were labeled variously as Whites, Europeans, Afrikaner, English, Coloured, Indian, Asian, Bantu, Native or African. Political authority resided almost exclusively in European hands. Reflecting the victory of 'volk' nationalism, Afrikaner hegemony was consolidated by 'cradle-to-grave' apartheid. In the decade from 1948 its brutal framework was fully elaborated under a complex of laws that included the population registration act, group areas act, Bantu authorities act, the reservation of separate amenities act, the Bantu education act (or the coloured people's education act), and the job reservation act. Laws prohibiting 'mixed marriages' or interracial sexual relations (enforced by the immorality act of 1950), along with ubiquitous signs on public amenities dividing 'whites-blankes' from 'Blacks-Africans', became infamous symbols of forced separation in public places - transport, parks, beaches, theatres, toilets, cafes, schools, hospitals, sport and sporting facilities. These laws reflected so-called 'petty apartheid'. They were widely interpreted as its defining feature.

Less acknowledged - abroad at least - were deeper structures legislated as 'Grand Apartheid'. A decade after the first explicit 'apartheid' laws were enacted a vast complex of legislation ensured that three million whites would exercise permanent authority over a coloured majority of thirteen million and more than 80% of the nation's land and resources. The remaining land areas, generally of poor quality with few natural resources, were reserved for 'African' use. These dispersed parcels of land were labeled euphemistically as 'Homelands', 'Bantu Homelands', or 'Bantustans' – areas set aside ostensible for 'separate development'. In practice they were economically unsustainable, and served as convenient sources of cheap migrant labour for white South Africa's farms, factories, and homes. Most African communities were forced to reside in 'homeland' areas or 'townships' separated from whites-only areas. 'It is Government Policy that the Bantu are only temporary residents in the European areas of the Republic', an official Bantu Administration circular stressed in 1967, 'for only as long as they offer their labour'.[15] White economic privileges and national economic growth demanded continued exploitation of a lowly paid, mobile labour force. Industry was built on the controlled exploitation of 'migratory labor' from African 'homelands' and 'townships'. The Group Areas Act and Pass Laws were used to regulate the supply of labour without undermining privileges reserved exclusively for whites. Separate, unequal access to education and training, coupled with rigid race-based job reservation laws and an elaborate framework of controls over internal movement, added to the complex of legislation that sustained the economic well-being of European South Africa without

compromising economic policy, racial separation or social controls. Power - political, economic and social - was exercised coercively by a 'white' minority government representing about twenty per cent of South Africa's people. The remaining 'non-white' majority, more than eighty percent of the population, exercised no real power in national politics. Typical of liberal assessments of South Africa's race policies was Martin Luther King's claim that 'Apartheid is medieval segregation and a sophisticated form of slavery'.[16]

In Australia, an overwhelmingly British society would ensure 'racial' authority by laws privileging 'white' Anglo-Celtic immigration and denying entry to people from countries outside Europe; by 'assimilation' policies that sought - in the crudely racist language of the time - to 'breed-out' racial differences; and by discriminatory legislation that in effect segregated Aboriginal people and communities from a far larger Anglo-European society. Prime Minister Billy Hughes proclaimed as the terms of peace were negotiated after the First World War that racial homogeneity was the 'greatest thing we have achieved'.[17] Within this 'New Britannia[18] citizens of Anglo-Celtic heritage comprised an overwhelming majority, while Aboriginal and Strait Islander communities comprised perhaps five percent of the population. Post-war Australia, as the Indian High Commissioner in Canberra noted in 1951, was determined to preserve a' British way of life' and protect the 'white democracy' And, he emphasized, European Australia was determined to avoid the conflicts dividing multiracial South Africa. White Australia would continue to shelter behind a 'wall of colour'.[19]

Within the racist logic of the self-proclaimed 'white' nation, homogeneity demanded not only that non-European migrants be denied entry but that other 'races' be denied equality under the law. Thus the Constitution of the Commonwealth excluded Indigenous people from full citizenship, stating that 'No Aboriginal native of Australia, Asia, Africa or the islands of the Pacific except New Zealand shall be entitled to have his name placed on the Electoral Roll'. In the following decades, numerous acts of parliament at federal, state and territorial levels established networks of discrimination that, arguably, had even more devastating consequences for Indigenous people than did formal denial of citizenship and political equality. In summary, in all states and the Northern Territory, most Indigenous people, especially those in rural or remote communities, lived segregated from mainstream society and institutions. Many Indigenous communities were distanced from 'country'; denied rights to traditional land; and separated from local cultures or community languages.

A legislated 'colour bar' regulated the lives of most Indigenous people. Customary segregation was widespread - especially but not exclusively in regional and rural areas. Legislation varied greatly across state jurisdictions. Only in NSW and SA, for example, did Indigenous people have the right to own property. Until 1969, in most states, children could still be subject by white authorities to forced removal from their families, made wards of state, or given up for private adoption. 'Racial purity' - 'whiteness' - would be achieved by breeding-out 'Aborigine blood'. Until well into the 1960s Federal governments assiduously defended 'race policies' designed to gradually absorb or assimilate 'Aborigines and part-Aborigines' into 'a single Australian community'. Dissenting voices claimed that assimilation policies were designed to 'breed-out' difference and were complicit in efforts to smooth 'the pillow of a dying race'. Despairing Indigenous voices lamented the brutal implications of assimilation. In 'The Dispossessed', written in 1964, poet Ooderoo Noonuccal spoke of 'A dying race you linger on, degraded and oppressed/ outcasts in your own land, you are the dispossessed.'[20]

Church Missions and Protection Boards were disturbing agents – and symbols – of systemic discrimination and separation. In most states 'any Aboriginal' could be removed to or detained in a reserve; 'any Aboriginal child' could be committed to an institution or forcible separated from family; or 'deprived of their liberty' and citizenship rights 'in many other ways', including the right to marry, consume alcohol, or access public facilities. As late as 1965 Queensland legislated to extend 'reservations' and further entrench segregation In rural communities, especially, many Indigenous people lived segregated lives, routinely denied equal access to hospitals, theatres, swimming pools and other recreational facilities, hotels and accommodation. The right to marry was denied many; 'interracial' marriage was prohibited in some states; and perhaps most disturbingly, generations of Indigenous children were forcibly separated from parents, and raised in state institutions divorced from Indigenous cultures and extended family. These children would later be known as 'the stolen generation(s)', after the 'Stolen Generation' enquiry and report, 1995-1997. In the name of assimilation, thousands of Aboriginal children were taken forcibly from their families to be trained and educated in coercive institutions or fostered out to 'white' families. Informed estimates suggest that across two or three generations until the late 1960s – early 1970s, as many as one-third of all Aboriginal families were affected by this brutal attempt at social engineering. The official Community Summary of the

Stolen Generation reported 'Indigenous families and communities have endured gross violations' of fundamental human rights'. Even more disturbingly, it concluded, such violations 'were an act of genocide, aimed at wiping out Indigenous families, communities and cultures [that are] vital to the precious and inalienable heritage of Australia'.[21]

Constitutional change during 1962 – 1967 brought formal political equality for Aboriginal people and importantly gave the Federal government power to override the many laws, regulations and local practices that sanctioned discrimination on the basis of 'race'. But racism was deeply embedded - institutionally, socially and culturally. Writing recently of his early life growing-up in Wiradjuri country in rural NSW during the 1960s -1970s, Stan Grant speaks of 'living in the cracks'; of unrelenting 'fear [of] the state'; of a 'sense powerlessness' and the 'intrusion[s] of the police and welfare officers who enforced laws that enshrined our exclusion and condemned us to poverty'. His poignant descriptions reflect wider conditions of un-freedom and inequality that confronted generations of Indigenous people.[22]

Indigenous disadvantage was not the only difficult symbol of systemic racialism. Anglo-European – 'White' - Australia was also defined by the 'wall' it had erected against 'colour'. Menzies told a sympathetic Hendrik Verwoerd (South African Prime Minister, 1958–66) that immigration restrictions were 'based not upon any foolish notion of racial supremacy, but upon a proper desire to preserve a homogenous population and so avert the troubles that bedevilled some other countries' (presumably South Africa). Patronising policies that aimed ostensibly to 'protect' and 'assimilate' 'native' or 'Aboriginal' people paralleled immigration policy. Menzies, and most who defended a 'white Australia', were wedded to the virtues of 'racial homogeneity' that would be achieved by the 'assimilation of all Aborigines' and by laws that in effect prohibited non-Europeans from entering the country. Under the heading 'Assimilation as Genocide', the *Sydney Morning Herald* editorialised decades after Menzies left office, that if 'race' could not be 'bred out' by forced removal and assimilation, it was to be made invisible in other ways – by segregation and exclusion. Until the late 1960s – early 1970s immigration law continued to deploy, albeit sometimes unofficially, categories of 'race' to deny people of colour entry to the self-proclaimed 'white' nation. And, the 'assimilation' of racial, ethnic or cultural difference remained an explicit goal of social policy, unapologetically designed to ensure an homogenous (Anglo-European) nation.[23]

The Semantics of 'Race' and 'Whiteness'

Few scholars would disagree with Richard H King's recent observation that '[a]ll in all, race is the modern West's worst idea' : [I]t is hard to think of any idea that has had more destructive consequences'.[24] Informed opinion, since the Holocaust at least, endorses the judgment advanced by Ashley Montague in 1942, that the idea of 'race' is *Man's Most Dangerous Myth* - 'the witchcraft of our time'.[25] In the immediate aftermath of war, as the true horrors of Nazi 'race' policies were more fully revealed, UNESCO issued its watershed 'Statement on Race'. Importantly it noted that 'race' 'as a valid scientific idea' was largely discredited during the interwar years, but 'race' as popular myth flourished.[26] UNESCO found that biological notions of 'race', including ideas of racial 'superiority' or 'inferiority', could not be supported by 'scientific evidence'. A generation after the war, renowned biologist Stephen J. Gould wrote, famously, that the idea of distinct races populating different rungs of a so-called racial ladder was unscientific: it reflected *The Mismeasure of Man.*[27]

Although 'race' and 'colour' have no objective purchase when applied to human populations, *ideas* about race and colour are of fundamental historical significance.[28] Racial labels have 'real' social meaning. 'In the troubled affairs of men,' Robert Redfield wrote as early as 1945 'race is of consequence because of what men(sic) think and feel about it, and not because of anything that race is of itself: That is the cardinal fact'.[29] Michael Banton, a most respected scholars in this field, has emphasised that '[p]atterns of race relations during the past 200 years have been influenced by what people *believe* to be the nature of race, and it is necessary therefore to take account of these ideas'. By extension, 'racism' is broadly used to refer to forms of prejudice or discrimination which focus on groups or individuals *believed* to represent a particular 'race'. Echoing Montague, Edward Shils wrote at the height of the civil rights struggles in the US that 'race' 'is inherently meaningless'. 'Race' is a cultural or social construct, important as myth or ideology, but not as 'objective' social category.[30] Thus, in the following study when – unavoidably – a term like 'white' or 'whites', 'black' or 'blacks', 'coloured' or 'Asian' is used, it refers only to an individual or group who 'believe themselves to be' people of that colour or race, or have been defined by the state or society as belonging to a particular 'racial group'.[31]

However arbitrary, ideas about race and difference, or colour and difference, were deeply embedded in histories of Empire and settler-colonialism. They were fundamental to the fabric of modern nations built on European privilege and ideas of 'white' supremacy. Yet as Ta-Nehisi Coates has written recently, '"race" is the child of racism, not the father.' [32] European expansion promoted biologised ideas of 'race'; ascribed particular colour(s) to these 'races'; and privileged 'white' over 'black' or 'colour'. Race was 'natural' and, in European eyes at least, self-evident. Racial ideologies reflected inequalities that grew from - and helped rationalise - settler-privileges in the colonized world. As Harold R Isaacs has written '[R]acial mythologies built around differences in skin colour and physical features were among the prime tools of power used in the era of Western empires'.[33] Ideas and images of 'race' and 'races' circulated routinely within and across European states and societies – ubiquitous signs of 'obvious' group difference. Belief in a racial hierarchy excused social segregation, economic exploitation and denial of political rights. The renowned African-American scholar WEB Du Bois wrote in the early 1900s that 'whiteness' is 'a very modern' 'discovery', a convenient label that helps justify the segregation of 'Black Folks'.[34] His claim applied with equal force to Europe's fragments of Empire. Ideologies of 'race' and colour were central to definitions of nation and collective identity in putatively 'white' Australia and South Africa. Racial ideologies legitimated historical narratives of violence and inequality - narratives that outlived European imperialism, decolonisation, and the spread of democracy in the twentieth century.

Referencing South Africa, Anthony W Marx has written: '[e]ven the terms "black" and "white" remain unfortunate shorthand for socially constructed and varying identities'.[35] I argue, broadly, in the following study that politics within and between the two 'white' nations were influenced at every level by racial ideologies and assumptions: by what Europeans communities thought about 'race', group difference and assumed genetic hierarchy. It mattered little to those in each society who were determined to promote 'white' privilege that such beliefs could not be defended scientifically or rationally. In contrast, it mattered greatly to opponents of racialism in each society that concepts of 'race' and 'colour' were as untenable as they were unethical; that they were elaborate de-politicised myths that substituted ideology for historical explanation.

Yet racial discourses remained tenacious historical agents throughout much of the twentieth century, particularly in ostensibly 'white' South Africa and 'white Australia'. Typically, for example, *Die Transvaler* editorialized in 1965 that 'The white race has maintained itself in South Africa because of a special factor – no intermingling of blood'.36 In Australia, as is evidenced throughout this book, 'Whiteness' was to be preserved by 'race-based' immigration exclusion and policies designed to eliminating or 'breeding out' racial difference. In their singularly important work, Drawing the Global Colour Line, Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have traced the appearance of 'whiteness' as an enduring 'mode of subjective identification that crossed national borders and shaped global politics'. Different histories in different nation-states left distinct imprints on these broadly racialised assumptions, even within the cluster of 'white men's countries' linked closely to Britain and Empire. Politics within South Africa and Australia, and relationships between them, were commonly prejudiced by racial ideologies that circulated transnationally. Belief in whiteness as 'race' was pervasive, reflecting and shaping patterns of inequality and exclusion. But, as is evident throughout this book, in the wake of global war racialised beliefs and practices confronted unprecedented challenges, albeit in ways largely distinct to each of the so-called 'white man's countries'.[37]

In the following study, I have been unable to fully avoid referencing vocabularies of 'race', 'colour' or 'whiteness' common to English-language and Afrikaner-language discourse during - and beyond - the apartheid era. However, I at no time wish to imply that racial labels - or indeed the very concept of 'race' itself - have any objective reality or scientific veracity. I acknowledge the arbitrary racism conveyed in language that equates group difference with 'blood'; refers variously to individuals or groups as racially 'pure' or racially 'mixed'; speaks of a hierarchy of races; or links 'race' with levels of 'civilisation' or 'capacity'. Nonetheless, the broad historical scope of this book makes it difficult to avoid fully the language of race and racialism that pervaded European-settler colonies and helped sanction 'white supremacy' across much of the twentieth century. Moreover, the language of 'race' changed over time and differed significantly across different regions and societies. Hence it is an important focus of any study of the 'politics of race' or 'race relations'. Interpretations of race and expressions of racism in European Australia changed gradually from the 1940s in the face of mounting demands for equality that accompanied the redefinition of 'race' in watershed UN conventions on human rights. It is argued here that protracted conflict over apartheid in South Africa encouraged significant ideological shifts as well as important legislative change within white Australia. Gradually, also, assumptions suggesting biological group difference and racial hierarchy were discredited. Yet, as is evident throughout this book, customary ideas about race, biology,

and group difference outlived formal political structures that protected - and rationalised - 'white' privilege in both societies.

Overview: Intersecting Histories, Diverging Trajectories

In tracing the interlocking histories of separate nation states, it is difficult to escape comparative generalisations. As Peter Kulchin has noted, 'because most historical judgments are implicitly comparative, what we term comparative history constitutes the effort to do explicitly… what most historians do most of the time'.[38] In this sense, unavoidably, the following book is in part a comparative study of two very different countries – although it does not explicitly seek to extend the important comparative project at the centre of *Southern Worlds: South Africa and Australia Compared*, published in 2010. In the decades of international division over apartheid, similarities between the two countries were frequently claimed - especially by those anxious to defend apartheid as an unexceptional consequence of European expansion. National comparisons, and moral judgments, were a bedrock of the discourse provoked by racialism in Southern Africa. David Yudelman caustically observed in the late years of apartheid that his country was 'widely' and unfairly 'seen as a bizarre exception' to international norms: 'The image is, of course, convenient for those anxious to distant themselves from, and to avoid obvious comparisons with, the dark side of their own societies, past and present.[39] Yudelman was referencing other countries divided by racism, particularly Australia, but also the USA.

Like South Africa, Australia has built a "wall of colour",[40] Afrikaner leader told Australia's Prime Minister Robert Menzies in Johannesburg in 1953. Throughout the long contests over apartheid white South Africa's propaganda offensive repeatedly claimed that Australians were in 'no position to criticise apartheid because' their country, too, was built on discrimination and segregation. In response, Australia's opponents of apartheid claimed, if somewhat lamely, that 'one cannot draw a reasonable comparison between the systemic racial persecution inherent in apartheid and Australia's maltreatment of the Aborigines and archaic immigration policy'.[41] Contests over apartheid were rooted in claim and counter-claim over the character - or morality - of white supremacy in both South Africa and Australia. From 1948 until the early 1970s at the earliest, comparative judgments dominated public discourse: South African example was routinely conflated with Australian practice. Yet if the institutions and ideas underpinning 'white supremacy' in part overlapped, the post-colonial histories of the two countries reflected distinct, essentially separate narratives. It would be misleading – and ahistorical - to conflate their different experiences. While each expressed the politics of white supremacy, they did so very differently.

A plethora of previous studies have charted white Australia's hesitant transition towards an open multiculturalism against a background of immigration reform, Indigenous struggle or Asian 'engagement'. The politics of race - domestic, regional and global – provoked by apartheid are neglected in this otherwise impressive historiography.[42] Yet, as is evidenced below, the retreat from 'white' Australia was significantly affected by the nation's deep political and moral ambivalence over apartheid and minority rule in South Africa. Australia was deeply entangled in the international contests buffeting South Africa. Transnational struggle against apartheid had provocative - if largely unanticipated – consequences in Australia. Like South Africa, it was obliged to grapple with the 'wind of change' transforming not only the colonised world, but international politics more broadly.

Jane Carey and Clair McLisky have suggested that assumptions about 'whiteness' were 'central to the racial regimes which … so profoundly shaped the development of the Australian nation' and other settler-dominated regions in the Americas and Southern Africa.[43] In the immediate aftermath of war the white 'Sisters of the South' clung to racialised certainties that had protected against diversity and change. It is argued here that struggles provoked by the regime of white supremacy in South Africa destabilized ideas that had long defined that other assertively 'white' nation, Australia. From the early 1950s, but especially after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, shadows cast by apartheid in South Africa disrupted Anglo-Australia's racialised sense of nation, sharpening debate over Indigenous rights and assimilation practices, immigration reform and cultural pluralism. Racialised anxieties and racial assumptions were disrupted in each white society – albeit unevenly and unpredictably. Understandings of 'race' and group difference were challenged, as were the discriminatory politics that enforced 'natural' ideologies that privileged 'whiteness' over 'colour'; that imposed settler entitlement over the rights of Indigenous people and communities. These contests open a uniquely important window through which to view the evolution of ideas about 'race' and racism as 'white Australia' slowly discarded old practices and moved towards multicultural openness.

My work maps the evolution of Australian reactions to minority rule, and apartheid, against an international landscape changed inexorably by the drive against colonialism and racism. It engages with historiographical controversies far wider than those centred on the anti-apartheid movement and divisive anti-Springbok protests in the early 1970s - although these are explored at length in Part III. The post-war histories of both countries were shaped by the interplay of external and domestic forces; by overlapping transnational exchanges and frictions that transcended their increasingly porous borders. My study explores not only conventional bilateral political and economic intersections, but emphasises the cross currents of culture, ideas and social movement that broadly conditioned the bilateral relationship. It explores also more formal negotiations conducted through supra-national organisations, especially the United Nations and the rapidly changing Commonwealth, as well as international sporting organisations, the International Olympic Movement, and the powerful transnational crusade against apartheid. Transnational linkages provided important substrata of negotiation and advocacy, shaping more formal diplomacy and negotiations centered on apartheid.[44]

Given that apartheid was interpreted abroad as fundamentally a moral or ethical issue, it cannot easily be incorporated into arguments that deem the 'rational' pursuit of national interests as the overriding determinant of foreign policy. White Australia's increasing readiness to condemn white South Africa, while steadfastly refusing to support action against apartheid, is a central theme of this book. Such ambivalence had significant implications for Australia, both domestically and internationally. As global condemnation apartheid intensified Australia, too, was censured. While ever it refused to differentiate itself from the apartheid state Australia was exposed - and judged - as complicit with it.

This book traces the involvement of Australia's people and governments in the protracted struggles over apartheid during 1945-1975, from the complacent early years of the Menzies era to the fractious years of the Whitlam Labor government. In short, it traces Australia's tortured responses to Apartheid in the generation after World War II. It explores what might be seen as the ripple effects of the rising assault on institutionalized 'white supremacy'. These were often unexpected. They changed as the political architecture of apartheid was elaborated in the decade after the victory of the extremist National Party in 1948. They shifted dramatically with a changing climate of oppression marked by the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, South Africa's forced exit from the Commonwealth the following year, and banning of the African National Congress (ANC). And they accelerated sharply as the politics of race and sport were joined in the late 1960s, precipitating mass anti-Springbok protests that isolated white South Africa from international competition. With the election of a radical Labor government in Australia in late 1972 the ripples of change became waves of anti-racism, sweeping away legislative support for white Australia and rupturing relations with the apartheid state.

My study, then, explores bilateral relations between two so-called daughters of Empire - two European-dominated settler-nations defined by narratives of racism and the politics of white supremacy. It explores the implications for Australia of the bitter domestic and transnational politics of anti-racism that disrupted apartheid in South Africa and led, eventually, to its collapse. Government-to-government relations were woven into the broader fabric of international and domestic contests over decolonization. The politics of 'race' infused virtually every aspect of these relationships. And, as was obviously the case with the conduct of Australian foreign policy - bilaterally, regionally or globally - relationships that involved South Africa were embedded in deep transnational exchanges that were cultural and social, as well as more conventionally political, strategic and economic. From the early 1950s, struggles over white South Africa centered on the UN and the Commonwealth - multilateral associations themselves transformed by decolonization and the drive against racialism. In ways very different in each putatively 'white' society these contests brought social division, political reaction and – very gradually – meaningful reform. The narrative arc of my book is thus, necessarily broad. The shadows cast by apartheid are explored within a framework of historical change that is simultaneously local and cosmopolitan, domestic and international.

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[1] Hodson, 'Race Relations…', p.308.
[2] RT Foster 'Apartheid is popular but…', *SMH*, 27/9/1952
[3] Thorne, *Allies of a Kind …*, pp.7-13, 42; *The Issue of War…,* pp.27-32; Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line…*, pp. xii, 3.
[4] Soper, *Racism - A World Issue,* generally.
[5] Hudson, *Australia and the Colonial Question…*, p.54.
[6] Said, *Culture and …*,p.341.
[7] Lowe, *Menzies and …,* p.108 n. 34.

[8] Said, *Culture and*…,pp.xii-xiv; pp.230-315.
[9] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*…, p.226.
[10] Hodson, 'Race Relations…', p.308.
[11] Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies*….,esp. pp.3-10.
[12] Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* pp.53-75; Wolpe, 'The Theory of Internal Colonialism…',pp.249-52; Roger Bell, *Multicultural Societies…*,esp. pp.15-24; Said, *Culture and* …, esp. pp.1-72. Blauner's thesis has been widely deployed by historians and social scientists. Since the civil rights movement in 1960's America, paradigms drawing on the study of colonialism have infused virtually all studies of racial oppression and inequality. However, ideas of 'race' have undergone radical scholarly revision (even if in public discourse they have changed very slowly). Jennifer Clark's pioneering study of *Aborigines and Activism* and the *Coming of the Sixties to Australia* embraces Blauner's 'language of colonialism' (pp.2-4). Even more recently Jim Davidson, writing of relations between the 'Sisters of the South', stated simply that in Australia, at least, Indigenous people 'are still experiencing colonialism'. See Davidson, 'Not Just "Sisters of the South"…', p.14.
[13] Cited by Legum, 'Colour and Power…', p. 209.
[14] Tothill, 'Trying to sell apartheid…', p.145.
[15] UNESCO, 'Apartheid in Operation', in UNESCO, *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa* (Paris 1974), esp. pp.45-76.
[16] King, 1965, in Bernice King, 'Nonviolence: a Valid Weapon Against Apartheid', in '*Sanctions against Apartheid*: record of the special meeting of the general assembly for the International Year of Mobilisation for Sanctions against South Africa…, UN Special Committee on Apartheid, [1978) p.26.
[17] Australia Department of Immigration and Border Protection, website 2014, *Fact Sheet #Eight*.
[18] McQueen, *A New Britannia*, generally.
[19] Russell Ward, *The History…,* pp.51–52; Indian HC, Canberra, Report 1951, cited in Meadows, '"He no doubt felt insulted"…,' p.91. Casey in *SMH*, 26/11/1949; See also *The Australian* 2/1/1988 (cites cabinet papers from 1950).
[20] Coleman, *The Observer* 13/6/1959, 2:12 pp.361-63, 25/7/1959, 2:15 p.475, and 27/6/1959, 2:13 p.411; Beazley (Snr.), *Canberra Times* 26/10/60; *Hansard* (HR), 25/10/1960; *Bringing Them Home*, Ibid; Kath Walker (Ooderoo Noonuccal), *We Are Going: Poems*, p16.
[21] Bringing Them Home. Report…. 1997, National Overview, Chapter 2 esp., pp 33-35; Walker, *We Are Going…*,p16; Note: It would be misleading to interpret the Stolen Generations Report as a comprehensive historical record of Indigenous Australia , or Australians, in the 20th Century. The recent works of a number of scholars, not least Rowse and Attwood, provide nuanced correctives to the necessarily narrow *Report*'s emphasis on the brutal and often debilitating legacies of systemic discrimination and disadvantage. Rowse , *Indigenous and Other Australians* for example, subtly explores – and critiques - the way some post-war scholars and newspapers routinely characterized Indigenous Australians 'as habitually invisible as people with a potential for corrective action'; as a people who adopted a 'mask of apathy' and lacked 'fixed centres of political organization or potential resistance' (esp. pp.66-68). The question of Indigenous agency and local political initiative is discussed in relation to claims by Clark and others in Chapter 8 of this study where I explore movement against apartheid and Indigenous struggle as 'complimentary', and linked, political 'contests'.
[22] Grant, Stan *Talking to My Country,* pp. 2-6.
[23] Menzies, June 1949, in Joske, *Sir Robert Menzies…,* pp.172-73. 'Assimilation as Genocide', ed. *SMH*, 22/4/1989. Grant, *Talking to My Country*, pp.2-5; 29-53. Assimilation policy and the quest for an 'homogenous' nation are discussed in Chapter 7, 'Parallel [with] Apartheid'.
[24] King, *Race, Culture and …*, p.1-2.
[25] Montague, *Man's Most Dangerous Myth….* Montague's then controversial assertion of the fallacy of 'race' was first published 'when Nazism flourished; when African-Americans sat at the back of the bus; and when race was considered a determinant of people's character and intelligence'. [Publisher's summary, p.3 of 1974 ed.]
[26] King, *Race, Culture and …*, pp.1-4.
[27] Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man*. In his very recent book *A Brief History of Everyone Who Ever Lived – Stories in Our Genes,* Adam Rutherford, concludes that modern genetics, most prominently the Human Genome Project, has not altered the claim of 'race' as myth. '"Black" is no more a race than "long distance runner is"', he writes. Rutherford, *A Brief History*…,p.267. See also Bell, Philip, 'The Limits of Semiotics - Epistemology and the Concept of "Race"',…pp.51-66.
[28] Philip Bell, 'Race, Ethnicity…'pp.26-31. See also, his 'The Limits of Semiotics…', esp. pp.51-59.
[29] Robert Redfield, 'Race and Human Nature', cited Soper, *Racism…*, Introduction.
[30] Shils, 'Color, the Universal…', p.1.
[31] Banton, *Race Relations*, p.3. Recent argument overwhelmingly accepts this premise: See for example Ta-Nehisi Coates, *Between the World and Me*, generally, esp. p.105.
[32] Coates, *Between the World…,* pp.7-8, 55-57, 149.
[33] Isaacs, 'Group Identity and Political Change'…, p.76.
[34] see generally, Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk*.
[35] Marx, *Making Race and Nation…,* p.xii.
[36] *Die Transvaler* [1965], cited *Canberra Times* 'Dark Cloud Over South African Sport', 5/2/1966.
[37] Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line…,* esp. pp.2-9. This pioneering work integrates studies of 'race' as ideology into a fresh transnational perspective. Lake's subtle understanding of the invention of 'whiteness' can be found also in '"The Discovery of Personal Whiteness …', pp. 320-27. For an informed consideration of 'assimilation' 'whiteness' and 'nation' see Russell McGregor, 'Making One People…', pp.71-79.
[38] Kolchin, 'Comparing American History', p.65.
[39] Yudelman, The Emergence..., in Dollery, 'Economic Sanctions…', p.49.; John Nieuwenhuysen and David Dunstan eds., Southern Worlds…, generally; Jim Davidson, 'Sisters of the South: South African Connections and Comparisons'…and '"Same Difference": Australia and South Africa'. See also, Note 25 below.
[40] Malan to Menzies, [n.d.]1953 in Meadows, 'He no doubt felt insulted'… p.95.
Times (London) 11/7/1953; (Melbourne) *Herald* 13/7 1953.
[41] T. Godfrey-Smith lr. *Canberra Times*, 18/7/1963.
[42] Throughout this study I acknowledge - and reference - important scholarship that qualifies this perhaps ungenerous historiographical claim. Various aspects of domestic race-politics and changing ideas about race and rights are explored through an international or trans-national lens in the diverse works of a number of scholars, most significantly Jennifer Clark, John Chesterman, Matthew Jordan, Sue Taffe, Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Peter Limb, and Sean Brawley. An important collection of essays, *Southern Worlds: South Africa and Australia Compared*, edited by John Nieuwenhuysen and David Dunstan (Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2010) does not explore in detail the issues at the centre of my study. However, the contributions of Jim

Davidson, Norman Etherington, Marilyn Lake, Anna Clark and Bruce Murray, especially, raise important historical questions about trans-national and bilateral relationships and comparative study of the so-called 'white' countries.

[43] The burgeoning historiography of 'whiteness' is explored by Jane Carey and Clair McLisky in their sophisticated exploration 'Creating White Australia…', Introduction, pp.ix –xxiii. See also Note 39, below.

[44] De Costa, *Indigenous Transnationalism*, pp.2-15; Gurtov, *Global Politics…,* esp.pp.6-11.