

**Australia and the United States**  
**in the American Century**  
Roger Bell

# **Australia and the United States in the American Century**

**Essays in International History**

**Roger Bell**

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*To Sarah,  
for everything*

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Roger Bell

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but should an error or omission occur, the author expresses his  
apologies.

## Foreword

As war raged in western Europe in early 1941, the influential publisher of *Life* magazine Henry R Luce claimed that in this, the great American Century, the United States must abandon isolationism and assume its destiny: global leadership. The Allies' hard won victories in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific were built on America's newly evident power. The 'American Century' anticipated from the 1890s was translated during World War II into unprecedented military authority and expansive internationalism. 'Consider the twentieth century', Luce asserted prophetically. 'It is not only [ours] in the sense that we happen to live in it but ours also because it is America's first century as the dominant power in the world.'

The outbreak of war in the Pacific and Asia brought Australia into a crucial strategic alliance with this dominant global power. The bilateral alliance was confirmed in the very different Cold War environment a decade after Pearl Harbor, as Australia sought assurances of American support against the possibility of a resurgent Japan and the uncertainties precipitated by a revolutionary new communist regime in mainland China. The ANZUS agreement, formalised as Cold War erupted in Asia, became for many in Australia a reassuring symbol of a deepening relationship with a new protector, the United States. This intimate military-strategic-intelligence association remained the defining feature of formal bilateral relations between the two very unequal states in the long years of war and fragile peace in the Asia-Pacific—through conflicts in Korea and Vietnam; deep tensions generated by the Cold War; contests over decolonisation, communism and nation building on mainland Asia; troubled relations with Indonesia; intervention in East Timor; and the War on Terror, precipitated by the September 11 attacks on the US.

The bilateral relationship was never limited to collaboration on security issues. It was also shaped by intersecting cultures, ideas and technologies. Speaking as the divisions of the Cold War hardened,

US President Harry S Truman anticipated his nation's broadening presence overseas: 'The whole world should adopt the American system', he proclaimed in 1946, 'the American system can survive in America only if it becomes a world system'. The 'American Century' proclaimed by Luce was now widely understood as a national imperative as the US and its allies confronted the deep ideological divisions of the Cold War. Given the inexorable spread of American values and technologies after World War II, the asymmetry of Australia's relationship with the United States was increasingly linked to the influence of so-called soft power: the alleged global cultural authority of the United States often labelled 'Americanisation'. Cultural forces, from the 'popular' to the political, helped shape—or at least symbiotically reveal—Australia's proliferating relationships with its widely proclaimed 'great and powerful friend', the US.




The broad design of this book highlights these major themes. Part I traces and examines political-military-strategic relations—those linked to the exercise of so-called hard power. Part II identifies and explores cultural relations—intersections which might be understood as linked to the exercise of 'soft power', globalisation and the international expression of American hegemony. These broad themes are closely related, although it is important that Australia's foreign policy be understood as expressing its perceived national interests and not be reduced to a policy dictated by America's overwhelming military power or cultural influences. It is broadly argued throughout this book that cultural shifts in the smaller nation were not directly or causally linked to the pursuit of politico-strategic interests which drew Australia away from the United Kingdom and aligned it closely to US power and ambition in international affairs.

This volume explores complex and changing relationships between two very unequal Pacific nations—relationships forged in war and sustained by a common alliance and a shared interest in peace. It brings together works published originally in journals and monographs in Australia and the United States since the late 1970s. It is my hope that these essays will stimulate a (re)consideration of the nature and implications of Australia's increasingly complex relationships with the United States. Additionally, it is hoped that they provide challenging insights into issues that continue to define this important international association in the wake of the Cold

*Foreword*




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War, concern over globalisation and Americanisation, and shared responses to a changed geopolitical environment signalled by the War on Terror.



## **Part I**

# **Bilateral Relations in War and Peace**





## 1

**Unequal Allies:  
Australia–America Relations  
and  
War in the Pacific  
1941–1945**

**1.1 Overview**

The outbreak of global war late in 1941 brought Australia and the United States into a critical, if temporary, military alliance. Although part of the broad multilateral United Nations alliance against the Axis states, Australian–American collaboration was directed principally against Japan. During the early phase of war the interests of the two Pacific Allied powers were often complementary, though not wholly identical. During the transition to peace, as the unifying threat of Japan receded, the sometimes divergent interests of the two countries were overtly manifest as the unifying threat of Japan receded, and both countries sought to play broader peacetime roles in Pacific and world affairs.

As a result of the overriding significance of the US to Australia during war in the Pacific, relations with the American Government were constantly the subject of top-level political and administrative

decisions made in Canberra. Australia's Labor Government, under Prime Minister John Curtin, consciously pursued a series of clearly discernible policy initiatives towards Washington. These were often modified or abandoned because of overt or covert American opposition. But they can nevertheless be traced in high-level Australian or US government records. In contrast, Australia figured prominently in America's external policies only briefly. Neither the Roosevelt nor the Truman administrations framed consistent policies towards Australia or indeed the Southwest Pacific area generally. Only in the economic arena did the US develop a specific and reasonably consistent policy towards this minor ally. When the Dominion achieved prominence in American planning, it usually did so within the context of broad Anglo-American decisions concerning global strategy. Seldom were bilateral relations with Australia the subject of protracted deliberation by the President, his Secretary of State, or the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. While understandably preoccupied with global strategy and relations with the major Allied powers—Great Britain and the Soviet Union—Roosevelt and his immediate advisers inadvertently overlooked the problems confronting the smaller members of the United Nations alliance. Specific American policy towards Australia was generally formulated on an *ad hoc* basis in response to Labor's persistent agitation or controversial initiatives.

The broad outlines of political and military relations between Australia and the US during World War II are well known.<sup>1</sup> But despite the availability of various published and unpublished surveys, no detailed analysis of the interrelated political, military and economic relations of the two countries during 1941–46 has yet been written. While existing studies, especially those by Hasluck, Reese, Grattan, and Reed, provide valuable insights into particular aspects of this subject, their general conclusions are often based on limited or highly selective evidence.<sup>2</sup> These studies have largely ignored critical aspects of wartime relations, especially Pacific settlement negotiations, the counteroffensive against Japan, and economic affairs. With the notable exception of Hasluck's substantial official studies, the findings advanced in existing works have not been based on extensive primary research. Hence most of the generalised assumptions about Australian–American wartime and immediate postwar relations have yet to be substantiated.<sup>3</sup>

Global forces, not domestic pressures, were the fundamental determinants of Australian–American relations during 1941–46. Consequently, the argument advanced here is more concerned with the influence of international developments and the distribution of global power on the evolution of relations between the two states than with the impact of domestic factors. It views the changing bilateral association within the broad context of altered American policies towards the Far East and Europe following the outbreak of war between Germany and the Allied powers late in 1939. Similarly it emphasises the decisive impact of Britain’s military difficulties in Europe and changes within the British Empire on Australia’s external relations, especially after early 1942. This is not to deny the particular imprint of the Australian Labor Government on relations with the US, nor indeed on Australia’s wider international relations and responsibilities after late 1941. Nonetheless, the independent initiatives adopted by the Labor Government cannot be adequately explained unless viewed within the framework of changing Anglo-American relations and Imperial affairs. Moreover, American responses to such initiatives were also fundamentally influenced by general international political, strategic or economic considerations, not domestic pressures.

The peculiar problems confronting Australia and the US in maintaining an effective wartime alliance and planning the peace were always aggravated by general difficulties arising from the unequal international status and power of each country. Despite the theoretical sovereign equality of all independent states, the influence Australia exerted within the wartime alliance was seriously restricted by its limited military resources and diplomatic weight. In contrast, as the dominant partner, the US was less concerned with the need to compromise in order to maintain the alliance than with implementing policies that would promote its specific national strategic objectives and postwar interests. After 1941 Australia was preoccupied with ensuring that its policies were not overridden by the US, and that its separate regional interests not merely subordinated to those of the major power. In a general sense, the disparate international power of Australia and the US is a durable factor which has consistently and often decisively influenced relations between them. At no time, however, has the unequal power and status of the two states been more apparent or crucial than during the conflict with Japan.

Relations between the governments of Australia and the US underwent fundamental changes during 1941–46. At the same time the wider international roles and objectives of each country in political, military, and to a lesser extent economic affairs, were altered decisively. While the Australian–American alliance was born of immediate military necessity, it was not translated into a permanent postwar security alliance. Moreover, it was not characterised by general bilateral accord on political, defence or economic matters during wartime. By bringing the two countries into close and effective military association, the war provided a necessary foundation for negotiation of a tripartite Australian–New Zealand–US alliance (ANZUS) a decade after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. While this postwar alliance was a response to essentially different international conditions from those operating during 1941–46, its origins lay in the wartime experiences of Australia and the US.

Political, military and economic affairs were interrelated and largely complementary aspects of relations between Australia and the US during war and preliminary postwar planning in the Pacific. Effective cooperation in each area was an essential basis for the successful common war effort against Japan. But the degree of bilateral wartime cooperation and accord in each area fluctuated considerably, and was less pronounced than historians have often implied.<sup>4</sup> While each power made sufficient contributions and concessions to enable ultimate victory over Japan, neither state was prepared to compromise its immediate or long-term national interests to further this end.

Without access to the confidential wartime records of Australia and the US, past studies have generally overemphasised the common strategic objectives and postwar interests of each government. The elaborate and determined efforts of both partners to maximise their respective influence on the wartime alliance and postwar settlement in order to protect their often incompatible security or economic interests, have been largely ignored. Evidence declassified recently indicates that despite successful prosecution of the war against Japan, and the development of more direct diplomatic bilateral contacts, political and economic relations between Australia and the US were often uncertain and ambivalent. Australia was constantly critical of American strategic priorities and the consultative machinery established in Washington. It

consistently presented exaggerated appeals for military and economic assistance to the US, and resisted American domination of the postwar settlement. The US provided levels of assistance considered unsatisfactory by Australia, and made minimal concessions to Australia's demands concerning inter-Allied consultation, global strategy, and postwar arrangements. Furthermore, the Roosevelt administration often sought to extract permanent political or economic concessions from the Dominion in return for generous wartime aid and a favourable postwar settlement in the Pacific.

However, these pronounced differences seldom found acute expression in the contemporary public record in either country. This was partly because war demanded that overt inter-Allied unity be maintained, even if this resulted in severe and unwarranted censorship of the mass media. After MacArthur had retreated hastily from the Philippines and established headquarters in Melbourne, censorship was often imposed to bolster the general's public image as well as for alleged security reasons. But MacArthur was not the only authority intent on controlling information. Through an overzealous Minister for Information, Arthur Calwell, the Curtin Government often manipulated news for political ends rather than national security. Knowledge of relations between the two states was also obscured by the fact that diplomacy, especially during wartime, is essentially a secret exercise. Now that both the public and confidential dimensions of Australian-American relations can be documented for the period 1941–46, it is apparent that in the political and economic arenas relations were often strained and uncertain.

The evidence presented here also suggests that while the two countries implicitly agreed that their military alliance must be sustained and Japan defeated, they generally failed to agree on the means necessary to achieve these related objectives. During the vital early months of war each government held widely divergent views and promoted often contrasting policies on the central questions of inter-Allied consultative machinery, global strategy, command arrangements, and reciprocal economic assistance. The Labor Government's unprecedented assertion of independent initiatives, however, generally failed to effect a dramatic change in American policies. Differences between the two states were consistently resolved in accordance with the wishes of the major partner.

Whereas the Labor Government was fundamentally concerned with developments in the Pacific after 1941, the Roosevelt administration consistently interpreted events in Europe as the principal threat to America's security interests. Despite Australian protests, the US devoted the maximum possible resources to an early victory over the European Axis powers. But, at the same time, America jealously attempted to maintain unqualified control of operations against Japan and to dominate all aspects of the postwar Pacific. During the transition to peace these policies conflicted directly with Australia's attempt to play an expanded or (as perceived by the State Department) 'imperialistic' role in regional affairs, and to participate meaningfully in all phases of the Pacific settlement.

The impact of the Pacific war on relations between Australia and the US on the one hand, and Australia and the United Kingdom on the other, has also frequently been misinterpreted. J J Reed has argued recently, for example, that the special bilateral relationship 'forged in the desperate early days of the war against Japan has been a cardinal feature of Australian and American policy' since Pearl Harbor.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, T B Millar has suggested that 'Australia's turning to the United States at this time ... has never been reversed'.<sup>6</sup> Australia did seek maximum military assistance from the US after war was declared against Japan. Yet both the United Australia Party governments of Lyons and Menzies, and the Labor Government of Curtin, had promoted defence commitments with Washington and sought substantial military assistance from the US before the Pearl Harbor attack. As early as 1908–09, Australia, under Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, had attempted to guarantee its security through a Pacific Pact embracing the US. Moreover, Australia's close wartime military collaboration with the US was not developed at the permanent expense of continuing defence cooperation with Britain or close postwar Imperial relations, especially in the political and economic spheres. December 1941 was a less decisive turning point in Australia's external affairs than has generally been assumed.

Nor is the suggestion, advanced for example by H G Gelber, that 'after 1941 the US assumed the role of Australia's chief protector', accurate.<sup>7</sup> In the immediate postwar years the Chifley Labor Government accepted that Australia must ultimately rely on US military assistance in the event of regional or global hostilities. But

Washington refused to be drawn into specific defence agreements or military arrangements embracing Australia. Moreover, despite protracted negotiations during 1945–47, the two powers failed to resolve political and military differences over reciprocal rights to bases in the postwar Pacific. After 1944 the Chifley Government sought continued defence cooperation with the US, provided this conformed with terms specified by Australia. These conditions were rejected by Washington. Not until 1951 did the US again accept a formal (if ambiguous) security agreement with Australia. But this agreement, the ANZUS pact, was negotiated in response to the alleged threat of international communism after Mao's victory in China in 1949; it was not a direct extension of wartime defence or military cooperation between Australia and the US. The evidence presented here supports the conclusion recently advanced by Trevor Reese that during the war the importance of the British Commonwealth to Australia declined, while that of the US increased.<sup>8</sup> But the temporary wartime alliance between Australia and the US was not translated immediately into a special postwar alliance contract. After the armistice, as before the Pearl Harbor attack, the US accepted no formal responsibilities for the defence of Australia.

While Australia was willing to foster joint Pacific defence and security arrangements involving the US after 1944, it was also anxious to limit unilateral American political and military influence in the South Pacific. During the transition to peace Australia reaffirmed its traditional political and economic allegiances with Great Britain, and sought close military and defence cooperation with Britain as well as with the US. By re-establishing close collaboration with the mother country and attempting to assume *de facto* leadership of residual British Commonwealth diplomatic and military influence in the Far East, Labor attempted to counter possible US domination of the postwar settlement, occupation of Japan, and disposition and use of bases in the Pacific. Australia also reaffirmed its traditional associations in order to add political and military weight to its position during negotiations with Washington over possible regional security arrangements and military cooperation after the defeat of Japan.

The period 1941–46 marks perhaps the most decisive stage in the evolution of an independent Australian presence in world affairs. The impact of war in the Pacific, combined with the assertive

independence of the new Labor Government, brought unprecedented changes in the direction and conduct of Australia's external relations. But the traditional view that 'the Curtin and Chifley governments gave Australia a foreign policy for the first time in its history',<sup>9</sup> overstates the influence of the new government and the war on the Dominion's external relations. The style and direction of foreign policy under Curtin and Evatt were much less radical than most historians have assumed.<sup>10</sup>

Pearl Harbor did not constitute a watershed for Australia in world affairs. The origins of Australia's new, if somewhat uncertain, relations with other powers, especially Great Britain and the US, and its preoccupation with regional affairs rather than Imperial unity predated the Pearl Harbor attack and formation of a Labor government in October 1941. The foundations of independent Australian diplomacy were laid in the interwar years as the Dominion moved hesitantly towards establishing separate diplomatic representations first within the Commonwealth, and later in the major capitals of the Pacific.<sup>11</sup> This development, combined with occasional Pacific security initiatives by Australian Prime Ministers and concerted attempts to shape British Far Eastern policy to Australia's regional interests, reflected a growing realisation that the interests of Britain and Australia were not synonymous. Before World War II (indeed, before World War I) Australia was concerned with security in the Pacific and sceptical of British policy. This found muted expression in unsuccessful efforts to involve America in regional security arrangements in the Pacific.<sup>12</sup> When the nature of Australia's prewar diplomacy is recognised, Labor policies after late 1941 constitute a less radical departure from the methods and objectives of previous governments than has generally been assumed.<sup>13</sup> This is not to deny, however, that under the Labor Government these prewar tendencies found more forceful and distinctive expression. Nationalistic policies of Curtin and Evatt dramatically quickened the development of a more independent and regionally oriented Australian role in world affairs. While more concerned with continental defence than its predecessors, Labor's foreign and defence policies brought unprecedented Australian participation in world affairs, precipitated a redefinition of Australia's status within the British Commonwealth, and established a new and essentially bilateral association with the US. If these policies were initially



necessitated by the exigencies of war, they were nevertheless brought to fruition by a Labor government holding different international objectives and employing contrasting diplomatic methods from those of its conservative predecessors.

## **1.2 Towards Pearl Harbor**

The Australian–American alliance was not formalised until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. But its roots lay in the emerging international tensions in both Europe and East Asia during the 1930s. Australia's relations with the US were transformed as a reaction to the expanding threat of the Axis states, especially in the Pacific.

Australia actively supported the British Commonwealth war effort against Germany and Italy after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. In contrast the US remained isolated from direct military involvement in Europe. Although it retained an undeclared, equivocal status, after mid-1940 the Roosevelt administration moved hesitantly away from isolationism and towards a position of tangible support for the Allied cause. Indeed, by August 1941, the UK War Cabinet had been informed that Roosevelt was attempting to 'force ... an "incident" that would justify him in opening hostilities' against the Axis states.<sup>1</sup> Yet until December 1941, when war with Japan was unavoidable, the US refused to comply with requests by the Allied powers that it declare war on Germany. It also refused to give Australia, Great Britain or the Netherlands an explicit commitment of military assistance if their possessions or territory in the Pacific were attacked by Japan.

Ironically, while war raged in Europe during 1939–41, diplomatic initiatives taken separately by Australia and the US focused increasingly on the Pacific area. The US was thrust into the European conflict as a full belligerent by events in the Pacific. While Australia's military and economic resources were directed towards the Commonwealth war effort in Europe, it sought to guard against its increased strategic vulnerability by developing firm political and military ties with the major power in the Pacific, the US.

In October 1935 President Roosevelt advised the Australian Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, 'that never again would the United States be drawn into a European war, regardless of circumstances'.<sup>2</sup> This statement indicated the strength of American military

isolationism during the 1930s, but it did not foreshadow American policy after Germany's expansionist aspirations were revealed in Austria and Czechoslovakia during 1938–39. Roosevelt's initial indications that his government might use 'more effective' methods than 'mere words' to deter Germany, and America's increased diplomatic involvement in European affairs after early 1939, were welcomed in Australia as tangible evidence that America was moving away from isolationism and towards a more responsible position in world affairs.<sup>3</sup>

However, this movement was barely perceptible until after the fall of France in 1940. Despite its traditional moral support for China's integrity and the 'Open Door', the US did not react forcefully to Japanese expansion in Manchuria during 1931 or in China proper during 1937. Not until late 1939 did the Roosevelt administration attempt to bolster its moral indignation and diplomatic protests by threatening to limit trade with Japan. Following the fall of France in June 1940 and formation of the Tripartite pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan shortly afterwards, the Roosevelt administration accepted that developments in Europe and the Far East were interdependent. During 1940–41 it moved towards military support for the British Commonwealth. In January 1941 Roosevelt acknowledged that America's 'vital national interests' were threatened by the activities of Germany and Japan, and emphasised that America's security was 'interwoven' with protection of the British Empire.<sup>4</sup> Until the Pearl Harbor attack finally resolved the principal dilemmas confronting Roosevelt, American foreign policy vacillated considerably. But it was not wholly unpredictable or inconsistent. Despite the restraints of public opinion and belated rearmament, the US moved inexorably towards firm economic sanctions and overt military intervention in support of the Allied powers, both in Europe and the Far East.<sup>5</sup>

As a member of the British Commonwealth involved in war in Europe but located on the periphery of Asia, Australia was directly affected by gradual revision of American foreign policy during 1939–41. Like the US, however, it was slow to discard its interwar policies in order to meet the changing international circumstances of the late 1930s. If events in Europe and the Pacific had initiated a change in America's foreign policy by 1939–40, it was events in the

Far East that largely precipitated a belated revision of Australia's foreign policy.

Australia's traditional obsession with Asiatic expansion received an indirect boost after 1937 as Japan occupied much of northern and central China and some key areas on the southern coast. This aggression culminated in an announcement by Prince Konoye in November 1938 that 'Japan intended to create a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere which would involve the cooperation of China, Japan, and the puppet state, Manchukuo'.<sup>6</sup> Australia was apparently unconcerned with the immediate consequences of the Japanese actions on China, but was apprehensive lest the Japanese actions foreshadowed further expansion southward.<sup>7</sup>

Although not uncritical of British policy, during the 1930s Australian governments accepted Britain's ambiguous commitments to send naval reinforcements to Singapore as an adequate substitute for radical innovations in Australian defence or foreign policy. The Lyons, and later the Menzies, governments largely ignored the substantial evidence that in the event of war against both Germany and Japan, Britain would focus its naval resources in Europe and the Mediterranean, not in the Pacific. Moreover, the hope of a general British Commonwealth rapprochement with Japan was optimistically entertained by members of the Australian Government until late in 1941. While the Lyons and Menzies governments were prepared to appease Japan in the hope of averting or delaying war, they also adopted limited international initiatives that were designed to promote Australia's regional security interests and reduce its traditional dependence on British foreign policy. During 1935 Lyons attempted to involve the US in a broad security pact embracing 'all the nations bordering on the Pacific Ocean'. He also discussed Pacific defence problems with Roosevelt in Washington and was assured in 1937 that if 'serious trouble arose in the Pacific, the US would be prepared to make common cause with the members of the Commonwealth concerned'. Without an independent diplomatic service, the Lyons Government could not effectively promote extra-Imperial initiatives. Opposition from the United Kingdom was sufficient to negate Lyons's proposal for a Pacific pact.<sup>8</sup>

In his first address as Prime Minister, R G Menzies extended the objectives implicit in Lyons's initiatives by declaring that in European affairs Australia would continue to be guided by Britain.

But he also emphasised that in the Pacific Australia had separate, primary responsibilities and must take the primary risks. 'The problems of the Pacific are different', he stated:

What Great Britain calls the Far East is to us the near North. Little given as I am to encouraging the exaggerated ideas of Dominion independence and separatism which exist in some minds, I have become convinced that in the Pacific Australia must regard herself as a principal providing herself with her own information and maintaining her own diplomatic contacts with foreign powers. I do not mean by this that we are to act in the Pacific as if we were a completely separate power; we must, of course, act as an integral part of the British Empire. We must have full consultation and cooperation with Great Britain, South Africa, New Zealand and Canada. But all those consultations must be on the basis that the primary risk in the Pacific is borne by New Zealand and ourselves. With this in mind I look forward to the day when we will have a concert of Pacific powers, pacific in both senses of the word. This means increased diplomatic contact between ourselves and the United States, China and Japan, to say nothing of the Netherlands East Indies and the other countries which fringe the Pacific.<sup>9</sup>

Although an important step towards greater Dominion autonomy in formulating and prosecuting foreign policy, this statement did not foreshadow a radical departure from British policy by the Menzies Government. It announced Australia's determination to depend, in part at least, on its own diplomatic service rather than a common British Commonwealth foreign service. Most significantly, however, Menzies's statement clearly differentiated Australia's immediate regional security interests from the broader interests of Britain, and implied that Australia would subsequently act as a 'principal' Pacific power to promote its separate interests. Ironically, it was the Labor Government, not the Menzies Government, that ultimately gave unequivocal expression to the objectives outlined by Menzies. Although capable of suggesting new directions for Australia's foreign policy, the Anglophile Menzies did little to effect these changes. Until late 1941, consecutive governments accepted that Australia's regional security interests could best be promoted by intimate, but not necessarily uncritical, cooperation with the mother country. Yet if Australia was reluctant to diverge sharply from British policy before late 1941, it does not necessarily follow that Australia was unwilling to promote its peculiar national interests in

international affairs. Indeed it did not defer automatically to British leadership in world affairs. Australia deliberately chose to cooperate closely with Britain and the Commonwealth. Despite support for this general policy, after 1939 successive Australian governments actively promoted closer Dominion and British Commonwealth cooperation with Washington and sought unequivocal assurances of American military intervention in the event of war in the Pacific.

Menzies's decision to establish a foreign diplomatic service and to formulate policy based on information supplied by Australian representatives abroad was a novel, if long overdue, response to growing instability in the Pacific. But it was not an unprecedented departure from combined British policy in the Pacific. Nor did it constitute the first attempt to promote closer Australian contacts with the US. As Meaney and a number of other historians have recently emphasised, from the time of Federation in 1901, Australian governments had adopted separate international and imperial initiatives which were designed to protect Australia's distinctive interests in the Pacific. Foremost amongst these initiatives were Prime Minister Alfred Deakin's proposal for a Pacific pact in 1909; the aggressively independent and largely successful activities of Prime Minister W M Hughes at the peace conference in 1919 which in effect secured firm Australian control over the former German colony in New Guinea and preserved the White Australia Policy from possible international sanction by the League of Nations; and Lyons's abortive Pacific pact proposal of 1935–37. If Australia had traditionally been preoccupied with the 'search for security in the Pacific', it was nevertheless slow to promote its regional interests by establishing diplomatic missions in the major capitals of the Pacific. Indeed, it was not until 1936 that a truly professional foreign service was created. However, from 1918 an Australian commissioner, under the control of the Prime Minister's department, operated from New York. The two major Australian states, New South Wales and Victoria, also had trade and immigration officers in San Francisco continually after the First World War. But, as Megaw has emphasised, until the late 1930s the duties of Australian representatives in the US were commercial rather than diplomatic. During these years Australian governments contemplated establishing full diplomatic links with Washington, but failed to do so, mainly because they did not wish to disrupt the

unity of the British Commonwealth or diminish Australian influence on British policy.<sup>10</sup>

In 1935 President Franklin Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, both recommended the 'establishment of regular diplomatic representations by Australia in Washington'.<sup>11</sup> Lyons initially rejected this suggestion. In 1937, however, an Australian counsellor, Keith Officer, was appointed to the British embassy in Washington.<sup>12</sup> The decision to establish a legation in the US was made by the Australian cabinet prior to the death of Lyons in April 1939.<sup>13</sup> This action was taken to promote the general interests of the British Empire as well as Australia's separate regional objectives in the Pacific. Richard Casey (later Lord Casey) was appointed Minister to Washington. Clarence E Gauss was nominated as first American Minister to Australia. Both men took up their new posts early in 1940, shortly after the outbreak of war in Europe. During 1940 Australia also established legations in Tokyo and Chungking.

Australia's diplomacy in Washington during 1940–41 had two interrelated objectives. It sought to strengthen general Anglo-American cooperation and to promote concrete assurances of American assistance to Australia in the Pacific. Casey's appointment was classified as an important 'strategic move in the Empire war effort, and an urgent immediate defence move for our own security'. Because of the current uncertainty surrounding Imperial naval strategy in the Pacific, an Australian official commented in 1940, America's support had become 'the vital element' in Australian defence planning.<sup>14</sup> However, despite Casey's exhaustive efforts, Australia received no firm assurances of military assistance from the US.

Yet the exchange of diplomatic representatives did effect substantial favourable changes in relations between Australia and the US, and established a firm basis for the intimate political and military cooperation between the two powers following the declaration of war against Japan in December 1941. During the decade preceding the Pearl Harbor attack Australian–American relations underwent marked changes, but they did not, as Esthus has argued, travel 'the road from enmity to alliance'. Despite persistent friction over economic matters, until the late 1930s relations between the Australian and American governments and public were notable for mutual indifference and isolation, not for deep-rooted hostility nor enmity.<sup>15</sup> Although broad bilateral agreement on

economic matters was not achieved, political and military relations between the two states progressed towards cooperation and mutual sympathy, culminating in a de facto alliance against the Axis states in December 1941. As American public support for Roosevelt's escalating assistance to the British Commonwealth increased, and the activities of the new Australian and American legations in Washington and Canberra expanded, the growing bilateral accord was translated into improved, more sympathetic and informed public attitudes in both countries. Australia's determination to seek America's support in the absence of certain guarantees of British protection was essentially a pragmatic political response to an immediate security dilemma, which did not substantially diminish Australia's traditional allegiance to Britain. While Australian public opinion was increasingly friendly to the US after 1939, available evidence suggests that public sentiment did not have an important direct bearing on government policy towards the US.<sup>16</sup>

Despite Casey's tireless activities, Australia remained of peripheral significance in American government policy, and an unimportant focus of American public opinion.<sup>17</sup> Most State Department officials continued to view the Australian legation as an instrument of British Commonwealth policy, and questioned the sincerity of Australian diplomacy towards America. During 1941 American officials criticised Australia for refusing to grant substantive economic or political concessions while constantly appealing for assurances of American military assistance. Australia remained reluctant to act independently of Great Britain in international affairs. Furthermore, until after the outbreak of war against Japan, the Dominion refused to lower the high tariff rates it imposed on American imports or to make any significant concessions to the Roosevelt administration. Hence, the State Department informed Hull and Roosevelt that Australia's attempts 'to establish its independent position vis-à-vis the United States' after 1939 had largely failed.<sup>18</sup> Not until early 1942, after Japan had exposed Britain's weakness in the Far East, did Australia pursue strongly independent initiatives towards the US, irrespective of the position adopted by Britain.

From early 1939 Australia's relations with the US centred explicitly on the question of reactions and attitudes of the Roosevelt administration and the American public 'towards any aggressive move by Japan in the Pacific Ocean, particularly in the

event of Britain at the time being involved with Germany and Italy and unable to send the necessary naval forces to the Pacific to contain Japan'.<sup>19</sup>

Developments in western Europe and the East progressively elevated the importance of this question. Australia and Britain now desperately sought to avert war with Japan. Casey commented in June 1940 that 'the British Empire cannot fight successfully Japan plus [the European] Axis powers'.<sup>20</sup> In the face of mounting Japanese pressure against Britain's Far Eastern possessions, and in the absence of an assurance of military aid from the US, Australia and Britain were prepared to appease Japan.

Both Casey and the British ambassador in Washington, Lord Lothian, advised their governments to negotiate a compromise settlement with Japan. This would establish stable relations with Japan and permit Australian and British forces to be used exclusively against the European enemy.<sup>21</sup> Casey was convinced that the 'time has now come when circumstances in the war in Europe necessitate major change in British and if possible American policy in the Far East'. Should America continue to refuse to give armed support if Japan attempted further aggression, Casey argued, then Britain should reach an agreement with Japan even if this involved 'large territorial concessions by China to Japan'. In return for this concession and other economic assistance from Britain, Casey proposed that Japan should formally 'undertake to remain neutral in [the] European war and to respect the territorial integrity, not only of the Netherlands East Indies, but also of British, French and American possessions in the Pacific'.<sup>22</sup> Menzies endorsed these appeasement proposals, although he possibly viewed them more as a tactic of delay than a permanent solution to Japanese expansionism.<sup>23</sup> 'My instinct tells me that Japan is not really anxious for another major war on top of her Chinese campaign if she can, by peaceful means, establish her commercial position in East Asia and get some assistance in what must be her real economic difficulties', Menzies wrote: 'Our approach should therefore be generous and understanding, without being abject'.<sup>24</sup>

However, the US refused to bargain China's territorial rights in return for a settlement with Japan.<sup>25</sup> Nor did New Zealand support such a settlement.<sup>26</sup> The Roosevelt administration was convinced that Japanese aggression could not be diverted by a policy of conciliation.<sup>27</sup> Privately, Menzies criticised America's decision. 'The



United States cannot very well complain if we decide not to fight her battles in the Far East', he informed Stanley M Bruce, Australian High Commissioner in London, because Roosevelt had refused 'to give any specific guarantee of the *status quo*, even in relation to Australia, or New Zealand, or the Netherlands East Indies'.<sup>28</sup> Despite this dissatisfaction, neither Britain nor Australia was anxious to risk destroying US confidence in British policy by separately adopting the appeasement proposal centres on China.

After July 1940 Australia increasingly attempted to demonstrate its support for America's hardening policy towards Japan. This changed emphasis was reflected in Menzies's statement of August 1940 in which he claimed that his government was now 'completely hostile to the mere appeasement of Japan'. Nonetheless, he added the important qualification that Australia's policy must remain sufficiently flexible to avert war in the Pacific so long as Britain was involved in war in Europe.<sup>29</sup> In the following months Australia and Britain anxiously sought to keep China belligerent to Japan, so that China would continue to divert Japan from moving southward and thereby remain a buffer zone protecting British territory in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.<sup>30</sup> However, Menzies now opposed appeasement of Japan, and argued that Australia adopt a Far Eastern policy which complemented that being pursued by Roosevelt and Hull after June 1940.<sup>31</sup>

Roosevelt's decision to restrict the export of strategic materials to Japan after early July 1940 increased Australian confidence in US policy. This act had a negligible impact on Japan's capacity to wage war. But as Langer and Gleason have pointed out, it indicated that Washington was 'gradually assuming the leadership in opposition to Japan's designs, which of necessity involved the acceptance of some responsibility for British as well as American interests'.<sup>32</sup> This leadership did not yet extend to military intervention against Japan.

Although seeking 'firm and exact'<sup>33</sup> assurances of military and political cooperation from Roosevelt, the Menzies Government remained privately critical of America's 'indefinite and variable' policy. After the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy was formed in September 1940, however, Australia experienced greater confidence in America's hardening policy towards Japan. Casey observed that the Roosevelt administration 'is now well aware that the security of the United States is bound up with the security of Britain'.<sup>34</sup> It was also reported that Hull 'clearly feels that [the]

German–Japanese alignment inevitably means that the United States itself will inevitably be drawn into war’.<sup>35</sup> Washington consented to follow parallel policies with the British Commonwealth in the Pacific, but refused to commit itself to ‘joint’ military action should these policies fail.<sup>36</sup> Nonetheless, Casey was confident that America would not abandon the Commonwealth powers.<sup>37</sup>

Britain and Australia reacted decisively to the Tripartite Pact. The Burma Road was reopened, thereby curbing Britain’s temporary appeasement of Japan. In October, both Britain and Australia gave an assurance that if Japan and the US became involved in war, they would immediately declare war on Japan. As the prospects of a Japanese attack on American territory were slight, this assurance did not involve them in an immediate risk. It was undoubtedly designed to stimulate greater American sympathy with British policy in the Far East.<sup>38</sup> Menzies also gave an assurance that should Britain become involved in war with Japan, Australia would immediately declare war on Japan ‘even if America does not ... We make no reservations about our associations with Great Britain and our willingness to collaborate with her to the full’.<sup>39</sup>

Australia’s determination to gain an explicit American commitment intensified after late 1940 as British and American defence planning and priorities were revealed during strategic conferences at Singapore, involving Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands. These powers requested that the US base at least part of its Pacific fleet at Singapore, rather than Hawaii, in order to deter Japan. However, the Roosevelt administration rejected this idea.<sup>40</sup> Menzies was ‘gravely concerned’ with the decisions made at Singapore, and anxious that Britain should give an unequivocal commitment to send adequate naval support to the Far East.<sup>41</sup>

This concern was aggravated during the Anglo-American discussions in Washington in 1941 where it was agreed that in the event of global war America’s principal military effort would be directed against Germany, not Japan. It was also agreed that Anglo-American policy in the Pacific would initially be purely defensive. The US refused to accept responsibility for retaining Singapore or defending the Netherlands East Indies, Australia or New Zealand. Although these decisions were not binding, they were accepted in principle by both governments. Kirby has emphasised correctly that the US ‘had neither accepted an obligation to enter the war nor

specified the circumstances in which they might do so'.<sup>42</sup> This broad outline of projected American global strategy was only slightly modified before December 1941.

While Australia continued to seek a formal American military commitment, it was reassured by Britain that the Roosevelt administration would not desert the British powers. Churchill advised the new Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden:

You should, however, be aware that the general impression derived by our representative at the Atlantic meeting was that, although the United States would not make any satisfactory declaration on the point, there was no doubt that in practice we could count on the United States' support if, as a result of Japanese aggression, we became involved in war with Japan.<sup>43</sup>

Although less confident than Britain, during August–September 1941 Australia exhibited 'renewed optimism' that war could be averted and, if not, that American involvement was virtually assured.<sup>44</sup>

The coalition governments of Menzies and Fadden publicly accepted that Australia had primary diplomatic responsibilities in the Pacific and took initial steps towards providing its own information and separate diplomatic contacts with other Pacific powers. However, despite Casey's resourceful activities in Washington and operation of the Tokyo and Chungking legations, Australia relied on Britain for most information concerning developments in high-level relations between the US, Japan, and Britain. Hence the Dominion Government generally accepted British assessments of international affairs because these were based on direct access to a wider range of information. Moreover, Australia's submissions concerning projected cooperation with other Pacific states, and reciprocal commitments of military assistance, were made largely through London. These submissions were consistently rejected or modified in London. On such central issues as appeasement of Japan, support for China, and formal assurances of support to Thailand or the Netherlands East Indies, Australia continued to defer to Britain. Under Menzies and Fadden, Australia lacked both the inclination and military resources to adopt a radically different Pacific policy. Australia was more urgently concerned than Britain with the immediate threat of Japan, but both were preoccupied with promoting maximum American support in

the event of global war. While not uncritical of British policy in the Pacific, Australia acquiesced in a united Commonwealth policy under British leadership and control principally because Britain shared its determination to ensure American belligerency against Japan.

The US interpreted events in Europe, rather than Asia, as the primary threat to its long-term security and economic interests, especially after the fall of the Netherlands and France. After July–August 1941, Roosevelt favoured American military involvement in a global war rather than witness the collapse of Britain or occupation by Japan of territories adjacent to British possessions in Asia. Realising this, Britain adopted responses to Japanese military and political ventures that paralleled or complemented those of the US. Ultimately, Roosevelt made an explicit commitment to intervene in the war against Japan, and by implication against the Axis states generally, before Japan actually attacked either British territory in Southeast Asia or American territory in the Pacific.<sup>45</sup>

This commitment was similar to that favoured by Australian governments after 1939. But it resulted primarily from British rather than Australian initiatives. Had it not incorporated the Roosevelt administration's independent assessment of the steps necessary to protect American security interests, it could not have been extracted from the US. Moreover, Roosevelt could not have moved as quickly or deliberately towards unqualified support for the Commonwealth and the occupied western European states had not American congressional and public opinion changed after 1939. Although, as Langer and Gleason have emphasised, American public opinion remained highly mobile and difficult to assess, by late 1941 support for appeasement of Japan was a minority view, and a majority of Americans were prepared to risk war in order to 'sustain Britain at all costs'.<sup>46</sup>

A new Australian government presided over the final phase of the Australian–American rapprochement and the commencement of bilateral military cooperation, that accompanied America's inexorable movement towards confrontation with Japan. On 3 October, following defeat of the Fadden Government in Parliament, the Australian Labor Party under John Curtin was commissioned to form a government. Curtin became Prime

Minister and Minister of Defence. The energetic and gifted Dr Herbert Vere Evatt was appointed Minister for External Affairs.

Following the outbreak of war against Germany, the Labor Party pledged 'to do all that is possible to defend Australia, and, at the same time, having regard to its platform, will do its utmost to retain the integrity of the British Commonwealth'. During 1940–41 Curtin's opposition to deploying Australian infantry forces in the Middle East was modified in the face of German gains in western Europe and the German attack on Russia. Through membership of the Advisory War Council the ALP promised to cooperate with the government. It did not publicly oppose Menzies's and Fadden's major initiatives, but remained sceptical of Britain's commitment to reinforce Singapore and criticised Britain's failure to consult meaningfully with the Dominions. Yet by mid-1941 Curtin and a majority of the parliamentary Labor Party accepted that Britain's survival and Anglo-American unity were essential if Australia's continental security and economic viability were to be maintained. While prepared to support the European war effort and to concede the significance of the Middle East and Singapore as 'outer bastions of Australia', Labor continued to place greater emphasis on local defence needs than did the Menzies or Fadden governments.<sup>47</sup>

However, when the Labor Government was commissioned, it did not immediately reorder Australia's defence priorities, diplomatic policies, or its external commitments. The theoretical assumptions of Labor's foreign and defence policies when in Opposition did not have a significant bearing on the policies it adopted in government until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Not until early 1942 did Labor act to give continental defence priority over support for the Commonwealth war effort in Europe. Moreover its actions in the international arena after October 1941 completely submerged the isolationist tendencies evident in party thinking during the 1930s. The external policies of Curtin's infant government during October–December did not depart radically from those of its predecessors. Labor took steps to reinforce Australia's troops in the Middle East, supported American leadership in negotiations with Japan, and pressed successfully for a renewed assurance of substantial British naval support for Singapore if Australia was gravely threatened.

Yet the new government was less confident of British intentions and more prepared to endorse or question American Far Eastern

policy without preliminary reference to London. It was also more willing to diverge from the policies of either major power to promote its immediate defence needs, and was less inhibited by its small power Dominion status. However, in the uncertain period before Pearl Harbor, these tendencies were only vaguely evident.

In the absence of a formal commitment to intervene against Japan, the Curtin Government, unlike Great Britain, was not prepared to defer automatically to America's leadership. It pressed for unilateral British action to strengthen the air and naval defence capacity of Singapore, and advocated that Commonwealth troops be sent immediately to the Netherlands East Indies.<sup>48</sup> Australia's special representative in London, Earle Page, told the British War Cabinet early in November that the Curtin cabinet did not fully endorse 'Britain's insistence that the United States must always take the lead' in dealing with Japan, and suggested that 'if Britain were more resolute America would recognise the necessity of going to her aid'.<sup>49</sup> In communications to London, Evatt criticised America's refusal to give details of its secret negotiations with Japan to Australia, and sought Britain's assistance in requesting such information from Secretary of State Hull.<sup>50</sup>

Changes in America's policy after early November 1941 made Australia's activities essentially redundant. On 5 November the joint board of the army and navy concluded that 'military counteraction' should be undertaken 'if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British or Dutch territory'. It recommended that a joint American-British-Dutch warning of military counteraction be issued to Japan if it attempted to advance in Thailand west of the 100th meridian or south of the 10th parallel in the Kra Isthmus, 'or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands'.<sup>51</sup> Roosevelt in effect decided to aid the British Commonwealth if Japan attacked southward. In response to this, Churchill declared that if America was drawn into war, Britain would declare war against Japan immediately.<sup>52</sup> Late in November, Hull withdrew his proposal for a *modus vivendi* with Japan, although Britain and Australia believed the American-Japanese talks over a compromise Pacific settlement should continue.<sup>53</sup> He presented an uncompromising counterproposal to the Japanese ambassador, Kurusu, demanding complete withdrawal of Japan's forces from China and Indochina as a precondition for a negotiated settlement.<sup>54</sup> The terms of this proposal (or 'ultimatum', as

‘revisionist’ historians label it) had always been unacceptable to Japan. By advancing it, Hull consciously negated any prospects of a lasting detente.

Hull’s inflexible proposal was influenced by an intercepted Japanese message of 5 November advising Kurusu that negotiations must be completed by 25 November. Later this deadline was extended to 29 November. After this date, Japan intended to commence further advances southward. Australia was unaware of this information and thus viewed the prospects of a negotiated settlement far more optimistically than the US.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, as late as 22 November the Australian legation in Tokyo had reported:

The [Japanese] Government’s attitude all goes to confirm the view that they are genuinely anxious to secure agreement with the United States and avoid at present anything that might prejudice discussions in Washington.<sup>56</sup>

Basing its policy on incomplete or misleading information, Australia continued to hope that a temporary compromise settlement, possibly similar to Hull’s *modus vivendi* proposal, would be negotiated. Evatt advised Casey to intervene ‘discreetly’ in the hope that this might prevent a breakdown of the talks.<sup>57</sup> Both men believed that a compromise settlement, ‘however temporary’, would at least delay the outbreak of hostilities and increase the likelihood of a commitment of America’s support before war commenced.<sup>58</sup> After Hull abandoned the *modus vivendi* proposal, Casey met secretly with Kurusu in an unsuccessful attempt to mediate between Hull and the Japanese representative.<sup>59</sup> Only a week before the outbreak of war, Curtin remained amenable to compromise:

We again repeat our opinion, that, even at this late stage, a further endeavour should be made to encourage the United States to establish a *modus vivendi* with Japan which can be made satisfactory to China as well as to the other powers concerned.<sup>60</sup>

Although Australia continued to support a negotiated settlement, its objective was to gain an explicit guarantee of US belligerency if Japan advanced further south. Curtin also wanted formal reciprocal assurances of military intervention in the Far East from Britain and the Netherlands East Indies. During late November he asked Churchill what aid Britain would give to Australia if Japan attacked the Netherlands East Indies or Thailand. Churchill refused to give

an assurance of military assistance if either contingency developed.<sup>61</sup> Australia's anxious appeal and its willingness to contemplate a negotiated settlement were influenced primarily by the apparent ambiguity of America's policy in the Far East. Curtin informed Bruce:

If we were certain that [the] United States' lead in talks [with Japan] would be followed by similar lead in armed defence against armed aggression, [the] position would be transformed; but there now seems grave danger of further armed aggression by Japan without any United States armed intervention.<sup>62</sup>

Curtin's anxiety was expressed against a background of intelligence reports that Japan would attack the Kra Isthmus and invade Thailand 'about 1 December'. Britain advised that this 'might involve us in war', but it was determined to promote simultaneous American involvement. Britain recognised that Japanese occupation of Thailand and the Kra Isthmus would undermine the security of Singapore and all British territory in the Far East. It thus renewed its efforts to gain assurances of military intervention from Roosevelt.<sup>63</sup>

After receiving details of Japan's intentions, however, the Curtin Government refused to accept that an American commitment of support was a necessary precondition for British military action against Japan. Curtin recognised that a Japanese attack on Thailand might result in the worst possible situation for the British Commonwealth, but he argued that Commonwealth powers should intervene militarily against Japan if it invaded Thailand, the Kra Isthmus, British territory or the Netherlands East Indies, regardless of America's response.<sup>64</sup> In contrast, Churchill was prepared to support military action against Japan only after an American assurance was given, unless Japan actually attacked British territory.<sup>65</sup> US actions in the first five days of December averted possible escalation of Australian-British friction over this issue.

During 1–3 December Roosevelt promised British foreign secretary Halifax that America would give 'armed support' to Britain if it resisted Japanese aggression in British or Dutch Territory or Thailand.<sup>66</sup> The British War Cabinet interpreted this verbal assurance as a definite commitment and on 4 December advised the government of the Netherlands East Indies 'that if any attack was made on them by Japan, we should at once come to their aid'.



Britain now had 'every confidence' that the US would take identical action.<sup>67</sup>

Roosevelt's verbal assurances were immediately translated into a formal commitment. Australia was advised that Britain had received an explicit, secret commitment of American military intervention in any one of the following contingencies:

- (a) if Britain found it necessary either to forestall a Japanese landing in the Kra Isthmus or to occupy part of the Isthmus as a counter to the Japanese violation of any part of Thailand.
- (b) if the Japanese attacked the Netherlands East Indies and Britain at once went to the support of the Netherlands.
- (c) if the Japanese attacked British territory.<sup>68</sup>

The commander of British forces in the Far East, Robert Brooke-Popham, was authorised to implement agreed Anglo-American action (MATADOR) if Japan violated Thailand's sovereignty or moved its navy towards the Kra Isthmus.<sup>69</sup>

In an article published in 1963, Esthus demonstrated convincingly that available British, Australian and American evidence 'was sufficient to justify the conclusion that Roosevelt gave Britain', and by implication Australia and the Commonwealth generally, 'a commitment of armed support in the case of a Japanese attack on British or Dutch territory or on Thailand' by 5 December 1941.<sup>70</sup> Additional evidence made available by release of British War Cabinet papers in 1972 supports this conclusion.<sup>71</sup> Yet, as Esthus has also emphasised, armed intervention by American forces could only have occurred after Congress had approved such action.<sup>72</sup> Roosevelt's commitment doubtless reflected his belief that Congress would immediately approve intervention if Japan attacked British or Dutch Territory, or Thailand. After early November 1941, Roosevelt and his senior advisers correctly anticipated that Congress and the American public would overwhelmingly support such action. In the weeks immediately preceding Roosevelt's commitment, the administration had drafted messages designed to prompt Congressional action. In a recent study Roberta Wohlstetter has concluded: 'All the evidence would suggest that the attention of the President and his top advisers was centered on the most effective way to urge Congress that America should join with Great Britain in a war to stop further Japanese aggression'.<sup>73</sup>

In the light of the evidence presented it is tempting to assume, along with Roosevelt's 'revisionist' critics, that Roosevelt and Hull deliberately adopted uncompromising policies which were unacceptable to Japan in order to provoke a Japanese attack on British and possibly American territory, and thereby ensure Congressional support for a declaration of war against all the Axis powers. Nonetheless the evidence for this interpretation remains, at best, circumstantial.<sup>74</sup>

Understandably, the Curtin cabinet was reassured by Roosevelt's secret commitment to the British Commonwealth. But it believed that Roosevelt and Churchill should also issue a joint, public warning to Japan. In an interview with Roosevelt on 6 December, Casey requested a joint warning against Japanese expansion in Thailand. Roosevelt did not agree, primarily because he desired to suggest directly to emperor Hirohito that Japan halt its aggression. However, the president agreed to issue a public warning in a message to Congress on 8 December if the emperor had not replied satisfactorily by then. He suggested that the Commonwealth powers could offer a similar public warning on 10 December.<sup>75</sup>

Japan's sudden attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December negated Australia's final attempt to involve America in political action to deter Japan from further expansion. Most significantly, however, the precipitate Japanese action ensured that the US and Australia would now cooperate militarily, politically and economically against the Axis powers.

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The *de facto* Australian–American wartime alliance was born of immediate strategic necessity, not conscious Australian or British diplomatic initiatives. Gradually, but decisively, America's isolationism broke down after 1939 as the Roosevelt administration moved towards unqualified support for the Allied powers. Changes in administration policy and public opinion reflected the view that an Axis victory in Europe or Southeast Asia would seriously threaten America's long-term security and vital interests. These changes were influenced only marginally by joint Commonwealth or separate Dominion diplomacy.

Australia's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the US and the policies subsequently pursued by the Menzies, Fadden and Curtin governments towards it were also essentially conditioned by

security considerations. In response to rapid Axis successes in western Europe, Japan's expansion in Asia, and Britain's diminished capacity and willingness to jeopardise its national security in order to reinforce its Pacific territories, Australia sought assurances of military assistance in the Pacific from America. Yet neither the conservative nor Labor governments departed radically from British policy during 1939–41. Moreover, despite Casey's work in Washington, both governments promoted their foreign policy and defence objectives by collaborating intimately with London, and generally permitted Britain to speak for Australia and a united Commonwealth in Washington. Although increasingly preoccupied with developments in the Far East rather than in Europe, Australia realised that Anglo-American cooperation was essential if Japan's southern drive was to be halted or at least delayed. The Dominion governments generally abandoned or adapted their policies in order to foster Anglo-American harmony and greater American leadership and responsibility in the Far East. Despite some reservations, the Menzies Government supported economic sanctions against Japan. Similarly, in the face of hardening American policy towards Japan, the Menzies cabinet abandoned its stated willingness to bargain China's sovereignty for a compromise settlement with Japan. Although less prepared to appease Japan than its predecessors, and determined not to sacrifice China in return for a compromise with Japan, Labor supported a negotiated settlement with Japan, at least as an interim measure until unequivocal assurances of American assistance had been received. Curtin's government was also less willing than its predecessors or Churchill to defer automatically to American leadership in negotiations with Japan. Nor was it uncritical of apparent US policy in the Far East, especially concerning possible action if Japan continued its advance towards Singapore and Australian territory.

In practice, however, these independent attitudes and policies were subordinated to the general objectives of developing firm assurances of American military assistance and broad Anglo-American unity against the Axis states. After the Pearl Harbor attack, when America's belligerency was assured and Britain's inability to defend its Far Eastern possessions painfully revealed, Labor was able to act decisively to ensure that Australia was defended and its immediate regional interests not subordinated to British interests in Europe. It established more direct bilateral

political contacts with Washington, sought a separate voice in the higher direction of the Pacific war, encouraged close military and economic cooperation with the US, accepted American operational leadership against Japan, and concentrated all possible defence forces in the Southwest Pacific to bolster Australia's immediate security.

The Curtin Government did not share Churchill's confidence that America's entry into war against both Japan and Germany signalled eventual victory for the British Commonwealth.<sup>76</sup> But Australia's concern with Japan was modified.<sup>77</sup> US involvement in the Pacific brought decisive assurances to Australia and added new dimensions and significance to relations between the two countries. But Australia and the US were unequal alliance partners with separate interests and military priorities. Both desired to achieve victory over Japan, but disagreed over the methods and strategy necessary. Although military collaboration was never seriously jeopardised during 1942–45, it was accompanied by serious problems concerning political, military and economic consultation and cooperation. These were consistently resolved in accordance with the wishes of the major alliance partner, the US. During the drift to war in the Pacific, Australia played at most a supporting role to Britain in the crucial Anglo-American negotiations which culminated in American intervention. Despite unprecedented diplomatic assertiveness and its vital strategic importance to the US after the Pearl Harbor attack, Australia's influence on Allied Pacific policy remained only marginal.

### 1.3 Directing War

The conditions of war usually reduce diplomacy between opposing states to an unimportant role and make the application of direct military power supreme. Yet just as military power often influences peacetime relations between states, so diplomacy can affect relations between countries during wartime. In particular, harmonious and cooperative diplomatic relations amongst wartime allies are constantly sought. Defence and economics become integral aspects of foreign policy and diplomacy when they operate across national borders, or indirectly effect relations between countries.

Orderly diplomatic relations, broad political agreement, and international economic cooperation amongst the Allied powers,

especially the US and the British Commonwealth countries, were principal factors in their ultimate victory over the Axis states. With the notable exception of the United Kingdom, and perhaps Canada, Australia was the most important Commonwealth ally of the US during 1941–45.

Although Australia made a relatively large contribution to the Allied war effort against Japan, and provided the major Allied base in the Pacific immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, it nonetheless always remained a ‘small’ or at most a ‘middle’ power. The nature and strength of Australia’s wartime diplomatic initiatives were conditioned by an unprecedented concern with preserving national security, the peculiar aspirations of the Labor Government, increasingly fragmented Imperial unity, and growing Dominion autonomy. Yet the impact of these initiatives on America’s policy was minimal. As a minor international power, Australia was forced to rely on external aid to ensure its own security. Traditionally it had depended on the military protection of Great Britain. But by late 1941 Australia looked to the greater resources of the US. As an important Dominion, Australia had exerted some influence on British defence and foreign policy during the interwar years and in the first two years of war against Germany. Australia could occasionally exert a limited influence within the restricted orbit of intra-Commonwealth relations, but its international status relative to the US or other non-Commonwealth states was low.

After Pearl Harbor the Curtin Government vigorously promoted diplomatic initiatives aimed at prominent and effective Australian participation in the higher direction of the war. When operating outside of the Commonwealth, however, Australia seldom exerted a decisive influence on the Grand Alliance. But if Australia’s influence on the US was limited, during the critical first eighteen months of the war against Japan it was nonetheless greater than that of other minor allies such as New Zealand, Holland, Canada and perhaps China. This was largely a result of two unique factors—Australia’s vital military and strategic importance in American planning and operations against Japan during 1942–43, and Labor’s assertive wartime diplomacy aimed at averting what it believed to be an imminent invasion by Japan.

Most significant in the wartime relationship between Australia and the US was the great disparity in each country’s military power, economic capacity, and influence on international politics. The US

implicitly assumed that, should differences develop between it and Australia (or indeed any Allied power in the Pacific), its own policies should prevail. Furthermore, America initially tended to view Britain, not the combined Commonwealth, as its principal ally. It was also inclined to accept Churchill as the legitimate spokesman for all Commonwealth countries. Hence, Australia exaggerated its demands for formally recognised separate and equal representation on inter-Allied consultative bodies, and pressed to establish direct political contacts with Washington as soon as further Japanese expansion southward became imminent. Yet Australia's aggressiveness never fully overcame the restrictions implicit in its small-power status and junior role in the alliance.

The effectiveness of Australia's influence in Washington was also retarded by President Roosevelt's disposition to shape American military policy in the Pacific on the basis of general strategic considerations rather than immediate military needs. In particular, the decision to adhere to a 'beat Hitler first' policy and determination to retain overriding control of the war against Japan induced the US to adopt rigid policies on Pacific strategy and inter-Allied consultation which strident small-power diplomacy could not substantially alter.

Yet during the early phase of the Pacific war the defence of Australia was vital to the US. Following the fall of Singapore and collapse of the American-British-Dutch-Australian command (ABDACM) in Southeast Asia in February 1942, Australia was the only viable Pacific base counteroffensive from which the US could prepare the counteroffensive against Japan. This dramatically, if temporarily elevated Australia's military and strategic significance. Recognising this, the Curtin Government was able to exert increased political influence in Washington, at least until defence of Australia became only a minor factor in America's strategy against Japan. While Australia retained only marginal control over its own survival and exercised only a peripheral influence on America's policy, the conditions of war nonetheless permitted the small power to increase its influence on Pacific planning. As Australia's military-strategic role in American operations and Anglo-American grand strategy declined after mid-1943, its influence in Washington also declined.

However, several more permanent factors helped to stabilise the general expansion of Australia's political influence and international

status during the late war and early postwar years. Foremost was its greater political and military authority and autonomy within the Commonwealth. Associated with this was Britain's decreased international authority and power, which permitted Australia to assume *de facto* leadership of some combined Commonwealth initiatives in the Pacific after 1943, and to employ general Commonwealth resources to promote its particular regional objectives. Second, the Labor Government, under the guidance of Dr H V Evatt, actively promoted independent diplomatic and defence initiatives directed primarily at promoting and protecting Australia's separate national interests rather than the more nebulous interests of the Commonwealth. Finally, in a marginally successful endeavour to counter general Great Power domination of the peace settlement, Australia developed closer regional collaboration with its small Dominion neighbour, New Zealand, and firmer international cooperation with other small or middle powers.

During the interwar years, W J Hudson has recently concluded, Australia moved belatedly 'towards a radical solution to her dilemmas in the form of separate Australian diplomacy'.<sup>1</sup> However, it was not until after it had established legations in Washington, Tokyo and Chungking in 1940 that this diplomacy acquired the formal machinery necessary to express an independent regional perspective. The provision of confidential information from its representatives abroad may have clarified Australia's distinctive international interests, but it was the Labor Government which finally translated this altered perception of interest into concrete international action. Not until after Pearl Harbor did Australia consistently adopt decisive extra-Imperial initiatives aimed primarily at promoting its separate interests in the Pacific. This objective was no longer subordinated to Empire interests and unity. Ironically, it was the traditionally isolationist Labor party that guided the way towards unprecedented autonomous involvement in world affairs. Despite a strong anti-imperialist element, Labor's new internationalism did not cause a permanent rupture in relations with mother England. Nor did it substantially reduce Australia's cooperation with the Empire. Indeed, by the late war period, the Labor Government itself exhibited imperialistic ambitions in the Pacific.

In the critical early months of war Australia could not risk fracturing essential bilateral military cooperation with the US.

Although prepared to adopt diplomatic and defence initiatives which severely aggravated Whitehall, Australia's approach to the US was somewhat more flexible and conciliatory. The Curtin Government did not pursue rigid policies if these were totally unacceptable to the Roosevelt administration. In the face of firm American opposition, Australia's objectives were usually modified. Nonetheless, its original policies on Pacific strategy and supplies and inter-Allied consultative and control arrangements provoked considerable friction with the US. The resolution or reduction of this discord followed Australia's decision to accept compromise consultative arrangements and to restrict its overt opposition to America's general strategic plans for the Pacific. But Australia was never genuinely satisfied. As a small power, preoccupied with its exposure to imminent invasion, Australia's determination to influence America's policy in the Pacific was overshadowed by realisation of the need to prevent alienating the Roosevelt administration. Despite protests from Australia and other small powers, Washington retained ultimate control of the Pacific war effort. It also determined unilaterally all crucial aspects of the Pacific peace settlement. The concessions ultimately made to the small states did not dilute America's control of Allied military policy in the Pacific. Nor did they establish a precedent of meaningful small power consultation with the US for the transition to peace.

During the first three months of war, Allied strategy failed to arrest Japan's southern advance. By March 1942 the colonial territories of the US, Britain and the Netherlands in the Far East, as far west as India and as far south as northern New Guinea, were under Japan's control. Singapore had fallen. The ABDACOM established late in December 1941 was dissolved in mid-February 1942, after the area it had been formed to defend in Southeast Asia had fallen. Admiral Ernest J King allegedly described Allied military activities in the Pacific during these months as 'a magnificent display of very bad strategy'.<sup>2</sup>

By early 1942 neither the Australian Government nor the Australian people shared Churchill's view that Japan would 'concentrate upon securing' its 'military position in the East Indies' and not attempt to attack or occupy Australia.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, many Australians believed they were the ultimate object of Japan's expansion. The fact that Japan had no plans to invade Australia or New Zealand after establishing its Southeast Asia Co-Prosperity



Sphere was unknown to any Allied power during the war.<sup>4</sup> Yet given the strength and duration of Australia's fears, it is doubtful whether this information would have substantially reduced Australia's acute and sometimes hysterical concern. Moreover, the mere fact that Japan had not made specific plans does not necessarily mean that it would have adhered to its original limited military objectives south of the Equator, especially after Singapore's collapse.

Although not fully aware of projected American or British policy in the Far East during December 1941 and early 1942, Labor promoted initiatives designed to encourage the Great Powers to give the war against Japan highest priority. It argued that the US, and possibly Britain also, should immediately allocate reinforcements to the Pacific above the level required merely to maintain defensive operations. Despite desperate Australian attempts to secure concrete assurances of military aid and a concise delineation of Allied strategy in the Pacific, both the US and Britain ascribed the Pacific a low strategic priority and supported a pragmatic defensive strategy against Japan. As the prospects for peace in the Far East deteriorated, the gap between Australian and British policies widened. When entering the conflict against Hitler in September 1939, the Menzies Government found it unnecessary to issue a separate declaration of war. Both Australia and New Zealand, in contrast to Canada and South Africa, accepted the British declaration as binding upon them. As a result of Britain's declaration, Menzies stated, 'Australia is also at war'. However, when war erupted in the Pacific, the Curtin Government refused to follow Britain automatically. On 9 December 1941 Australia separately declared war on Japan.

Australia's dissatisfaction with Britain intensified sharply after the Pearl Harbor attack. By late December 1941 British and Australian policy as outlined in submissions to military authorities in Washington were largely contradictory. Australia wanted the Pacific recognised as an equally important area of warfare, and argued strongly against its being accorded lower priority in global strategy than Europe or the Middle East. In contrast, Churchill was worried that America might focus its attention predominantly on the Pacific and neglect the European theatre. His government consistently and successfully promoted a general global policy designed to attain victory first in Europe while maintaining a purely defensive strategy

and limited Anglo-American military presence in the Pacific. Unaware of the high degree of initial Anglo-American agreement on global strategic priorities and anxious to foster a major American presence in the Pacific, Australia directed its criticism largely against its traditional partner. Although engaged in a common war effort, different Commonwealth countries were primarily involved in two different ocean theatres, and with different principal opponents. Under these conditions, strong Commonwealth unity was difficult to sustain.

The Curtin Government quickly accepted that it could not effectively present independent political initiatives or proposals on general military strategy in London or Washington during wartime through normal diplomatic channels. Nor was it content to rely on British authorities or joint Imperial initiatives to advance Australia's peculiar interests. Rather it sought direct consultation with the principal Allied power in the Pacific, the US, on high-level issues. Although important, direct Australian consultation with Britain was relegated to a largely complementary function during the crucial early years of war against Japan.

Yet during this period the US, no less than Britain, was reluctant to establish and participate in broad consultative machinery with the various Allied powers. Inter-Allied consultation was restricted to the major countries—the Big Three and sometimes China. From the outset of its involvement in the war, the US refused to decentralise, complicate or slow Allied decision making by consulting directly and equally with the small countries involved.

Furthermore, the US was slow to recognise the separate identity and political autonomy of the two British Dominions in the South Pacific, both of which were important, if small, Allied powers. During the war years both were classified officially by the State Department as part of the division of European affairs. They were often treated as part of a united British Commonwealth, and assumed to have very similar national interests and foreign policy or military objectives to those of the UK. In the early months of the war Washington attempted to deal exclusively with the UK and encouraged it to act on behalf of the Commonwealth after consulting separately with the Dominions. By mid-1942, however, Australia was increasingly viewed as an independent Pacific state with frequently different interests and policies from those of the UK.

Within forty-eight hours of the Pearl Harbor debacle Britain's principal reinforcements in the Far East, the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, had been sunk. Australia's anxiety was now acute. Immediately it requested separate discussions in London or Washington concerning the Pacific war. On 11 December Australia made its first, though unfruitful, request that Britain immediately establish an inter-Allied consultative organisation on Pacific affairs. A week later Casey asked Roosevelt to guarantee separate Australian representation in any Allied discussions concerning the Pacific, but received no firm undertaking.<sup>5</sup> At the same time Curtin reminded Churchill 'that in April last Mr. Menzies was categorically assured by the UK Secretary of State for Air that, should war occur in the Far East, there will be an immediate review of air resources with a view to their redistribution to meet the dangers on all fronts'. He concluded sharply: 'This contingency has now arisen'. Most of Australia's permanent force of air squadrons were currently employed in the East Indies, Malaya, the United Kingdom and the Middle East. Curtin did not request their immediate return, but asked that Britain provide aircraft strength to Australia equivalent to that provided by Australia in the Number 3 squadron, Middle East, and the Number 10 squadron, United Kingdom<sup>6</sup>. Five days later Curtin requested that Britain deploy additional aircraft carriers east of Suez, and suggested to Churchill that if Britain could not do this he would ask the US to send one carrier to the Pacific. Britain provided limited immediate air reinforcements for the Far East, but refused to give major reinforcements until after the completion of Allied strategic conferences in late December 1941.<sup>7</sup>

Australia also lacked confidence in America's policy towards the South Pacific. On 13 December Curtin appealed privately for additional cooperation with the US. The 'changed naval situation has had such repercussions on our local defence position and cooperation in overseas theatres', Curtin advised Roosevelt, 'that our military resources are insufficient to meet the commitments for the defence of the Pacific Islands in which you and we are vitally interested'. He requested immediate advice on help the US 'may be able to give in providing forces to deny these areas to the enemy'.<sup>8</sup> Although the American war plans divisions adopted 'every possible means' to send air reinforcements to the Australian-East Indies-Philippines area in December, these were inadequate. Amidst reports that the Philippines situation was 'critical',<sup>9</sup> the

arrival of seventy US aircraft and a small number of American troops in Australia in December did little to allay the concern of the government. Reporting Australia's attitude on American policy in the Pacific, the US Minister in Canberra, Nelson Johnson, wrote on 20 December:

Australia officially and publicly has been severely shocked by initial success of Japanese attacks in Pacific into realization of continental vulnerability and threatened isolation in matters of supply and assistance. There is a certain amount of gloomy foreboding in official circles due to belief that American military and naval strategy will concentrate all American striking force in northern Pacific, leaving southern Pacific prey to marauding Japanese naval vessels and armed raiders, accompanied by feeling that American action may involve time factor permitting Japanese to extract enormous damage before their threat is averted.<sup>10</sup>

Had Australia been aware of Roosevelt's initial attitude towards immediate reinforcement of the Pacific, its concern may have been even greater. On 10 December the President agreed with Churchill on 'the gravity of the naval position, especially in the Pacific', but refused to allocate additional naval resources until Allied global strategy had been 'clarified' by secret Anglo-American conference negotiations.<sup>11</sup> Military policy and reinforcement in the Pacific, and Australia's role in Allied planning were decided. Despite the direct relevance of these decisions to Australia and other small powers, the conference discussions were exclusively bilateral. Indeed Australia was not advised of the general subjects to be discussed in Washington.<sup>12</sup> Details were not made available to Australia until May 1942.<sup>13</sup> Ultimately it was British, rather than American, authorities who informed Australia. Curiously, as early as 21 January 1942 Page had heard Churchill refer to the ARCADIA decision to 'defeat Hitler first' but had not reported this to Evatt.<sup>14</sup>

The day after ARCADIA commenced, Curtin informed Roosevelt and Churchill that his government was acutely dissatisfied with their failure to authorise adequate naval reinforcement of the Singapore–Malaya–East Indies–Philippines area. In requesting that the US accept greater responsibilities in the Pacific, Curtin prophesied:

The fall of Singapore would mean the isolation of the Philippines, the fall of the Netherlands East Indies and an attempt to smother

all other bases. This would also sever our communications between the Indian and Pacific Oceans in this region. The set-back would be as serious to the US interests as to our own.

The defence of Singapore remained central to Australia's naval policy. But following the British naval losses of mid-December, the Curtin Government also increasingly emphasised the need for strong air defences in the Malaya-Singapore region. However, Australia was incapable of providing the necessary aircraft. Hence, Curtin advised Roosevelt and Churchill:

the amount of resistance to the Japanese in Malaya will depend directly on the amount of resistance provided by the governments of the United Kingdom and the US.

Our men have fought and will fight valiantly. But they must be adequately supported. We have three divisions in the Middle East. Our airmen are fighting in Britain, Middle East and training in Canada. We have sent great quantities of supplies to Britain, to the Middle East and to India. Our resources here are very limited indeed..

It is in your power to meet the situation. Should the government of the US desire, we would gladly accept an American Commander in the Pacific area. The President has said that Australia will be a base of increasing importance, but in order that it shall remain a base, Singapore must be reinforced.

Johnson gave earnest support to Curtin's assessment and request.<sup>15</sup> Although ostensibly an appeal for joint Anglo-American aid, Curtin's cable was principally directed at Washington. His suggestion that an American be appointed to command the Pacific was apparently made without consulting Britain. Moreover, until late December Churchill opposed any unified Allied command in the Pacific.<sup>16</sup>

The immediate response to Curtin's private request was essentially negative. Neither power gave assurances of support which Australian authorities considered adequate to meet demands in the Pacific. They agreed to provide additional air assistance and ground forces to help defend Australia and New Caledonia. But neither could be induced to reinforce Singapore with an aircraft carrier. At the same time, the British War Cabinet advised that Britain could not provide a balanced fleet at Singapore, and would not send Capital Ships there.<sup>17</sup> The demands of other theatres and

shipping limitations restricted the level of immediate reinforcements.

The Curtin cabinet viewed the American and British responses as 'most unsatisfactory'. Both were either 'unable or unwilling' to deploy naval forces in the Pacific adequate to ensure that the vital Singapore base would be retained. Thus on 26 December Curtin instructed Casey:

Please understand that the stage of gentle suggestion [by Australia] has now passed ... This is the gravest type of emergency and everything will depend upon a Churchill–Roosevelt decision to meet it in the broadest way.<sup>18</sup>

The following day Curtin appealed publicly to the US for immediate military assistance. His controversial statement symbolised Australia's determination to act independently of Britain in order to protect its regional interests. Curtin's appeal, published in the *Melbourne Herald* on 27 December, read in part:

We look for a solid and impregnable barrier of democracies against the three Axis Powers and we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict. By that is not meant that any one of the other theatres of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that Australia asks for a concerted plan evoking the greatest strength at the democracies' disposal determined upon hurling Japan back.

Curtin clearly anticipated that general Anglo-American planning might accord higher priority to early victory in Europe or the Middle East than in the Pacific. More significant, however, was Curtin's outline of Australia's proposed policy towards its major allies:

The Australian government ... regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the US and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom. We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength. But we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go and shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the US as its keystone, which will give our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy.

While acknowledging the primary importance of future American aid, Curtin did not underestimate the significant, but essentially complementary, military role which Britain, China, the Netherlands or the Soviet Union could play in the Pacific.<sup>19</sup>

Curtin's statement was aimed primarily at promoting immediate and substantial American assistance. Being directed essentially towards America during a critical phase of the Pacific war, the appeal exaggerated Australia's willingness to break its traditional links. Moreover, Curtin's suggestion that Australia would not compromise its own security by dispersing its resources to support Britain did not necessarily imply that Labor was anxious to alter permanently the Dominion's associations with Britain or the Empire. Nonetheless, Curtin accepted implicitly that Britain was no longer capable of protecting the South Pacific Dominions.

Curtin's statement was an unprecedented public assertion of Dominion autonomy. It provoked some criticism locally. Menzies described the statement as a 'great blunder'. In a series of critical editorials, *The Sydney Morning Herald* described Curtin's words as 'deplorable'. The former Prime Minister Hughes interpreted Curtin's apparent willingness to deprecate the military value of the Imperial connection as 'suicidal'.<sup>20</sup> In response, Curtin asserted that despite its support for closer Australian-American relations, his government did not regard Australia as 'anything but an integral part of the British Empire'.<sup>21</sup> Later, at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference in 1944 Curtin 'made no apologies for asking for American assistance in the days when Australia was seriously threatened'. He argued that the decision 'in no way affected Australia's deep sense of oneness with the United Kingdom', or implied any reduction in Australia's traditional loyalty to the British Commonwealth or Crown.<sup>22</sup>

Yet as the American consul general in Melbourne observed, 'there was surprisingly little public criticism of Curtin's article'.<sup>23</sup> Most criticism focused on his emotive and rhetorical language rather than his argument. *The West Australian* perhaps best expressed the prevailing Australian view. Within the context of an altered wartime environment, it commented, Curtin's statement was not only understandable but imperative:

No possible exception can be taken to the desire of the Commonwealth government to conclude what is virtually a military alliance

with the US. The US are vitally interested in the outcome of the Pacific war in which they are directly, and soon will be heavily, engaged, and by which Australian security is threatened as it has never been threatened before. Not only are the US as vitally interested in the Pacific as Britain, but—what is more important—they are in a better position geographically to take in this zone the brunt of the Axis attack. It is natural enough that Australia should look to the US for aid. Britain herself has done so, and Canada's position has been immensely strengthened by her inclusion within the protective ring of the Monroe Doctrine.<sup>24</sup>

The reaction of the Churchill Government to Curtin's public redefinition of Australia's war time objectives was extremely critical. 'You should take a firm stand against this misbehaviour', Churchill told the Dominions' secretary: 'I hope therefore, there will be no weakness or pandering to them [the Australian Government and people] at this juncture, while at the same time we will do all in human power to come to their aid'. However, Churchill immediately contradicted this statement by intimating that Britain now accepted only limited responsibility for Australia's defence. 'By placing their relations with Britain after those with Russia, Dutch [sic], and China, and by saying they rely on America unhampered by any pangs of traditional friendship for Britain'. Churchill stated bitterly, 'they must be taken as relieving us of part of our responsibility in pursuance of which we have sacrificed *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*'.<sup>25</sup> Churchill wrote to Curtin on 27 December, 'I have been greatly pained in all my labours here by the harsh tones which have characterised your various messages'. He emphasised that Curtin's address would 'cause resentment throughout the Empire' and criticised 'the mood of panic' which had prompted it. Indeed Churchill went so far as to threaten to intervene in Australia's domestic affairs in order to ensure that the Australian public be accurately informed of Britain's war effort and problems. 'If hostile speeches continue to be delivered by members of your government against the Mother Country and the present war direction, I should be quite ready to address a broadcast to the Australian people', Churchill warned: 'I feel confident of their generosity and enduring goodwill'.<sup>26</sup>

This hostile reaction reflected and exacerbated a widening rift in relations between the Churchill and Curtin governments during late 1941. This gap was increased early in 1942 as Australia withdrew



some of its troops from the Middle East, and the 'acid and embarrassing' cables exchanged by the two Prime Ministers on this issue became a matter of public record.<sup>27</sup> Relations between the two powers remained strained and uncertain during the following eighteen months.

Despite Churchill's allegation that Curtin's statement had 'made a very bad impression in high American circles',<sup>28</sup> no convincing evidence supports this contention. During late December 1941 the US initiated detailed planning to send 'critical supplies' of planes, ammunition and personnel to the Southwest Pacific which could be transferred to the Philippines or retained for subsequent action against Japan. Lieutenant General George H Brett arrived in Australia to command American military forces in the Southwest Pacific on 28 December 1941. Already about five thousand US troops had been diverted from the Philippines to Australia.<sup>29</sup> Curtin's request was thus made at a time when the US was planning to send additional aid to Australia and to use the southern continent as a major Pacific base. It is unlikely that the request or Curtin's emphasis on the importance of the Pacific struggle would have aggravated American planners who already envisaged a close military relationship between the two Pacific powers. Moreover, unlike the British Government, the Roosevelt administration would scarcely have been disturbed by evidence of a thaw in Empire solidarity. Indeed, during the war and immediate postwar months, the US consistently sought to undermine Imperial economic and political unity and to restrict British Commonwealth influence in the Pacific. Legation officials in Canberra welcomed Curtin's statement as concrete evidence that Australia was willing to collaborate bilaterally with the US, and advised Hull that the State Department should support Curtin's private requests for additional American reinforcement of the Southwest Pacific.<sup>30</sup>

Curtin's assertion that Australia 'must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan'<sup>31</sup> foreshadowed the central thrust of his government's wartime diplomacy. Australia's concern with the scope and structure of Allied consultative arrangements predated commencement of hostilities against Japan. During 1939–41 the Menzies and Fadden governments optimistically attempted to participate in the British War Cabinet and British Chiefs of Staff. Existing Imperial machinery did not permit Australia to influence the use of its own troops in Greece

and Syria during April–May 1941. Britain endorsed the transfer of part of the US Pacific fleet to the Atlantic in mid-1941 without first consulting Australia.

The appointment of Sir Earle Page as a representative on the British War Cabinet did little to expand Australia's direct influence on Allied strategy. After war erupted in Asia, Allied strategy was no longer determined by the British War Cabinet or British Chiefs of Staff, but the combined Anglo-American chiefs of staff and secret Anglo-American strategic conferences. While war was restricted to Europe, Australia was preoccupied with improving consultations with Britain. However, with 'the threatened extension of the war to this hemisphere', *The Sydney Morning Herald* argued in August 1941, 'conceptions of Imperial strategy must be widened, and it is essential that Australia's voice should be strongly and directly heard in the shaping of decisions affecting the Pacific'.<sup>32</sup>

During the first three days of war against Japan the Australian cabinet decided to request a 'supreme authority for the higher direction and coordinated control of Allied activities and strategy in the war in the Pacific'.<sup>33</sup> Britain was advised that such a body should be created at Singapore.<sup>34</sup> Curtin also suggested that Page be given greater consultative opportunities and that Britain give Australia 'full knowledge of all the essential facts, developments and trends of policy' in all theatres. Separate representation in all conferences in London and Washington on Allied strategy was also demanded.<sup>35</sup> Yet while Australia was represented at the preliminary staff discussions in Singapore, it was excluded from the ARCADIA conference in Washington, DC, between 22 December 1941 and 14 January 1942, and not advised of most of its major decisions until May 1942.

However, Australia was informed late in December 1941 immediately that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed to establish a unified American–British–Dutch–Australian command embracing the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, Malaya and Burma areas. Despite the agreement at Singapore that an American commander of a Pacific command 'would not only be acceptable but desirable', and Australia's earlier suggestion for the same, a British officer was given the position. Recognising Australia's concern, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that 'an appropriate joint body' would be responsible for determining Allied strategy in the new area.<sup>36</sup>

Curtin initially accepted the unified command proposal, apparently because he thought that Australia would be 'included in the composition of the "joint body" from which "the commander" would receive his instructions'. Australia envisaged a council comprising representatives of each of the four countries, who would remain in direct contact with their respective governments. Curtin confidently expected that the 'joint body' would give his government direct consultation with the major powers during the determination of Pacific strategy and the allocation of supplies and military reinforcements.<sup>37</sup> However, these expectations were not fulfilled.

Roosevelt was not enthusiastic about broadening inter-Allied consultation. He told a Washington press conference that he 'was not impressed with the need for constituting any new consultative body at Washington to deal with the Pacific war problem'. Surprisingly, he suggested that Australia and New Zealand were satisfied with existing arrangements. However, he did concede that a council 'with a fancy name' could be formed 'if it would make anybody happy'.<sup>38</sup> Two days later Roosevelt agreed that a Pacific War Council would be established in Washington immediately. On 30 March Roosevelt made an announcement to this effect. Its first meeting was scheduled for 1 April 1942.<sup>39</sup>

Curtin stated publicly: 'The fact that Australia would now have a direct voice in the higher direction of the Pacific war was a source of deep satisfaction'.<sup>40</sup> However, this early confidence quickly dissipated as the true nature of the council emerged. Paradoxically, Roosevelt and his military chiefs finally agreed because they were confident that the council would not undermine America's existing domination of Allied military policy in the Pacific.<sup>41</sup>

When announcing the Pacific war council, Roosevelt emphasised that the Washington council would be a 'consultative' body, without executive jurisdiction to allocate supplies or formulate and implement specific Allied strategy. Despite Curtin's statement, the Washington council was purely advisory. Moreover, its composition was broader than that favoured by Australia. Represented at the first meeting were the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, China, and the Netherlands government-in-exile. The Philippines were given full membership in June 1942.<sup>42</sup>

After the Washington council was formed both Australia and the US concentrated all Pacific decision making in Washington. Both

worked against Churchill's attempts to revitalise the London Council and thereby revive his government's declining influence on strategy in the Far East. Roosevelt rejected Britain's request that America's ambassador in Britain, John G Winant, be appointed to the London council. Evatt was content to let the London Council 'die a natural death', because it now served 'no purpose'.<sup>43</sup> The London body, which had met infrequently during its first months of operation, lapsed into disuse late in 1942. The Pacific belligerents recognised immediately that the US had accepted responsibility for the Pacific and that Washington should be the only centre from which to plan the defeat of Japan.

President Roosevelt presided over all meetings of the Washington Council. During 1942 it met at the White House once each week. However, in 1943 it met irregularly, generally once or twice a month. The last formal meeting was held on 11 January 1944. However, informal discussions were held occasionally during 1944.<sup>44</sup>

Meetings could only be convened at the discretion of the President. All of the White House discussions were informal and purely exploratory, being restricted to aspects of Allied policy which the US was prepared to divulge to member states. At most Roosevelt considered the council a necessary, but ineffective, compromise. As early as 17 June 1942 he told Winant privately: 'My own Pacific Council serves primarily to disseminate information as to the progress of operations in the Pacific—and secondly to give me a chance to keep everybody happy telling stories and doing most of the talking'.<sup>45</sup> Acting on the advice of his Chiefs of Staff, Roosevelt consistently refused to give important information to member nations. In August 1942, for example, the joint chiefs 'strongly recommended' that information about US plans and operations in northern New Guinea 'be not divulged to the Pacific War Council because of the danger of a leak and the disastrous consequences which would result from such information getting into enemy hands'.<sup>46</sup> In late 1944 the Australian Minister in Washington, Sir Frederic Eggleston, commented that the council had been ineffective because Roosevelt 'simply' gave members 'what he wanted to give, as a rule an account of the progress of events', and refused 'to submit important matters to the council'.<sup>47</sup> Occasionally, however, Roosevelt did provide specific details of Anglo-American decisions to the council. On 3 February 1943 he

gave some details of the major decisions taken at the Casablanca conference, primarily to illustrate America's concern with the Pacific theatre and to allay Australia's dissatisfaction with the low priority accorded the Southwest Pacific area.<sup>48</sup> Generally, Roosevelt used council meetings to defend American policy. At the meeting of 2 September 1942, for example, he dismissed criticism of US strategy made jointly by Curtin and MacArthur.<sup>49</sup> Despite the purely advisory nature of the council, Australia's representative Owen Dixon claimed that it was 'an important source of information' for Australia.<sup>50</sup> Clearly, then, Australia had very limited access to other information on America's plans and operations.

Despite occasional pronouncements to the contrary, the Australian Government was never satisfied with the Washington Council.

By mid-1942 private Australian criticisms of the compromise concessions granted by the US and Britain to its request were extreme. Commenting on them the Australian high commissioner in London, S M Bruce, observed: 'In actual fact the experiences of a few months has shown that what we have got is considerably less than we believed'. Despite representation on the Pacific War Council in London, the British War Cabinet and British defence committee meetings, he noted, Australia had not gained 'a real share in the formulation and direction of policy'.<sup>51</sup> Dixon 'was equally disturbed by the form and operation of inter-Allied arrangements in Washington'. In October 1942 he complained privately of America's 'contemptuous indifference to [its] Allies'.<sup>52</sup> Dixon told the advisory war council that it was an ineffective civilian body which the President refused to use for discussing strategic questions or pending naval or military operations. The one significant 'advantage of the Council', Dixon told the War Cabinet, 'was that it enabled the views of the nations represented to be kept prominently before the President'.<sup>53</sup> Evatt shared Dixon's dissatisfaction. During his second diplomatic mission to Washington, he told Hull 'that the Pacific War Council really was of no particular benefit', and again advocated unsuccessfully that the Washington Council be converted into an 'executive body'.<sup>54</sup>

The refusal of the US and Great Britain to democratise the Allied decision making processes resulted from two principal factors. First, the major powers recognised that postwar political, military and economic conditions and arrangements would be

influenced substantially, perhaps decisively, by wartime decisions. Neither was anxious to grant smaller states equal status in Allied bodies with executive powers, as this might have led to immediate military objectives and long-term political or economic policies of the Great Powers being overruled by the combined pressure of the smaller countries. Unable to contend on equal terms with the Great Powers, the lesser allies reluctantly acquiesced in decision making machinery and military priorities which often conformed with their own interests only in so far as they were directed towards ultimate victory.

Second, it resulted from a valid belief that broadly based councils with executive authority would delay decisions. Clearly the views of only two states could be resolved more easily than the views of many. The refusal of the US and Britain to consult fully with allies other than the Soviet Union, reflected Churchill's idea that the 'most sure way to lose a war' was to establish broad consultative councils. Churchill publicly opposed the suggestion that all allied powers should be consulted before action on their behalf was undertaken by the major allies.<sup>55</sup> Roosevelt and his service chiefs agreed. The President argued that a Pacific war council with the functions originally proposed by Australia would be 'unwieldly' and indecisive.<sup>56</sup> 'As it is impossible to conduct military operations through such a large group', the US service chiefs argued, 'the executive power for the conduct of these operations should rest with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff'.<sup>57</sup> Churchill later acknowledged the limited value of both the London and Washington councils when he wrote: 'The war continued to be run by the old machinery'.<sup>58</sup>

Denied an effective voice on war time strategy, Australia redoubled its efforts to participate in the councils which determined the military, political and economic conditions of the peace. As the political implications of war assumed greater prominence after late 1943, Australia's diplomacy towards the US over matters related to the postwar settlement became even more assertive. However, under Evatt's leadership, this diplomacy was based on closer cooperation with small powers, especially New Zealand. It also included an attempt to expand Australia's international status and regional influence by asserting *de facto* Australian leadership over combined British Commonwealth interests and policies in the Pacific.

In the absence of effective inter-Allied control or consultative machinery in Washington, the Curtin Government relied increasingly on direct diplomatic contacts with the Roosevelt administration and detailed submissions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. As Australia's immediate military objectives and priorities differed sharply from those of Britain, it refused to let the mother country speak on its behalf in the councils of war during 1942–43. Britain was less willing than the US to ascribe a higher strategic priority to the Pacific theatre. Despite Hasluck's arguments to the contrary, Australia's early wartime diplomacy would scarcely have been more effective if directed primarily towards London rather than Washington.<sup>59</sup> Australia did not influence the direction of British or 'united' Commonwealth policy through its membership of the British War Cabinet or the activities of the high commissioner, Stanley M Bruce, in London. Indeed, when Britain disapproved of Australian initiatives, it sought to enlist the support of Washington to dissuade the Dominion from its proposed course of action.<sup>60</sup> Australia's immediate strategic interests contrasted more sharply with Britain's than with those of the US during the first years of war. Moreover, events in Europe and the Far East had, by February 1942, undermined Britain's ability and willingness to support Australia's regional military interests. On the other hand, the US was not only the major Allied power in the Pacific, but the dominant member of the Anglo-American alliance by early 1942. In these circumstances, Australia's initiatives centred increasingly on Washington. Similarly its military activities were directed increasingly towards the Pacific sphere and closer collaboration with its major Pacific ally, the US. Yet the compromise consultative machinery did not permit Australia to substantially expand its influence on grand strategy or America's Pacific strategy. Australia's influence in Washington did increase during 1942 as a result of closer bilateral political, military and economic contacts. If Australian influence on Washington increased, it was, however, never decisive.

#### **1.4 Dispute Over Allied Global Priorities**

When finally advised informally in May 1942 of the general strategy and priorities previously adopted by the major powers, the Curtin Government attempted to reverse or at least modify these critical decisions. It thus came into direct conflict with the Roosevelt

administration which had assumed overall responsibility for Australia and the Pacific, and had implicitly agreed, as early as August 1939, that the primary goal of Allied strategy in the event of a global war should be to attain victory first in Europe rather than the Pacific. Five months after the outbreak of war in Europe the Joint Planning Committee of the US armed services advised Roosevelt's military chiefs that if America became enmeshed in war with Germany, Italy and Japan, 'the European Axis should be defeated first'.<sup>1</sup> This priority was adopted at Anglo-American staff conversations at Washington in January–March 1941. Although the decisions made were not binding, they indicated the underlying aims of America's global planning. It was agreed that the major strategic objectives of the US and Britain if both were involved in war in Europe and Asia would be:

1. The early defeat of Germany as the predominant member of the Axis, with the principal military effort of the US being exerted in the Atlantic and European area, the decisive theatre. Operations in other theatres to be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the main effort.
2. The maintenance of British and Allied positions in the Mediterranean area.
3. A strategic defensive in the Far East.

Roosevelt did not formally approve these decisions. But he indicated that identical priorities would be adopted if war broke out on a global scale.<sup>2</sup> Believing that Germany possessed a much greater military potential than Japan, Washington adhered to these priorities during 1941 and after Pearl Harbor. Planners in Washington accepted that an Axis victory in Europe would threaten, albeit indirectly, US survival. After Germany attacked the USSR in June 1941 America's concern with events in Europe crystallised. A German victory in the USSR spelt potential disaster for the US. As early as November 1940 Admiral Stark had warned that if the British Commonwealth were defeated, America's military position would be undermined in two critical ways: firstly, it would expose the western hemisphere to attack by the successful Axis states; secondly, it would undermine America's international trade, especially with Europe, and reduce America's ability to develop heavy armaments on which subsequent national survival might



depend.<sup>3</sup> The long-term security and economic interests of the US were clearly threatened. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor precipitated America's entry into global war, the Roosevelt administration reaffirmed that it would support only a limited defensive strategy against Japan until after the European Axis was defeated.

At the ARCADIA conference of December 1941 to January 1942 Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill agreed on the following priorities and objectives:

1. that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.
2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the war, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.
3. only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

Had Australia been aware of these decisions, its protests against American and British policy in the Pacific would doubtless have been voiced earlier and more emphatically. It was nonetheless agreed that 'vital interests' and 'raw materials' in the Far East must be protected. Hence the ARCADIA conference agreed that the security of Australia, New Zealand and India should be maintained, and the war effort of China be supported, provided this did not jeopardise operations in Europe.<sup>4</sup>

The rapid Japanese advance during the first three months of war underlined the urgent need to enlarge Australia's defence capability. Responsibility for this task was gradually but 'somewhat reluctantly' assumed by the US.<sup>5</sup> In March Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that overall operational responsibility for the Pacific theatre would rest exclusively with the US. At the same time MacArthur's Southwest Pacific area command was established in Australia. Yet the broad strategic priorities established at ARCADIA remained virtually unchanged. The US remained wedded to a purely defensive Pacific strategy, but it now recognised that this might require greater

resources than originally envisaged. During the war the US interpreted the 'Europe first' strategy more flexibly than Great Britain. But neither departed appreciably from this goal.

America's willingness to provide military assistance to Australia corresponded with the impending retreat of MacArthur from the Philippines, the collapse of Singapore and the disintegration of Wavell's united American-British-Dutch-Australian command in Southeast Asia. By mid-February 1942 these events had dramatically aggravated Australia's concern with its immediate survival. Yet, at the same time, these events had made Australia the only viable southern base for Allied operations against Japan. Both American and Australian military authorities now recognised that various geographic and political factors made Australia the 'most suitable' Pacific base. Foremost were its uninterrupted sea communications with the US, and its vast size and relative isolation which militated against a possible Japanese occupation. It was also argued that Australia had 'sufficient industrial development to form a good basis for rapid expansion with American aid', and that:

Its northern shores are sufficiently close to Japanese occupied territory to make a good 'jumping off' area for offensive operations, whilst its Southern areas are sufficiently far from Japanese bases to ensure a reasonable degree of immunity from continuous sea and air bombardment bearing in mind the growing strength of U.S.A. Naval and Air forces.<sup>6</sup>

In mid-December, 1941 General George C Marshall and President Roosevelt agreed with General Eisenhower's proposal that America establish a major base in Australia as well as in the Philippines. At the ARCADIA conference it was apparently recognised that 'the Philippines could not be held', and decided that Australia would become a major base in the war against Japan. Allied operations in North Africa were delayed to permit substantial American troops and reinforcements to be diverted to Australia during January-April 1942. The policy of the Roosevelt administration and Joint Chiefs of Staff towards Australia resulted largely from strategic necessity and a realisation that Australia was the only viable Pacific base from which to conduct a holding war. Short of actually abandoning the Pacific area and its plan to maintain a defensive Pacific strategy until victory in Europe, the US

had no real alternative but to develop Australia as the major base for initial Allied operations in the Pacific.

America's military planners did not anticipate that the Japanese would be permanently halted by MacArthur's forces in the Philippines or by British reinforcements at Singapore.<sup>7</sup> Hence, after late December, Washington planning was directed towards maintaining the Australian base. The consequences of this policy were fortuitous for Australia's government and people. But Australia's freedom and security were only incidental to America's long-term strategic objectives and interests. The level of American aid was always determined essentially by its global objectives and commitments. Nonetheless diplomatic and defence initiatives adopted by the Curtin Government did focus Washington's attention on the needs of the Southwest Pacific area, and encouraged Roosevelt's military planners to ascribe greater urgency to reinforcement of the Pacific.

The Curtin Government did not simply rely on diplomatic requests for additional assistance, or complacently accept that Australia's unprecedented strategic value would ensure sufficient American aid. It also adopted a major independent military initiative which bolstered its immediate regional security, and simultaneously indicated that it was acutely dissatisfied with Anglo-American global strategy. Early in 1942 Australia ignored the protests of its Great Power allies and withdrew part of its forces from the Middle East to assist in the defence of Australia and its territories. The Curtin Government possibly hoped to demonstrate that Australia was a significant military power which could not reasonably be denied the right to participate in high-level Allied policy making machinery. Yet it was principally security considerations rather than political implications which motivated this initiative.

With the collapse of Singapore on 15 February 1942 John Curtin proclaimed that Australia's territorial integrity, not the general contribution which his country could make to the Allied war effort, was now the fundamental objective of Australia's defence policy.<sup>8</sup> This aim was quickly translated into an appeal for the return of Australian troops from the Middle East, some of which were currently *en route* to the ABDACOM in Southeast Asia.

In the weeks preceding the collapse of Field Marshall Archibald Wavell's command, Curtin sent Churchill thirteen personal cables requesting fresh reinforcements. He also sent numerous requests to

Roosevelt. Anticipating the collapse of Singapore, Curtin advised Churchill through Earle Page of its critical importance. After emphasising 'that the whole of the internal defence system of Australia was based on the integrity of Singapore and the presence of a capital fleet there', Curtin stated that if this could not be ensured by Britain, Australia would act to reinforce its own security. Australia's original willingness to participate militarily in the European and Middle East theatres, Curtin argued, had been premised on a belief that Britain would make Singapore impregnable.<sup>9</sup> Clearly, Australia now believed that its obligation to Britain beyond the Pacific theatre had been removed by Britain's failure to reinforce Singapore adequately. Irrespective of the validity of this argument, the Curtin cabinet and Australian military advisers were adamant that decisions concerning deployment of Australian forces would be made in Canberra, not London or Washington.

Curtin suggested that the returning Australian forces should not proceed to the Netherlands Indies, but be sent directly to Australia. Because of inadequate British military assistance in the Far East, Curtin argued that the 'defence of Australia in the short term period must largely rest on Australian Forces and the degree to which they can be supplemented by forces, and to a large degree equipment from [the] United States'. However, he correctly pointed out that large-scale American aid could not reach Australia as quickly as the 6th and 7th Divisions if they were immediately diverted. No longer was Curtin prepared to use Australia's troops in the 'outer screen' of islands to the north of Australia if this threatened to weaken its continental defence capability.<sup>10</sup> The rapid collapse of Singapore intensified Australia's already acute anxiety, and clearly demonstrated that a British Empire military presence in the India–Burma area would not limit the Japanese advance south.

Two days later, Curtin instructed Churchill to authorise the diversion of the 6th and 7th Divisions to Australia. Following Lieutenant-General Vernon Sturdee's recommendation, Curtin also requested that Churchill assist in making 'urgent arrangements' for the 'recall of the 9th Division and remaining AIF in the Middle East at an early date'. The War Cabinet approved this decision the following day.<sup>11</sup>

This provoked an extremely critical reaction from Churchill and strong, if less explicit, criticism from Roosevelt and his military advisers. During 16–17 February Churchill and Wavell

recommended that although reinforcement of the Netherlands Indies was no longer feasible, at least one of the Australian divisions should be diverted to Burma. The British War Cabinet and Pacific war council in London also opposed diversion of both divisions to Australia. Roosevelt and his special advisor Harry Hopkins apparently shared this view.<sup>12</sup> The combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington also opposed Australia's decision.<sup>13</sup> Yet despite this combined Anglo-American opposition, the Australian War Cabinet refused to approve diversion of either division to Burma, and reiterated its instruction for their return.<sup>14</sup>

Churchill reacted by warning that continued intransigence might adversely affect Australia's relations with the US. 'Your greatest support in this hour of peril must be drawn from the United States', Churchill told Curtin:

They alone can bring into Australia the necessary troops and air forces, and they appear ready to do so. As you know the President attaches supreme importance to keeping open the connection with China, without which his bombing offensive cannot be started, and also most grievous results may follow in Asia if China is cut off from Allied help.

I am quite sure that if you refuse to allow your troops which are actually passing to stop this gap, and if, in consequence, the above evils affecting the whole course of the war follow, a very grave effect will be produced upon the President and the Washington circle, on whom you are so largely dependent.<sup>15</sup>

Roosevelt personally opposed Labor's decision, and Churchill successfully encouraged the President to relay this opposition in strong terms to Australian representatives. In discussions with Casey, Hopkins stressed that the President was determined to support China and India by reinforcing Burma. He intimated that if Australia diverted troops to Burma, the US would send additional forces to Australia.<sup>16</sup> Roosevelt presented a similar argument in a personal message which exaggerated the priority accorded the war against Japan by Britain and the US. It also reflected a concern that Australian policy might jeopardise Allied operations in the Far East and thus disrupt Anglo-American global planning. Roosevelt advised Curtin:

I fully appreciate how grave are your responsibilities in reaching a decision in the present circumstances as to the disposition of the

first Australian division returning from the Middle East. I assume you know of our determination to send in addition to all troops and forces now en route another force of over 27,000 men ... We must fight to the limit for our two ranks—one based on Australia the other on Burma, India and China. Because of our geographical position we Americans can better handle the reinforcement of Australia and the Right Flank ... On the other hand, the Left Flank simply must be held. If Burma goes it seems to me our whole position, including that of Australia will be in extreme peril. Your Australian Division is the only force that is available for immediate reinforcement [of Burma]. It could get into the fight at once and would, I believe, have the strength to save what now seems a very dangerous situation.<sup>17</sup>

Roosevelt agreed with Churchill that diversion of Australian forces to Burma was of 'utmost importance' to Allied global plans.<sup>18</sup>

Roosevelt's appeal failed to alter Labor's policy. On 22 February Roosevelt again asked Curtin to divert one division to India or Burma. However, in an effort to reduce tension which had developed between Australia and Britain, and to a lesser extent between Australia and the US, Roosevelt now assured Curtin: 'Under any circumstances you can depend upon our fullest support'. Despite this assurance, Roosevelt, like Churchill, remained firmly opposed to Australia's decision.<sup>19</sup>

The Australian Government refused to respond to this combined pressure. In the following months Churchill and Roosevelt, with the support of the combined Chiefs of Staff, continued to oppose Australia's tentative proposal to recall its one remaining Middle East division at the earliest possible date.<sup>20</sup> Indeed Roosevelt warned that an increased level of American aid to Australia was contingent upon its remaining in the Middle East.<sup>21</sup>

The dispute both reflected and aggravated Australian-American differences over military strategy. Australia's intransigent refusal to reinforce Burma was made in the absence of detailed information concerning Anglo-American global priorities or strategy against Japan. Curtin refused to accept assurances of additional American aid as the *quid pro quo* for deployment of some Australian forces in Burma in part because the proposed aid might have been inadequate or unavoidably delayed. He also rejected the proposal because he was anxious to demonstrate the magnitude and urgency of Australia's immediate defence problems after the collapse of

Singapore. Clearly, Curtin was prepared to act independently in both the military and political arenas to protect Australia's particular interests. Australian troops would only be used to 'help the common cause', if this could be accomplished 'without imperilling' Australia's security.<sup>22</sup>

Although opposed to the return of Australia's troops, the Roosevelt administration did not reduce the level of military assistance proposed for Australia. Indeed, the fact that the dispute coincided with the collapse of Singapore and the Philippines ensured that aid would be expanded. Curtin perhaps anticipated this.<sup>23</sup>

In Washington early in 1942, Morison has claimed, there was 'serious talk of abandoning Australia and New Zealand to the enemy'.<sup>24</sup> Although this policy was never adopted, the US military viewed retention of Australia as a 'highly desirable' but not an imperative or 'mandatory' objective. Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs accepted Eisenhower's suggestion that Australia was of minor importance compared with the need to retain the US, England, Russia and the Middle East. The US War Plans Division classified the Southwest Pacific 'as a very important but not a vital area'.<sup>25</sup> In mid-1942 Roosevelt acknowledged privately that he would 'rather lose' Australia or New Zealand than contribute to Russia's collapse.<sup>26</sup> This view was an extension of the 'Europe first' concept. It was also influenced by the Joint Chiefs' optimistic assumption that Japan would not attempt to occupy continental Australia.<sup>27</sup> The Great Powers adhered to the ARCADIA decision to allocate resources to the Pacific theatre which were sufficient only to support a purely defensive strategy. In contrast, Canberra favoured 'an immediate change on the part of the Allies to a positive offensive strategy' in the South Pacific after February–March 1942.<sup>28</sup> But without the allocation of American troops and materials at a level well above that envisaged in Anglo-American plans, anything other than a purely holding operation in the Southwest Pacific area could not be contemplated.

MacArthur collaborated closely with Curtin in requesting additional American reinforcement during 1942 and early 1943. Both leaders argued during April 1942, for example, that reinforcements allotted or promised were 'quite inadequate to carry out the objectives laid down' in MacArthur's directive, 'and far from enabling him to prepare for the offensive they are not sufficient to

ensure the security of Australia as a base for offensive operations.<sup>29</sup> By late April, Curtin, Evatt and MacArthur were making virtually identical submissions to different authorities in Washington.

Requests for additional aid and an early offensive implied criticism of Anglo-American global priorities. Other major submissions made by Curtin directly contradicted these priorities. While Evatt was gaining informal but extensive information from British officials concerning the ARCADIA decision to 'beat Hitler first', Curtin advised Roosevelt that Allied global policy should be directed towards defeating Japan first. 'The advantages of this course are several', Curtin argued:

It would ensure the security of the Southwest Pacific area. It would be the best means of protecting India. It would provide a second front for assistance to the Russians by relieving pressure on Siberia and releasing forces for use on the European front or by enabling a cruiser squadron to join with the United Nations in an early defeat of Japan, when the entire effort could be concentrated against Germany. Finally, a large scale offensive can be staged more easily and quickly in the Southwest Pacific area than in any other area.<sup>30</sup>

Although informed of Anglo-American global objectives and priorities in May, as late as August Curtin continued to preface his requests with the suggestion that he was ignorant of global strategy. On 31 August, for example, he cabled Roosevelt:

In the absence of knowledge of what is contemplated in the Southwest Pacific area in the general scheme for global strategy, we feel apprehensive regarding the capacity of the forces assigned to the Southwest Pacific area to ensure the security of Australia as a base.<sup>31</sup>

Curtin had received some indication of the ARCADIA decisions from Evatt in London during May, but his government remained largely ignorant of precise Anglo-American plans. MacArthur was designated 'the source of all information to be given to the Australian government on operational matters'.<sup>32</sup> Yet MacArthur was not advised by his superiors of the global priorities adopted at ARCADIA or of the broad objectives and priorities of Anglo-American strategy.<sup>33</sup> Evatt's discovery of the ARCADIA decisions intensified Australia's determination to insist on 'prior consultation to a greater degree'.<sup>34</sup> However, the Joint Chiefs refused to



disseminate important strategic information to the Curtin Government. In discussions with Dixon in August 1942, for example, General George C Marshall, US Chief of Staff, 'emphasised as he had done before the impossibility of making disclosures of plans and intentions' and repeated that military risks would be involved if vital strategic information was given to the small Allied powers.<sup>35</sup>

After gaining knowledge of the ARCADIA decisions, the Curtin Cabinet modified its proposal that the principal Allied objective be Japan's defeat. A report by the War Cabinet dated in June conceded that operations in all theatres of war were interdependent. Rather than argue that Japan should be defeated first, Curtin now emphasised that the US should provide sufficient aid to ensure that MacArthur could take the offensive and 'inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy'. Although no longer adamant that Japan should be defeated before victory in Europe, the Middle East or Russia, Curtin nonetheless emphasised that 'from the aspect of grand strategy' it was imperative that effective offensive operations against Japan be made 'an agreed objective of first priority'. MacArthur and Admiral Ernest J King made identical requests.<sup>36</sup>

However, the US made only slight adjustments in the level of aid given Australia during 1942 and early 1943. It thus refused to accord the Pacific a higher defence priority than that agreed to at ARCADIA.

Until early 1943 the combined Chiefs of Staff adhered to a policy of providing only 'minimum forces required' for a holding operation in the Pacific, and allocated maximum resources to the other theatres.<sup>37</sup> Nonetheless, the Pacific areas did receive American air, naval and ground reinforcements in 1942 above the levels initially contemplated by Anglo-American planners. Despite limited resources and a 'defensive' strategy, the US navy struck at Japan whenever possible, and was rewarded with major victories in the Coral Sea and at Midway. By mid-1942 approximately 250,000 American ground and air forces were stationed in the Pacific; over 80,000 had reached Australia.

Australian cabinet ministers continued to maintain publicly that they 'could never consent to the doctrine that Hitler must be defeated first', and argued that it was 'more important to the Australian people that Japan should be defeated in the Pacific theatre than that we should participate in the European theatre'.<sup>38</sup>

However, by September 1942 Evatt conceded that the US was justified in balancing the reinforcement of Australia against the valid claims of other theatres and the other areas of the Pacific.<sup>39</sup> Yet the Curtin Government remained critical of US policy towards Australia. A secret American report issued from Canberra in December 1942 described Curtin as 'being very bitter at President Roosevelt and Churchill' for failing to support Australia, and convinced that "no appeals" to the Allied leaders "would do any good".<sup>40</sup> Curtin's public criticisms were deliberately muted. He acknowledged in Parliament that 'Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt were unable fully to accept the views of the Australian Government on Pacific strategy and the provision of the forces and supplies sought'.<sup>41</sup> But such was the strength of Curtin's private dissatisfaction that Nelson Johnson, US representative in Canberra, advised the State Department to initiate steps 'to establish better understanding and greater confidence' between Curtin and Roosevelt.<sup>42</sup>

Australia remained dissatisfied with the level of US aid, and attempted to use its Middle East troops as a lever for gaining additional assistance. As indicated previously, Roosevelt agreed to send an additional division to Australia in March 1942, provided the 9th Division and supporting troops remained in the Middle East.<sup>43</sup> But in July Curtin told Churchill that withdrawal of the 9th Division would only be delayed if Britain's representatives in Washington undertook to support Australia's appeals for reinforcement of the RAAF to 73 squadrons by mid-1943. The combined Chiefs of Staff ultimately agreed to provide equipment for 30 squadrons by this date. Roosevelt and Churchill argued that in conjunction with other projected reinforcements this would ensure the defence of Australia.<sup>44</sup>

Australia was not placated. In the following weeks, during September 1942, Curtin advised that Australia might have to recall the 9th Division unless it received additional assurances of American equipment and forces.<sup>45</sup> In mid-October Curtin stated that Australia could no longer maintain the 9th Division unless it was stationed in Australia.<sup>46</sup>

Roosevelt responded by offering to dispatch an American division from Hawaii to Australia, provided the Australian forces remained in the Middle East. However, the President also stipulated: 'it must be appreciated that the situation may develop in such a

manner as to require the diversion of this additional Division for Australia to another locality within the South or Southwest Pacific Areas where its employment will be of greater advantage to the defense of Australia'.<sup>47</sup> In recommending that an American division be transferred from Hawaii, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also requested that Roosevelt inform Curtin:

I assume that sending this division will obviate the necessity for the Australian War Council to call back the 9th AIF Division from the Middle East. I cannot too strongly stress that leaving the 9th AIF Division in the Middle East will best serve our common cause.<sup>48</sup>

On 27 October the Joint Chiefs instructed the 25th US Infantry Division to transfer from Hawaii 'to Australia, or to stations in the Southwest or South Pacific Areas, depending on the situation', between 15 November and 1 December. Both the Joint Chiefs and Roosevelt considered 'it imperative that the Australian Division now in the Middle East remain there'.<sup>49</sup> Speaking before a sympathetic Combined Chiefs of Staff in November, Marshall outlined why America opposed Curtin's proposal. 'There were now sufficient troops in Australia to ensure the security of the continent', Marshall argued. Furthermore, 'an additional division was being shipped from Hawaii during November–December'. Finally, Marshall argued that Curtin's proposal would necessitate 'serious cuts' in projected Anglo-American reinforcements throughout the world. This would jeopardise operations in the Middle East, Burma and possibly New Guinea and the Solomons.<sup>50</sup>

Despite these developments, Australia recalled its remaining troops from the Middle East. In November Curtin told Roosevelt that Australia expected the Allied powers to provide adequate shipping to give 'early effect' to the return of these troops. Roosevelt immediately asked Churchill to cable Curtin that the US opposed any withdrawal of Australia's Middle East forces 'until the whole African operation from Algiers to Egypt is definitely settled in our favour, and every German and every Italian is driven out of Africa'.<sup>51</sup> Churchill endorsed Roosevelt's views, and intimated that suitable shipping might not be available.<sup>52</sup>

Still the Australian Government refused to accede to combined Anglo-American pressure. Confronted with this intransigence, Churchill reluctantly recommended to Roosevelt on 2 December that Australia be permitted to remove the 9th Division 'as soon as

shipping can be provided'.<sup>53</sup> Roosevelt acquiesced but reiterated that the troops should not be transferred until after a 'final and decisive victory' had been achieved over Rommel's forces.<sup>54</sup> The Combined Chiefs were adamant that 'there were no military arguments that would justify' the return of Australia's forces.<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, the troops were withdrawn. In early February the 9th Division reached Australia.

New Zealand decided against withdrawing its remaining division from the Middle East. This pleased both Churchill and Roosevelt, and permitted the early withdrawal of the Australian troops.<sup>56</sup> It also modified the negative impact of the Australian action on Allied policy in North Africa. Yet it did not reduce America's displeasure with Canberra's refusal to accept the recommendations of the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff. Washington's disenchantment was accentuated during December when Curtin announced that acute manpower difficulties had forced Australia to reduce its military forces by two divisions. This intensified criticism of Australia's unwillingness to contribute to the global war effort by concentrating on the defence of its own continent and immediate island periphery. Immediately Curtin reaffirmed that the 9th Division would be recalled, the Joint Chiefs of Staff diverted the US 25th Division originally scheduled tentatively for Australia, to assist at Guadalcanal in the Solomons. By late 1942 American military planners believed that Australia was adequately protected, and that any reinforcement above projected levels would be largely redundant.<sup>57</sup>

Australia refused to defer or alter its decision to withdraw its forces from the Middle East. While this undermined America's confidence in Australia's willingness or capacity to contribute unselfishly to the Allied cause, it also stimulated additional US military assistance to the South Pacific. Similarly, Curtin's previous refusal to divert Australian troops to Burma or India disturbed the Roosevelt administration and intensified Australian–American differences over global strategy and priorities. Nonetheless, the first dispute over the return of Australia's forces indirectly influenced Roosevelt's decision to send an extra American division and additional reinforcements to Australia. The unexpected Japanese military advance, rather than Australian pressure, was principally responsible for expanding the level of American aid to the South Pacific during 1942. The US was anxious to allocate MacArthur and Nimitz sufficient resources to prevent Japan from consolidating its

newly won positions. Delays in the proposed Allied cross-channel assault on Germany, coupled with the fact that America's wartime production had outstripped expectations, permitted the Joint Chiefs to divert expanded resources to the war against Japan.

The Anglo-American strategic conference in Casablanca during 14–24 January 1943 reaffirmed that basic Allied policy was to delay a full-scale offensive against Japan until after Germany was defeated. Yet despite this, the US Chiefs of Staff and the President gave qualified support to offensive operations in the Pacific. They also stressed that action against Japan be given a higher priority in future Allied planning. Indeed, Marshall and King argued that the percentage of resources diverted to the war against Japan should be increased from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. Although the conference made no final decision to give the Pacific a higher strategic priority, this altered emphasis in American planning was expressed in limited offensive operations against Japan in the South, Southwest and Central Pacific areas early in 1943.<sup>58</sup>

However, Great Britain did not share America's new enthusiasm for offensive operations. When advising Canberra of the decisions taken at Casablanca, the Dominion's secretary merely emphasised that operations in the Pacific would be 'limited by the necessity for concentrating maximum US and British forces against Germany, the primary enemy, but these will be sufficient to ensure that we retain the initiative against Japan'. The US did not advise Canberra of the Casablanca discussions. Hence Australia remained unaware that America was now prepared to diverge from the ARCADIA strategy and ascribe greater importance to offensive operations in the Pacific. Australia interpreted the Casablanca discussions and decisions as a simple restatement of existing 'Europe first' strategy.<sup>59</sup>

The strategic decisions made at TRIDENT, combined with recent Allied successes in the Guadalcanal and Papuan campaigns, conditioned a new optimism in the Curtin Government after May 1943. Although the TRIDENT decisions did not reject the primacy of the European theatre, they did elevate the Pacific to a position of unprecedented importance. Plans were proposed to eject the Japanese from the Pacific islands, details of a Central Pacific drive against the Marshalls and Carolines were decided, and joint Anglo-American long-range planning to defeat Japan was initiated.

These decisions did not fully validate Curtin's assertion of June that the Allied powers would now prosecute the war in the Pacific 'with the same vigor as the war in Europe'.<sup>60</sup> But they did constitute an unprecedented modification of the ARCADIA strategy, and foreshadowed broad Allied offensive operations in all areas of the Pacific. After early 1943 the momentum of operations against Japan increased rapidly, although victory in Europe was still the first priority.<sup>61</sup> The TRIDENT decisions did not, as Curtin claimed in June 1943, 'absolutely and completely support the contentions of the Australian government' on global priorities or strategy.<sup>62</sup> But after TRIDENT, Anglo-American objectives did correspond more closely to Australia's views. Nonetheless, no conclusive evidence exists to suggest that Australia's consistent and forceful opposition to Anglo-American global policies during the first eighteen months of the war had a decisive influence on the gradual modification of Pacific strategy early in 1943. Through Evatt's two diplomatic missions to Washington, withdrawal of its forces from the Middle East and frequent appeals to Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Australia asserted its dissatisfaction with both the low priority accorded the Pacific theatre and the level of American reinforcement. The Roosevelt administration made some concessions to these initiatives. It increased the level of Pacific aid above that initially projected in Anglo-American plans. In addition, it gradually ascribed the commencement of offensive operations against Japan a higher priority in grand strategy.

Yet in the final analysis, the pragmatic changes in America's policies and objectives in the Pacific resulted from altered military circumstances in all theatres of the war, not from political pressure exerted by any power. The initial American decisions to reinforce Australia and to establish the Southwest Pacific command resulted fundamentally from geographic and military factors, not from political persuasion. By March 1942 Australia was the only viable major Allied base available to the US in the South Pacific. The *ad hoc* adjustments made by the US in relation to the defence of Australia during 1942 and early 1943 were designed to sustain Australia as a base for defensive operations against Japan, not to placate the Curtin Government. The nature and extent of military assistance provided to Australia were always determined within the context of America's broader global objectives and commitments. At no time was Australia allocated additional reinforcements if this threatened

## Testing the Open Door Thesis in Australia, 1941–1946

The strength of American self-perceived exceptionalism is nowhere more evident than in the persistent belief that, during the World War II and the conversion to peace, the United States denied its particular national interests and promoted multilateral economic policies designed to benefit all nations equally. According to the most vigorous recent defender of this view, Alfred E Eckes, Jr., multilateralism was a prerequisite 'for peace and human betterment'. Eckes reasserts the argument advanced by most American economists and commentators in the early Cold War years, which interpreted multilateralism as 'a courageous, farsighted initiative to reverse interwar economic nationalism and to restore an efficient productive international economy benefiting all countries'.<sup>1</sup> In a similar vein, Lisle A Rose commented that an 'open postwar world of free and unfettered international trade' cannot be interpreted as 'an ignoble conception of the ideal postwar economic order'. Indeed, Rose argues, 'Washington's policy objectives can only be termed commonsensical and broad-minded,' and a reflection of 'enlightened and generous economic nationalism'.<sup>2</sup> This view also finds veiled support in John Gaddis's important study, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947*. While prepared to acknowledge that economic motives were behind some limited US initiatives in these years, Gaddis nonetheless stresses that multilateralism 'stemmed from more than narrow considerations of

economic self-interest' and was 'an objective clearly in the interests of all nations'.<sup>3</sup> This orthodox interpretation of multilateralism is reasserted unequivocally by Eckes, who portrays multilateralism as a 'benign tool of global cooperation' which was generally applauded by economists from other countries and was welcomed by all states except perhaps the Soviet Union as an essential ingredient in recovery from the ravages of war and depression.<sup>4</sup>

These assertions sharply contradict, and are in part reactions to, the now familiar arguments advanced by so-called revisionists, most notably Gabriel Kolko, Lloyd Gardner, and Walter La Feber. Deriving many insights from the pioneering work of William A. Williams, these historians have interpreted World War II as a critical period of Open Door expansion—a self-serving strategy to help America dominate global trade, resources, and investment.<sup>5</sup> This policy reflected the expansionist needs of liberal, capitalist America, and stimulated suspicion, concern, and defensive action by other states, especially communist Russia. In this way, revisionists assert, US behaviour before the end of World War II substantially caused the tensions and conflicts of the Cold War. Non-discriminatory trade, currency convertibility, and equal access to raw materials, the three keystones of wartime multilateralism, are portrayed by revisionists not as inoffensive or necessary means towards global economic cooperation, but as Open Door instrumentalities for expanded penetration and control of foreign markets, resources, and economic planning. Pursuit of such aims demanded the abolition or breakdown of existing spheres of influence, and trading arrangements, particularly those centered on Great Britain or the Soviet Union, and was inimical to the interests of those countries anxious to promote socialism, retain substantial levels of protection, or pursue an independent nationalist road to postwar recovery. The war provided American planners with an ideal opportunity for imposing this strategy. Desperate to ensure immediate aid from Washington during wartime and reconstruction, weaker states reluctantly accepted multilateral proposals, such as Article VII of Lend-Lease and the Bretton Woods Agreement, which were quickly translated into global arrangements and institutions dominated by the United States.

The contours of the partisan historiographical controversy which these conflicting views represent are by now widely known. Yet, orthodox and revisionist historians have remained preoccupied



with evaluating the sources of American policy in isolation from the reception given this policy by states other than the Soviet Union. They have focused primarily on relations between the superpowers in order to explain the origins of the Cold War. Such approaches have necessarily derived essentially from research on American manuscript sources and have dealt with the internal dynamics, nature, and motivation of US behaviour during the conversion to peace. This narrow approach ignores the attitudes and reactions of the various Allied governments to Washington's attempts to shape a new world order after the war. By neglecting the responses of these nations and by failing to specify the conditions under which at least some of these small or middle powers ultimately and often reluctantly consented to US initiatives, historians have avoided a critical test of the perceived nature and impact of American policy during this period. Certainly, detailed studies of how other nations interpreted and responded to American efforts to foster a multilateral economic order are essential if new light is to be shed on the issues raised in the debate over Open Door expansion and World War II. It must be recognised that the difficult climate of international relations during the conversion to peace was influenced substantially by how other states viewed American objectives. Other nations did not necessarily share Washington's enthusiasm for an open postwar economic order. Rather than simply assume that US aspirations coincided with those of its former Allies, apart from the USSR historians should test this assumption by using the manuscript sources of other nations, especially those governed by parties on the left, which were eager to pursue protective nationalist alternatives to multilateralism.

One such state was Australia. It was ruled by a nominally socialist Labor Party from 1941 to 1949 and was also a central factor in the most significant closed economic agreements of the 1930s and 1940s—the British imperial preference system. The following analysis of US relations with this significant and ostensibly close Pacific ally provides a limited but necessary test of the specific ways in which US economic policies, strategies, and motives were perceived and reacted to during the transition to peace. It presents a concrete evaluation of the responses of a lesser state to multilateralism, suggests how American policies were received abroad, indicates the ideological bias of American behaviour, and considers the relationship between US economic aims and its

political-military activities. Previous accounts have given little attention to the context of interactions with other countries. Consequently, the direction, nature, and tactics of US economic policies invariably have remained submerged beneath generalisations restricted to US initiatives only and have continued to reflect the constraints imposed by exclusive dependence on American perceptions and sources.<sup>6</sup> Without a wider framework, interpretations of American policy will continue to be shaped almost exclusively by questions which derive implicitly from the existing historiographical fixation with apportioning responsibility to either Moscow or Washington for precipitating the Cold War.

The harsh needs of war initially induced European and Pacific Allies to accept aid from Washington under terms defined largely by the creditor nation. But as the prospects of an Allied victory gradually improved, at least some of these states displayed increasing suspicion and acute concern with the implications of such terms for their national sovereignty and long-term economic plans and prosperity. Members of the British imperial preference arrangements epitomised this alarm, vigorously opposing the aims and tactics adopted by Washington to promote a new liberal international economic order. A memorandum submitted to the United Kingdom's War Cabinet late in 1943, for example, described multilateralism as:

a deliberate attempt to restore the mid-nineteenth century world of capitalist-individualist-internationalism. It aims at eliminating all material control of monetary and economic policy, of production and standards of life, in favour of a bygone economic philosophy which aimed at enabling every individual to buy and sell, to invest and employ, to his maximum immediate profit regardless of all social and national consequences, and on the same terms everywhere as the individuals of other nations—the system appeals in America, as it did here a hundred years ago, to a particular blend of quasi-religious internationalist emotion with a robust economic imperialism.<sup>7</sup>

For lesser members of the British Empire which were also nascent socialist states, especially Australia and New Zealand, this concern was compounded by an ideological suspicion of imperialism and traditional fear of domination by major states. Australia's minister in

Washington in 1944, for example, voiced this alarm in terms which now read like extracts from revisionist arguments. 'It will be seen that history is repeating itself,' Frederic Eggleston advised Canberra:

When Great Britain secured complete industrial supremacy she went into free trade and thereby assisted in clamping her economic empire over the world in the Nineteenth Century. America is in the same position as Great Britain was then, and the same urge is showing itself. It cannot be sufficiently realised that in a situation where one power is immensely superior to all others, economically free trade is the short way to economic imperialism.<sup>8</sup>

This negative view of American policy was not restricted to members of the British Empire nor to representatives of socialist or labour factions in Allied countries.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, it was not based on a wildly distorted assessment of Washington's aims and tactics and cannot be dismissed as merely a surface indication of uneasy inter-Allied relations towards the end of the war. Distrust of multilateralism permeated every facet of US relations with its Allies as they planned for a new postwar economic order, and it deeply affected international relations during the formative years of the Cold War.

The closed imperial preference system which had controlled about forty percent of all prewar international trade, was a principal focus of Washington's multilateralism. Although it depended heavily on US aid after Pearl Harbor, Australia doggedly attempted to avoid permanent new arrangements which might threaten its vital economic links with the British Empire.<sup>10</sup> The success of American-style multilateralism, however, hinged partly on abolishing the preferential trade and tariff block. During negotiations for the Atlantic Charter, mutual aid arrangements, wartime trade agreements, recovery loans, and the postwar settlement of Lend-Lease and other issues, Washington attempted to use its unrivalled power to lever Australia away from the British Empire into a new liberal international economic order geared primarily to the needs of the United States.

Multilateralism was strongly opposed as early as the Atlantic Conference of August 1941. Confronted with Prime Minister Winston Churchill's objections to a clause pledging the Commonwealth to promote liberal, nondiscriminatory trade practices, President Franklin Roosevelt agreed to accept a

compromise which 'did not imply formal and immediate obligation on the part of the British to abrogate' existing economic arrangements with the dominions. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was keenly disappointed with this escape clause and intensified his efforts to commit by other means Britain and her dominions to eliminate, or at least substantially reduce, all preferential or discriminatory trading practices.<sup>11</sup>

Pearl Harbor, and Australia's urgent appeals for help, permitted Washington to seek concessions from Canberra in return for Lend-Lease assistance. The controversial Article VII of the Master Lend-Lease agreement, which subsequently applied to Australia and indeed all Allies receiving aid, provided for agreed action to stimulate world trade; 'elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce'; 'reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers'; and postwar discussions to implement these multilateral aims.<sup>12</sup> This imprecise clause was accepted reluctantly, after protracted and sometimes acrimonious negotiations in 1941–42. Ultimately, it was Japan's rapid advance south which induced the Commonwealth states to consent. Article VII was, as Dean Acheson later observed, 'the purest essence' of multilateralism, and it boded ill for arrangements established under the Ottawa Agreements of 1932.<sup>13</sup> The broad implications of this clause were acknowledged by Hull, who commented that it laid 'the foundation ... for all our later postwar planning in the economic field'.<sup>14</sup>

In all future negotiations, however, neither Britain nor Australia conceded that Article VII necessarily committed them to modify or abolish preferences after the war. Indeed, before they consented, both countries had been given assurances by Roosevelt and Hull that the United States did not wish 'to trade the principle of imperial preference as a consideration for Lend-Lease'.<sup>15</sup> Later, H V Evatt, Minister for External Affairs from 1941 to 1949, refused a request by Acheson that Australia, which had signed an exchange of notes governing Lend-Lease but not the master agreement, sign a separate explicit commitment to Article VII.<sup>16</sup> Despite persistent differences over the formal undertakings implied by the exchange of notes, American officials confidently anticipated that Commonwealth states could not successfully resist multilateralism. Hull, for

example, optimistically interpreted the ambivalent response to Article VII as 'a long step toward the fulfillment, after the war, of economic principles for which I have been fighting for half a century'.<sup>17</sup>

Although confident that Article VII would dissolve closed economic arrangements, American officials never relied exclusively, or indeed primarily, on this device. The war, not the New Deal, had largely overcome the catastrophe of depression. By 1942 the American economy was operating at full capacity for the first time since the late 1920s. Acutely conscious of this fact, American officials were anxious to ensure that recovery was not merely a wartime aberration.<sup>18</sup> To help achieve a postwar economic order which would guarantee it expanded access to new markets and resources and thus maintain the boom production levels of wartime, the United States provided Lend-Lease under selective, rigid terms, which inhibited the industrial expansion of competing states and attempted to increase the dependence of other states on the US economy and technology. Requests for industrial and machine tools by Australia, for example, were often rejected because such assistance might have fostered competitive secondary industries abroad. Late in 1943, Dean Acheson instructed Nelson Johnson, US Minister to Canberra, that requests should be scrutinised with ever increasing care to ensure that Australia not use aid to build up industries that could be maintained after the war.<sup>19</sup> Restrictions imposed on Lend-Lease effectively excluded 'all projects of a permanent nature' from future eligibility. Such actions further reduced Australia's potential to make goods which might compete with American exports.<sup>20</sup>

Despite Australia's limited industrial capacity, Washington officials were alarmed that it might 'build up an industrial organization capable of supplying her own requirements in automobiles and aircraft,' which would ultimately compete with US goods in 'Eastern markets'.<sup>21</sup> This concern was translated into a policy designed to stifle Australia's infant industrialisation. Appeals for aid to enable Australia to produce aluminum were rejected. According to Australian Minister of Supply J.A. Beasley, this was a direct result of pressure from US 'officers who in private life represented American aluminum interests'.<sup>22</sup> Projects aimed at producing Mustang aircraft, Lincoln bombers, and diesel engines—all seemingly vital to the Allies' war effort—were subject to 'long

and bitter' negotiations and were belatedly accepted by Washington only as joint, or modified ventures. Attempts by the Labor Government to establish local automobile and aircraft industries were delayed and compromised.<sup>23</sup> Clearly, Washington was reluctant to countenance expanded competition in international markets after the war, especially if it was an indirect result of wartime aid arrangements.

After 15 November 1943, US policy on Lend-Lease hardened further when it ceased providing as reciprocal aid all capital goods, including materials needed for permanent projects, machine tools, and industrial equipment. Curiously, this decision was made while Hull and Johnson were asking for expanded reverse aid from Australia.

Such ill timed requests ignored Canberra's claims that it 'had given more proportionately, if not actually,' than it had received as direct Lend-Lease.<sup>24</sup> Against this background, the US decision to restrict Lend-Lease provoked another angry rejection by Australia of Hull's request for more reverse aid. Intensified Australian hostility to the broad thrust of American foreign economic policy was also reflected by early 1944 in reports that 'strong feelings ... against the United States' had surfaced in the Cabinet, and in suggestions reaching Johnson that Prime Minister John Curtin and Treasurer Ben Chifley had become 'quite anti-American'.<sup>25</sup> Less than eighteen months after Pearl Harbor and the panic-stricken appeals for help, Johnson observed, the Curtin Government was exhibiting 'deep-seated distrust of American policy'.<sup>26</sup> Aware of frequent American newspaper claims that the United States should dominate all facets of the postwar Pacific and also disturbed by increased congressional and State Department reference to the vast untapped economic opportunities awaiting the United States in the Asian-Pacific region, the Labor Government again looked anxiously for help from the Commonwealth.<sup>27</sup> Curtin, for example, quickly suppressed his earlier distaste for Churchill and the empire, urging now that US economic ambitions in the Pacific must be offset by a prominent British presence.<sup>28</sup>

Both countries adjusted their reciprocal aid to their particular postwar economic aims. This reduced the amount and types of support given the war effort against Japan, especially after mid-1943 when bilateral trade agreement talks collapsed after more than two years of sometimes bitter discussions.<sup>29</sup> Immediately after the talks

ended, John Minter, a US official in Canberra, observed that the Curtin Government had intensified its support for an international full employment agreement, and he warned that Labor apparently believed support for full domestic employment was 'the only objective of Article VII'. If implemented in the major countries after the war, such an agreement might deflect the pressure for reduced tariffs and permit Australia to expand industrialisation and employment behind protective tariff walls. Given Labor's theoretical commitment to democratic socialism at home, its entrenched support for protectionism, and the upsurge in economic nationalism within the Curtin cabinet, American officials reluctantly conceded that full employment was the cornerstone of Australia's postwar plans.<sup>30</sup>

The full employment proposal was, in part at least, a device to counter multilateralism. It reflected an ideological commitment of improving living standards in all countries, but it also provided Labor with a convenient defense against pressure to reduce or abandon protectionism. As Minister Evatt observed, Labor attached 'primary and indeed supreme importance' to full employment as a means to enable all states to retain sovereignty over economic planning.<sup>31</sup> Washington, however, viewed a binding full employment agreement very differently. Johnson pointed out, for example, that Evatt's proposals on employment would oblige the United States to adopt a degree of centralised planning control and governmental responsibility over labour and capital 'far beyond anything conceived by our people'.<sup>32</sup> Predictably, opposition to agreements binding states to domestic full employment policies as proposed by Australia at various international conferences during 1944–46 was led by Washington. Initially, Australia refused to make any promise on tariff matters before the United States gave firm support to the full employment ideal. US representatives at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco were convinced that Australian support for a charter clause committing member states to ensure full local employment was 'merely an attempt to bypass the demand for lower tariffs'.<sup>33</sup>

But ideological hostility to this allegedly socialist alternative to multilateralism was also strong. Senator Arthur Vandenburg conceded, for example, that many American officials 'believed "full employment" synonymous with Communism and collectivism'. Some officials portrayed Australia's full employment objectives as 'a

socialist instrument' designed by 'dogmatic ... Canberra Pinks,' most notably Evatt's close advisors, John Burton and H C Coombs, and others in the Departments of External Affairs, Treasury, and Postwar Reconstruction. It appears also that prominent US representatives at San Francisco, especially John Foster Dulles and Leo Pasvolosky, believed that Australia was one of 'a number of nations which seemed to think that the US had been the cause of the war because of its failure to maintain a sound economic structure'.<sup>34</sup> Revisionist historians such as Robert F Smith later resurrected this argument.<sup>35</sup> These mutual suspicions over international economic aims and motives were sustained, in part at least, by deep-seated ideological differences.

After trade agreement negotiations failed in 1943, Washington intensified its efforts to gain Australian support for liberalised trade. Hull instructed his legation in Canberra late in 1944 to endeavor 'to persuade Australia to follow a broadly balanced postwar economic policy which would include a liberal, nondiscriminatory trade policy, devoid of exchange and quantitative import controls, and designed to maximise the exchange of goods and services'. He also expressed concern with the growth of protectionist sentiment in Australia and the threat which this might pose to a future expansion of US exports: 'Particularly does the American government desire that Australia give no support to uneconomical industries after the war'.<sup>36</sup> Yet throughout the war, as New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser observed, the Dominions were reluctant to sacrifice 'the substance for the shadow'; they were reluctant to dismantle protectionism and preferences in return for the uncertain results of multilateralism. Indeed, as late as mid-1944 dominion leaders asserted that they were 'free, if they wished, to maintain or indeed extend' preferences and tariffs.<sup>37</sup>

By 1943 the war had caused a dramatic revival of the American economy, trebling exports, doubling output, and creating a trade surplus almost twice as large as in the boom year of 1920.<sup>38</sup> This vast export capacity was also demonstrated by the massive volume of Lend-Lease material produced and transported after 1939. To sustain these new levels and avert recession, however, Washington was anxious to implement international monetary measures which would permit importing countries to maintain or expand purchases. A policy of increased capital exports was foreshadowed as early as April 1942. But the State Department maintained that loans for



postwar reconstruction should only be provided to countries following commercial and general policies which were not 'an obstacle to the expansion of our foreign trade'.<sup>39</sup> Reciprocal aid was a crucial factor in the Allied victories in Europe and Asia, but it was always provided under arrangements which endorsed America's perceived long-term economic interests. 'Our basic purpose,' Acheson informed Hull in 1944, 'is to see to it that Lend-Lease methods cause the least possible disturbance to our normal commercial practice, and that the interests of American exporters are fully protected in all the markets of the world'.<sup>40</sup>

Throughout the war American officials not only spoke explicitly of extending the open door in Asia and the Pacific, but they also linked this aim with the need to dominate and determine all vital aspects of the Allied war effort and peace settlements in this region. Wilsonian notions about the nexus between capitalism and democracy and the long-standing illusions about the vast potential of Asia's markets both remained strong influences on American policy.<sup>41</sup> Writing from Chungking shortly after Pearl Harbor, Frederic Eggleston warned Canberra 'that the US intends to pursue a policy of economic development in the Far East after the war, in competition with all comers'. Later, from his new vantage point as Minister in Washington, Eggleston observed that businessmen serving as officials in the Roosevelt administration were 'busy coining new "freedoms" to cover some attempt to use their superior capitalistic position to secure a monopoly' in the Far East or the Pacific. He warned that America's unchallenged global power was being translated into policy of economic expansion.<sup>42</sup> This view was apparently shared widely within Labor circles in Australia. Minister Johnson noted privately that many members of Curtin's cabinet were hostile to capitalism and foreign 'capitalistic leaders,' and thus determined to resist American multilateralism.<sup>43</sup>

As the prospects of an Allied victory improved, US officials redefined the relationship between Lend-Lease arrangements adopted in 1941–42 and expansionary economic aims. 'The basic postwar objectives of the United States in the field of commercial policy are incorporated in Article VII of the mutual aid agreements,' the Secretary's Staff Committee concluded in early 1944. It wanted barriers relaxed and liberal commercial policies established 'simultaneously in as many countries as possible'. The Roosevelt and Truman administrations were equally anxious to ensure the 'greatest

possible expansion of international trade on a non-discriminatory basis in accordance with comparative efficiencies of production'; to preserve 'private enterprise in traditionally private enterprise countries'; and to shift production 'from the less efficient to the more efficient sources of supply'.<sup>44</sup> Given America's unrivalled mass production capacity and efficiency by 1945, its preeminent trading potential, and the massive devastation of Europe's industrial base, these measures were likely to stimulate a proportionately higher level of growth and prosperity in the United States than in competing economies. Washington's stated bias for free trade and capitalism abroad implicitly opposed the reconstruction plans being developed by the Labor Government; these plans included the nationalisation of banks, diversification of local industries under protectionism, state support for viable heavy industry, and local manufacture of such items as automobiles and aircraft. The cornerstone of Labor's plan for 'economic security' and 'social justice' in the uncertain postwar climate was its full employment policy. Its ambitious plans for improved employment, housing, education, child welfare, retirement pensions, and widows' pensions embraced uncritically the Keynesian notion that variations in private expenditure must be offset by adjustments in the expenditures of government. To avoid a return to the widespread 'social insecurity' and threatened 'anarchy' of the 1930s, Labor was adamant that the state must exercise strong central authority over planning and spending. These reformists, unashamedly nationalistic aims were criticised as socialist during the national election campaign of 1943, but, along with Labor's war record, they provided the backbone for its unprecedented landslide victory at the polls on 21 August.<sup>45</sup> Clearly, Labor's economic priorities and political ideology contrasted dramatically with those expressed by US multilateralism. Not surprisingly, during the conversion to peace, multilateralism was frequently portrayed by Australian officials as a threat to small-power sovereignty and a thinly veiled form of 'economic imperialism'. In Parliament, charges of 'dollar imperialism' were made by representatives of both the Labor and conservative opposition parties.<sup>46</sup>

Australia's distrust of US economic aims and tactics also surfaced at the United Nations-sponsored monetary and financial conference at Bretton Woods in July 1944, where the participants agreed in principle to establish the International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. The conference rejected an Australian proposal for an international agreement binding states to promote full employment. Fearing that the United States would dominate the proposed fund and bank and concerned that participation would undermine small-power economic sovereignty, Australia initially refused to join other participants in accepting the conference decisions. Significantly, when Australia belatedly signed, it did so on the understanding that this would imply no commitment to implement the decisions. Twenty-eight nations joined the monetary fund and international bank late in 1945. Washington strongly urged Australia to consent, but it refused.<sup>47</sup> Those opposed within the Labor Party protested that ratification 'would mean the sacrifice of sovereign rights of independent nations on the altar of dollar imperialism'. They feared it would prejudice the right to maintain high levels of tariff protection and thus undermine high levels of domestic employment. Some cabinet members and government advisers believed Australia might unnecessarily circumscribe its freedom to vary exchange rates and thereby threaten vital earnings derived from exporting primary products.

Opposition to possible American domination was shared by conservative parliamentarians, most of whom accepted the argument that Australia must ultimately ratify. Commenting on the proposed operation of the monetary fund, for example, the leader of the Country Party observed: 'No alteration can, without the consent of the US, be made (a) in the agreement itself [or] (b) in the quotas, on which all the voting power depends'. He concluded that 'The US, by its power of veto, by the administrative provisions, and by its virtual monopoly of monetary gold, has all the power necessary to dominate the fund'.<sup>48</sup> The Australian Minister in Washington informed Evatt that the United States was 'keen to inaugurate foreign trade, but the organisations which they set up for the purpose will be exclusive in character and will not allow the people in foreign countries to participate either management or in profits'.<sup>49</sup>

The strength of Australia's opposition is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that it did not ratify Bretton Woods until March 1947, after a long fight which seriously split the Labor Party.<sup>50</sup> As late as 1947, a substantial minority of government members continued to argue that 'the Bretton Woods agreement would inevitably deliver

Australian internal affairs into the hands of an international financial autocracy' dominated by the United States. Some prominent members, led by the dogged Minister for Transport and External Territories, Eddie Ward, advocated joint action by Australia, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union to ensure that the Bretton Woods apparatus collapsed.<sup>51</sup>

During the transition to peace, Washington employed an intricate strategy to induce Australian support for the implications of Article VII. Less than a week after Japan had surrendered, President Harry F Truman announced the end of Lend-Lease. All existing contracts, except where cash would be paid for materials previously ordered, were abruptly cancelled. This decision was foreshadowed during 1944–45 by various administration statements suggesting that the end of Lend-Lease would correspond with the end of the war by the gradual imposition of restrictions on the amount and type of aid during the final phase of the war, and by the withdrawal from Britain of all assistance, except for military use in the Pacific, immediately following the defeat of Germany in May 1945. Nonetheless, Britain and Australia were acutely disturbed. The new British Labor Prime Minister Clement Attlee protested publicly: 'We hoped that the sudden cessation of this great mutual effort would not be effected without consultation and prior discussion'.<sup>52</sup> Eggleston advised that his government was also 'profoundly dissatisfied' with Truman's action. Shortly afterwards, Australia retaliated by stipulating that supplies and services to US forces in the Pacific would no longer be furnished as reciprocal aid and that all reverse aid provided since 2 September would retrospectively be excluded from reciprocal arrangements and considered as normal exports to the United States.<sup>53</sup>

The US decision to end Lend-Lease derived from a complex of local political and economic factors, and it should reasonably have been anticipated by its allies. But this action was widely viewed as an additional attempt to oblige other nations to participate in the postwar economic arrangements foreshadowed in Article VII. In 1944 Roosevelt stated he would permit Britain to use Lend-Lease to assist its economic reconversion and recovery immediately after the war. But Truman's decision to end Lend-Lease in August 1945 negated this assurance. It also implicitly reversed earlier intimations that Lend-Lease and the Lend-Lease settlement would not be used as instruments to break down imperial preferences.<sup>54</sup> This

understanding involved the dominions as well as Britain. Eggleston believed Truman's action was motivated by a desire 'to force the British to take loans from the Import-Export Bank,' or 'to force the British to repeal the discriminations under the Ottawa Agreement ... to break-up the sterling bloc'.<sup>55</sup> American planners now accepted that Article VII did not ensure Britain and the dominions would 'go along with our program to restore [sic] world-wide multilateralism in finance and trade'.<sup>56</sup> Hence in preliminary loan discussions with Britain, US officials 'indicated that it is essential that we discuss both finance and trade simultaneously,' and stipulated 'that it will be necessary for us to come to a broad understanding as to postwar trading methods and policy before we can ask Congress for any large-scale financial aid to Britain'.<sup>57</sup> Significantly, when it was announced that Britain had accepted a loan late in 1945, it was also agreed that Britain and America would commence preliminary negotiations 'for the purpose of developing concrete arrangements' to convene an international conference which would develop 'definitive measures for the relaxation of trade barriers of all kinds'.<sup>58</sup>

Although Britain conceded publicly that the loan was not conditional upon future reductions of imperial preferences, this argument did not convince Australia. It continued to believe that the United States wanted to reduce preferences as the *quid pro quo* for a generous Lend-Lease and postwar economic settlement. During the loan negotiations Attlee made a strong and personal appeal to Australia's new Prime Minister, Ben Chifley, requesting consent to an Anglo-American formula for reducing preferences. While prepared to discuss possible tariff revisions, Chifley replied that his government could 'not indicate in any way that Empire preference had been sold out in advance' of the loan being granted to Britain.<sup>59</sup> US policy toward small powers during Lend-Lease settlement negotiations indicates that it attempted to use the settlement as a means of extracting broader international support for its multilateral objectives. No bilateral Lend-Lease settlement was concluded until the Chifley cabinet had given firm, if informal, evidence that it was finally prepared to participate in postwar arrangements aimed at promoting multilateralism.<sup>60</sup>

Australia's attempts to avert or delay a settlement were based ostensibly on the view that a financial settlement was redundant since both countries had made approximately equal contributions.

But in reality these tactics reflected distrust of Washington's motives and a determination to protect Australia's particular economic interests in the postwar world.<sup>61</sup> Ultimately, after months of negotiations, Australia accepted in mid-1946 a Lend-Lease settlement which virtually wiped out its debt, estimated variously by American authorities at between \$490 (US) million and \$100 (US) million.<sup>62</sup> This generous arrangement, however, was conditional upon Australia accepting a joint undertaking on economic policy, which stated in part:

The two Governments have undertaken to enter into negotiations for the reaching of agreement between themselves and other countries of like mind on mutually advantageous measures directed to the reduction of trade barriers, and the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, payments and investments.<sup>63</sup>

Australia did not sign a formal declaration to this effect. But the State Department correctly believed that during settlement negotiations Australia had agreed, if somewhat reluctantly, 'to work out fair and liberal civil aviation and commercial policy agreements,' and to participate in an American-sponsored conference on trade expansion aimed at implementing the liberal trade objectives of Article VII.<sup>64</sup>

In announcing the terms of the Lend-Lease settlement of 7 June 1946, Chifley accepted these informal commitments. He acknowledged that the agreement conformed with provisions of the Mutual Aid Agreement which was designed to increase 'mutually advantage bilateral trade, expanded worldwide trade, and improve international economic conditions'. Australia was now prepared also to participate in a series of conferences proposed at Bretton Woods which aimed to determine 'agreed measures for the expansion of world trade, production and employment, and to establish permanent international machinery to foster these purposes'. Moreover, Chifley accepted an invitation to participate in an additional conference of major trading nations to 'consider specific reciprocal trade arrangements for the joint relaxation of trade barriers and the active promotion of wider trade between themselves and with other countries'. John Minter reported enthusiastically that Chifley's announcement was 'the very first attempt on the part of any Australian Government agency to tell the

people of Australia that the government had some obligations under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement other than just the exchange of resources during the war'.<sup>65</sup>

Despite this new confidence that US tactics had finally prevailed, the Chifley Government still refused to give unequivocal support to multilateralism. It refused to reduce tariffs if this action threatened to endanger protected Australian industries; it resisted strong US pressure to abandon plans for a locally produced automobile; and it collaborated with other dominions in a strategy to avoid relaxation of British Empire preferences at the proposed international conferences 'except on a *quid pro quo* basis'.<sup>66</sup> As the compromise Lend-Lease settlement had anticipated, however, during 1946–48 Australia bowed to American pressure by abandoning the full employment principle, by accepting a limited trade and tariff agreement, and by ratifying new US-sponsored arrangements projected at Bretton Woods and later extended through the International Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs at Geneva.<sup>67</sup> Thus, belatedly and reluctantly, Australia was incorporated into the broad multilateral apparatus envisaged in Article VII.

Australia's opposition to US aims and policies was not restricted to the economic arena. Indeed it perceived Washington's foreign economic policies as central aspects of a broader desire to dominate all critical facets of the postwar world. During the war, representatives of the Labor Government complained of America's 'contemptuous indifference' to its allies; stridently criticised Roosevelt's failure to consult with small states; argued that Australia could never consent to the principal Anglo-American strategy that 'Hitler must be defeated first'; and complained that this strategy and all other vital Allied policies had been determined without reference to Australia.<sup>68</sup> Curtin articulated the frustrations of small allies when he concluded angrily: 'The simple fact is that we had no voice in the decisions. We were confronted with a *fait accompli* and we had no alternative but to accept the decisions, much as we disliked them'.<sup>69</sup>

Australia's vigorous opposition to US postwar ambitions in the Pacific and Japan reflected a similar concern.<sup>70</sup> While prepared to tolerate big power leadership during the conversion to peace, External Affairs Minister Evatt argued that it was 'an indispensable corollary of such leadership that other nations, which have shared

the tremendous burden and sacrifices, should have the correlative right to share in the planning and making of the armistice and peace arrangements, especially where their interest is direct and substantial'.<sup>71</sup> Minister Eggleston perhaps best captured Australia's hostility when he observed: 'the mood of the USA is that they have won the war and they have not that sort of greatness which recognises the share of others, and especially that of smaller nations'.<sup>72</sup> Despite occasional public disclaimers to the contrary, after 1942 Australia's representatives from the Prime Minister downward exhibited concern with growing US influence and imperialism in the Far East. Increasingly, they urged an expanded British and Commonwealth role in the Pacific war against Japan as a barrier to American penetration.<sup>73</sup> Aware of Washington's inchoate plans to control unilaterally a string of postwar Pacific bases and disturbed by its refusal to share responsibility for deciding the future of the Far East, Australia's cynicism intensified. Washington's convenient strategic area trusteeship proposals, for example, were portrayed by Eggleston as a decent garment to conceal the nakedness of their control.<sup>74</sup>

Acting with New Zealand late in 1944, Canberra initiated a bold but ultimately unsuccessful effort to offset American domination and to seek recognition as a principal force in all negotiation and arrangements for the Pacific and occupied Japan. In the controversial ANZAC agreement the small states declared that no changes in the control of ownership of any territory should be made without their explicit consent. Negotiated against a background of growing concern with American imperialism and Washington's apparent determination to monopolise all facets of the Japanese settlement,<sup>75</sup> this pact was, as State Department officials quickly acknowledged, 'aimed all too obviously at the US'.<sup>76</sup> Fears of US imperialism, both economic and territorial, continued to be voiced in the final phase of the war by representatives of Australia, as well as other Allied governments.<sup>77</sup> Shortly after Japan had capitulated, Australia's Defense Minister went so far as to compare American behaviour toward his government with Soviet activities in Eastern Europe.<sup>78</sup>

While implacably opposed to closed spheres of influence by other states, whether a British economic zone or a Soviet security sphere, the United States persistently sought to establish unilateral control over postwar Japan and all significant aspects of the Far



Eastern settlement. At the same time the United States strengthened its traditional domination of Latin America, especially in the economic domain. These developments were not a reaction to difficulties with the Soviet Union in Europe. While advocating an open, liberal world, Washington also wanted to define and control the new postwar order in the Pacific. The American allies, both large and small, were acutely aware of this fundamental discrepancy between global ideals and regional behaviour. Commenting on US aims in the Pacific, Eggleston noted candidly that the 'so-called idealism of the USA is not for home consumption but only to provide a standard by which to judge other people'.<sup>79</sup> Even General Douglas MacArthur conceded that Washington refused to share responsibility for the Pacific with other states because unilateral domination would guarantee 'American prestige and commercial prospects throughout the Far East'.<sup>80</sup> Initially, Washington had envisaged and planned for possible Soviet participation in the final assault on Japan. But by mid-April 1945, against a background of intensified departmental warnings of the growing threat posed by Soviet ideology and activities, Secretary of State James Byrnes was determined to 'get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in'.<sup>81</sup> In seeking to extend its influence throughout the Far East and to foreclose the region to possible Soviet penetration, Washington excluded all interested powers from an effective role in the counteroffensive, peace settlement and occupation of Japan. This policy aroused strong resentment among former Allies. Australia's hostile view of American foreign economic policy and overall tactics was part of a wider concern about America's expanding and exclusive ambitions in the Pacific—aims which pointedly contradicted the rhetoric of liberal internationalism emanating from Washington.

As a small state, Australia's authority and options in the international economic arena were only marginally greater than in military and political affairs. It vigorously resisted full-fledged multilateralism throughout the war, but like other dependant Allies it could not successfully counter US initiatives. Ultimately it participated, albeit reluctantly, in the new international monetary and trade agreements developed under American auspices during 1944–47, and it was induced to accept some changes to imperial preferences. Concessions extracted from Australia in return for wartime aid drew it gradually into a series of arrangements designed

to implement multilateralism in the postwar world. In sum, Australia's reactions and counter initiatives from 1941 to 1946 is firm evidence that US multilateralism was interpreted by other nations as a self-serving strategy of open door expansion.

It must be conceded, however, that this limited study does not offer conclusive support for the revisionist's view that US policy during World War II had as its core objective<sup>82</sup> an expansionist policy designed to open the world irreversibly to American trade and investment.<sup>83</sup> But this study does indicate that other states believed it was a central aspect of American policy. Historians may never be able to quantify accurately the relative weight attached to economic, military, or political goals by American planners. But certainly these facets of American policy were perceived in Australia, at least, as integrated parts of an expanding US presence in, and control of, the Pacific region during 1943–47. If these initiatives were usually couched in disclaimers of self-interest and derived from a conviction that the world must be reformed by the United States, since it alone had the capacity to complete the task,<sup>84</sup> they were seldom interpreted in this light by other nations. Australian responses ranged from hesitant to hostile, as it attempted to counter, resist, or deflect US initiatives. This small state felt its particular economic interests and regional ambitions stifled by the predominance of American power and influence in the Asia–Pacific area after 1943 and also threatened by Washington's liberal internationalism. Only gradually after the war, and against the background of an allegedly new Asian threat to its security in the form of Communist China, did Australia accommodate itself to American authority in the Pacific. This change was pursued after 1949 by the conservative Robert Menzies Government which, like its American counterparts, eagerly exploited the anti-Communist rhetoric of the Cold War for electoral advantage at home. Much less nationalist and reformist than its predecessor, the Menzies Government substituted an uncritical dependence on its so-called 'great and powerful friends' for the assertive independence in international affairs which Labor had pursued from 1941 to 1949.

Writing recently on Anglo-American relations and the future of colonial possessions after 1945, W R Louis observed that the 'great expansion of American power during the Second World War was not accompanied by an overall clarity of policy'.<sup>85</sup> Despite the claims of revisionists, it is still widely asserted that 'America entered

the post-World War II period without a clear and consistent view of the world or of America's role in it'.<sup>86</sup> A corollary to this argument, advanced by Lisle Rose, is that the most striking aspect of US 'international economic policy during and after the war is not its aggressiveness, but its timidity'.<sup>87</sup> Such assertions appear difficult to substantiate. Washington viewed dominant penetration of the postwar economic order in the Pacific and the Far East as vital to its long-term open world interests, and it used a complex strategy to promote this aim. It moved deliberately after 1941 to break down and penetrate existing spheres of influence beyond the western hemisphere. Fundamentally, the espoused liberal internationalism was an expression of separate national needs, supported in the Pacific at least by exclusive military authority; it was not a genuine attempt to accommodate shared Allied aspirations by implementing broadly endorsed international goals. It is difficult to escape Lloyd Gardner's conclusion that economic opportunity in a given region such as Eastern Europe was not alone considered essential to American prosperity, 'but an open world was—especially after twelve years of Depression and war'.<sup>88</sup> That this objective was not fully realised in all parts of the world, including Australia, cannot be adduced as evidence that it was not actively pursued by the United States during 1942–46. Nor can the negative reactions of other states be ignored simply because US initiatives were occasionally compromised. The exigencies of war, the urgent need of the Allied powers for help, and pre-eminent American economic and military capacity together provided after 1941 a unique opportunity for the adoption of tactics aimed at committing the Allies to the principles of multilateralism.

As a vital member of the closed preference arrangements and a focus of resistance to unilateral American action in the Far East, Australia was an important target of Washington's plans and tactics. Such initiatives were not a response to tensions deriving from difficulties at Yalta or Soviet intervention in Poland. They predate rifts with the Soviet Union over the Eastern European settlement, since they were being pursued vigorously throughout the Pacific war.<sup>89</sup> Unless it can be demonstrated that US policies towards Australia were essentially an aberration or that Australia's perception of these policies was unique and without foundation, then clearly the major power attempted to exploit the conditions of war to promote the open door and further its particular long-term

economic interests.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, Washington's efforts to penetrate the Pacific by employing its unchallenged wartime supremacy and by unilaterally dominating all facets of war and peace in this area were resented and opposed by lesser states. Although clouded in the rhetoric of anti-imperialism and liberal internationalism, still accepted by many scholars as accurate descriptions of US aims, the states actually involved in the war effort usually regarded such assertions with profound cynicism. Even conceding that US behaviour appeared more hegemonic than in fact it was, or that there was a significant gap between acknowledged open door intentions and actual results, Stanley Hoffman is correct to point out that this 'does not mean that American objectives could not have appeared to the Soviets,' or other countries, 'the way they now look to the revisionist'.<sup>91</sup>




In his imposing study of inter-Allied relations during the conflict with Japan, Christopher Thorne concluded that America's military, political, and economic ambitions and strategies were fundamentally integrated. The 'arrogance of American power in the 1950s and 1960s, involving the determination to enforce a Pax Americana in the Pacific and to establish there and in the Far East an open door for United States commercial enterprise,' he observed, 'had been fostered by the manner and extent of the country's victory over Japan'.<sup>92</sup> This relationship between US economic aims and its exclusive military and political strategies in the Pacific was recognised and stridently opposed by consecutive Australian Labor governments, especially after 1943. If Australia was disturbed by Washington's attempts to determine unilaterally all major aspects of Allied Far Eastern policy during the war and peace, it was no less concerned with the implications of American-style multilateralism for dominion sovereignty and prosperity.

In resisting multilateralism, the Labor governments exhibited a strong conviction that American policy was a subtle form of economic imperialism that was in deep conflict with the interests and needs of other states, especially those anxious to pursue a moderate democratic-socialist alternative. Despite protests by critics of revisionism, there is little evidence to suggest that this perception of multilateralism was isolated or unfounded. If the Australian example is any guide, there is little reason to doubt, despite the assertions of Alfred Eckes and others, that US 'internationalist rhetoric, emphasising equal access to raw materials,

nondiscriminatory trade, and currency convertibility, concealed the classic pursuit of national self-interest'.<sup>93</sup>

Clearly the United States attempted to derive maximum long-term advantage from its dominant economic and military position. It would have been an exceptional major power indeed, had it not sought to employ its unprecedented authority for national advantage. The United States was by no means alone in seeking to reap economic advantage from the conditions of war. But it was uniquely placed to pursue its separate economic goals. Unlike the activities of a major state, the behaviour of small or middle powers in international affairs is essentially reactive; they are seldom able to implement successful independent initiatives. Hence any generalisation about the reactions of the major Allies to US multilateralism, most notably the Soviet Union, remains open to qualification and detailed examination.

But if the Australian case is at all representative, there is no reason to doubt that US economic goals overseas were clearly defined and actively pursued during the war and the peace settlement discussions; that these policies provoked suspicion, concern, and resistance among allies; and that these policies were influenced by an ideological distrust of left wing governments which were viewed as anxious to resist American influence. US behaviour thus contributed substantially to the suspicions and bitterness which increasingly characterised the wartime alliance, and it helped condition the uncertainties and disputes which quickly hardened into new tensions in the postwar world.



## 3

## **Australian–American Disagreement Over the Peace Settlement With Japan, 1944–1946**

Australian–American disagreements centred on the Pacific counter-offensive and peace settlement with Japan were essentially a continuation of bilateral friction over Allied strategic priorities and consultation arrangements precipitated by the rapid Japanese advances early in 1942. Unable to induce the Roosevelt administration to abandon its support for the Anglo-American plan to ‘defeat Hitler first’, the Curtin Government expressed constant and bitter disapproval of American policies. This criticism was only slightly modified after the Pacific War Council in Washington and MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Command were formed during March–April, 1942. If Australia’s criticisms of United States policies were sometimes muted during the dark months of the war against Japan, it was because the small power could not risk undermining wartime collaboration with its principal ally, not because it was satisfied with the wartime alliance. However, as the possibility of a Japanese victory receded after late 1943, overt Australian criticism of American policies assumed a sharper and more forceful character.

### Contrasting Australian and United States Objectives

Allied military advances in Europe and the Pacific by early 1944 foreshadowed ultimate victory over the Axis powers. A marked increase in the relative economic and military contribution of the United States to the Allied war effort accompanied these advances. The balance of military power within the coalition steadily shifted to the United States and the Soviet Union. The Roosevelt administration was aware of the precipitous decline in Britain's 'relative military and economic strength' and the concomitant 'phenomenal development of heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength'. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was advised that this change appeared 'certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military international relationships'.<sup>1</sup> The principal consequence of this altered distribution of global power, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff observed prophetically, would be the emergence of unprecedented Soviet influence in Europe and Asia. 'In estimating Russia's probable course as regards Japan', the Joint Chiefs concluded:

We must balance against such assurances as we have received from Russia, the fact that whether or not she enters the war, the fall of Japan will leave Russia in a dominant position on continental Northeast Asia, and, in so far as military power is concerned, able to impose her will on all that region.<sup>2</sup>

It was not until early 1945, however, that concern with emerging Russian power dominated American politico-military decision making. Yet at no time during 1944–45 did the United States seriously contemplate giving the Soviet Union, or indeed its other allies, an equal or effective role in determining or maintaining the postwar settlement in the Pacific. When Germany capitulated in May 1945, the Truman administration was prepared to concede the theoretical right of the major Allied belligerents in the Pacific war to share in the military occupation of Japan. It was also prepared to consult with some of these powers. But it opposed formation of Allied zones of occupation similar to those established in occupied Germany, and insisted successfully that responsibility for interpreting and implementing 'Allied' policy in Japan rest ultimately with the United States. Soviet reluctance to sustain the temporary wartime alliance following victory over Germany, and growing



American suspicion of Soviet intentions in occupied Germany and Eastern Europe, hardened America's determination to dominate the Far Eastern counteroffensive and monopolise the control of defeated Japan. America's efforts to exclude or restrict Soviet influence in the Far East resulted in similar attempts to circumscribe the military and political role of the other Allied Powers in the counteroffensive and occupation of Japan. Hence relations between the United States and Australia were indirectly, but nonetheless decisively, influenced by the altered distribution of world power and the disintegration of the Great Power alliance during the transition to peace.

America's efforts to decide unilaterally the future of Japan were also influenced by a desire to acquire unqualified control of strategic bases in the North and Central Pacific. The fervour of American anticolonialism declined during the late war years as it gained control of former Japanese territories in the north Pacific, and contemplated unilateral or joint control of Allied bases south of the Equator.<sup>3</sup> America's expanded interests in the Pacific, and its decision to monopolise all aspects of the peace settlement with Japan, were justified on the grounds that America's contribution to victory had been decisive and unequalled by the combined role of all other Pacific Allies.

Australia's power and influence in the Pacific compared to that of Britain, and to a lesser degree the United States, increased markedly after 1941. The Dominion's altered international status and expanded regional ambitions were reflected in its independent initiatives concerning the Pacific War Council in Washington, the direction of Allied global policy, withdrawal of its troops from the Middle East, and formation of the Canberra Agreement with New Zealand, during 1942–44. In part, these initiatives were attempts to compensate for the decline of Britain's interest, prestige and influence in the Far East. Yet if Australia's relative power had increased by 1944–45, it nonetheless remained, at most, a 'middle' power. Implicit in its attempts to act in concert with other Commonwealth powers, especially New Zealand and Britain, during the counteroffensive and negotiation of a Pacific settlement, was the realisation that it could not promote its perceived regional interests or influence American Pacific policy when acting in complete isolation from the British Commonwealth. Hence, by sustaining combined British Commonwealth authority in world

affairs, and influencing the direction of Commonwealth policy in the Pacific, Australia hoped to supplement its expanded regional power and promote specific political objectives during negotiation of the Pacific settlement.

The frequent, diverse and assertive attempts by Australia to participate in and influence the counteroffensive and occupation of Japan were largely negated by America's determination to monopolise all major aspects of the final phase of the war and the Pacific peace settlement. Despite a significant military contribution to victory in the Pacific, close collaboration with Britain and repeated separate requests for more equitable consultative arrangements amongst Allied powers engaged in the Pacific war, Australia failed to exert a decisive influence on American policy towards Japan either before or after the armistice.

### **The Counteroffensive**

Australia's decision to recall its troops from the Middle East during the early months of war against Japan was designed to reinforce its precarious local defences. It foreshadowed determined efforts by Prime Minister John Curtin and External Affairs Minister Dr H.V. Evatt to concentrate Australia's war effort in the Pacific. Underlying this policy, the US Minister in Canberra, Nelson Johnson, noted, was the conviction that maximum use of ANZAC forces in the Pacific 'would give Australia the right to insist upon having its voice heard and considered in the making of any plans by the United States for the future of the Pacific'.<sup>4</sup> The political aims of this military strategy were clearly emphasised in the controversial Australian–New Zealand Agreement signed in Canberra during January 1944. The central clauses of the Agreement were directed against anticipated American policy in the Pacific and Japan. Predictably it provoked a hostile reaction in Washington.<sup>5</sup> Both dominions stipulated that 'no change in the sovereignty or system of control of any of the islands of the Pacific should be effected' without explicit Australian and New Zealand concurrence, and foreshadowed a forceful ANZAC role in the Japanese counter-offensive in order to ensure 'representation at the highest level on all armistice and executive bodies'.<sup>6</sup> By 1944 postwar political considerations, not immediate military necessity, were the principal determinants of Australia's military role in the Pacific and its

relations with the United States. In 1945 General (later Field Marshal) Sir Thomas Blamey conceded that the level and location of Australia's military effort 'was a purely political and not a strategic question'.<sup>7</sup> As early as June 1943 the Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff had observed that despite a desire to reduce the number of men in the armed forces, the Curtin Government was anxious to maintain its war effort 'on a scale which, taken with the Commonwealth's earlier record in the war, would guarantee her an effective voice in the peace settlement' but not prejudice the need 'to resume a proper balance between the direct military program and its industrial basis'.<sup>8</sup>

Attempts to continue a prominent war role were part of a broader effort to use combined British Commonwealth participation in the Pacific as a vehicle for expanding Australia's postwar influence in the region. At the London Prime Ministers' Conference in May 1944, for example, Curtin and Churchill agreed that a British force based in Australia would increase the Commonwealth's contribution to Japan's defeat, possibly permit a combined Commonwealth force to recapture Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, compensate for declining British prestige in the Far East, and strengthen relations between their two countries. Curtin confidently anticipated a British presence in the Pacific, as Anglo-American decisions made at Cairo late in 1943 had 'approved in principle as a basis for further investigation and preparation' a Plan for the Defeat of Japan which provided for an initial British Task Force in the Pacific by June, 1944.<sup>9</sup> However in March, 1944, Churchill asked to be released from this undertaking'.<sup>10</sup> Nonetheless, Curtin and Evatt continued to press for British participation. The unexpected speed of the United States' advance against Japan gave this aim new urgency after mid-1944.

Curtin advised Churchill in July that the rapid advance by America's forces threatened to make any major operations by British Commonwealth forces redundant. He suggested that the British Navy be used to complement the American contribution as soon as possible, as this was 'the only effective means of placing the Union Jack in the Pacific alongside the Australian and American flags'. The 'pace of events here demands immediate action', he concluded.<sup>11</sup> In August Curtin again emphasised the political implications of virtual British exclusion from the counteroffensive: 'I am deeply

concerned', he told Churchill, 'at the position which would arise if any considerable American opinion were to maintain that America fought a war on principle in the Far East and won it relatively unaided'.<sup>12</sup>

Australia's consistent requests for an expanded British Commonwealth role in the counteroffensive were conditioned largely by postwar political considerations. But they also reflected growing dissatisfaction with MacArthur's command<sup>13</sup> and Cabinet's fear of allied American territorial interests south of the Equator. Hence Australia encouraged the use of the Royal Navy in the central Pacific, an Australian presence in the Philippines campaign under MacArthur's general command, and increased command and operational autonomy for Australia's forces retained to neutralise the southwest Pacific Area. While favouring a combined British task force in the Pacific, Curtin and Blamey apparently endorsed appointment of an Australian, not a British officer, as commander of this proposed new section of MacArthur's overall command.<sup>14</sup> Australia hoped to direct, not tacitly support, combined Commonwealth operations in the counteroffensive. Despite Anglo-Australian differences over the form and leadership of the proposed force, by early 1944 Australian policy implicitly supported the British Foreign Office suggestion that 'if there is to be no major British role in the Far Eastern war, then it is no exaggeration to say that the solidarity of the British Commonwealth and its influence in the machinery of peace in the Far East will be irretrievably damaged'.<sup>15</sup>

Although the Second Quebec Conference accepted in principle that the Royal Navy participate in the main operations against Japan, the United States continually attempted to restrict the role of its Pacific allies in the final phase of the war. 'Deployment of British forces does not involve strategy—they can neither hasten nor retard strategy', the War Department observed: 'Deployment must be based solely on high political policy'. To implement its basic political objectives America initially attempted to assert control over all Japanese mandates and territory, and to maintain its dominant influence in the Philippines and China. It sought to retain unrestricted American access to necessary bases throughout the Pacific.<sup>16</sup> The virtual exclusion of British Commonwealth or Soviet

influence from the North Pacific settlement was necessary to ensure that these objectives were easily obtained. During the final two years of war the US Chiefs of Staff consistently refused to share the control of operations against Japan. This decision was justified on the grounds of America's overriding military contribution to, and operational control of, the war against Japan during 1941–43. It was designed partly to ensure military unity and efficiency. But it also reflected a determination to retain unilateral domination of 'operations and activities in the Pacific and China' during the transition to peace.<sup>17</sup>

This policy was reaffirmed during 1945 in response to growing Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Yalta agreements, and the widening Soviet–American rift over the occupation of Germany. The Truman administration was anxious to restrict Soviet influence in the Far East and to avert repetition of Soviet–American friction over Japan similar to that emerging over the occupation of Germany. As early as July 1944 the US Chiefs of Staff had warned:

After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the only military powers of the first magnitude ... While the United States can project its military power into many areas overseas, it is nevertheless true that the relative strength and geographic positions of these two powers preclude the military defeat of one of these powers by the other even if that power was allied to the British Empire.<sup>18</sup>

By May 1945 the Truman administration had accepted the need to limit Soviet penetration in the Far East by excluding it from an effective role in the counteroffensive. It also contemplated strengthening either Japan or China after the war in order to provide a counterweight to Soviet influence.<sup>19</sup> Immediately after the surrender of Germany a special State–War–Navy Committee concluded that the occupation of Japan should be centralised under American control and not based on national zones of control such as the occupation of Germany. President Truman endorsed the Committee's suggestion that 'The major share of the responsibility for military government and the preponderance of forces used in Japanese occupation should be American, and the designated Commander of all occupational forces ... and the principal subordinate Commanders should be American'.<sup>20</sup> The following month a White House meeting attended by President Truman,

Admiral Ernest J. King, General George C. Marshall, Henry L. Stimson and James V. Forrestal accepted the suggestion that 'Anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China'.<sup>21</sup>

Closer Anglo-Australian cooperation was in part a reaction to America's reluctance to share responsibility in the Pacific. Despite acute manpower problems, the Australian Government was anxious to contribute to 'the proposed Commonwealth force for the invasion of Japan' or to a separate Australian force which might be assured direct representation at the invasion.<sup>22</sup> The surrender of Germany in May 1945 enabled the Allies to concentrate available military strength in the Pacific and demobilise some troops. Although anxious to substantially demobilise, in June Australia requested that the US Chiefs of Staff associate remaining Australian troops 'with the forward movement against Japan under General MacArthur'. The formal submission made to the Washington Chiefs clearly stated the political implications of this military policy:

From the aspect of prestige and participation in the Pacific peace settlement and control machinery, the government considers that it is of great importance to Australia to be associated with the drive to defeat Japan.<sup>23</sup>

Australia remained anxious both to be associated with the forward offensive and to maintain a conspicuous military presence in this offensive.

However, the United States remained opposed to sharing high strategic control of operations in the northern Pacific, and resisted efforts by other powers to employ 'token' national forces in the northern Pacific offensive. During 1944–45 it maintained that combined Allied control of high strategy in Europe could not 'appropriately be applied to the Pacific war' because Pacific operations were 'organised under a command and control setup peculiar to the United States', and were overwhelmingly dominated by the 'forces and resources' of the United States.<sup>24</sup> The abrupt surrender of Japan following the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, signalled the unsuccessful conclusion of Australia's attempts to achieve a prominent separate or combined Commonwealth military role with American forces in the forward offensive against Japan. However, Australia relied on

independent diplomatic initiatives as well as military policy to promote its ambitious regional objectives.

### **Consultation**

Following Australia's exclusion from the Cairo Conference late in 1943, Evatt again appealed for closer consultation so as to ensure that subsequent inter-Allied conference decisions would result from the 'reasoned deliberation of all' interested powers, not in 'pronouncements by a selected few'.<sup>25</sup> During 1943–45, however, Australia, like all other small or middle powers, was excluded from the critical Great Power conferences on the European and Pacific peace settlements held at Moscow, Teheran, Quebec and Yalta. Nor did it succeed in gaining American support for the conference of Pacific powers foreshadowed in the Canberra Agreement. These failures encouraged Curtin to promote a new Empire Council to improve Commonwealth consultation and nurture 'concerted Empire policy' which reflected the interests of the Dominions as well as Great Britain.<sup>26</sup> It also influenced Australia's attempts to use the United Nations Conference on International Organisation during April–May 1945 as a forum for democratising consultative contacts between the major and minor world powers.

Shortly after the capitulation of Germany, Evatt asked Truman to establish regional 'consultative machinery of a character which would be at least as effective as that of the Pacific War Council'. He also requested active support from Truman for his request that the President prevent 'any discussion either of armistice or peace arrangements in relation to Japan unless Australia is treated as a principal in the matter'.<sup>27</sup> This request was motivated by acute disappointment with the method employed by the United States and the other major Allied powers in accepting the surrender of various European Axis states during late 1944 to May 1945. The Declaration of Allied Nations, signed 1 January 1942, pledged signatory states 'not to make a separate armistice or peace' with any enemy state. Evatt argued that the Declaration 'was clearly broken whenever armistices were signed by the major Allied Powers without the express authority of other Allied Powers at war with that particular Axis country'.<sup>28</sup> A similar conclusion was reached by the State Department.<sup>29</sup> Evatt later complained that when they negotiated the European armistices the 'major powers purported to act "in the

interests of” all other belligerents, even though they did not have the authority so to act’.<sup>30</sup>

### **The Armistice**

During 1945 Evatt’s persistent efforts to democratise inter-allied consultation over the proposed Japanese armistice and postwar control were also largely ineffective. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Britain and China endorsed an American-sponsored joint declaration to Japan. However, the Soviet Union and other allies did not concur before the controversial document was issued.<sup>31</sup> The declaration reflected Washington’s belief that Japan would continue military resistance rather than accept unconditional surrender. It did not call for unconditional surrender, but merely requested that the government ‘proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces’.<sup>32</sup> The Emperor reportedly accepted these terms ‘without hesitation’, but they were rejected by military authorities.<sup>33</sup>

Australia was not advised that the Potsdam meeting would issue an ultimatum to Japan, presumably because Britain was unaware of America’s intention to raise this matter. However, it was advised informally by the Foreign Office that a preliminary study of possible surrender terms was being undertaken in London and Washington. External Affairs immediately began to finalise its policy for submission to the major powers. However, the Potsdam Declaration was issued shortly before Australia’s official views reached Washington or London. ‘Not only was there no warning’ of the ultimatum, an Australian official complained, ‘but we were led...to believe that the whole matter was still in the stage of preliminary departmental consideration’.<sup>34</sup>

The Labor Government reacted swiftly and bitterly to this exclusive Great Power decision. On 29 July Evatt stated publicly:

Ever since 1941 it has been the declared and accepted policy of the Australian Government that in all matters relative to the peace settlement, both in Europe and the Pacific, Australia, being an active belligerent, possesses the right to the status of a party principal to every armistice and peace arrangement ... The recent Potsdam ultimatum to Japan makes it necessary to restate this fundamental policy. Although that ultimatum declared certain terms



or principles of peace settlement with Japan, it was published without prior reference to, still less the concurrence of, the Australian Government

While prepared to accept 'Big Power Leadership', Evatt argued that it was 'an indispensable corollary of such leadership that other nations which have shared the tremendous burden and sacrifices should have the correlative right to share in the planning and making of the armistice and peace arrangements, especially where their interest is direct and substantial'.<sup>35</sup> Britain's explicit recognition of Australia's right to direct participation as a party principal in all peace settlement discussions, and the fact that responsibility for the terms of the ultimatum rested essentially with the Truman administration,<sup>36</sup> meant that Evatt's protest was unmistakably designed for American consumption. John Minter advised the new Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, that Evatt's protest was directed primarily against the continued failure of the United States to consult with Australia.<sup>37</sup>

Although deeply concerned at its exclusion from preliminary peace planning, the Australian Government was equally disturbed by the direction of American policy as defined in the Potsdam Declaration. 'All that need be said about the actual terms of the peace foreshadowed in the ultimatum,' Evatt protested, 'is that they appear to treat Japan more leniently than Germany, in spite of the fact that the slightest sign of tenderness towards Japanese imperialism is entirely misplaced'.<sup>38</sup>

Four days after the first atom bomb devastated Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, and one day after a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan advised that it would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, provided these 'did not compromise the prerogative of the Emperor as sovereign ruler of Japan'. Britain immediately informed Australia of this decision. Australia responded on 11 August by asserting that the 'Emperor should have no immunity from responsibility for Japan's acts of aggression and proved war crimes',<sup>39</sup> and requested that an unconditional surrender, not a negotiated or contractual peace, be imposed on Japan. These arguments were communicated to the United Kingdom only. Initially Australia relied on the Foreign Office to transfer its views to Washington. It apparently believed that

America's policy towards Japan could only be altered by combined Commonwealth opposition.<sup>40</sup>

Partly in response to Australia's requests, Britain advised Washington that the text of the Allies' surrender ultimatum and the procedure to implement it should be settled by inter-Allied agreement. However this proposal was received by the State Department shortly after it had unilaterally formulated an 'Allied' surrender proposal and forwarded it to Japan. Instructions from Evatt to the Australian Minister in Washington, Frederic Eggleston, outlining Cabinet's interpretation of necessary surrender terms and requesting that the Emperor be treated as a war criminal, arrived at the Washington Legation after 'Truman's reply to the Japanese' via the Swiss Government 'had already been dispatched'.<sup>41</sup> Japan accepted the surrender terms on 15 August. The same day America adopted a Draft Act of Surrender which corresponded closely to these surrender terms. Eggleston consulted Byrnes on 13 August in an effort to support Britain's demands for meaningful inter-Allied consultation during determination of the terms of the final Draft Act of Surrender. Although Byrnes stated that Australia's position was 'appreciated', the State Department announcement of the Draft Act of Surrender was accompanied by an assertion that the United States was 'not in a position to consult their allies'. Despite a combined British Commonwealth protest, the State Department remained 'unwilling' to conduct formal consultations with Britain or the Dominions because it did 'not intend to invite comments' from the Soviet Union or China.<sup>42</sup> In discussions with Eggleston, Byrnes intimated that the problems deriving from Soviet participation in the German occupation were 'inducing the Americans' to make the other peace in a different form'.<sup>43</sup> He also observed that United States policy in Japan resulted primarily from two factors: 'one, the intense desire of the Americans to end the war and avoid further casualties, and second, the recognition of the difficulties in Germany'.<sup>44</sup>

Despite the Labor Cabinet's assumptions to the contrary, Australia's protracted and substantial military contribution to the Pacific victory did not ensure it a responsible role in determining the terms of the Japanese surrender or Allied occupation policy in Japan. Indeed, it was only after vigorous protests that the Truman administration consented to give Australia separate, direct representation at the formal surrender ceremony in Tokyo. As early

as November 1944, Australia and New Zealand affirmed their intention 'to ensure that their Governments are consulted in regard to the drafting of the armistices with Japan and Thailand, that they are represented directly at the conclusion of the armistices, and that they have the right of participating in the armistice control arrangements'.<sup>45</sup> Denied direct consultation in drafting the surrender term, Australia was determined to implement the final two aspects of this policy.

When notifying Britain of the Allied surrender terms, Truman proposed that MacArthur be designated Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with exclusive responsibility to accept, coordinate, and implement the surrender of Japanese forces. He also proposed that Clement Attlee nominate an officer to represent Britain at the surrender. Australia was notified of America's decisions by the British Government when Attlee suggested the Dominion nominate a service representative to be attached to the British representative at the Tokyo ceremony.<sup>46</sup> New Zealand quickly agreed to a similar request from the British Prime Minister; but Australia refused to nominate a representative. Instead, on 14 August Evatt criticised Truman's proposal and requested separate Australian representation at Tokyo. Cabinet gave Evatt's request unqualified support. The American Legation in Canberra was advised that Australia felt 'very strongly' that it 'should participate in the simultaneous surrender announcement', and be represented separately at the surrender ceremony. Evatt viewed 'it as unthinkable that Australia—which barring the United States has contributed proportionately more with bases, works, supplies and fighting men to bring about the present happy development than any of the Big-Four—should be deprived' of these honours.<sup>47</sup>

On 17 August the Australian Government announced somewhat ambiguously that General Blamey was going to Manila 'to join the Headquarters of General MacArthur for the surrender ceremony'.<sup>48</sup> Privately, it advised that Blamey had been nominated 'to represent Australia in its own right at the general Japanese surrender'. However, without America's concurrence, Blamey could only act as an official observer at Tokyo. The decision to nominate Blamey as its separate representative was made while America's policy still contemplated restricting direct Allied representation at Tokyo to high ranking officers from Britain, Russia and China.<sup>49</sup> Minter warned Byrnes that exclusion of Blamey from direct, separate

representation would 'seriously' jeopardise Australian cooperation with America in postwar Japan, and emphasised: 'I have not yet encountered such strong language of official protest as I have during this episode'.<sup>50</sup>

The Truman administration promptly modified its policy to accommodate the protests of Australia and other small powers. On 21 August the State Department formally recommended to MacArthur that representatives of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Holland and France separately sign the Instrument of Surrender with Japan. This recommendation was apparently influenced by representations made to MacArthur by Blamey. 'MacArthur's help appears to have been enlisted', Eggleston wrote in a note to Evatt: 'I congratulate you on your success, but I am not sure whether it has endeared us with the State Department'. Byrnes also acknowledged that Australia had bypassed his Department and enlisted MacArthur's support.<sup>51</sup>

Although pleased with its belated separate representation at Tokyo, the Chifley Government was not convinced that America was prepared to regard the Dominion as a 'party principal in all proceedings associated with the Japanese settlement'. Inconsistently, it protested against the inclusion of such powers as France, Canada, and the Netherlands in the Tokyo ceremony because the contribution of these powers to the Pacific war was allegedly less significant than that of Australia. Nonetheless, during the transition to peace, Australia premised its appeals for representation in the Japanese armistice and occupation on the assertion that its wartime record validated such demands: 'In view of the special contribution in the war against Japan' Evatt requested that Byrnes support Australia's efforts to participate as an 'independent' military force in the occupation of Japan and 'to take part as a principal in the Allied Control Council for Japan or any other body corresponding thereto'.<sup>52</sup>

### Occupation and Control

Combined Allied pressure induced the United States to acquiesce in compromise political and military arrangements for occupied Japan, but did not effect a significant alteration of fundamental American policy. In theory, the United States was 'committed to consultation with the Allies at war with Japan' on all matters related to the Pacific

peace settlement.<sup>53</sup> However, on 17 August the Dominions' Secretary warned that America 'was pushing on with plans for the control of Japan with all possible speed' and not attempting to incorporate the views of its British allies in these plans.<sup>54</sup> While Australia and Britain were discussing Allied control policy, the Truman administration issued a crucial document outlining its 'Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan'. Prepared jointly by the State, War and Navy Departments, the policy was forwarded secretly to MacArthur on 29 August, but not made public until late September. It stated, in part:

Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern.<sup>55</sup>

A week before this policy was finalised, the US Chiefs of Staff advised that responsibility for the control of Japan had been vested exclusively in MacArthur acting as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, and would 'be exercised by the United States throughout (the) occupation period'. They designated only the United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China as principal allies, but relegated the possible influence which these powers could exert on occupation policy to a purely advisory function. In the event of lack of agreement amongst the major powers, MacArthur was advised, the United States 'will assume responsibility for issuing directives for control of Japan'.<sup>56</sup> Eggleston commented accurately: 'This takes the view that as (the) United States won the war in the Pacific, she will determine the peace; she will consult her Allies, but in the case of a difference between them, United States' view will prevail'.<sup>57</sup>

The Initial Post-Surrender Policy made two concessions to growing Allied demands for broader involvement in policy making; it committed the United States to participate in 'appropriate advisory bodies', and reiterated America's approval of Allied military participation in the occupation. But while prepared to use the troops of other powers, the United States stipulated that occupation forces, irrespective of their national origin, would be placed under the overall 'command of a Supreme Commander

designated by the United States'.<sup>58</sup> As expressed privately within the State Department, American policy was 'to "allow" rather than "encourage" other Allied contingents to participate'.<sup>59</sup>

Three days before the Tokyo ceremony, Chifley announced that he intended to make available 'an Australian force to participate in the occupation of Japan itself'. This decision implied that Cabinet opposed a British recommendation that Australia contribute to a combined British Commonwealth Occupation Force, comprising Australian, British-Indian, New Zealand, and Canadian troops, operating under a British commander. Chifley acknowledged that the decision was prompted by a desire that an Australian force should 'have the same status as the occupying forces being supplied by the United States, Britain, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'.<sup>60</sup> It aimed to reinforce Australia's claim to be recognised 'as a primary and not a secondary Pacific power'.<sup>61</sup>

However, Evatt, in London at this time, did not fully endorse Chifley's policy statement. On 14 September Evatt requested that Cabinet reconsider Britain's suggestion for a combined force. If a Commonwealth force was commanded by an Australian, and executive authority over it exercised from Australia, Evatt argued, it might affirm rather than undermine 'Australian leadership in Pacific affairs and in the Pacific settlement'.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, there was little prospect of Chifley's original proposal being accepted by Washington. The War Cabinet promptly accepted Evatt's submission. On 19 September it approved participation in a combined British Commonwealth Occupation Force—provided this was commanded by an Australian, controlled primarily from headquarters based in Australia, and gave the commander direct access to the Supreme Allied Commander. As Evatt had confidently anticipated, Britain accepted these proposals.<sup>63</sup>

Although prepared to contribute to a combined Empire force, Australia was unwilling to submerge its growing political or military identity in the Pacific by joining a force not manifestly under Australian control and substantially Australian in composition. Only by participating in a combined force with Britain could Australia ensure that it could not be completely excluded from the occupation on the grounds that it was not a leading Pacific power.

It was not until 31 January 1946 that the United States finally accepted the Commonwealth Force. *The Sydney Morning Herald* reflected growing criticism of the delay when it stated:

The British Empire occupation force ought to have been organised quickly and have followed the Americans into Japan within two or three months at the latest. The impression that it is neither needed nor wanted has grown as delay has followed delay.<sup>64</sup>

The first Australian troops arrived in Tokyo in February. Australia supplied 12,000 of the total Commonwealth Force of 36,000 troops. Compared to the American contingent of almost 400,000 troops, the belated commitment of the small combined British force was obviously of limited military significance.<sup>65</sup> At most it gave Australia token representation in the occupation, but did not afford it an independent or effective role in determining occupation policies. Nor did Australia's participation in inter-Allied political councils established during late 1945 enable it to influence significantly the occupation and control policies imposed on Japan.

By August–September 1945 Australia was deeply perturbed by both the method of policy formation and the content of American (or 'Allied') policy in defeated Japan.<sup>66</sup> Evatt and Chifley attempted to gain British, and occasionally Soviet, support for a series of initiatives designed to reduce America's domination of Allied policy. These initiatives induced the Truman administration to share advisory consultation with other countries, but they could not have been extracted without the support of the major European states.

During August 1945 the United States attempted unsuccessfully to placate growing Allied opposition by agreeing to establish a Far Eastern Council. This concession was a compromise reaction to Anglo-Australian requests. Acting with Australia's support, Britain submitted a comprehensive proposal in mid-August requesting a five member Allied Council for Japan comprising the United States, Britain, China, the Soviet Union and Australia.<sup>67</sup> 'In view of Australian interest in the Pacific, the Australian part in the war against Japan, and the expressed wish of the Australian Government to participate in the control of Japan', the Dominions' Secretary advised Canberra, 'we consider that Australia should be represented on the Council'. Britain also proposed an additional, complementary Allied Advisory Council for Japan, comprising the five members of the Control Council and representatives of New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, India, France, the Netherlands and the Philippines. 'The function of the Advisory Committee should be to consider matters referred to them by the Control Council and

to make recommendations to the Control Council,' Britain suggested.<sup>68</sup> If accepted these proposals would have provided for substantial combined British Commonwealth influence in both Councils. Moreover, separate Australian representation as a principal power in the control of Japan was incorporated in Britain's recommendation for a Control Council.

The British proposals were given unequivocal support by Australia.<sup>69</sup> However the Truman administration was originally prepared only to establish an Advisory Council, not a Control Council with executive responsibilities. Secretary of State Byrnes suggested on 21 August that an Advisory Council be established to permit 'full consultations ... between the Allies on all problems relating to treatment of Japan after surrender'. He contemplated participation by the 'Big Four' and Australia, France, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands and the Philippines in the Washington-based Commission. But, the Dominions' Office informed Canberra, 'the United States does not (repeat not) favor any derogation from the principle that sole responsibility should be vested in the Supreme Commander', and 'it was not (repeat not) contemplated by the United States that an Allied Control Council should be set up to assist the Supreme Commander in the execution of his responsibilities'.<sup>70</sup>

During September the United Kingdom, with active Australian support, continued to press for the five member Control Council in Tokyo in addition to a broad advisory Commission in Washington.<sup>71</sup> Following a fresh indication that Washington was prepared to share responsibility for the control of Japan, Byrnes, Ernest Bevin and Evatt reached a tentative, compromise agreement. This permitted establishment of an Advisory Commission, but did not prejudice further consideration of supplementary control arrangements.<sup>72</sup> Byrnes agreed to consider a Control Commission based in Tokyo after the Advisory Commission had been established in Washington.<sup>73</sup> Nevertheless, the Commonwealth powers accepted—albeit reluctantly—that America would never participate in a Control Council in Japan based on the Berlin model, 'or indeed any Commission which would be subject to veto of an individual power'.<sup>74</sup>

The purely advisory eleven member Washington Commission, formed on 23 October 1945, did not satisfy either Australia, Britain, or the Soviet Union. While the scope of its powers were being



determined in Washington, Australia and Britain pressed for a five member Control Council, preferably in Tokyo, responsible for deciding and issuing policy directives to MacArthur. Soviet pressure for a four member Council continued.<sup>75</sup> Despite vehement opposition to a Tokyo body from the Department of War and MacArthur,<sup>76</sup> in late October the State Department retreated slightly from its inflexible opposition to a Great Power Council in Tokyo, and agreed to participate in an Allied Military Council in Tokyo.

However, this body was to be purely advisory, with no authority to alter policy favoured by MacArthur. It was proposed, Byrnes conceded privately to MacArthur, primarily 'to enable the USSR to withdraw' its opposition to the Washington Commission by accepting the Tokyo Council 'which would appear to give the USSR and other major powers a position in connection with the occupation more in conformity to their real position than merely membership of an eleven-power Advisory Commission'. The Secretary of State attached 'the greatest importance' to Soviet membership of the Advisory Council, believing that a permanent Soviet absence might further undermine general Soviet-American relations.<sup>77</sup> However this concession did not immediately induce the Soviet Union to withdraw its opposition to the Commission. During November further concessions were made to Soviet, British and Australian requests.

Control arrangements for Japan were altered dramatically by the three major powers at the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1945. Evatt's concern with the possible outcome of this big power meeting was temporarily allayed by an assurance from Byrnes and Bevin that the discussions 'must be purely preliminary and general in character'; final determination of all peace settlement issues would await 'detailed review and final decision by all countries directly concerned'. The Chifley Government believed these assurances had been accepted 'in principle' by Byrnes and Bevin, but exhibited little confidence that America was prepared to fulfill them.<sup>78</sup>

New American proposals made at the time of the Moscow Conference incorporated—in a qualified form—provision for a Control Council which Australia, the Soviet Union, and Britain had consistently advocated. A suggestion that the Advisory Commission be replaced by a new Far Eastern Commission was the central

aspect of the proposals. Theoretically, this new Commission could formulate Allied control policy. In addition, the United States agreed to an essentially supervisory Control Council in Tokyo, comprising representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, China, and one representative of the combined British Commonwealth powers.<sup>79</sup>

Although it supported replacement of the Advisory Commission with bodies in Washington and Tokyo, Australia protested against the proposed composition and terms of reference of the new bodies. The suggested Far Eastern Commission would have given either the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, or China the ability to veto any decision endorsed by a majority of the eleven member Commission. The Soviet Union and the United States accepted this, as both wished to retain veto control over the multinational Commission. However Australia wanted separate and equal status with all other members. 'If the four great powers are not prepared to participate' on the basis that majority decisions prevail, Canberra emphasised, 'then the work of the Commission will inevitably be stultified and the ultimate result might well be unilateral handing of the situation by the United States and the worsening of relations between the United States and the Soviet'.<sup>80</sup> The War Cabinet remained 'uncompromisingly opposed to the four power veto which could paralyse the work of the Commission'.<sup>81</sup>

Australia's criticism of the projected Tokyo Control Council was equally strident. The failure of America's proposal to permit Australia and Britain separate representation, while including both China and the Soviet Union, was opposed by both the Chifley and Attlee governments. Inclusion of a combined British Commonwealth representative did not placate Australia because it implicitly failed to recognise the major belligerent role of the Dominion in the war, or its special regional interests in the Pacific peace settlement. Britain interpreted its omission as further evidence of America's reluctance to accord it full status as a Great Power in the postwar community of states.<sup>82</sup> Australia was anxious to employ British diplomacy to support its regional interests. Hence it opposed America's efforts to limit British influence in the Far East, unless these gave concurrent recognition to an expansion of separate Australian influence.

Bevin conveyed these objections to the Moscow Conference. However, on 24 December, Canberra was advised by the British Government 'that there was no chance of altering American policy

on these issues'.<sup>83</sup> Arrangements for the control of Japan were ultimately decided at Moscow in the absence of a majority of states previously involved as belligerents against Japan. In form and substance the control arrangements deviated little from the American proposals of December 1945 for a Washington Commission and a Tokyo Council. Yet these bodies had a broader composition and wider responsibilities than the Truman administration had anticipated or intended at the time of the Japanese surrender in August. America's response to persistent Allied demands for effective participation in the control of defeated Japan was not completely inflexible immediately after the end of hostilities in the Pacific.

Acting with the explicit concurrence of only one other Pacific ally, China, the Great Powers announced the terms of the new control arrangements for Japan on 26 December 1945. A new Far Eastern Commission replaced the Advisory Commission in Washington. In contrast to the original Commission, the new Washington body was responsible for formulating Allied policy to govern Japan. Exclusive responsibility for interpreting these decisions and translating them to MacArthur was reserved, however, for the United States. The Commission was explicitly forbidden from making 'recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations', or territorial adjustments. Nor could it interfere with or alter existing control machinery in Japan, 'including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander, and the Supreme Commander's command of occupation forces'.<sup>84</sup> Although the voting procedure did not require unanimity to enable policy directives to be adopted, the Commission could only act with less than unanimous consent after it had gained the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives, including all representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and China. This clause gave the major powers a veto control over the Commission. As the United States had unilaterally determined and implemented existing occupation policy through the Initial Post-Surrender directive and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the veto permitted it to resist any modification of this policy. The other major powers could obstruct the adoption of new policy, but unlike the United States they had not determined existing policy. Hence formation of the Far Eastern Commission

did not alter the direction of American policy in Japan, or significantly undermine American responsibility for determining and implementing this policy.

Nor did concurrent formation of the Allied Control Council for Japan substantially reduce existing American authority over Japan. Membership of the Tokyo Council was restricted to the Supreme Commander or his deputy, who was to be its Chairman and the American representative, representatives of the Soviet Union and China, and 'a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India'. Australia's request for separate representation on a five member Council was not accepted. Although ostensibly an Allied Control Council, its functions were purely advisory and consultative. It was not a controlling body and could not interfere with the freedom of the Supreme Commander to implement policy. The Supreme Commander 'is the sole executive authority for the Allied powers in Japan', the Moscow announcement of 26 December stipulated: 'He will consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance ... His decisions on these matters will be controlling'.<sup>85</sup>

Despite these new arrangements, Australia remained acutely dissatisfied with both the consultative machinery and the direction of American policy in Japan. Initially, the Dominion refused to accept the invitation to join the Washington Commission because, Evatt protested to Minter, the veto would frustrate the Commission's operation. Evatt also protested that the veto implied 'Australia's status is to be regarded as in some way inferior to that of other powers'.<sup>86</sup> Not until 26 February 1946 did Australia formally consent to join the Washington Commission. The decision of the interested Commonwealth powers to appoint an Australian, W. Macmahon Ball, as their joint representative on the Tokyo Council lessened, but did not remove, Australia's dissatisfaction with the control arrangements.<sup>87</sup>

The Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Control Council exposed American policy to closer scrutiny by its former allies, but did not alter the direction of American policy established immediately after the collapse of Japan. America's pre-eminent power and responsibility in the Pacific by mid-1945 was immediately translated into unilateral domination of Allied control policy and occupation of defeated Japan. As exercises in postwar cooperation

amongst the victor powers or shared international responsibility for a defeated state, the compromise control bodies established in Washington and Tokyo were largely unsuccessful. The Australian representative on the Control Council commented as early as 1947, for example, that it was 'on balance a failure, and at times a fiasco'.<sup>88</sup> No issue created greater bilateral discord during the transition to peace in the Pacific than America's resistance to Australia's efforts to participate directly and effectively in formulating and implementing Allied policy in occupied Japan.

The contrasting policies adopted by Australia and the United States towards Japan reflected the disparate powers and divergent national interests of the former Pacific allies. The resolution of the Chifley Government to secure an equal voice in the councils which determined Allied policy and at least a token military presence in the actual occupation of Japan, was an interrelated aspect of its broader desire to help shape a Pacific settlement which would offer the strongest possible assurances against a resurgence of Japanese aggression, or indeed new Asiatic expansion from any source. This objective was foreshadowed in Australia's efforts to broaden consultation amongst the Pacific Allies in the early war years, and in the central clauses of the Canberra Agreement. Its implementation demanded increased independent political and military initiatives in the Pacific and towards the Great Powers. But these initiatives did not necessarily imply a breakdown of Australian cooperation with British Commonwealth states. While it reflected and hastened the growth of Dominion autonomy in international affairs, Australia's expanded regional role depended partly on general political support from Britain in international councils, and tacit British approval of Australia's leadership of allegedly common Commonwealth interests in the Pacific. Through leadership of joint Commonwealth military and political activities, most notably in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force and Allied Control Council in Japan, Australia sought to reinforce its ambitious separate initiatives in the region. In particular, the Australian Government was anxious to restrict America's domination of the Pacific settlement and to influence the direction of American or 'Allied' surrender and control procedures and policies in Japan.

Australia's initiatives were only marginally responsible for America's reluctant decision to set up international councils in Washington and Tokyo, and include small power representatives in

the Washington Commission and a combined Commonwealth representative in the Control Council. Australia remained dissatisfied with these procedural arrangements; but it had gained a degree of advisory consultation which greatly exceeded that previously accorded the 'small' and 'middle' Allied Powers as members of the Pacific War Councils in London or Washington during 1942–43. Evatt's initiatives also influenced America's decision to permit a combined British Commonwealth force to participate in the military occupation of Japan. Australia was responsible for commanding this force and made a greater manpower contribution to it than any other Commonwealth power. Although subject to overall American control, this Australian-dominated Commonwealth Force nonetheless contributed directly to the execution of Allied occupation policy in Japan.

The marked expansion of Australia's regional influence and its more prominent international status in the postwar world, coincided with an unprecedented assertion of American peacetime involvement in global affairs. Bilateral political contacts between the two powers increased in frequency and importance as a result of each country's determined efforts to promote these altered international roles. Both powers attempted to maximise their respective influence on the Pacific settlement, as their strategic interests and policy objectives did not fully coincide. However, the resolution of these differences had ultimately to await the altered climate of international relations in the Far East which accompanied the Communist victory in China late in 1949, when the United States, and gradually Australia also, accepted that the threat of a resurgent Japan was far outweighed by the possibility of Communist expansion in Asia.

## Shifting Alliances\*

*The whole world should adopt the American system ... the American system can survive in America only if it becomes a world system.*

US President Harry S Truman, 1946

*America's dream is Australia's reality.*

Telecom Australia advertisement, 1992

Despite America's decisive role in defeating Japan, and the escalating tensions of the Cold War, Australia's postwar Labor Government refused to accept that Washington's international actions were in the interests of all former Allies. Indeed, through the UN, in its continuing imperial links, and in bilateral diplomacy, Australia encouraged other nations to join it in attempting to counter, resist, or at least to deflect US foreign policy initiatives. As a small state, it felt its particular economic interests and regional ambitions stifled by the predominance of American power and influence in the Asia-Pacific area.

\* This paper might be read in conjunction with two papers on the bilateral alliance in the post Cold War era and the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack on the US, published in the important series *Australia in World Affairs*: Roger Bell, 'Reassessed: Australia's Relationship with the United States' in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs, 1991–95*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, and Roger Bell, 'Extreme Allies: Australia and the United States' in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), *Australia in World Affairs, 2001–2005: Trading on Alliance Security*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2006.

Only gradually, and against the background of an allegedly new Asian threat to its security in the form of communist China, did Australia accommodate itself to American authority in the Pacific. The conservative government of Robert Menzies pursued such a policy and, like its American counterpart, eagerly exploited the anticommunist rhetoric of the Cold War for electoral advantage at home. Much less nationalist and reformist than its predecessor, the Menzies Government substituted an uncritical dependence on its so-called 'great and powerful friends' for the assertive independence in international affairs that Labor had pursued, however successfully, from 1941 to 1949.

The 1949 change of government in Australia coincided with dramatic developments in the international arena, especially in Australia's 'Near North'. European colonialism was almost everywhere in retreat or under military challenge. India had won its independence from the UK. The Philippines was granted a qualified independence by the US. The Dutch reluctantly prepared to relinquish colonial authority over Indonesia (while retaining West New Guinea). The Soviet Union now extended its authority over much of Eastern Europe and in 1949 detonated its first atomic bomb. In China the US-backed forces of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang regime were expelled to Taiwan and replaced by the victorious communist-nationalist government under Mao Tse-tung. In Malaya and Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) the colonial authority of Britain and France was seriously challenged from left wing nationalist forces. In the middle of 1950, North Korean communist troops moved south, crossing the 38th parallel. The war that erupted in Korea quickly became a brutal reminder that the divisions of the Cold War had been transferred to the Asia-Pacific region and would now be contested in virtually every sphere of international politics.

### **Cold War Allies In Asia**

Against this background, the new Australian Government became increasingly receptive to American definitions of international threat, as it did to American interpretations of security issues and international politics more generally. The suspicions and rhetoric of the Cold War that justified America's global confrontation with communism also came to dominate official Australian perspectives



and actions in foreign affairs. Independent efforts of the Labor governments of the 1940s may have delayed, but could not avert, a broad realignment of Australia's policies consistent with American perceptions in both its foreign policy and, to a lesser extent, domestic affairs. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, an accumulation of interlocking changes in international politics, economics, technology, and culture transformed Australia's links with the outside world, and relationships with the US assumed centre stage. American influences squeezed out many of those long associated with the UK and its empire. Although the rhetoric and symbols of traditional ties to the mother country were not all displaced, the realignment of Australia towards the US was to be insistent and irreversible. As interactions between the two multiplied, the vast asymmetries in power and status between the societies biased their relationships towards American models and American interests.

The victory of the conservative parties in the Australian elections late in 1949 coincided with a radical reappraisal by America of its 'containment' policies, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and selective use of limited counterforce in confrontations with the Soviet Union were central to America's containment activities. By the early 1950s containment was transformed from a selective application of *realpolitik* to an ideological crusade against communism everywhere.

National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC 68), drafted in April 1950, is the most blatant evidence of this fundamental shift. Against a background of anticommunist hysteria at home, revolution in China, and communist gains in Korea, American perceptions of international communism and the policies necessary to contain it (or preferably to 'roll it back') were dramatically revised. 'Soviet aggression' was held to be responsible for the rise of communism in different parts of the world—from Yugoslavia to China and Korea, and later Cuba. Ignoring the varied nationalist bases and the very different types of socialist revolutions in these regions, official American opinion preferred to see communism as a uniform and monolithic movement promoted everywhere by the Soviet Union. This was despite the fact that, shortly after Mao's victory in 1949, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had cautioned against such simplistic and conspiratorial thinking. The 'loss' of China, he argued, was not a result of Soviet expansion, but of a civil war, 'the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which

this country tried to influence but could not'. Such subtlety had little appeal by 1950, as McCarthyist slogans and hysterical anticommunism sought tougher action against a 'subversive' enemy both at home and abroad.

Boosted by McCarthyism, policies underlying the Truman Doctrine and NATO were generalised to other regions and, as with West Germany in Europe, a revitalised Japan became the linchpin of American strategy in Asia and the Pacific. Communism would be resisted in Asia by both physical and 'moral' (that is to say ideological and economic) force. In the words of NSC 68, containment policies of the past had failed; diplomatic and economic efforts were impotent to counter Soviet aggression. American planners now wanted greater physical power and a stronger moral commitment to the 'free world'. They envisaged not just the containment of communism but 'offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity'.<sup>1</sup> America's ideological construction of, and its material responses to, the communist 'enemy' were most evident in its refusal to recognise the People's Republic of China—although most European states, including Great Britain, had extended recognition by late 1950.

War in Korea became the testing ground for America's policy of 'containment militarism'. It ushered in an unprecedented acceleration in American defence spending and support for remilitarisation of Japan as a counterbalance to communist China. New American bases were established abroad; existing bases were strengthened. In the Asia-Pacific region, the ANZUS Agreement and SEATO were the two paramount examples of America's new Cold War posture. Within two decades, while the European powers were withdrawing or being expelled from their colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, the US had established new military commitments with no less than forty nations; it had stationed permanently abroad more than one million troops; it occupied almost 400 major bases and supported about 300 minor military facilities on foreign soil; and it had entangled itself in at least forty other anticommunist alliances.

As the Cold War intensified, the Asia-Pacific region joined Europe as a focus of superpower rivalries. Australia's foreign policies and strategic assumptions were radically recast by its associations with the US. Some on the left in Australia rejected the need for such a relationship and refused to view international events

through what they saw as the distorting lens of the Cold War. Instead, they interpreted revolutions in Asia as legitimate manifestations of nationalism and evidence of long overdue social change. They criticised the assumption that China and North Korea (and later North Vietnam) were merely willing satellites of the Soviet Union, or pawns in the global contest between 'Marxism' and 'democracy'. But for members of the ruling Liberal-Country Party coalition, as well as the Democratic Labor Party, recently splintered from the ALP, such interpretations were at best naïve, at worst comfort to the 'enemy'. In the first months of war with Korea, for example, Liberal MP Paul Hasluck greeted his government's decision to send troops to serve under General MacArthur in Korea with words that clearly echoed NSC 68: 'This expansionist, imperialistic and aggressive policy of the Soviet Union must be resisted wherever it is exemplified'.<sup>2</sup>

Despite its 1949 election loss the ALP did not eagerly support America's early Cold War initiatives, nor inflame the exaggerated anticommunist fervour that helped to sustain and rationalise these actions. Far more responsive to American policies was the Anglophile and deeply conservative government of Robert Menzies. The new cabinet and many in the wider community ingested much of the rhetoric and fear that characterised McCarthyist America in the early 1950s. The Menzies cabinet accepted that foreign economic and military initiatives were integrated aspects of America's broad international objectives. Australia could not shelter behind 'containment' and seek American 'protection' without at the same time conceding further ground over multilateralism and offering at least symbolic support to America's Cold War military-strategic adventures in the Asia-Pacific region.

Although from the early 1950s Australian governments sought to hinge their foreign policies on an alliance with America, the Liberal-Country Party governments still did not wish to cut the ties of Empire. Conservative leaders, including Menzies, Richard (later Lord) Casey, and the Country Party's John McEwen, wanted physical protection for their vulnerable nation, but they remained privately disturbed by the postwar acceleration of American cultural commerce with Australia. They were enthusiastic allies but reluctant friends. Anglophile Australians were drawn to America as a protector, but would not break the ties of monarchy, 'race', and history that bound them to England and Empire. *The Sydney Morning*

*Herald* echoed this ambivalence in words common in conservative circles, when it suggested in 1951 that: 'Australia's relations with America are often imperfectly understood abroad ... They imply no weakening of the Commonwealth bond, nor any turning away from Britain'.<sup>3</sup>

Until the mid 1960s, at least, Protestant Australians, in particular, continued to share what Russel Ward and others have described as a 'dual identity': 'For most, but not all people, national and imperial patriotism were complementary, not contradictory'.<sup>4</sup> The lessons of Singapore and Darwin, and later the decolonisation of Asia, dented but did not destroy the illusion of an imperial umbrella under which white Australia could shelter. 'We draw our main strength not from eight million of our own population,' Casey claimed, 'but from the fact that we are a member of a great cooperative society: the British race, of which the senior partner is our mother country Great Britain'. Significantly, he added: 'We also have the very great potential asset of the friendship of the greatest single nation in the world, the United States of America'.<sup>5</sup> Although Australian conservatives were anxious to negotiate a formal alliance with their potential new friends, royal visits, royal honours, and celebrations of Empire remained linchpins of public life in the Menzies years. Even in the late 1960s, while Australian troops fought alongside Americans in Vietnam, it was not uncommon for prominent Australians to announce, as did a former Ambassador to Washington, Sir James Plimsoll, that 'we do not see our United States relationship as a threat to British relationships'. Such assertions could not conceal the drift away from Great Britain. However, this realignment was much slower than most historians have assumed.<sup>6</sup>

Given this background, it is not surprising that Australia's relationship with the US remained uneven and ambivalent. During negotiation of the ANZUS agreement in 1950–51, for example, Australia's perceptions of China and Japan often contrasted with those of Washington. The US agreed to the alliance because it paved the way for a 'soft' peace settlement with Japan, and provided another link in a broad anticommunist network in Asia. In contrast, Australia initially viewed ANZUS as a guarantee against a resurgent Japan. Four years later, during the Suez crisis, the two nations also

acted from very different perceptions and pursued very different policies. Menzies's effort in support of British and French aggression against Egypt led to a sharp exchange with Eisenhower, who condemned the attack as a debacle that merely accelerated the decline of Anglo-French prestige in the Middle East and paved the way for expanded Soviet influence. Even under Menzies, Australia occasionally attempted to distance itself from America's Cold War policies, especially if these challenged British interests. Australia was not yet an uncritical follower of America. However, the Dominion's refusal to recognise the communist government of China, its willingness to fight in Korea under American leadership, and its anxious promotion of ANZUS and SEATO were portents of the new direction in its foreign policy.

The precipitous decline of Britain's power in the Far East, combined with Mao's victory in China and the war in Korea, convinced Menzies' cabinet that it must cultivate a new protector—the US. This decision did not rest comfortably with either the arch-Anglophile Prime Minister or many members of his conservative cabinet. However, guided by the Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, an alliance with America was actively pursued. Concessions over investment and trade, which went further than those given grudgingly during 1950 and early 1951, were offered. Spender observed privately: 'Australian policy is directed fundamentally towards acceptance by the US of responsibility to assist in the protection of Australia ... [thus] it is necessary for Australia to cultivate US interest in our welfare and confidence in our attitude'.<sup>7</sup> Consistent with this calculating policy, Australia obediently fell into line behind Washington's various Cold War initiatives—except when such initiatives contradicted the interests of the UK or its empire.

The tenor and direction of Australia's policies in the period framed by the wars in Korea and Vietnam were expressed by Menzies in discussions with his cabinet in 1958. Australia must not disagree publicly with the US, he stated, and Australia's defence forces must be geared to fight alongside those of its great and powerful friends. Independence in policy formulation, or military-strategic activity, was rejected. 'The greatest practical fact of life for Australia is that we are in no danger of conquest, either directly or indirectly, except from Communist aggression,' Menzies observed. '[O]ur doctrine at a time of crisis should be "Great Britain and the United States right or wrong" ... The simple truth, therefore, is that

we cannot afford to run counter to their policies at a time when a crisis has arisen'.<sup>8</sup> Surprisingly, this observation came after the Suez crisis of 1956 had exposed the impossibility of simultaneously courting two great and powerful friends in the event of a disagreement between them. This crisis, along with events in Malaya, South Africa, and Indonesia, confronted Australia with additional difficulties as it attempted to embrace British imperial policies without alienating its powerful new Cold War partner in the Pacific.

In seeking to ensure that American power would uphold Australia's regional interests—rather as British power once had—Australian governments in the 1950s and 1960s actively encouraged an expanded and belligerent US presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia's compliance in the diplomatic arena became starkly visible over the question of recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Privately, there was strong support for following the UK and most European states by recognising Mao's infant regime and permitting it to enter the UN. Publicly, however, Washington's hostile refusal to extend recognition was supported. Subsequently, Taiwan was recognised, not the PRC, and Australia endorsed the view that mainland China was an agent of subversion throughout Asia and directly responsible for the mounting conflict in divided Vietnam. As early as 1950–54 Australia joined in military and security activities that tied it to American interventions in the affairs of Asian states.

Hostilities in Korea obliged Australia to demonstrate its support for America's hardening anticommunism in more than just polite diplomatic language. In July 1950 Canberra committed troops to fight under MacArthur in Korea—an action welcomed by Truman as of 'great political value', for it helped Washington represent its military involvement as part of a genuinely multilateral UN operation. Within months Australia had received a positive response for a loan through the World Bank, as well as favourable terms from the US for purchases of military equipment. Significantly, Washington's generosity was encouraged, as an Australian negotiator conceded, by Australia's decision to fight in Korea. It 'is understood that the assistance rendered the United States/Nations by Australia providing naval, aid and ground forces in Korea has facilitated the consideration of Australia's request for a dollar loan'. Adamant that involvement in the Korean conflict presented an opportunity of

cementing friendships with the US that may not have easily presented itself again, Spender was able to convince his cabinet colleagues that Korea would be a turning point in Australian–American relations: ‘From Australia’s long-term point of view any additional aid we can give the US now, small though it may be, will repay us in the future one hundred fold’.<sup>9</sup>

The ANZUS alliance, negotiated during 1950–51, was the most enduring expression of Australia’s efforts to shelter under America’s widening anticommunist umbrella. The conflict in Korea crystallised Washington’s plans to give Japan a pivotal role as an ally in the Far East. With Japan’s economy reconstructed and linked to the US, more than 80 per cent of world industry would be controlled by ‘the west’. And, as the US Secretary of Defense commented in 1949—in words that predictably reflected Washington’s fears about ‘monolithic’ communism—if ‘Japan, the principal component of a Far Eastern war-making complex, were also added to the Stalinist bloc, the Soviet Asian base could become a source of strength capable of shifting the balance of world power to the disadvantage of the United States’. For the CIA, ‘the crux of the problem’ was ‘to deny Japan to communism’. However, memories of the Pacific War died slowly in Australia and it did not welcome the plan to cultivate Japan as an ally. Nonetheless, American opinion about Japan eventually prevailed in Canberra—if only after a final compromise had been agreed over security arrangements. In February 1951 America’s leading Cold War warrior, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, brought a proposal to Canberra that he correctly anticipated would allay Australia’s fears of a resurgent Japan while bringing both Japan and Australia firmly into an anticommunist network spanning Asia and the Pacific. Dulles outlined a ‘chain of Pacific defence’, extending from the Aleutians to the southwest Pacific, with Australia and New Zealand incorporated into a security treaty with the US. This proposal placated Australian fears of the possible consequences of a ‘soft’ peace treaty with Japan. Thus, the tripartite ANZUS Agreement was signed.<sup>10</sup>

ANZUS, however, was a very modest concession by America, as it was not a strong Pacific version of the Atlantic NATO alliance. ANZUS did not insist that an armed attack on one member would be interpreted as an attack on all. At most, Australian officials conceded privately, ANZUS gave them ‘access to the thinking and

planning of the American administration at the highest political and military level'. In practice, however, it did not even ensure this limited result. If ANZUS was celebrated publicly over the next four decades as an assurance of US military support, Australian officials were privately dismayed by its limited and ambiguous nature. Spender, the Australian largely responsible for securing the agreement, complained as early as June 1952 that on matters of vital international importance 'our former enemies, Germany, Italy and Japan ... are to have the opportunity of consultation ... in a manner which has so far been denied to Australia'.<sup>11</sup> Echoing the protests of Curtin and Evatt during war against Japan, Spender stated bitterly during the Korean conflict that 'the conduct of military operations is directed solely by the United States' and that Australia was denied consultation. This pattern of exclusion dominated the bilateral relationship, being broken rarely, as in 1961, when the US sought for domestic as well as international reasons to involve troops from other nations alongside it in Vietnam. During that war, the Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, claimed that Australia continued to enjoy close and frequent contacts with the Johnson administration. But despite such routine assurances Australia and other allied combatants were excluded from major policy decisions, including Johnson's unilateral decision to bow to domestic protests and halt the bombing of Vietnam on 1 April 1968. In Korea in 1952, and later in Vietnam, the US made major 'allied' decisions unilaterally—even when such decisions directly affected Australia's military role in these conflicts.

In 1952 Menzies had welcomed ANZUS as a significant boost to 'the concerted efforts of the free world'. Washington interpreted the agreement far more cautiously, emphasising only the very limited consultative obligations it imposed on the major partner. Yet over the next four decades ANZUS remained the cornerstone and symbol of a relationship to which Australia, unlike New Zealand, gave unqualified support. Ever anxious to demonstrate its commitment to America, Canberra sent two additional battalions to fight in Korea in early 1952. Two years later Australia agreed to join the overtly anticommunist Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a collective defence treaty, even before the actual aims or nature of the association were finalised. In contrast to European democracies like the UK and France, as a member of SEATO Australia consistently followed the US—in the words of an



American official, 'almost without exception'. Cooperation under ANZUS and SEATO went beyond the defence of shared interests. 'It is in the interests of the United States,' a National Security Council official recommended, 'that Australia and New Zealand as strong-points of political stability and Free World orientation in the Far East, continue and extend their developing interest and activities in that area'.<sup>12</sup>

SEATO, far more than ANZUS, was to be the expression of the unifying power of anticommunism among Asia-Pacific nations. It embodied the exaggerated fears of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and sought to contain communism by erecting a series of countervailing alliances. Earlier, the hastily conceived, compromise ANZUS agreement had anticipated 'a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area' (Clause 5). Stalemate in Korea and the humiliation of France by communist-nationalist forces in Vietnam were factors that encouraged anticommunist states in the region to join together in a formal alliance. These events also induced Washington to broaden its formal containment policies from Europe to include the Asia-Pacific region. SEATO was negotiated against an immediate background of discussions over the partition of Vietnam at the Geneva Convention of 1954. It embraced the US, France, the Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and Australia. Like ANZUS, SEATO did not commit the US or other signatories to anything more than joint discussions 'in accordance with constitutional processes' in the event that any party was involved in military conflict. From the late 1950s Canberra learnt with dismay that in the event of hostilities over communist influence in Malaya, or conflict with Indonesia over the future of West New Guinea, neither ANZUS nor SEATO would guarantee diplomatic or military support from the US.

Later, bogged down with America and a handful of its allies in Vietnam, Canberra attempted to use its SEATO membership to justify intervening in this conflict. But in reality, Australia's role in Vietnam was an outgrowth of its uncritical embrace of American Cold War policies. In the words of an analysis conducted by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia's participation resulted from 'the frequently expressed wishes of the United States for political support from its friends and allies'. However, very few of America's other allies, notably other members of NATO, were

prepared to demonstrate their friendship by joining this protracted and costly war. Moreover, Australia did not simply support US initiatives; rather, as recent archival disclosures reveal, Canberra actively encouraged Washington to intervene with direct military force against communism in Asia. Given this context, Vietnam has been labelled Australia's 'war for the asking', and interpreted as the symbol of Australia's willingness to go 'all the way' with American policies.<sup>13</sup>

Both the ANZUS and SEATO agreements only committed their member states to consult on matters of mutual significance. It was a measure of Australia's limited power on the world stage that it accepted these agreements as a symbol of its elevated status in the postwar world and as a vehicle for establishing a more balanced relationship with Washington.

Despite ANZUS and SEATO the Menzies Government was slow to recognise Britain's decline. In its own limited way, it attempted to hold back the tide of decolonisation that symbolised this decline. As mentioned above, in the Suez conflict of 1956 Australia's support for British and French colonial policies left it isolated from America as well as from the decolonising nations. Again, in the late 1950s, Menzies's clumsy attempts to keep white South Africa within the Empire (the Commonwealth) signalled his nation's isolation in the climate of rapid international change that accompanied the drive for decolonisation and racial equality in the 1950s and 1960s. Events in Malaya and Indochina eventually convinced even Anglophile Australia that its physical security, if not its demographic character, depended on events in the region rather than traditional ties to the Old World. Britain's application to join the European Economic Community in 1963, and its decision of 1967 to gradually withdraw its forces from Malaya and Singapore, obliged even the most conservative Australians to recognise that their future lay in developing regional security and closer ties with the US. Australia had traditionally displayed what Bruce Grant has labelled 'loyalty to the protector',<sup>14</sup> and in the 1960s it belatedly accepted that its old protector had to be discarded. So more than twenty years after the shock of Pearl Harbor and Singapore, Curtin's claim that Australia would look to America free of guilt about its ties to Great Britain had come to fruition. Australia now encouraged its new protector to commit ground forces to Asia and to expand its permanent military presence in the region.

### **Vietnam And Beyond**

As war in Vietnam revealed, the decolonisation of much of Asia was a protracted and bloody contest that ultimately drew the US and Australia deeply into the region in a struggle against nationalist and 'communist' movements. These movements generally enjoyed wide local support as they led the struggles to overthrow European colonial authority and create more egalitarian, sovereign states. But nationalist victories, like those of the Pathet Lao and indigenous Vietnamese forces over the French during 1953–64, were won as Cold War rivalries intensified throughout Asia. To the Cold Warriors in Washington and Canberra, peasant nationalism had become merely a euphemism for communist subversion. In Australia, deep-rooted anxieties about Asian expansion and 'racial contamination' were now mixed with ideological alarm over the expansion of communism in what came to be called the 'Near North'. The Menzies Government, along with most Australians, understood communism as a monolithic movement that had spread from the USSR to Eastern Europe, China, and the wider Asian region. Communities once obscure to western interests, notably in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, were interpreted as precarious strategic 'dominoes' by Australian officials now locked into the ideological imperatives of the Cold War. Justifying his government's decision to send troops to Vietnam, Menzies echoed this familiar argument. 'The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and Southeast Asia,' he said. 'It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.'<sup>15</sup> Should one domino fall, all the others would topple in quick succession.

Australia's road to Vietnam was marked by at least three separate, if unsuccessful, attempts to draw the US into direct military intervention against so-called communist subversion on the Asian mainland. In September 1959, for example, cabinet agreed in principle that troops and RAAF fighter planes would be sent to assist the government of Laos against the Pathet Lao, provided they served with US forces or were part of a broader military intervention involving the US and other SEATO members. Despite encouragement from Canberra, the US under President Kennedy did not intervene militarily in Laos. By mid-1961 the Australian cabinet accepted that it could not act unilaterally and 'must follow

the lead of the US in the question of intervention ... anything less would put at risk the desire of the US to assist in our security in case of need'. These policies, which encouraged wider American military involvement in Asia but deferred to American leadership, established precedents that drew the two nations into the escalating conflict within Vietnam. Commenting on these policies, David Jenkins observed:

There are two golden threads that run through Australia's postwar foreign policy in Asia. One is the need to block the downward thrust of communism. The other is the need to keep up the premiums on the American insurance policy.<sup>16</sup>

Graham Freudenberg identified an equally resilient strain in Australian foreign policy, which outlived the conservative governments of Menzies, Holt, Gorton, and McMahon: 'From the beginning, the ruling purpose of Australia's intervention [in Vietnam] was to ingratiate Australia with the American Administration'. This pattern has not been broken, despite the Whitlam Government's independence and a decade of Labor rule under Hawke in the 1980s. Even conservative experts have been surprised by Australia's reluctance to seek a more independent path in world affairs. 'Many nations must depend on others for their ultimate security but in most cases they try to maximise their own independence within a relationship of dependency,' Sir Alan Watt observed in 1967. 'Australia has seemed intent on doing the very opposite: of maximising its dependence, first on Britain and lately on the US'.<sup>17</sup>

In his excellent study *All The Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam*, Gregory Pemberton has demonstrated that Australia's willingness to support American intervention in that divided country was conditioned by concern over Indonesian expansionism and Canberra's uncertainty over America's commitment to ANZUS in the event of conflict with Indonesia over potentially explosive issues like Malaysia and West New Guinea. Although he tends to underestimate the transformation of Australia's ideological assumptions about communism in Asia as the context of its foreign policy, Pemberton argues convincingly that '[u]ltimately it was Australia's dependence on the US that led it into Vietnam'. He concludes that in the eyes of Australian officials 'it was the

necessary price to secure a large US commitment to Southeast Asia'.<sup>18</sup>

Australia's dependent status was expressed most disturbingly in its willingness, even eagerness, to follow America into Vietnam. This decision was, in part at least, a product of Australia's deepening interaction with the American arms trade and strategic planning, which started immediately the ANZUS agreement was formalised. In 1952 Australia began purchasing substantial military equipment, including anti-submarine aircraft, from its ally. The following year the two Pacific powers signed a Military Standardization Agreement, replacing a long-established arms link between the Dominions and the UK. Integration of its new 'free world' allies into the burgeoning US armaments industry was an important aim of the Eisenhower administration. As one of its officials noted in 1956 'included in military policy is the need to attract allies and bind them to the US—this involves a mutuality of military and economic interests'. To support this policy, Australian–American arms and defence links were further extended in 1960 through a Mutual Weapons Development Program, which provided for research and development of military equipment. Earlier, Washington had helped Australia develop two atomic reactors. Within a decade of ANZUS, Australia had become an important purchaser of American arms—by 1963, it ranked third behind West Germany and Canada. During the 1960s it purchased 6 per cent of the total US arms exports for that decade. This trade in military equipment and the partial integration of Australia's armaments and defence industries into those of the US, were additional forces of dependence drawing the small power into the orbit of the larger. This point was not lost in Washington. As US Ambassador Ed Clark cabled from Canberra in 1967: 'They are our strongest supporters in Vietnam and now they are paying their own way there at considerable cost to their own balance of payments'. As an Australian military intelligence officer who served in Vietnam observed, the American alliance 'is like an insurance policy and every now and again you have got to pay your dues on an insurance policy'.<sup>19</sup>

The costs to Australia of the alliance involved much more than expenditure on arms. By 1967 it had committed 8,000 men—many of whom were conscripts—to fight in Vietnam. It had also permitted the establishment of a series of major American military installations on Australian soil and linked its intelligence activities

inextricably to those of its powerful ally. Rather than challenge the limited role that such an asymmetrical alliance assigned it, Australia seemed anxious to constrain its own influence and autonomy by participating in a series of arrangements that were dominated overwhelmingly by the major partner, America. These arrangements implicated Australia deeply in American military adventures, Cold War brinkmanship, and nuclear strategies, while denying the small power genuine autonomy.

The huge Australian land mass in the southern hemisphere was essential to America as it moved to set up a truly global network of military surveillance, intelligence gathering, and control of its sophisticated weaponry. As Ed Clark disingenuously put it when justifying the establishment of US bases on Australian soil: 'We had to have them there: there wasn't any other place to go'. Moreover, Australia was 'a perfect place to do business—no leaks, no problems, no undercutting, no resistance'.<sup>20</sup> As early as 1955 a secret agreement had anticipated a joint defence-intelligence facility near Alice Springs. Australia was to have no responsibility, even in a consultative sense, for operating this facility. Shortly afterwards Australia also offered Washington use of the Woomera rocket range, and the two nations collaborated on tracking upper atmosphere rockets and satellites.

However, it was the period 1963 to 1970 that saw Australia incorporated most intimately into America's global strategic network. A series of so-called joint facilities was established over which Australia relinquished its normal sovereign rights and sanctioned unilateral American control. (These arrangements were not relaxed until the breakup of the Soviet Union had signalled the end of the Cold War.) In 1963 it was agreed that a radio communications station be built at North West Cape. America's lease on this base was renewed in 1988 by the Hawke Government, which, like its predecessors, refused to disclose publicly the role of the facility. Most analysts agree, however, that it is one of only three very low frequency US communications bases that can track nuclear submarines, and trigger them into attack. They are vital to America's second strike capacity. Less is known about the blandly named Joint US–Australian Defense Space Research Facility, called Pine Gap, which was established during 1966–69 at a cost in excess of \$US200 million. Pine Gap played an important role in satellite reconnaissance and was linked to CIA intelligence gathering

activities. A third major base, at Nurrungar, received signals from early warning satellites, assisted US spying operations against the USSR and China, and was a vital link in America's early warning system designed to detect Soviet nuclear activity. It is estimated that a total of fourteen 'communication', 'defence', and 'scientific' installations have been established in Australia. These join it to America's strategic activities, both offensive and defensive.<sup>21</sup>

The foremost authority on these facilities, Des Ball, ranks at least three of them, North West Cape, Pine Gap, and Nurrungar, as 'extremely critical to American military and intelligence operations'. Moreover, he has emphasised that these were all 'primary Soviet targets'. In 1988 Prime Minister Hawke conceded that the various US bases invited some risk of a Soviet nuclear strike, while Soviet officials have also acknowledged that the bases were a 'high priority' as nuclear targets. Neither trenchant public criticism nor changes of government has modified official Australian support for hosting these essentially secret bases.<sup>22</sup>

The joint installations compromised the sovereignty of the host nation, implicated it as an important target in the event of any conflict between the superpowers anywhere in the world, and, most importantly, stifled its ability to shape its own policies to its own national needs. The 'joint' bases were a blatant index of a network of connections that encompassed intelligence activities, support for covert US intervention in other nations' affairs, collaborative research on weapons systems, and close alignment with US policies on such matters as uranium production and nuclear safeguards. As well as the bases, other bilateral links were equally intimate and complex, as evidence from the intelligence field clearly indicates.

Intelligence cooperation during the Pacific War led to the 1947 Secret Treaty or UK–USA agreement linking Australia to the emerging Cold War intelligence network of the western allies. This arrangement complemented the internal affairs focus of Australia's own 'CIA', the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and remained critical to Australia's security throughout the long years of the Cold War. From its first years of operation ASIO was welcomed by the US as a most sympathetic agency—in the words of prominent CIA officer Ray Cline, American officials were always confident that liaison with ASIO was helping to protect 'our interests'.<sup>23</sup> Collaboration in Vietnam and formation of the 'joint facilities' confirmed this confidence (at least until the election of the

Whitlam Government in 1972). The very operation of Australia's intelligence network became dependent on institutional, technological, and even personnel exchanges and support from America. The small power's ability to collect and analyse material independently of the US has always been limited, and this dependence has been exploited by Washington. In times of discord between the two nations it has threatened to exclude Australia from intelligence sharing arrangements. During the turbulent Whitlam years some information was withheld, while clandestine CIA activities in Australia were expanded. A threat to deny Australia 'joint' intelligence was also used when the Hawke Government came to power and contemplated denying nuclear-armed ships access to Australian ports. When New Zealand adopted such a policy in 1985 it was promptly expelled from ANZUS.

Generally, however, the intelligence relationship has been cooperative and, therefore, largely invisible to the Australian public. As early as 1958, for example, Australia gave support to covert CIA operations in Indonesia, and in 1965 Australia helped the CIA to 'destabilise' the Sukarno regime. In that year, also, when US diplomats and CIA operatives were expelled from Cambodia Australians took over their operation. Commenting on the elaborate covert activities conducted there over the next five years on behalf of the US, Camilleri has written:

This particular episode is significant not only because it contributed to the overthrow of the Sihanouk regime and helped to engulf Cambodia in one of the most tragic and brutal wars of modern history, but because it reveals the almost complete integration of the Australian intelligence community into the American foreign policy framework and the failure of Australian governments to maintain the most elementary supervision over the foreign operations of Australian intelligence organisations.<sup>24</sup>

In Vietnam, from as early as 1962, close military and intelligence cooperation was also practised. In addition, Australia rushed in so-called Black Teams to join the CIA's hamlet 'pacification' and assassination squads. Recent disclosures have also confirmed that two Australian Secret Intelligence Service officers worked for the CIA in Chile in the critical years 1970–72. And during 1972–75 ASIO and the CIA collaborated against the elected Whitlam Government by (at least) withholding information from it. In the



words of convicted spy Christopher Boyce, the CIA practised a policy of 'deception against the Australians' that was calculated to destabilise the Labor Government. Usually, however, Australian and American intelligence gathering and analysis worked in complementary, not antagonistic ways.<sup>25</sup> The deep integration of their intelligence networks was part of a wider pattern of cooperation towards a common purpose defined and justified within the objectives of the Cold War.

Throughout the period of conservative government in the 1950s and 1960s the symbols of Empire and Mother England were often invoked to placate those disturbed by the new direction in Australia's foreign policy. Yet even the cloying Empire rhetoric of Menzies could not conceal this dramatic change in direction. Imperial relations were not the only casualties of Australia's reorientation towards the US. Many Australians who had anticipated that dependence on Great Britain would be replaced by a vibrant regionalism and independence in defence and foreign affairs, along the lines suggested by Curtin and Evatt in the 1940s, viewed with dismay their nation's increased reliance on American leadership and power. Opportunities for regional initiatives—perhaps even 'non-alignment' along lines pursued by many recently decolonised nations—were lost as Australia transferred its allegiances from one 'great and powerful friend' to another.

Initially, as the private musings of both Menzies and Casey indicate, many Australians promoted a close public military relationship with Washington while they spoke disparagingly in private of America and Americans and clung longingly to the culture of Britain and the Empire. However, by the mid 1960s military dependence on America was encouraged and celebrated both publicly and privately in the language of the Holt and Gorton governments. Later governments were sometimes less effusive. The Labor Government of Whitlam (1972–75), and, to a lesser degree, Fraser's Liberal-Country Party Government (1975–82), did not blindly follow American leadership on all matters. Under Labor, specifically, the alliance was exposed to new tensions as Australia sought a more autonomous role in global affairs, anticipated US policy by recognising the People's Republic of China, and immediately withdrew its forces from Vietnam. But from the early 1960s until the late 1980s examples of Australian independence or dissent from American initiatives and perceptions were fairly rare.

Ironically, as recent disclosures on West Irian and Vietnam reveal, Australia's most forceful initiatives in foreign affairs sought not to offset American power, but to increase America's presence in Asia and bolster its military effort against 'communism' in the region. It has been argued recently that Australia deliberately exploited American anticommunism and Cold War fears in order to draw this powerful nation into ANZUS and later into Vietnam. This interpretation dramatically exaggerates Australia's influence on Washington. It also ignores the powerful interests and perceptions that motivated American initiatives in Japan, China, Indochina, and the Pacific from 1945 to 1975. But it does correctly highlight Australia's determination to embrace a new protector from the early 1950s. If this initiative was considered consistent with Australia's perceived security interests, it nonetheless narrowed the foreign policy options Australia could subsequently pursue. By constantly emphasising the centrality of the American alliance to its foreign policies, Australia undermined its own capacity to bargain with the US. While always anxious to demonstrate its reliability as an ally, Australian governments, both Liberal and Labor, found it difficult to dissent from American actions or to resist American pressure for military support.

Yet this compliance did not win Australia the confidence of American military officials or governments. For example, although it went 'all the way' with America in Vietnam, Australia exerted no influence on, and had no prior knowledge of, crucial American decisions on such matters as the bombing of the North, hamlet 'pacification', or the invasion of Cambodia and Laos. Indeed, a small number of Australian officers were used by the CIA in the infamous 'Operation Phoenix' and in Cambodia, without any prior agreement from the Australian Government. As we have seen, Australia made major concessions to American demands for base rights and port facilities in an attempt to show its unqualified support for ANZUS and America's Cold War strategy. Official Australian strategic thinking and behaviour was often indistinguishable from that of its alliance partner.<sup>26</sup>

In its wish to encourage, and join, America's invasion of Vietnam, Australia unwittingly revealed its inability to determine significant foreign policy in terms of its own national interests. Ever anxious to demonstrate their nation's loyalty to the American alliance, Australian politicians and bureaucrats usually deferred

uncritically to policies and perceptions emanating from Washington. Writing two decades after Australia had signalled its new deference to American policy initiatives and ideology by refusing to recognise Mao's regime, Malcolm Booker, a leading Australian diplomat, complained that Australia had accepted US attitudes and policies on virtually all important foreign policy questions since the 'loss' of China. Indeed, he went so far as to characterise Australian policies as passive, derivative, sycophantic, and uncritical. By endorsing America's foreign policy from Korea to Vietnam, he charged, Australia had not acted in support of its own interests, nor as an independent and informed ally.<sup>27</sup> This indictment was supported when the Fraser Government went to the High Court seeking an injunction to stop publication of documents on *Australian Defense and Foreign Policy, 1968–1975*. The editor of this book, Richard Walsh, commented tersely: 'The US Department of State is writing the script for Australian foreign policy. It is clear that our people fall in too easily with its advice'.<sup>28</sup>

Occasionally, this docile emulation has been interrupted by independent assessments and initiatives—most notably Whitlam's prompt withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and recognition of China, and later efforts of the Hawke and Keating Labor governments to challenge America's protectionist agricultural policies and promote independent initiatives over such diverse issues as Antarctica, Cambodia, and chemical weapons. But, in general, Australia until the early 1980s followed America's initiatives and endorsed the rationale on which such policies were based, as though Australia's interests were a direct extension of US interests in the Pacific.

A number of different incidents during the Hawke and Keating governments suggest that Australia continues to behave in this way. In 1986 Canberra voted in the World Bank in favour of a \$250 million 'structural adjustment loan' to Chile. This decision, the Labor Government argued, was based purely on economic criteria and was entirely nonpolitical. But, as Morris Morely has demonstrated, the decision was a response to US foreign policy interests and pressure, more than an objective economic consideration. 'There has developed a pattern of World Bank lending which at the very least exposes a willingness to fund a regime as much on the basis of political as economic criteria and to refashion policies and redefine notions of credit worthiness in

accordance with shifts in Washington's bilateral relation'. Morely concluded: 'For Australian Government officials to cite the World Bank's formal policy pronouncements as justification for supporting a multi-million dollar loan to one of the most totalitarian regimes in recent history shows, at best, how ignorant Hawke, Hayden and Keating are of the Bank's history and pattern of lending in the Third World'.<sup>29</sup>

An incident that was given more publicity took place in 1984, when the Hawke Government quickly reversed its decision to deny dry-docking facilities to warships suspected of carrying nuclear weapons into Australian ports. Beneath headlines proclaiming that the 'US Wrote Words of N-Ship Backdown', the local press demonstrated that 'the reversal' was 'forced on the government by the US Secretary of State, Mr George Schultz', and that the very wording of the announced decision was identical to that recommended by the US State Department. Further evidence of Labor's reluctance to contradict US policy, even when it involved military intervention abroad, was provided by events in Granada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. Advice from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs had warned cabinet that the invasion of Granada, and later of Panama, could not be justified as such acts violated the political independence and sovereignty of the nation state. In the General Assembly of the UN most nations accepted similar principles and refused to support US actions. Canberra, however, supported the Granada intervention and quickly changed its policy over Panama so that it would not alienate Washington. Initially Australia had voted with a UN majority and condemned US proposals on Panama. On 21 December 1989, the day after the widely criticised US invasion began, President Bush phoned Prime Minister Hawke. Despite departmental advice that Australia would be implicated in an unpopular and illegal act it if altered its policy, Hawke told Bush that 'Australia fully understood the US action and was supportive of it'. The local press interpreted this change as further evidence that Australia was still as anxious as during the early days of the Vietnam War to go 'all the way' with Washington.<sup>30</sup>

The press also highlighted the inconsistency of other Australian policies that flowed from its uncritical embrace of US actions. In 1987 Hawke had justified Australia's decision to join the US and send warships to the Persian Gulf as a matter of high principle. It is 'important for Australia that the world understands that big

countries cannot invade small neighbours and get away with it', he stated.<sup>31</sup> However, the Indonesian invasion and protracted war of occupation in East Timor had previously exposed such sentiments as shallow rhetoric that could be ignored when the realities of friendship with powerful allies or regional neighbours were at stake. The Hawke Government's decision to contribute warships to the US-led blockade of Iraq and Kuwait followed a pattern reminiscent of the one established during the Menzies and Holt years over Vietnam more than two decades earlier. Australia did not wait for Washington to request that it send forces to the Gulf. Rather, as in Vietnam, Australia lobbied strenuously in Washington for such a request to be made. Despite a changed international climate and the great distance separating it from the Middle East, Australia remained anxious to demonstrate support for the US by contributing conspicuously to American-led actions in the Gulf. The US-led assault on Saddam Hussein's regime in the inconclusive 'Gulf War' of 1990–91 was yet another example of Australia's compliance with American policies of armed intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state.

Under both conservative and Labor governments, Australia has clung to the American alliance. The general thrust of its policies was unmoved by dramatic shifts in public opinion, the breakdown of ANZUS as a tripartite agreement following New Zealand's expulsion from it by the US in 1985, and growing instability in various Pacific island states, which demanded that Australia pursue regional initiatives independently of America's interests. The link between public opinion and official support for the alliance had remained strong during the Cold War, surviving even the interlude of the Whitlam years. But the promise of *détente*, declining superpower rivalries, and a more multipolar international environment broke Australia's fixation with the menace of communism. By the late 1980s less than one in ten Australians saw either communism or the USSR as a threat to security. At the same time, less than 50 per cent supported the visit to Australian ports of nuclear armed ships and the continuation of the joint US–Australian bases under existing arrangements.

In contrast to New Zealand, such dramatic changes in opinion did not generate changed policies in Australia. Despite the dominance of Labor after 1982, the ANZUS agreement and uncritical support for American military-strategic policies remained

central tenets of foreign policy. New Zealand's removal from ANZUS because it refused to accept US nuclear armed ships highlighted yet again Australia's fundamental reluctance to depart from American policies. Although Australia attempted to placate its near neighbours by opposing both the alleged Libyan presence and Soviet efforts to gain fishing rights in the area, and by promoting the toothless South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, these efforts did not help to isolate it from American policies. Indeed, as Mary O'Callaghan observed when writing of 'Australia: The Outcasts of the Pacific', such gestures have meant that, since New Zealand's expulsion from ANZUS, 'Australia is more than ever identified according to many people in the region, as the agent for American interests in the area'.<sup>32</sup> During negotiations for the Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Australia supported conditions acceptable to Washington. However, the Reagan administration still refused to sign, because even this weak treaty, in the words of one of its officials, 'would have been a signal for the proliferation of nuclear free zones throughout the Free World. Such zones for the west, unmatched by disarmament in the Soviet bloc, weaken rather than strengthen the cause of peace'.<sup>33</sup>

However reluctantly, as ANZUS came under unprecedented strain, Australian policy did acquire a degree of independence. Indeed, after America's defeat in Vietnam and promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine, Australia grudgingly accepted that it must take greater responsibility for its own defence. It attempted to match its security aims with commitments of money, personnel, and materials.<sup>34</sup> The limits of ANZUS were now conceded publicly. The government paper on defence, the Dibb Report, acknowledged in 1987: 'The ANZUS Treaty provides for consultation in the first instance. There are no guarantees inherent in it. It is realistic to assume that the parties will continue to approach each situation in accordance with their respective national interests'. Official statements now emphasised that 'it is not this Government's policy to rely on combat assistance from the US in all circumstances'.<sup>35</sup>

For some Australians, at least, this was a disquieting assertion of small power autonomy. In reality, however, it took cognisance of Pentagon inspired press reports that revealed that in the event of conflict between Australia and Indonesia, the US would either remain neutral or support Indonesia. During 1989 Australia's Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, conceded that in the event of a

localised conflict with Indonesia the US would be unlikely to come to Australia's assistance. Vice President Dan Quayle was equally honest. In such a conflict, he observed, the US would limit its role to the pursuit of 'diplomatic initiatives'.<sup>36</sup> Perfunctory bilateral consultations between Canberra and Washington were virtually all that remained of the formal alliance enshrined in the ANZUS treaty. The end of the Cold War signalled the end of this central symbol of Australian foreign policy.

As international Cold War tensions evaporated, traditional military and security concerns were pushed aside by a variety of economic, environmental, humanitarian, and diplomatic issues. Notable amongst these were: efforts to protect the world's precarious environment; human rights and refugee agreements and protocols; the revitalised role of the UN in peacekeeping, development issues, disarmament, and chemical weapons; and negotiations over trade and tariffs as disillusion grew over the GATT arrangements and the rise of new regional trading blocs. Responding to this changed relationship with Washington, Australia from the mid 1980s pursued more independent initiatives that were sensitive to the new climate of regional affairs in Asia and the Pacific. Through the UN it successfully guided a peace plan for war-ravaged Cambodia, which by 1991 led to a UN peacekeeping operation, the return of refugees, and the prospect of supervised elections. A second initiative, Prime Minister Keating's plan to revitalise the twelve member Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC) by holding regular heads of nation summits, confirmed Australia's desire to put regional economic matters ahead of sensitivity to America's wishes. On these, and a string of other matters, like the outlawing of chemical weapons and an Antarctic environmental agreement, Australia refused to defer as it once might have to the policies or pleas of its senior Pacific partner. Under Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans, Australian foreign policy in the early 1990s was pursued with an independent vigour reminiscent of the 1940s under Dr Evatt's controversial guidance.

In the light of the changed international climate, which had signalled the end of the so-called alliance era of the Cold War, Australian officials were obliged to downgrade ANZUS. Typical of this more sober reference to the alliance was a statement made by Defence Minister Kim Beazley in 1989. Rather than rely overwhelmingly on the US, he commented, Australia now wanted

immediate, if practical, benefits, like 'day-to-day assistance in building up a self-reliant capability, intelligence, access to the best type of equipment, access to training opportunities'. Modest levels of defence cooperation had displaced 'ultimate guarantees' of protection as the fundamentals of the bilateral relationship.<sup>37</sup> Any lingering Australian belief that ANZUS had once given—and might still give—such assurances was evidence only of the tenacity of the myth of a special bilateral relationship: it was not based on a dispassionate reading of the limited and ambiguous treaty negotiated four decades earlier.

In bilateral security arrangements, as in economics, the myth of the special relationship had evaporated. Australia was now 'on its own' in a world made unpredictable by the new global complexities of the 1990s. Without God or America on its side, Australia was coming to recognise its Asian and industrial realities as reflected directly from its region rather than as refracted through American perspectives. The press now acknowledged that the US 'no longer guarantee[s] its security, let alone its economic wellbeing'; and Australia is 'no special ally for America'. (This observation was made by *Time* magazine in an article ironically titled *Home Alone*, after a popular American movie about a child left without a babysitter.) The cultural similarities assumed by *Time* speaking to Australians underscored the fact that popular culture remained one medium through which Australians could be spoken of by American interests outside the diplomatic discourses of ANZUS or GATT. Although the local edition of the American magazine proclaimed Australia's independence, it also signified the smaller nation's continuing implication in America's global culture.



## **Anticipating the Pacific Century? Australian Responses to Realignments in the Asia–Pacific**

### **Introduction: Australian Responses to Realignments in the Asia–Pacific**

The rapid economic transformation of much of Asia places Australia for the first time within, or at least closely adjacent to, the region of greatest global economic power. Australia's overriding desire to integrate closely into the region has, on one level at least, been substantially achieved: in 1995, almost three-quarters of its total exports flowed to the Asia–Pacific region, and APEC anticipated a multilateral regional economy grouping which eclipsed in importance either the European Union (EU) or NAFTA.<sup>1</sup> These developments intensify Australian Government and business optimism that the so-called Pacific Century will be realised, integrating Australia further into the deepening prosperity of the region.<sup>2</sup> Equally, it is anticipated that the Pacific Century will be built on more balanced and reciprocal systems of multilateral political interactions which mitigate conflict and emphasise the shared interests of the diverse members of the region. And in Canberra, at least, this vision persists even as its global political equivalent—the so-called New World Order—is undermined by brutal conflicts,

especially in Europe and Africa; a demoralised and impotent UN; bitter trade rivalries, especially in the Asia–Pacific; difficulties in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons; escalating expenditure on armaments, especially in the Middle East and Asia; the persistence of authoritarian governments on both the ‘left’ and ‘right’ of politics; and widespread abuses of human rights. This chapter traces Australia’s often faltering efforts to adjust to the changing realities of the Asia–Pacific. It emphasises the fundamental consequences for Australia of its uneven integration into the realignments—economic, political and cultural—which characterise the dynamic region on the eve of the much heralded Pacific Century. Australia’s changing aspirations and policies are located throughout wider contours of regional and global changes—changes which are increasingly understood as essentially economic, but which are deeply embedded in political and cultural processes.

### **Colonialism, The Cold War and Australia’s ‘Asia’**

The transformation of Asia did not begin with the overthrow of colonialism 1902 and the proliferation of independent nation states in the postwar world. Japan’s partial modernisation and unexpected victory over Russia in 1902 were potent early symbols of emerging nationalism and embryonic state building in Asia. China also found a degree of unity and assumed some of the institutional trappings of a unified state at the turn of the century as it struggled to reduce foreign influence and modernise. Nationalist movements fuelled by opposition to colonialism surfaced throughout much of the region—from India to Indonesia. By the turn of the century, also, the US had emerged as an economic giant, with a formal and informal empire in the Far East, the Pacific and the Caribbean. Developments in Asia and the Pacific intensified white Australia’s exaggerated security fears. Anglo-Australian racism, already deeply embedded in its immigration policies and national culture, further fuelled Australian anxieties about Asia.

Though tied tightly to England and empire, newly federated Australia looked anxiously across the Pacific for US support against the uncertainties of Asia. During 1907–08, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin proposed ‘extension of the Monroe Doctrine to all the countries around the Pacific ocean’. The magazine *Lone Hand*

betrayed Australia's enduring racist anxieties when it proclaimed: 'Against the two white peoples with important establishments in the Pacific—the United States and Australia—are arrayed millions of brown men, ambitious and arrogant in Asia for more than 400 years.<sup>3</sup> Just as commentators in the 1990s speak optimistically of the Pacific Century, so in the 1890s many anticipated and hoped their nation would share in the so-called American Century. And for race patriots, like the British writer W T Stead, the impending 'Americanization of the world' was to be welcomed as it 'would ensure the continued triumph of the Anglo-Saxon race'.<sup>4</sup> The rise of the USA as the major world economy and an expanding military and economic power in the western hemisphere, the Pacific and East Asia prefigured in the 1890s its later global authority.

Throughout much of the twentieth century Australian society remained overwhelmingly Anglo-Irish in origin and defiantly 'white'. Yet traditional ties to Britain could not compensate for regional isolation and vulnerability. Attempts by Australian governments to forge new friendships in the Pacific through symbolic visits by the US navy, as well as calls for a regional security agreement with Washington, initiated a pattern that was to become a familiar ritual in its international behaviour throughout the twentieth century—even as it belatedly sought to accommodate its economic interests to those of its near neighbours.

War in the Pacific in the 1940s, followed by Cold War confrontations in Asia, especially Korea and Vietnam, drew Australia militarily into the region. Its involvement in Asia continued to be shaped by extreme, often exaggerated security concerns. Its understanding of Asia, as nations in the region strove to decolonise, remained shallow and anxious, linked increasingly to Washington's perceptions and policies. At the same time, however, the residual ties of empire and race nationalism continued to distort Australia's engagement with the emerging nations and peoples of the Asia-Pacific.

Despite the decisive role of the US in defeating Japan, and the escalating tensions of the Cold War, until it lost office late in 1949 Australia's Labor Government refused to accept that Washington's international actions were in the interests of all former allies. Indeed, through its continuing imperial links, support for the infant UN, and through bilateral diplomacy, Australia encouraged other nations to join it in attempting to counter, resist or at least deflect

US foreign policy initiatives. As a small state, it felt its particular economic interests and regional ambitions stifled by the predominance of US power and influence in the Asia-Pacific area. Only gradually, and against the background of an allegedly new Asian threat to its security in the form of communist China, did Australia accommodate itself to US authority in the Pacific. The war that erupted in Korea quickly became a brutal reminder that the divisions of the Cold War had been transferred to the Asia-Pacific region and would now be contested in virtually every sphere of international politics. Against this background, the conservative government of Robert Menzies (1949–66) became increasingly receptive to US definitions of international threat, as it did to US interpretations of security issues and international politics more generally.

Yet if most Australians now welcomed the US as their protector in a volatile region, they were much less enthusiastic about American culture and commerce, especially when these threatened to displace ties with Britain. As *The Sydney Morning Herald* protested during negotiations over the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the USA (ANZUS): 'Australia's relations with America are often imperfectly understood abroad ... They imply no weakening of the Commonwealth bond, nor any turning away from Britain'. Until the mid-1960s at least, Protestant Australians in particular continued to share what Russell Ward and others have described as a 'dual identity'. 'For most, but not all people, national and imperial patriotism were complementary, not contradictory', he observed.<sup>5</sup>

The fall of Singapore and bombing of Darwin in the early days of the war against Japan, and later the decolonisation of Asia, dented but did not destroy the illusion of an imperial umbrella under which white Australia could shelter. 'We draw our main strength not from eight million of our own population,' Richard Casey, Foreign Minister in Menzies's Government, claimed, 'but from the fact that we are a member of a great cooperative society: the British race, of which the senior partner is our mother country Great Britain'. Significantly, he added: 'We also have the very great potential asset of the friendship of the greatest single nation in the world, the United States of America'. Although Australian conservatives were anxious to negotiate a formal alliance with their potential new friend, royal visits, royal honours and celebrations of

empire remained linchpins of public life in the Menzies years. Even in the late 1960s, while Australian troops fought alongside Americans in Vietnam, it was not uncommon for prominent Australians to announce, as did a former ambassador to Washington, Sir James Plimsoll, that 'we do not see our United States relationship as a threat to British relationships'.<sup>6</sup> Such assertions could not conceal the drift away from Great Britain. However, this realignment was much slower and more complex than historians have sometimes assumed.<sup>7</sup>

Anglophile Australia's relations with the USA were often uncertain and ambivalent as the small dominion reluctantly accepted that its future would be defined by developments in Asia rather than ties to Europe and empire. During negotiation of the ANZUS agreement in 1950–51, for example, official Australian perceptions of China and Japan often contrasted with those of Washington. The US agreed to the alliance because it paved the way for a 'soft' peace settlement with Japan, and provided another link in a broad anti-communist network in Asia. In contrast, Australia initially viewed ANZUS as a guarantee against a resurgent Japan. Four years later, during the Suez crisis, the two nations also acted from very different perceptions and pursued very different policies. Menzies's effort in support of British and French aggression against Egypt led to a sharp exchange with President Eisenhower, who condemned the attack as a debacle that merely accelerated the decline of Anglo-French prestige in the Middle East and paved the way for expanded Soviet influence. Under Menzies, Australia occasionally attempted to distance itself from Washington's Cold War policies, especially if these challenged British interests. Australian governments did not always follow the US uncritically. Privately, Menzies portrayed ANZUS as a 'superstructure on a foundation of jelly'. However, the dominion's refusal to recognise the communist government of China, its willingness to fight in Korea under General MacArthur's leadership, and its anxious public promotion of ANZUS and SEATO were portents of the dominant direction in its foreign policy.<sup>8</sup>

As the Cold War intensified, the Asia–Pacific region joined Europe as a focus of superpower rivalries. Australia's foreign policies and strategic assumptions were radically recast by its association with the US. Some on the left, in the trade union movement and the Labor Party (ALP), in Australia rejected the need

for such a relationship and refused to view international events through what they saw as the distorting lens of the Cold War. Instead, they interpreted revolutions in Asia as legitimate manifestations of nationalism and evidence of long-overdue social change. They criticised the assumption that China or North Korea or, later, North Vietnam were merely willing satellites of the Soviet Union, or pawns in the global contest between 'Marxism' and 'democracy'. But for members of the ruling Liberal-Country Party coalition, as well as the Democratic Labor Party which had recently splintered from the ALP, such interpretations were at best naïve, at worst comfort to the 'enemy'. In the first months of war in Korea, for example, Liberal MP Paul Hasluck greeted his government's decision to send troops to serve under MacArthur with words that clearly echoed official US statements: 'This expansionist, imperialistic and aggressive policy of the Soviet Union must be resisted wherever it is exemplified'.<sup>9</sup> From stalemate in Korea to defeat in Vietnam, Australia joined the US in a protracted struggle to contain communism, and nationalism, in Asia. Indeed, most officials in both Canberra and Washington were unable or unwilling to differentiate between nationalist movements and communism, viewing them in Cold War terms as threatening and subversive. Additionally, in Australia at least, ideological concerns compounded deep-seated anxieties centred on fears of 'Asian' expansion. Along with most Australians, the Menzies Cabinet interpreted communism as monolithic, believing that it had been imposed by the USSR on Eastern Europe and East Asia.

In this view, communities long ignored—notably Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam—had become vulnerable 'dominoes' in the ideological struggles of the Cold War. Arguing the decision to send troops to Vietnam, Menzies stated simply: 'The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and Southeast Asia'. And, he concluded, 'It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans'.<sup>10</sup> The infamous domino theory remained a convenient justification for reliance on American protection.

Yet even as it rushed to join the US in Vietnam, Australia's wider relationships with Asia were increasingly complex and distant from the divisive formulations of the Cold War. On the eve of the

election of an unorthodox Labor government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, Australia's rapidly growing trade with Japan, loss of traditional markets in Europe, and re-evaluation of domestic policies on the sensitive issues of immigration and Aboriginal affairs foreshadowed a reorientation in Australian foreign policies. Under Labor (1972–75) especially, the alliance with Washington was exposed to new tensions as Canberra searched for a more independent role in global affairs, anticipated US policy by recognising the People's Republic of China, and immediately withdrew Australia's troops from Vietnam. Canberra's strident independence was short-lived, as the Whitlam Government was replaced by the conservative coalition government during the constitutional crisis of 1975. From Korea to the Gulf War examples of official Australian dissent from US actions and perceptions, like those fostered by the Whitlam administration, were fairly rare. Ironically, as recent disclosures about West Irian and Vietnam reveal, Canberra's most forceful initiatives in foreign affairs often sought not to offset US power, but to increase America's presence in Asia and bolster its military effort against 'communism' in the region. ANZUS remained the public cornerstone of Australia's strategic planning while enduring intelligence links and 'joint' security/communication facilities on Australian soil provided the backbone of an intimate relationship that survived undiminished despite the end of the Cold War. However, as superpower rivalries thawed, and economics challenged security as the central preoccupation in foreign policy, Australian governments, notably those led by Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating, did pursue more diverse and consistently independent initiatives abroad.

The Nixon Doctrine issued in 1969 and America's defeat in Vietnam encouraged both major parties in Australia to accept that despite ANZUS, Australia must act more independently and relate more closely its security aims to its military capacity. In 1987 the Dibb Report acknowledged the limitations of the bilateral alliance: 'The ANZUS Treaty provides for consultation in the first instance. There are no guarantees inherent in it. It is realistic to assume that the parties will continue to approach each situation in accordance with their respective national interests'. At the same time, Canberra now emphasised that 'it is not this Government's policy to rely on combat assistance from the US in all circumstances'.<sup>11</sup> In the face of such official qualifications, the myth of the bilateral 'special

relationship' evaporated. With the end of the so-called alliance era of the Cold War, Australian officials accepted more restrained, and realistic, estimates of ANZUS. Defence Minister Kim Beazley commented in the wake of the Dibb Report that Australia now sought practical if limited returns from the US—like 'day-to-day assistance in building up a self-reliant capacity, intelligence, access to the best type of equipment, access to training opportunities'. Practical levels of defence cooperation and intelligence sharing, not 'ultimate guarantees' of military protection now underpinned the bilateral relationship.<sup>12</sup> And increasing Australian-US bilateral disagreements over trade and regional arrangements hastened a long overdue re-evaluation of Australia's links with the many nations of the wider Asia-Pacific.

Constrained by its protracted identification with US policies and its Eurocentric political culture, Australia's positive reorientation towards Asia was realised slowly. In 1964 the Minister for External Affairs claimed, in words which echoed rhetorically in postwar Australia: 'Friendship with Asia, reciprocal trade, closer cultural relations and a clearer understanding of Asia and its people are in the forefront of Australian policy'.<sup>13</sup> By the early 1970s the White Australia Policy was dismantled, Australian troops had been withdrawn abruptly from Vietnam, and Prime Minister Whitlam could speak with some justification of the 'withering away of xenophobia, isolationism, and racism'. No longer would insulated political leaders speak publicly of 'the riddles, of the inscrutable East', as had the then Treasurer, later Prime Minister, William McMahon in 1968.<sup>14</sup> Official Australian perceptions of Asia were more nuanced, its policies more pragmatic, its regional expectations more optimistic. As Richard Woolcott wrote, Australia's international policies and the assumption on which they rested had reached a fundamental turning point:

What is happening is simply that the world around us has changed and we are responding to these changes ... [I]t was one thing for the Australian Government of the day to base a policy in Asia in the fifties on the containment of China and implacable anticommunism, when the United States was so doing, when the Korean War was being fought and when the French were still fighting in Indochina. But two decades later, by 1970, such a basis was completely outmoded. By 1972 we needed a new China policy, a different and more mature relationship with the United States, a



new approach to our historic links with the United Kingdom ... The Government does not now look upon South East Asia as divided between anticommunist 'goodies' and communist 'baddies'; it does not look upon the countries of South East Asia as buffer states, as some sort of northern military line where some potential future enemy of Australia should be held. The approach is now less ideological and less militarily oriented.<sup>15</sup>

Australian government policies in the region were now more cooperative and reciprocal, constructed increasingly around a recognition that economic considerations obliged it to adapt flexibly to the new realities of its region.

### **Multilateralism and the Economic Roots of Australia's 'Turn to Asia'**

World War II, and the extension of US-sponsored economic multilateralism, punctured Australia's comfortable economic arrangements with the United Kingdom. By 1959 the imperial preference scheme was crumbling, and Great Britain had moved to secure its economic future in the European Economic Community (EEC, later EC). Significantly, two years earlier Australia signed its first major bilateral agreement with an Asian power—the Australia–Japan Trade Agreement. Recovery of the Japanese and European economies had been encouraged, in part at least, by the US as it sought during the war years to reduce barriers to international trade and consolidate its pre-eminent position in a more open global economy. The GATT, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) embodied US plans for a more open world when established at Bretton Woods as the war ended. These were to be the principal instruments of a new international order which would ensure longterm stability and prosperity by undermining the power of competitive economic blocs. In particular, the US was anxious to dismantle 'closed' international arrangements which underpinned colonial systems, and separated socialist states along with many protectionist so-called mixed economies from integration into the global economy. Washington was determined to promote a liberal international economic order. This would be achieved, over time, by a series of multilateral arrangements based on the ideal of the 'open door' that would

ensure nondiscriminatory trade, currency convertibility and unrestricted access to materials and markets everywhere. As Emily Rosenberg has written: 'This brand of liberalism—emphasising equal trade opportunity, open access, free flow, and free enterprise—was advanced as a formula for global development, a formula that the Americans liked to think had succeeded in the US'.<sup>16</sup>

Multilateralism was portrayed as the way to undercut economic nationalism and replace closed spheres of influence with an open and efficient world economy, ostensibly benefiting all nations equally. In practice, however, multilateralism was often interpreted as a self-serving US initiative—especially by small and less efficient states anxious to establish their sovereign authority over postwar reconstruction and long-term domestic economic planning. These nations usually portrayed multilateralism as a vehicle to promote US domination of global trade and investment. While it remained the most efficient industrial nation, advantaged by economies of scale and boosted by the demands of war and reconstruction, the US stood to benefit far more than any competing economy from a new, more open order.<sup>17</sup>

The US economy boomed in the two decades after World War II, but Washington was initially unable to win unqualified support for economic multilateralism (even in the so-called developed western world). Nations like Australia which were heavily dependent on non-manufacturing sectors and commodity exports, remained particularly unhappy with GATT's emphasis on reducing barriers to industrial goods rather than agricultural products. Economic multilateralism, then, was an uneven and compromised process. And the formation of the EEC implied that the wealthier industrialised states would continue to put regional blocs and protection ahead of a genuine commitment to freer trade. Decades after the Bretton Woods agreements, commodities exports—largely unprocessed agricultural or mining products—remained subject to higher levels of protection and regulation than manufactured goods. Much of the so-called 'developing world', along with economies like that of Australia which depended heavily on commodities, were slowest to benefit from multilateralism. Furthermore, by the late 1970s as exports from Japan and the newly industrialised countries of Asia challenged the industrial dominance of the US and western Europe, support for general tariff reductions declined. Washington,

for example, used a range of subsidies and later pursued so-called 'managed trade' to stall the very tariff changes and multilateral openness it had welcomed during the Bretton Woods negotiations. The US, the EC and Japan fought strenuously to protect local agriculture. Their embrace of economic multilateralism weakened as the benefits of open trade declined for the powerful industrialised nations. GATT's continuing reluctance to discuss a more open global trading system for agriculture was rejected angrily by Australia in 1982, for example, as an all too familiar fiasco. A year later Deputy Prime Minister Doug Anthony complained: 'The sorry state of agriculture is one that the founding fathers of GATT could never have foreseen in their most despairing moments'.<sup>18</sup> Anthony's pessimism grew out of his government's largely unsuccessful efforts to establish regional arrangements capable of overseeing freer trade in both industrial and primary products.

During the period of Liberal-National Party government under Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (1975–83), unprecedented emphasis was given to resource diplomacy and trade with ASEAN, while an embryonic Pacific Rim (or Pacific Basin) arrangement also won strong support. Officials claimed (in terms familiar a decade later) that the 'economic future of Australia points inevitably to our strong involvement with Asia'.<sup>19</sup> Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock foreshadowed a broad reorientation in Australian policies. 'Australia can't long delay important decisions as to how it as a nation is going to relate to the economic development of our near North', he stated in late 1979, 'if we want close political relations with our neighbours, we must appreciate that we cannot do so while remaining economically inward looking and protectionist—economic and political relations are different sides of the same coin'.<sup>20</sup> Initially, however, the Fraser Government made only minor concessions to the demands of its Asian neighbours for improved access to Australia's markets. Yet Canberra did support, in principle at least, the demands of developing countries for freer access to world markets. This position cannot be simply dismissed as hollow rhetoric, if only because as a major exporter of primary commodities Australia would undoubtedly have profited if these demands were met by the developed world. At the UN Conference on Trade and Development V (UNCTAD) meeting in Manila in 1979, for example, Fraser attempted to project Australia as a sympathetic broker between the protectionist industrialised blocs

(EC, Japan and the US) and the developing anti-protectionist states represented by the Group of 7. Like the developing states, Australia was disturbed that it would not be represented at a forthcoming Tokyo summit of OECD countries, and used the Manila meeting to attack protectionism. Understandably, most developing countries interpreted this as a criticism of EC barriers to Australian exports, rather than an unselfish general commitment to freer international trade. This suspicion was allayed slightly when, shortly after releasing its Third World Report, the government eliminated preferences for a wide range of imports from Britain (500 in all), and granted tariff preferences to a substantial number of products (sixty-six) from developing countries (most notably many clothing and footwear items). Australia also doubled its contribution to the ASEAN–Australian Economic Cooperation Program, bringing its commitment to almost \$30 million. At the same time, Anthony foreshadowed other measures aimed at minimising ASEAN’s concerns with Australia’s economic policies. ‘We seek to give every product from ASEAN the maximum access and most favoured entry into our market that the economic and political realities in Australia will permit us to offer’, he stated. In October 1979 officials from ASEAN and Australia met in Canberra and agreed in principle to a range of measures to improve trade—including bilateral trade and investment promotion programmes; an undertaking by Australia ‘to take prompt action’ if remaining British tariff preferences inhibited ASEAN access to Australia; and an undertaking to reassess duties on ‘those items subject to the twelve and a half per cent import surcharge, on which ASEAN can provide specific evidence that its exports have been adversely affected by the surcharge’. Officials on both sides welcomed those decisions as marking ‘a new beginning’ in trade cooperation.<sup>21</sup> While these developments strengthened economic ties between Australia and ASEAN, East Asia remained far more important to Australia’s economic prosperity than the ASEAN area. Moreover, there remained much greater economic ‘complementarity’ between Australia and the more heavily industrialised states of East Asia, than between Australia and ASEAN.

Regional negotiations to liberalise trade from the late 1970s complemented attempts by a succession of Australian governments to promote a formal regional economic arrangement. In a series of proposals which in some respects anticipated the formation of

APEC a decade later, Australia embraced the so-called Pacific Rim idea. Significantly, Japan was also an enthusiastic supporter of this proposal. In broad terms, it envisaged closer formal economic interdependence between various states, or groups of states, in the Asia–Pacific region. The advanced industrial states, Japan and the US, would provide capital, technology and planning; Australia, New Zealand and Canada would act essentially as sources of foodstuffs, raw materials and energy; and the developing, so-called cheap labour states of ASEAN and East Asia would provide manufactured goods. By the late 1970s the Asia–Pacific region accounted for almost half of total world GDP. It was argued that by exploiting the varied, allegedly complementary resources of countries throughout this region, the rate of development in the Pacific would quickly outstrip that of other regional groupings like the EEC. Various academic and business groups (especially those linked to mining industries) actively supported the idea, arguing that it capitalised on the existing interdependence of Pacific Rim countries. Anticipating the visit by the Prime Minister of China to Australia in January 1980, Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock announced that his department would recommend the government work towards developing a broad regional consensus on the idea. ‘I personally think that in the eighties we will have a Pacific economic bloc’, Peacock commented. ‘The academic talk has ended. We have now moved on to inter-governmental discussions’.<sup>22</sup>

Expanded trading ties between Australia and ASEAN paved the way for closer and more cooperative regional relations. In the decade from 1980 the ASEAN states emerged as a more important export market for Australian products than either the EC or the US (although as critics of Australia’s trading performance pointed out, its overall share of this fast-growing market remained fairly static). ASEAN was also crucial to Australia’s efforts to diversify its export base by becoming less reliant on commodities and winning recognition as a ‘clever country’. From 1987 especially, ASEAN’s purchases of value-added Australian manufactures rose more sharply than such exports to any other market. Member nations also became the principal focus of exports in the fast-growing educational services industry—an industry worth over \$1 billion annually to Australia by 1993. Immigration trends complemented this new interdependence. By the early 1990s immigrants from Southeast Asia (largely ASEAN states) comprised 40 per cent of the

annual migrant intake into Australia. Political cooperation also expanded; most importantly, the Hawke Government's APEC initiative built on careful negotiations with the ASEAN states, especially Indonesia. Like Australia, these states were keen to expand their voice and influence in multilateral commercial diplomacy, and were concerned by the prospect of large exclusive trading groupings or blocs focused on Europe and North America. Collectively, by the 1990s ASEAN and Australia made up about 2.5 per cent of the total global economy, and further growth demanded greater political unity and participation in multilateral trading initiatives. Canberra's relations with individual ASEAN states were sometimes brittle—as intermittent differences with Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia demonstrated. All parties accepted, however, that continued economic growth should be complemented by regional initiatives as well as improved bilateral cooperation.

The Labor governments of both Bob Hawke (1983–92) and Paul Keating (1992–96) agreed that fundamental structural changes and domestic reforms of the local economy were necessary if Australia was to benefit from a more open global or regional economy. Successive governments deregulated the exchange rate, reduced barriers to foreign investment, deregulated financial markets, further reduced levels of protection, initiated micro-economic reforms especially in transport, and took steps to free up the labour market. At the same time they introduced so-called structural adjustments which sought to make local industry—from textiles to motor cars—more efficient and less protected.

The continuing success of GATT in reducing protection of industry during multilateral negotiations from 1947 to 1979 did not translate into unqualified support for a liberal international economic order—even in the US. Indeed, by the early 1980s as Australia attempted to restructure its domestic economy so that it was more open to competition from the outside world, strong symptoms of ongoing protectionism remained in the EC, Japan and the US and in some of the Newly Industrialising Economies of Asia. Trading blocs remained, most importantly the EC, and new ones were in prospect, most notably NAFTA. During the Tokyo Round of GATT (1973–79) and later during the Uruguay Round (1986–94), many governments used qualitative controls, subsidies and export incentives as well as tariffs to protect local industries and agriculture. 'Managed trade' became a euphemism for such practices

in states publicly tied to liberalised commerce but reluctant to commit themselves fully to more open regimes. The Common Agricultural Policy of the EC employed a complex of subsidies to privilege local producers; Japan maintained massive agricultural support; and from 1985 the US Farm Bill and Export Enhancement Program heavily subsidised that country's agricultural production and exports. Progress towards reduced protection for primary production at GATT was stalled by such practices. The effects on Australia's export earnings was dramatic. For example, during its first three years of operation the Export Enhancement Program increased the US's share of the world's wheat trade from 29 to 43 per cent, while Australia's share declined from 20 to 12 per cent.<sup>23</sup> International trading regulations were easily sidestepped or compromised, creating distrust rather than genuine cooperation.

Confronted by a virtual impasse in GATT over continuing high levels of agricultural protection, in 1986 the Labor Government convened a meeting of 14 countries in Cairns,<sup>24</sup> anxious to bring the giant economies of the EC, US and Japan into multilateral regimes which opened their agricultural producers to international competition. The Cairns Group was a unique coalition of small and middle powers, from both the 'North' and the 'South'. Like many so-called developing countries of the South, Australia belonged to no trading bloc (other than a bilateral agreement with neighbouring New Zealand), and its commodity exports were stifled by barriers and subsidies erected in the major world economies. The fourteen states which joined Australia in the Cairns Group attempted to push multilateral trade negotiations, especially the Uruguay Round, towards genuine reform of agricultural trade. By the mid-1990s the Cairns coalition had won some major concessions under GATT, as barriers to mineral imports were virtually eliminated and a regime agreed for reducing agricultural protection.

However, changes in the global order did not consistently move towards increased openness. While protectionism generally declined, this change coincided in the 1980s and especially in the early 1990s with a somewhat contradictory growth in regional groupings and trading blocs. In addition, uneven responses by the seven major OECD economies to GATT processes, and the recurrent eruption of economic nationalism in such conflicts as the EC-US subsidy disputes of the mid-1980s or the ongoing trade dispute between Tokyo and Washington undermined progress. Fearing

exclusion from new trading blocs, in 1989 the Labor Government sponsored the forum for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). However, Canberra was careful to reassure its neighbours that this initiative did not foreshadow formation of a formal regional trading bloc. Rather, like the less conclusive Pacific Rim initiatives a decade earlier, APEC initially sought to provide both a focus for resolving regional trade difficulties, and a vehicle for promoting stronger regional and global commitments to the Uruguay Round of GATT. While bilateral trade liberalisation outpaced multilateral change, by 1994 APEC had committed member states to a specific timetable of trade liberalisation for the Asia-Pacific region. (See Table 1.1 for basic statistics on APEC member states.)

Despite the much publicised unity stated in the Leaders' Declaration issued at the Bogor meeting of APEC in April 1994, some differences between member states remained unresolved. The major partners, Japan and the US, disagreed over the fundamental question of whether participants should be permitted to deal on a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis with the rest of the world, or develop APEC into a preferential trading area with the characteristics of a trading bloc. Australia shared Japan's support for giving negotiations MFN status. In contrast, Washington favoured a 'preferential' grouping of trading states. APEC had become a complex institutional symbol of trade liberalisation and regional integration. Yet Japan and the US were not fully committed to a specific timetable for removing barriers—despite decisions taken at the APEC leaders' conference in 1994. These decisions anticipated the removal of obstacles to trade and investment among industrialised members by 2010, and among developing member states by 2020. However, as some critics argued, bilateral agreements, along with progress under GATT, might well have achieved equivalent results more rapidly. In addition, compliance with multilateral APEC regimes and timetables was difficult to monitor and even more difficult to enforce. To promote unanimous agreement, the Bogor Declaration was necessarily vague. 'The pace of implementation', it declared, 'will take into account the differing levels of economic development among APEC economies'. No attempt was made to define or specify which states were 'developing' economies—although the deadline granted this group of nations was considerably more generous than that for the so-



called developed economies. Nor did the Declaration take account of the prospect that some states, most notably China and perhaps Indonesia, might grow rapidly and join neighbours like Singapore or South Korea in the 'developed' category. Indeed, under the Bogor guidelines each state was in effect free to identify the category which best described its level of economic development.<sup>25</sup>

**Table 1.1 APEC (in brief), 1995**

	Population (millions)	Per capita income (\$)	% GNP growth*
<b>Asia</b>			
Brunei	0.3	15,640	NA
China	1,162.2	470	7.6
Hong Kong	5.8	15,360	5.5
Indonesia	184.3	670	4.0
Japan	124.5	28,190	3.6
Malaysia	18.6	2,790	3.2
Philippines	64.3	770	-1.0
Singapore	2.8	15,730	5.3
South Korea	43.7	6,790	8.5
Taiwan	20.8	10,163	7.8
Thailand	58.0	1,840	6.0
<b>Oceania</b>			
Australia	17.5	17,260	1.6
New Zealand	3.4	12,300	-0.2
Papua New Guinea	4.1	950	2.3
<b>Americas</b>			
Canada	27.4	20,710	1.8
Mexico	85.0	3,470	-0.2
USA	255.4	23,240	1.7
Chile	13.6	2,730	3.7

Source: Adapted from *Newsweek*, 22 November 1994

\* Average of annual growth 1980–92

Total GDP of APEC countries by 1994 was more than \$13 trillion, equal to half the world's total production.

International trade within East and Southeast Asia by 1994 was more than the region's trade with the United States and Canada.

Despite these ambiguities, Australia welcomed APEC. Canberra was pleased that the guidelines made no explicit distinction between industrial goods and agricultural products, as this might pave the way for long overdue nondiscriminatory tariff reductions which the GATT Rounds had largely failed to achieve. Indeed, Canberra anticipated that by 2020 Australia's exports would have expanded by \$7 billion annually. Prime Minister Keating conceded after Bogor: 'We have a long way to go before free trade is implemented in APEC'. But his government anticipated that the next APEC summit, in Osaka in 1995, would formalise agreements establishing a firm guarantee of genuine free trade and investment. Publicly, Keating welcomed APEC in terms which reflected its extreme significance for his nation's future. In his words, formation of APEC was 'an absolute triumph for the Asia Pacific, a triumph for the world trading system, and ... a triumph for Australia'.<sup>26</sup>

The Cairns Group and the APEC initiative were, in part at least, exercises in domestic politics, as they reinforced Labor's argument that Australia's economic difficulties resulted from its integration into a global order of unequal states, over which it could exert very limited authority.

Australia's domestic difficulties were linked to the failure of the major states to give unqualified support to multilateralism. Unless these governments supported liberalised trade in agricultural commodities, Australia warned, it and other small economies would reject the GATT arrangements and be suspicious of its successor, the World Trade Organisation, which was scheduled to begin in January 1995. Conveniently overlooking its own protection of manufacturing, Australia's leaders proclaimed that it was 'not prepared to be the only free trader in the world'. Bureaucrats and some business and union leaders publicly lamented the absence of a 'level playing field' in international economics. At the same time, Prime Minister Hawke conceded the limits of his own government's power in the more integrated world. The nation's economy has reached a point of 'absolute dependence in the international economy', he observed in 1986. A year later, as the Australian dollar continued to decline against the major world currencies, Hawke protested lamely that Australia was 'part of a worldwide situation and we can't affect the world'.<sup>27</sup> Yet as deregulation of the domestic economy and initiatives like APEC implied, both the Hawke and Keating governments anxiously sought to influence the emerging

economic configuration, especially in the Asia–Pacific. At the same time, the Labor Government energetically pursued a range of foreign policy initiatives—notably efforts to reconstruct Cambodia—by which Australia sought to confirm that it was both an independent and a constructive partner in the region.

Under the leadership of Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, Australia encouraged UN peacekeeping operations; actively pursued international agreements on environmental matters; negotiated to protect the Antarctic; conceded that human rights issues could not be divorced from international politics; supported revised refugee agreements and protocols; and worked more independently through the UN to make issues like development equity, disarmament and restrictions on chemical weapons production more central to the international agenda. Such initiatives were complemented by a more realistic appreciation of the limits of alliance diplomacy and the ambiguous consequences of automatic Australian identification with US policies—especially in the Asia–Pacific. As the contests over Lend-Lease, multilateralism and Article VII had demonstrated in the 1940s,<sup>28</sup> international economics was a central concern in Australian foreign policy as it adjusted to a world in which British ‘protection’ and imperial preferences would no longer dictate the dominion’s economic plans. Genuine economic sovereignty in the postwar world could only be sustained at the expense of reciprocal involvement in multilateral developments fostered by the US through the Bretton Woods agreement. By the late 1970s, Canberra belatedly accepted that the elaborate system of tariffs, quotas and incentives which protected local secondary industries would have to be modified if Australia was to participate more fully in the fruits of multilateralism. By the early 1980s about 70 per cent of Australia’s imports faced ‘non-protective rates of duty’, while about 90 per cent of imports from the ASEAN nations entered under this duty or under a special low rate imposed on ‘developing countries’. Canberra recognised that it must support concessions which expanded trade in industrial goods while seeking to induce GATT to implement genuine reforms in the agricultural area. Reform of the global economy was essential if Australia was to arrest its deteriorating terms of trade and declining role in an increasingly competitive international economy. Over four decades, from 1947, Australia’s share of total international trade slumped from 2.5 per cent to 1.1 per cent; its ranking in terms of per capita income fell

from third to thirteenth place; and its exports as a percentage of GDP remained static while exports by most other nations in the Asia Pacific region grew rapidly. From the early 1980s, Australia's current account deficit, expressed as a proportion of total GDP, rose appreciably, hovering around 6 per cent from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. Although located conveniently on the geographical edge of the fast-growing economies of much of East and Southeast Asia, Australian business and industry struggled to benefit from the transformation of the region. Finding it difficult to compete in the new regional environment, Australian governments were relatively quick to realign their state with the major industrial economy of the Asia-Pacific after World War II. Japan replaced the United Kingdom in 1969 as the major purchaser of Australian exports, and Japan became the most important destination for Australia's products—especially those from the mining and agricultural sectors (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3).

**Table 1.2 Trends in postwar trade (%)**

	UK	Other EEC	Japan	South and Southeast Asia	USA
<b>Exports</b>					
1949–1950	39.4	18.9	4.0	11.1	8.2
1959–1960	26.4	18.7	14.4	8.4	8.1
1969–1970	11.8	10.9	25.0	12.3	13.4
1979–1980	5.0	9.3	26.9	13.0	10.8
1989–1990	3.5	10.4	26.1	18.7	10.9
<b>Imports</b>					
1949–1950	53.1	6.3	1.3	13.5	9.9
1959–1960	35.7	11.7	4.5	11.3	16.2
1969–1970	21.8	12.8	12.4	6.5	24.9
1979–1980	10.2	13.4	15.6	12.4	22.1
1989–1990	6.5	15.5	19.2	12.1	24.1

Source: Adapted from R A Foster and S E Stewart, *Australian Economic Statistics, 1949 to 1989–90*, Sydney, Reserve Bank of Australia, Occasional Paper no 89, February 1991, and B Pinkstone, *Global Connections: A History of Exports and the Australian Economy*, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992.

**Table 1.3 Australia's merchandise exports and imports by country, 1991–92 (\$ million)**

	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>
<i>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)</i>		
Brunei	19	82
Indonesia	1,635	995
Malaysia	1,106	867
Philippines	514	143
Singapore	3,189	1,301
Thailand	825	647
<i>Total ASEAN</i>	<i>7,288</i>	<i>4,035</i>
<i>European Community (EC)</i>		
Germany	1,092	3,007
Italy	979	1,229
Netherlands	855	588
United Kingdom	1,930	3,102
<i>Total EC</i>	<i>6,861</i>	<i>10,359</i>
China	1,457	1,976
Taiwan	2,537	1,978
Hong Kong	2,104	792
Japan	14,589	9,290
Korea, Republic of	3,374	1,213
New Zealand	2,826	2,399
USA	5,221	11,743

Source: Adapted from Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Year Book Australia 1994*, ABS Catalogue no 1301.0, pp 765–9; *Foreign Trade, Australia: Merchandise Exports and Imports, 1991–92*, ABS Catalogue no 5410.0.

Yet if Japan's rapid industrialisation compensated Australia for the collapse of imperial preferences and Britain's withdrawal to the EC in 1961, it was the US which exerted the most pronounced influence on Australia's economy after Bretton Woods. Australia was aligned far more rapidly with the economy of its powerful Pacific ally than with the proliferating growth centres of Asia. At the same time, Australia was a disproportionately important focus of US trade, investment, technology and popular culture as Washington, too, reoriented its economy increasingly from Europe and the Atlantic to Asia and the Pacific. Within a decade of VJ Day, the US challenged the UK as the principal source of investment capital in Australia. By

the early 1980s the Australian economy was affected by higher levels of foreign penetration than any industrialised nation other than Canada. Australia's balance of trade with the US continued to deteriorate as the volume of bilateral trade grew. By the mid 1980s Australia was the second most important purchaser of US exports, and the value of its imports from the US exceeded the value of imports from any other nation. As a stable, democratic, Anglophile and essentially risk free nation, Australia, like Canada, was arguably a most attractive home for US investments. Australia's attractiveness was reflected in the fact that in the early 1990s it accepted higher levels of US investment than any single country in the Asia-Pacific area. Australia ranked fourth as a destination for US capital, and in 1994 outstripped the entire East Asia area as a target of US investment capital. Investments from the three major sources of overseas capital—the US, the UK and Japan—were by the early 1990s broadly equal in dollar terms, ranging between \$58 billion and \$51 billion. While Japan remained the principal destination of Australia's exports, the US remained the major national source of overseas capital as well and the nation with which Australia had by far its most serious imbalance of trade. If, by the 1990s, the economic shift towards the Asia-Pacific was inexorable, it was uneven and far from complete. As late as 1992, for example, both direct and portfolio investments from the EC countries—mainly the UK—far exceeded those from either the US or Japan. In the following three years, however, US investments grew rapidly outstripping those from the EU/UK or Japan (see Table 1.4a).<sup>29</sup>

Increasingly, however, Australian trade was linked to Asia, especially to the most recently industrialised states of ASEAN, and to China and South Korea, as well as Japan. This region purchased over 70 per cent of total Australian exports by the mid-1990s, and commentators spoke optimistically of the 'ascendancy' of Northeast Asia as the region quickly emerged as the most powerful focus of industrialisation and growth in the wider region.<sup>30</sup> Australia's trade surplus with the region now exceeded \$8 billion annually, but at the same time its deficit with its major Pacific partner, the US, exceeded \$10 billion annually.

**Table 1.4a Foreign investment in Australia by country (levels of investment at 30 June 1992) (\$ million)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Investment</i>
USA	58,223
Japan	51,353
UK	52,117
Total EC	72,887
ASEAN	7,325

**Table 1.4b Australian investment abroad by country**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Investment</i>
USA	36,714
New Zealand	6,985
UK	19,730
Total OECD	77,871
ASEAN	3,041

Source: Adapted from Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Year Book Australia 1994*, ABS Catalogue no 1301.0, pp 791–3.

Despite optimism about the generalised benefits of expanded global trade in a more open multilateral order, these benefits were distributed unevenly and were often slowly realised. At the same time, economic liberalism did not automatically foreshadow greater political liberalism, genuine human rights or democratic practices in the diverse states of the region. Indeed, Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Mahathir have led an assault on decadent western values and asserted that western-style democracy might not be compatible with Asia's varied social patterns, cultural traditions or economic ambitions. Moreover, market economies have been adopted by states as diverse as China, Vietnam and Indonesia, which remain rigidly authoritarian. The reluctance of the major economies to embrace trade liberalisation fully did not, however, override bipartisan support within Australia for the view that the nation's long-term economic interests would be best served by adhering to the principles of liberal international trade and a 'rational' economic agenda. Yet the protracted GATT impasse over agriculture and divisions between the trade groups centred on the EC, North America and East Asia were symbols of international rivalry that some commentators likened to the divisions of the interwar years. Multilateralism, as reflected in the operation of GATT, Strobe

Talbott observed, remained '[t]he imperfect, spluttering engine of globalisation'.<sup>31</sup> Economic regionalism persisted despite half a century of negotiations over multilateralism. President Bush's New World Order envisaged continued economic integration and broader political cooperation. But bilateral trade disputes, regional economic groupings, and partial liberalisation of trade persisted into the 1990s—even as the rhetoric of global openness intensified.

### Adjusting to Asia

Well before the disintegration of communism in Eastern Europe, Australia, like many other capitalist nations, had embraced much of the rhetoric and practices of open door liberalism. And, as in most western democracies, 'economic rationalism' had been accepted as the new economic orthodoxy by government and opposition parties alike. Moves to deregulate finance, business and commerce, along with efforts to transfer government enterprises to private ownership, were indications of a fundamental shift towards a diminished role for state intervention and the public sector in the economic life of the nation. Both the Labor Party and the conservative parties also accepted that Australia must join regional as well as wider global economic arrangements, or risk isolation from the international processes that increasingly shaped the politics and prospects of national states. Australia, like other small and medium sized economies, was essentially powerless to resist integration into the more open economic order. Yet the benefits of this transformation remained, as Labor leaders had warned in the 1940s, at most very uncertain. In the half century after World War II, Australian living standards had declined relative to those of other OECD nations; domestic inequalities had increased; the official unemployment rate hovered around 10 per cent; national debt levels and debt servicing levels exceeded those in all but one of the OECD nations; and Australia's terms of trade continued to decline as it failed to arrest its mounting annual trade deficits. Despite substantial integration into the dynamic Asia-Pacific region, Australia's overall economic performance had not kept pace with those of its major partners, notably Japan, the ASEAN states and South Korea. As Richard Higgott observed in 1994: 'As the Asia-Pacific region has become a major force in the global system of production and exchange, Australia's economic significance and



influence in that region has declined'.<sup>32</sup>

Adjustment to these altered international circumstances demanded more than new trading agreements or domestic economic restructuring and reform. Cultural and constitutional change were also essential, it was argued by those anxious to secure Australia's future with Asia. Formal links to a European colonial past, symbolised by ties to the British monarchy, would retard Australia's quest to secure its future in the Asia-Pacific. A generation earlier, decisions liberalising immigration policies and endorsing multiculturalism as a fundamental prescription for society were overdue responses to regional pressures for a more open and tolerant Australia. By the mid-1990s Keating spoke for a majority of Australians in claiming the need to redefine further his nation's political and cultural reorientation, when he stated: 'We can't succeed without the world knowing who we are, and much as we like and acknowledge the British and the institutions we have inherited, we are not British now'. Efforts to join the Pacific Century pushed Australia more rapidly towards political maturity. The quest for a republic came to symbolise national independence and sovereignty, not merely the end of formal ties to the UK. Even as he courted European investment and technical expertise on a visit to Germany, Keating emphasised that it was Australia's integration into the Asia-Pacific region and the global economy which obliged his nation to reshape its political culture and identity. Realignments in the region, he asserted, had created 'a tide of national renewal' and intensified the 'necessity for a Republic'.<sup>33</sup> Yet republicanism had not yet won formal acceptance, even if during the Keating Government it had the support of a growing majority of Australians.

Not surprisingly, as the occasional observations of Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Mahathir revealed, some Asian elites remained determined to identify Australia as Eurocentric, misinformed about the region, and culturally separate from its neighbours.<sup>34</sup> And its close ties with the US, like links to a foreign monarch, intensified such criticism. US Under Secretary of State Joseph Nye's claim of early 1995 that his government's relationship with Canberra is 'probably the most intimate we have with any Asia-Pacific country'<sup>35</sup> underlined Australia's difficult position in the region. Its independence could be asserted, but it remained closely identified

with US policies, especially in military/strategic affairs. The sharp shifts in regional power, especially the rapid rise in Chinese economic power and military spending, reinforced Washington's determination to maintain a substantial 'forward presence' at least in East Asia. Australia's subtle distinction between greater self-reliance and continuing acceptance of the US as a key element in defence policy was sometimes understood by its neighbours as a continuation of its close Cold War ties with Washington. Nor did bilateral acceptance of the limited, purely consultative nature of ANZUS quickly win recognition that Australian governments were genuinely independent actors on the international stage. In the post-Cold War world, the strategic architecture of the Asia-Pacific was being rebuilt by the emerging major powers of the region—China, Japan, India and Indonesia, as well as residual Russian and US influence. Conscious of its relative powerlessness in the face of escalating military spending by some Asian states, and the changing strategic alignments in the region, Australian independence was always qualified by reference—if not deference—to Washington. Australia remained intimately linked to US strategic and intelligence arrangements, and deeply penetrated by US popular culture, even as its contacts with Asian states and Asian peoples proliferated and matured.

Just as commentators exaggerated the vulnerability of Australian culture, both political and popular, to 'Americanisation' during the period of US hegemony in the 1960s and 1970s, so too do they exaggerate its openness to 'Asianisation' in the post-Cold War era. Typical of such routine claims is that in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in 1994:

The awakening of Australians towards Asia can be partly explained by the rise in Asian immigration, which has already rendered sweeping changes to the culture of the country. The 'Asianisation' of Australia talked about in cautious tones in the early 1980s is becoming a reality as more than 40 per cent of the country's annual migrant intake now comes from Asia. By contrast, Australia's traditional migrant source, Europe, provides less than one third of new arrivals, and even that proportion is declining.<sup>36</sup>

But this claim, like those made by opponents of a more open society, obviously exaggerated the social consequences of Australia's new liberal immigration policies. It is estimated that by 2025 the

proportion of its population of Asian descent will have grown to about 7 per cent. And these peoples, from a variety of ethnic and language groups, would remain heavily concentrated in the largest cities, especially Sydney. Based on the experiences of previous immigrants to Australia, assimilation into a plural society, not 'Asianisation' of the host culture, is the most likely outcome of the more open policy.<sup>37</sup> Economic realignment does not necessarily foreshadow fundamental social disruption, or rapid cultural and political change, in contemporary Australia.

After World War II, Australia simultaneously welcomed US protection, clung to the symbols of the empire and monarchy, consumed imported popular culture with growing enthusiasm, and opened its doors to a widening stream of migrants from a range of linguistic and ethnic communities. Its cultural fabric was not torn by such influences. Rather it gradually absorbed and adapted these international currents of ideas, people and commodities into a more distinct and independent national culture. By the late 1970s, the celebratory label of multiculturalism symbolised the adaptation of Australian cultural and political life to international processes which eroded its insularity without rendering it merely imitative or dependent.

### **Conclusion: Anticipating the Pacific Century?**




Modern Australia is neither a new Britannia in the South Pacific, nor a politico-cultural satellite of its powerful ally and influence, the US. Nor is it a part of Asia, except arguably in a broad geographic or economic sense. It is increasingly linked to Asia, but remains culturally and socially very separate from the diverse nations and cultures of the region—even those with which it has shared a long history of British rule. Australia's population, cultural forms, external ties and educational priorities are increasingly informed by ties with Asian states and peoples. These influences have helped to shape a more plural Australian culture. Yet Anglophone Australia's particular history, traditions and identity as well as the complex legacies of British and US power remain the fundamental forces in contemporary Australian life. Recently, Asian peoples and influences have made Australia's multicultural complexion more diverse, further complicating traditional distinctions of class, religion, region and ethnicity. Developments in the Asia-Pacific have reoriented

Australian diplomacy and economics unambiguously towards the region. While contemporary Australia is increasingly touched by these changes, domestic culture and society will not be quickly transformed by them.

The fields of material and cultural interaction between Australia and the diverse nations of Asia have expanded dramatically. Domestic society and culture, like the dominant Anglo-US sources which influenced them from abroad, are now challenged by new sources of material and cultural interaction—by new peoples, technology, commerce and ideas. Australians now negotiate their identity and culture from within an increasingly plural society on the periphery of the newly emerging Asia-Pacific. The nation's economic future is routinely understood as one dependent on further incorporation into the web of developments which continue to promote regional integration and growth. Yet Australia is arguably more culturally assertive and politically independent than at any time since Federation. Local differences have been sharpened as Australian society has responded to regional changes in a postcolonial world. The end of the Cold War hastened Australia's formal separation from dependence on the US, although the small power remains deeply implicated in North American popular culture, political discourse and security networks. Like much of the modernised world, central fields of Australian life are touched by what Joseph Nye calls the 'soft power' of the US, by its 'cultural and ideological appeal'.<sup>38</sup> The legacies of its involvement as an ally in the American Century persist, even as Australia prepares for the Pacific Century and a more fluid multipolar world. Australian governments, especially Labor under Keating, responded flexibly to this more open international environment, finding their nation's status as a small or middle power less limiting than during the bipolar certainties of the Cold War. As it has attempted to accommodate to the transformation of the Asia-Pacific, Australia has sought to define itself in more distinctive national terms, and to promote more independently its separate national interests both within the region and on the wider world stage. Dr Mahathir's less than subtle assertion that economic considerations inspired Australia's belated efforts to become part of Asia is well-founded. In many respects, Australian society remains largely distinct from the diverse nations of the region, despite efforts to engage more broadly with them.

## **Part II**

# **Cultural Intersections, 'Americanisation' and Global Power**



## 6

## The American Influence

Modern Australia has been decisively shaped by overseas influences, especially from Great Britain. It is, to use Louis Hartz's term, a 'fragment' of Europe which took root in a new soil and brought forth a new nation. In the nineteenth century, and far more significantly in this century, Australia has also been affected by constant interaction with another 'new society' or European 'fragment'—the United States. While the nature of Australia's relationship with the external world has changed dramatically since it was founded, its development has always been greatly influenced by its interactions with other societies, especially the United States.

Australia's identity and history have always been linked to sources and influences beyond its geographical borders. Distance from Europe and proximity to Asia have often encouraged Australia to seek the support of 'great and powerful' friends. But dependence on white English-speaking countries has brought in its wake cultural penetration, compromised political independence and a derivative political culture.

Obviously, forces peculiar to Australia have helped to fashion its culture. Even in the nineteenth century, when British influences were pervasive and Australia was, at least in part, an extension of Britain in the Pacific, it was the interplay of endogenous and exogenous factors that conditioned its development. Colonial societies defined themselves, to some extent, in reaction against the British domination. This tension nurtured distinctive strands of Australian nationalism, social patterns and political life.

But the factors at work on Australian culture were never purely British or Antipodean. From the beginning of the nineteenth century the model of the American republic also had great appeal, and America's influence grew as it rose and challenged the powers of Europe, so that by the middle of the twentieth century the United States was the dominant external influence on Australia. Thus this paper focuses on three distinctly important periods of American influence on Australia—the decades from white settlement to colonial self-government in the 1850s; the years of nationalism, political reform and Federation, from the 1880s to the visit of the Great White Fleet in 1908; and the decades of the Cold War, when Australia was progressively integrated into new economic, cultural and political associations dominated by America.

As early as the 1830s it was acknowledged that the infant colonies in Australia had much in common with Britain's former colonies in America. As the New South Wales newspaper, *The Colonist*, noted on 19 January 1837, developments in the two societies were connected—not least because the Republic was viewed in some quarters as a shining example to emulate. *The Colonist* observed that

It is natural that Australia should look upon the United States with more than ordinary interest. Throughout the whole of their history, there are certain broad features bearing no imaginary resemblance to our own. America was once a British dependency; Australia is so now. America was once the receptacle of those whom Britain banished from her bosom; Eastern Australia is that receptacle now. America received her manners, her literature and the germ of her laws and political institutions from the British Isles; so also has Australia. America at length outgrew the trammels of national juvenility, and asserted the prerogatives of matured manhood, which she in the end compelled her reluctant parent to acknowledge: it is perfectly consistent with loyalty and with common sense to predict, that at some future period, far distant no doubt it is, Australia will pursue a similar course, and with similar success.

Over two hundred years the two nations have sometimes shared broadly similar experiences and reached roughly similar conclusions. Australian historians have, implicitly at least, acknowledged this by



undertaking comparative studies which focus on such themes as the frontier, federalism, political reform, European contact with indigenous peoples, and immigration.

The extent, however, to which developments in Australia have been influenced by America, remains largely unexplored. Nevertheless scholars and pundits have not hesitated to pass judgements about the nature and extent of American penetration of Australia's political life and institutions. Generalisations abound. Donald Horne's claim, made in the mid-1960s, that Australia is 'between Britain and America' is typical of these broad assertions. Others have coined glib phrases like 'Washminster' or 'Austerica' to suggest the dual character of Australia's political and cultural landscapes. Organic local characteristics are squeezed out of such assessments. Other studies which focus on political economy or strategic relations emphasise the limited role which Australia plays in its unequal associations with America. For example, in 1980 Joseph Camilleri concluded that: 'American values, institutions and policies have come to dominate not only Australia's external conduct, but its economic and political life'. In the eyes of some scholars, at least, contemporary Australia had fulfilled the prophecy expressed by Herman Melville in *Moby Dick*, and become 'that great America on the other side of the sphere'. However, it is not necessary to accept Melville's comment literally in order to concede that Australia's history has been heavily influenced by the United States, or that this influence has grown inexorably over almost two centuries of contact.<sup>1</sup>

It is difficult to identify and locate the intellectual sources—whether internal or external—of political change in a given society. The impact of imported and transplanted ideas is often indirect and diffuse. Ideas are deeply embedded within social and economic structures. And they are rarely discrete, static or readily definable. They do not have a life of their own. They are significant as vehicles of political action and cannot be divorced from social and economic realities of time and place. It is clearly impossible to sort out, in both quantitative and qualitative ways, the separate and differential influences of particular ideas on the body politic of a society. These tasks have grown more complex as the global community has become increasingly integrated by economic and technological changes, and the individual nation state is made less autonomous and less powerful. 'National' ideas and institutions are increasingly the

product of international changes, and are transported rapidly by sophisticated technology. Cultural distinctiveness and political sovereignty have been blurred by economic and technological imperatives which open once diverse societies to fairly uniform cultural and intellectual penetration. Assigning a national origin to components of this interaction, or showing the impact of such forces on politics or culture in a recipient society, are crucial, but very challenging, tasks. These difficulties are not confined to the study of postwar societies. The expansion of Europe, the rise of colonialism, the enlightenment, the industrial revolution, mass emigration from Europe, the growth of liberalism, or the rise of literacy, are but some of the processes which have blurred national divisions in the western world and linked Europe and its fragments abroad to overlapping changes in politics, culture, and economics. In more recent times these processes have given way to changes which result from the homogenising effects of advanced international capitalism on postindustrial societies. These are often labelled as aspects of 'Americanisation', but they are seldom exclusively American in origin or content.

The modern international community comprises diverse national states which enjoy, under international law at least, sovereign equality. But nation states have never been sovereign nor equal. Interaction between states, especially in the late twentieth century, is a crucial determinant of political, economic, and even cultural activity within individual national boundaries. Vast inequalities in power and authority characterise this international community today, as in earlier periods of colonial domination by European powers. The demise of formal imperial structures has not substantially redressed this imbalance between states. Inequalities in power still give rise to unequal relations between 'metropolitan' centres and small or middle powers at the 'periphery'. Australia's relationship with the United States can only be understood in this context.

Since the late nineteenth century, Australia has moved gradually from a situation of formal dependence within the British Empire to informal dependence on major world powers, notably the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan. This interpretation is implicit in most assessments of Australia's changed position in world politics since Federation. Paradoxically, under formal British colonialism Australia was arguably a less derivative society than it

was to become after World War II as British influences receded. Apart from its willingness to embrace things American and attach itself uncritically to the American alliance, Australia, like many other lesser powers, was drawn inexorably into a widening sphere of American influence abroad. In the 1950s especially, Australia was also buffeted by international currents which transformed the global economy around an American axis, and which persistently undermined cultural and political independence and national distinctiveness in societies at the periphery.

Political culture is defined and accepted here as that which is expressed through the ideas or 'modes of thought' common to a specific social or class group, or as shared by a wider alignment of classes and groups within the nation. Political culture is more than the sum of political ideas and values. It, too, provides a frame of reference within which ideas are shaped and interpreted and become dominant. A nation's political culture both reflects and affects the very society from which it springs. In other words, political culture often serves to construct the world in unproblematic, commonsense, and consensual ways. But this 'understanding' is rarely uncontested or common to an entire society. Within a complex national culture like that of Australia, various political ideas and initiatives both coexist and compete. These reflect social divisions and are subject to change over time.

### **From European Settlement to Self-Government**

It was no mere coincidence that the British colonised Australia within a decade of the loss of their colonies in North America. Even before the First Fleet reached Port Jackson, James Matra advocated colonisation of Eastern Australia with American loyalists to 'atone for the loss of our American colonies'. The conservative Empire federationist, G W Rusden, expressed a view common to nineteenth century historians when he argued that in colonising Australia 'the greatest English statesmen strove to remedy the defect in North America'. Defeat at the hands of the rebellious American colonies weighed heavily on British officials. By the late 1780s they accepted that the east coast of Australia must be settled if it was to be foreclosed to colonisation by other European powers, especially France, which remained a thorn in the side of Britain's loyal colonial outposts in the new world. When the American War of

Independence abruptly stopped the transportation of convicts to Virginia and Maryland, the penal character of the New South Wales colony was quickly decided. Against this background, Australia's white colonisation has been interpreted as an unintended result of the American Revolution. In the words of one historian, 'George Washington may have been the father of the United States; he was assuredly the stepfather of New South Wales'. There remained some who questioned the wisdom of a penal colony in Australia. Fearing that the transported convicts would soon gain freedom, multiply, and demand independence as the Americans so recently had, prominent Englishmen like Alexander Dalrymple and Sir Nathaniel Wraxall, protested against this 'great folly'.

Knowledge of American experience, law and institutions was widespread in colonial Australia. Some settlers were attracted to these liberal examples, others were disturbed by them. A conservative element consistently drew upon the American Revolution to warn against the possibilities of the rise of mob rule, of 'a turbulent and immoral democracy like that of America, which will in the end overturn the government and form a licentious republic upon its ruins'. If the success of the American Revolution had ignited such fears, they were fuelled by the failure of Britain to defeat the nascent American nation in the War of 1812–15. The spectre of demands for reforms like trial by jury, local legislatures, or limitations on the powers of governors, which could end in a colony 'declaring itself a nation' (albeit of 'freebooters and pirates'), consistently disturbed conservatives in the colonies. For those anxious to retain strict British political authority and a hierarchical social structure, America presented a disruptive and threatening example which could not be permitted to take root in Antipodean soil. The rise of Jacksonian democracy in the 1820s simply confirmed the worst fears of these small, privileged groups, and entrenched their support for the autocratic powers vested in the governors of the various colonies. In New South Wales after 1823, these powers were modified by the Legislative Council. But in Van Diemen's Land, Western Australia and South Australia, even in the late 1840s, governors continued to wield virtually unrestrained power.<sup>2</sup>

Major colonial figures, such as W C Wentworth and J D Lang, invoked America, though for very different purposes, in the lengthy debates over political reform in the colonies. Increasingly, however, it was interpreted as a model for change rather than as a warning to those who refused to learn from the bloody example of the War of Independence. *The Australian* newspaper, established by Wentworth and Robert Wardell in 1824, constantly drew on American experience to argue that Britain should relax its control over New South Wales and permit 'the people' to elect a House of Assembly. (In subsequent decades, as representative government approached, Wentworth's definition of 'the people' became narrower and more elitist; his liberalism was a means to defend the interests of property, not a recognition of the fundamental liberties and rights of all men.) In 1831, *The Australian* spoke of the United States as 'a model for all new countries and New South Wales in particular'. Along with *The Colonist*, published by the radical nationalist, Lang, it embraced a perspective which has been called 'the Future America Fantasy'. *The Colonist* spoke of New South Wales as 'the America of the South'. Lang promoted it as 'the future America'. At the same time the *Monitor*—an independent newspaper second in influence only to *The Australian*—extolled the virtues of American society and government. The stain of slavery provoked some criticism of this, the 'best Government in the World'. But many radicals, both native born and immigrant, warmly embraced the greater freedom, wide franchise and republican persuasion of the American Constitution. Works by Thomas Paine, James Otis, Patrick Henry and, by the late 1830's Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, informed a growing debate in New South Wales over the legitimacy of imperial government, the absence of liberty for colonial subjects, and the likely consequences of a broad franchise.

Yet few went as far as Lang demanding separation from the Empire and republican government. As early as 1805 the *Edinburgh Review* had echoed the arguments of Bentham and other British liberals in emphasising that political authority in New South Wales was more autocratic than in colonial America (where it had rested, ultimately, on the sanction of the British parliament). Such authoritarian rule, the *Review* predicted, would eventually give rise to 'a fresh set of Washingtons and Franklins' determined to reject all imperial authority from colonial Australia. But demands for separation from the imperial yoke, republicanism, and unrestrained

democracy, never truly dominated the political debates as the colonies grew and sought a more mature and independent political status. Rather, the dire warnings that the 'terrible' lessons of the American revolution would be repeated in Australia were used to help lever limited concessions from Britain. American ideas stimulated debate, but were seldom used as specific blueprints for change. They were adopted selectively and often most inconsistently (as Wentworth's changing arguments from the 1820s to the 1850s demonstrated). Usually, they were cited only to suggest the variety of political options open to the dynamic new society.

Understandably, specific debates over the future government of the colonies took place within an imperial framework and drew overwhelmingly on English precedents. The dominant factions in colonial politics—the 'exclusives' which comprised largely wealthy pastoralists and the officer class, and the 'emancipists' made up of more liberal landowners and landowning ex-convicts each took comfort from the First British Reform Act of 1831–32. It suggested that property interests were entitled to exercise political power, and it stopped well short of an unrestrained democracy which might have challenged the vested interests of the propertied classes. Significantly, the prospects of additional reforms helped to draw the exclusives and wealthy emancipists into a broad alliance. Wentworth's altered pronouncements on political representation and his increasingly contradictory use of the American example, symbolised the 'rapprochement' between the exclusives and wealthy emancipist factions. In the constitutional debates of the 1850s he spoke of 'moderate liberty'; emphasised the need for 'men of wealth, property and education' to have ultimate veto powers in the new legislatures; and stressed that it was the 'solemn duty' of Australians to 'adhere to English principles and not hastily adopt American innovations'. De Tocqueville's cautionary treatise on the levelling effects of 'Democracy in America' was now used by Wentworth to support an upper house elected from an hereditary order (a 'bunyip aristocracy') which would guard against the excesses of 'public opinion'. If some read de Tocqueville as a celebration of liberalism, others took his work as a warning against the dangers of a mass society weighed down by the tyranny of the majority.<sup>3</sup>

By the 1840s, colonial opinion was increasingly divided over the appropriateness of America as a model for political change. This

division corresponded with the realignment of class interests in the colonies, especially in the mother colony, New South Wales.

In the decades before the 1850 Australian Constitution Bill paved the way for immediate self-government, class relations were transformed. The contest over political authority intensified as the prospects for responsible government improved. Wealthy pastoralists sought to dominate the new instruments of local government. But they, in turn, were challenged by new social groups formed by the growth of urban centres, that is by the expanding numbers of emancipists and small property owners; a rise in the numbers of free immigrants; and a growing wage earning and artisan class. This challenge was expressed in the formation of labour organisations, and of popular radical associations which opposed transportation; the unrepresentative nature of colonial institutions; and the narrow access to land grants. All groups were broadly united in their desire to wrest power from Britain's officials.

However, the factions were not united by a common vision of a future Australia. They believed in the need for home rule, but were sharply divided over who should rule at home. Few members of the wealthy land-owning classes wanted to risk the consequences of unqualified democracy. The 'self-evident' truths that 'all men are created equal', enshrined in the infant American Declaration of Independence, appealed to relatively few influential colonists—even during the debates of the 1840s and 1850s over the nature of self-government. And piecemeal concessions towards greater colonial autonomy, opening the way for responsible government, had by the mid-1850s robbed republicanism of much of its appeal, even in radical circles.

Knowledge of American history was fairly widespread in the colonies, and was constantly drawn upon in the debates. Lang's infatuation with America and republicanism, especially after he visited the United States in 1840, was obviously not typical of general colonial attitudes. But, by the time of the gold rushes in the 1850s, numerous avenues to American ideas and developments were open. Press reports were detailed and frequent. Books as varied as Frances Trollope's *Domestic Manners in America*, George Bancroft's *History of the United States*, and J Fenimore Cooper's *The Last of the Mohicans*, were popular. In the 1820s the first American missionaries arrived. American inventions, both industrial and domestic, were widely used in the colonies, and demand for them was fuelled by the

gold rushes. Buggies and wagons, ore crushing machinery, the timber frame house, ice chests, sewing machines and printing presses were but some of the many commodities which became known locally as 'American notions'.

With the gold rushes came migrants—from radical democratic miners to circus families, actors and minstrels. Already, the impact of American technology, commerce and popular culture, as well as its intellectual and political life, were being felt throughout the colonies. Americans, or 'Yankees', were associated with a sense of rebelliousness, optimism and materialism. A visitor to the Victorian goldfields found, for example, 'a go ahead, self-confident Yankee sort of people'. Some representatives of property and capital anticipated that free immigrants and the effects of the gold rushes would soon transform the colonies. 'Are we not all men of yesterday', a wealthy squatter, Niel Black, asked sadly: 'Is not this the beginning of Yankeedom stimulated by the Golden treasury in the earth we trade upon?'

America was a principal source of ideas because it was the only significant English-speaking society not still bound by colonial ties. In contrast, the decolonisation of much of South America from Spanish rule after the 1820s, excited relatively little attention. Only one nation symbolised the overthrow of British imperial control, and those in colonial Australia anxious to limit British authority turned predictably therefore to the United States.

Moreover, radicals who were disturbed by the failures of Chartism or the hesitant gradualism of the English Whigs after 1830, turned eagerly to America as the consummate example of a working democracy built on the ideas of John Locke and Thomas Paine. As early as 1835, a correspondent to *The Monitor* implored: 'Let us look to America and see what she has exhibited in the full progress of all her liberal institutions and under the unfettered independence of years'. Even local Whigs, like John West, alluded to the possibility that force might be resorted to by some in the colony if Britain's authority was not reduced. He was confident that such a prospect, once brought to the attention of 'moderate imperial' opinion would 'teach that the integrity of the Empire is only safe in the unity of interest and affection' between the mother country and its subjects in Australia. Other, more direct warnings, highlighting the bloody overthrow of British power in America, echoed through the protests of those seeking responsible government, an end to



transportation, separation of church and state, or more liberal land-grant policies. The imagery invoked by the antitransportation campaign based in Sydney was typical: 'As in America, oppression was the parent of independence', it warned, 'so shall it be in this colony'. Opponents of restrictions imposed by Britain on land grants to free settlers appealed to the 'quite different', more open circumstances which applied in America as a result of independence. For example, the slogan 'Homesteads for the People', was borrowed directly from America by reform groups in Victoria. Indeed, by the 1850s much of the language of American political life had taken root in Australian soil. Words like 'homestead', 'preemption', 'squatter' and even possibly 'the bush' were 'readily borrowed and applied locally and eventually their origin forgotten'. At the same time, images of the American Constitution, the founding fathers and the democratic frontier, could not be wholly absorbed into the political cultures emerging in Australia. In the struggles over representative government, however, American political precedents complemented and, at times, overshadowed those originating from British experiences.

An 1851 petition, for example, hinted that unless concrete concessions were granted, disloyalty, and possibly an American style rebellion, might surface in the colonies. Lang, leader of the New South Wales radicals, even publicly contemplated a recourse to armed rebellion if colonists' demands were not met. For Lang, self-government and republicanism were synonymous and interdependent. The path towards this end had been charted by the American colonies, especially in the New York Convention of 1765, and the Philadelphia Congress of 1774. Lang rejected the suggestion that self-government should cover only local matters and cited Benjamin Franklin on the impossibility of drawing a 'line' between 'imperial' and 'subordinate' issues. Lang's support for a democratic republic, for universal male suffrage, vote by ballot, the end of nominee positions in the upper houses of parliament, the severing of links between church and state, were, however, derived as much from English Chartism as from the American Revolution.<sup>3</sup> The prominent role of Californian diggers in the miners' bloody Eureka uprising of 1854, and later appeals to it as a symbol of republicanism and egalitarianism, have led to exaggerated estimates of American influence upon it. The uprising has been compared to America's War of Independence, called 'the Australian version of

the Alamo', and eulogised by Mark Twain as 'a revolution ... a stand against injustice and oppression ... great in political results'—the 'finest thing in Australian history'. But this was a misreading of the event. The grievances of the disgruntled miners were confined to difficulties on the goldfields. The wider issue of political representation was settled by Victoria's Constitution Bill of 1854, drawn up months before the uprising. Despite the conspicuous presence of Americans, Eureka expressed political sentiments nurtured largely by local conditions, not borrowed from republican experience on the other side of the Pacific. Though the insurrection was an indirect protest against imperial authority, limited suffrage, and unjust land laws—an expression of changing political culture in the Eastern colonies from the early 1830s—concessions granted through a broad franchise, self-government, revised land laws and a secret ballot, immediately undercut the appeal of republicanism. Despite this, the Eureka insurrection was a painful reminder to the bourgeoisie and to British authorities that without careful handling the Australian colonies might follow the example of the American revolutionaries.<sup>4</sup>

Disillusionment with British parliamentary government was widespread. *The Argus*, no mouthpiece for radical opinion, complained in 1854 that:

In theory, the British Constitution is as near perfection as any which exists; but in practice it is, and has all along been, an oligarchy of the educated, comprehending two great parties who have alternately shared the powers, the honour, the patronage and the offices of the church and state.

Unjust practices had undermined democratic government in Britain, but not in the United States: 'In all probability the British colonies in America exhibited the first experiment of fair legislation for all classes of the people'. *The Argus* stated that 'We think we cannot now do better than trace further the history of the American experiments ... their developments are suggestive, and must be instructive in the highest degree to us at the present momentous period of our history'. And, in tracing that history, it stressed Bancroft's celebratory descriptions of Rhode Island's pioneering movement towards 'pure democracy'. It should be noted, however, that in later articles *The Argus* also highlighted the shortcomings of such a radical departure from British practice.

In virtually every phase of the colonial constitutional debates, the American constitution was cited. Wentworth's doubts about the levelling effects of genuine democracy did not stop him, or others, from acknowledging their debt to this unique political 'model'. In 1853 he conceded that the name of the United States of America 'was in every man's mouth in reference to the constitution [best] fitted for this colony'. However, these debates also drew heavily on Canadian precedent, especially on the question of a bicameral legislature. Furthermore, some of those who cited the United States example, did so in order to highlight, much as de Tocqueville had, the democratic 'excesses' which flowed from its constitutions and political practices. In the Victorian debates, one observer suggested that the accusation of 'Americanisation' was 'the most telling sarcasm' which could be employed by conservatives against reformers. Occasional outbursts about independence, republicanism, and even 'no taxation without representation' were always overshadowed by confident appeals to English precedents and Whig pragmatism. John West's *History of Tasmania*, published in 1852, epitomised this view. For 'every considerable amelioration' of the severity of colonial rule 'the colony has been indebted to the Whigs', he declared.

While privileged exclusiveness in Great Britain is crumbling to dust,  
it cannot be that the middle classes will impose upon the necks of  
the infant colonies the burdens they themselves abhor.

This argument conceded that American subjects had been obliged to fight British privilege and imperial despotism. But in contrast, Australian subjects could confidently expect their freedoms to be granted without a bloody struggle. The triumph of the Whigs at home, West implied, would inevitably spill over into a victory for liberalism in the colonies.

This confidence was not shared by all groups, especially the many new immigrants who had firsthand experience of English politics around the time of the First Reform Act. Henry Parkes and others, schooled in the struggles of the English Chartists, brought their ideals to the colonies, where by the late 1840s they had taken root. Their emphasis on suffrage as the foundation for legislative reforms expressed the essence of Bentham's liberalism. Yet, if the programs of these recently arrived Chartists and native-born colonial radicals borrowed heavily from Bentham and English

reformers like William Cobbett, they also owed a debt to other influences—from Paine's *Rights of Man* and general enlightenment philosophy to the constitutions of the American states, which in the early 1800s abolished property qualifications for voting and granted this right to virtually all white males.

But in the colonies, as in England, an entrenched order was reluctant to share power, other than with the 'respectable classes'. Even *The Argus* echoed de Tocqueville's warnings in elaborate detail, revealing an intimate acquaintance with American history and the peculiar conditions which encouraged that nation to trust 'pure democracy'. The character of Australian society was rooted in transportation and penal life, it cautioned, whereas New England was a haven for moral and religious people. 'In a democracy', it observed, 'the people themselves being sovereigns, the corruption or purity of government is the reflex of their own character'. When grafted on to a society not distinguished by honour and justice, 'the democratic principle in such a case would be a failure'. The implications of this argument for Australia were all too apparent: 'When the majority, of a democracy are ignorant or corrupt ... They are apt to become tyrannical over the minority'. Even in early colonial New England, superstition, oppression, and witch hunts had led to a 'cruel tyranny'. To clinch its argument, *The Argus* quoted at length from de Tocqueville on the 'tyrannous propensity of the majority'. Australia's population was not sufficiently educated or moral to avoid the 'utopian errors' which would follow democracy. American experience convinced *The Argus*, colonial conservatives, and a growing number of liberals, 'to hesitate as to the expediency of carrying out the democratic system quite so far' as in a 'pure democracy'. Nor would the imperial government have sanctioned such a radical change. The constitution makers in the various colonies thus heeded the warning of *The Argus*—they ensured that unrestrained democracy and colonial independence would be avoided. This was accomplished by reserving powers to the Crown, stipulating the ultimate legal supremacy of the imperial parliament, and establishing upper houses based on nomination or a restricted franchise.

Conservatives in holding out against upper houses elected by a universal male franchise, or in opposing cheap land for free immigrants, understood they were combatting ideas derived from new world practice rather than old world theory. As their leaders

publicly acknowledged, their success depended on the triumph of English liberalism over American democracy. Wentworth equated 'British principles' with the protection of the interests of property against 'Yankee' or 'democratic notions'. He cautioned all those who loved Australia to adhere to 'English principles, and not hastily adopt American innovations'. James Macarthur was similarly hopeful that 'Reason and England will prevail against Democracy and America'. Twenty years earlier Wentworth had invoked the rights of 'the people' in appealing against the unrestrained authority of the British Government over Australia. Now he used English liberalism, with its linking of property and political rights, in an attempt to defeat universal male suffrage.

Nevertheless, the franchise requirements incorporated into the constitutions were more generous than the pastoralist class had wanted. The voting rights granted were far more generous than those permitted in the First Reform Act. Indeed they were more in keeping with Jacksonian America than with the narrow property based franchise which applied in Britain until the Second Reform Act of 1867. Wentworth's 'great interests' might dominate the legislative councils, but he failed to avert the victory of 'mere numbers' in the legislative assemblies.

During the protracted constitutional debates in the different colonies, as Wentworth acknowledged, American 'precedent and authority' were a central point of reference. They informed discussion and affected statute provisions in many areas, most notably voting arrangements, the bicameral legislature, the composition of upper houses, the requirements for a two-thirds majority to effect constitutional change, the creation of administrative boundaries and the decentralisation of government. The flood of legislation enacted by the newly self-governing colonies also drew heavily on developments in the United States. Victoria's Homestead Act and protective tariff exemplify this indebtedness. The protracted colonial contest over the tariff was generally represented as 'American protectionism' versus 'British Free Trade'. In other areas as well, such as education, church-state relations, indigenous people, railway construction, immigration, female suffrage, temperance and even the initial push for federation of the colonies, American authority was often cited and American examples followed.

In these formative years, America's experiences helped to guide and justify legislative and constitutional innovation in the Australian colonies. America served an important ideological function in the shaping of the colonies' political culture. The colonists selected from the United States that which served their purposes. Many radicals eagerly embraced America as both a symbolic and practical alternative to imperial control or liberal conservatism. Although distant, and often little understood, Australians could not ignore a new society which had rejected British authority and identified itself with unqualified democracy.

### **Reform and Federation**

The United States rose to pre-eminence amongst the world powers in the 1890s. New industrial and urban frontiers displaced the exhausted geographical ones long romanticised by American folklore and historians. Big business and consumer capitalism triumphed. Mass immigration, rapid population growth, and overseas expansion both symbolised America's new vitality, and reinforced in many an optimism in the inevitability of progress based on individualism and competition. But America's concentrated and unprecedented industrial revolution also brought with it new social divisions, political discontent and intellectual ferment. Rapid economic growth was accompanied by extreme concentrations of wealth and power in the hands of a business and entrepreneurial elite. Social divisions hardened. Family life, patterns of work, the webs of community and social organisation, changed. Increasingly, both the working class and a new middle class felt threatened and powerless in the face of the concentrated exercise of wealth and power in relatively few hands. Modern industrial America presented bold new challenges to a citizenry wedded to a belief in voluntarism, limited government, and the Protestant ethic. In responding to these challenges the United States, while not unaffected by comparable European movements, had created reforms, critiques and programs which had a considerable impact on Australia.

From the 1870s many Australian radicals, like their American counterparts, sought to define themselves and their causes in terms which distinguished their society from those of Europe. For Queensland socialist William Lane, the progressive Australians were

escaping from 'the Past with its crashing empires, its falling thrones, its dotard races'. For the poet Henry Lawson, Australia's greatness would be assured once it had thrown off the malign forces of class and monarchy which so stifled the old world. The contrasting images of a static moribund Europe and a dynamic new world, so common in American thought, were constantly invoked by Australian radicals. Typically, Lawson warned that, without change, Australians would find 'the good old English gentlemen over them, the good old English Aristocracy rolling around them in cushioned carriages, scarcely deigning to rest their eyes on the common people who toil, starve and rot for them'. Like Lang in the 1840s, many radicals now turned for inspiration to America—to another new society which had defined itself in opposition to, rather than as an extension of, the European sources from which it sprang. These radicals saw their society's future in the mirror of America's past. Predictions of a glorious republic, peopled by Anglo-Saxons and eventually rivalling the United States itself, were common.

However, the enthusiasm of radicals and republicans for America was often qualified by the fact that it was the quintessential capitalist nation—an unequal society sustained by a rapacious economic system. And, following a common line of American reformist thought, some Australian radicals recognised that American commitment to democracy and equality was being submerged beneath forces long associated with the class divisions and antagonisms of Europe. America was less and less a social exception among nations. Contrasts between the material conditions of life in the old world and those in the new were fast disappearing.

Self-government in the 1850s had slowed the growth of republicanism while boosting support for liberalism and gradualism throughout the Australian colonies. But, by the 1880s, dissatisfaction was again growing with Britain's distant and unsympathetic rule. At the same time, colonial legislatures were fairly unresponsive to the needs of a community which was probably the most urbanised in the world. Until the 1880s, most reformers had accepted that a combination of fairer land laws, trade union organisation, and democratic political institutions, would achieve an egalitarian future. But in the new circumstances a more radical political movement sought to enlist the aid of the state to ensure both equality of opportunity and domestic sovereignty. As expressed by the *Bulletin*, *Australian Radical* and *Boomerang* magazines, Australia's future was to

be both republican and socialist. Demands for federation of the colonies and independence from Great Britain were built around constant references to the bloody struggle of America's colonies for independence in the face of an intransigent Britain. Most Australian radicals also believed that social relations must be transformed, and that government was the appropriate vehicle to effect such change. The development of trade union organisations espousing political goals and collectivist philosophies reflected these ideas. And in taking this new direction, they were guided less by European socialists such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels or Sidney Webb, than by American reformers, notably Henry George, Edward Bellamy and Lawrence Gronlund.<sup>5</sup> This is not to suggest that Australian writers and activists were simply ciphers for imported ideas and political programs. Local conditions, local experience and local intellects reshaped and extended intellectual and political developments originating in Europe and America.

The writing of Lawson and Joseph Furphy acknowledged, if in very different ways, that Australia's reforming nationalism was born out of an interaction with external cultural and political currents. Recalling the late 1880s, Lawson wrote: 'I watched old fossickers and farmers reading *Progress and Poverty* earnestly and arguing over it Sunday afternoons ... I heard Tommy Walker and Collins and the rest of 'em and, of course, a host of Yankee free thought and socialist lectures', In *Rigby's Romance*, Furphy refused his editor's request to make Rigby an Australian rather than an American. The optimism and egalitarianism which Rigby embodied, despite the hardships encountered in his adopted country, were to Furphy genuine elements of the movement for independence and social reform in late nineteenth-century Australia. Rigby's socialism was steeped in his knowledge of American history and literature, including Paine and Bellamy. This distinctive background gave Rigby's ideas greater appeal, Furphy believed, and stamped his prophetic words with international authority.

American radicals were more than distant fictional heroes. For Henry Parkes, at least, Henry George was a 'gentleman in whom all persons claiming to be democratic or men of the people, should take a special pride'. Judged by the enthusiastic reception given George when he visited Australia in 1890, Parkes' sentiments were widely shared. Among the many radical and socialist clubs and societies, which sprouted in these years, were Henry George and



Single Tax Leagues and Bellamy Clubs. While predominantly supported by working-class men, these societies also gained considerable support in middle class and intellectual circles, Samuel Walker Griffith, a Premier of Queensland and first Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, was one prominent leader attracted to the program of George. Recalling the 'wave of socialist hope', which accompanied the early years of labour organisation, J D Fitzgerald wrote in 1915 that *Progress and Poverty* 'profoundly influenced us', while Gronlund's *Cooperative Commonwealth* provided a convenient and popular introduction to state socialism and Marxism. Bellamy's *Looking Backward and Equality*, he also noted, were 'a revelation to the working classes'. However, while these American writers may have been more widely known than European socialists, they drew heavily on European thought and their proposals were usually grafted onto a tree which had already taken root in Australian soil. They did less to plant new political ideas than to clarify, extend, and popularise existing ones.

The influence of George's theories on a single tax and land nationalisation was most apparent in the trade union movement. For George, the unfair and unequal distribution of wealth within capitalist society could be overcome by one initiative—the single tax, a tax on unimproved land values. This proposal won unanimous acceptance at the 1888 Intercolonial Trade Union Congress which resolved, in the very words of *Progress and Poverty*:

A simple yet sovereign remedy which will raise wages, increase and give remunerative employment, abolish poverty, extirpate pauperism, elevate moral taste and intelligence, purify government and carry civilization to a yet nobler height, is to abolish all taxation save that on land values.

Despite George's stay of three months in 1890, this idea faded away as organised labour embraced a progressive land tax with exemptions for smaller estates. Though Single Tax Leagues appeared in Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and New South Wales around the time of George's visit and many of the founders of the Labor party in New South Wales and South Australia during 1890–91 were members of these leagues—including W A Holman and W M Hughes—by 1893 the single tax idea had little support. In view of George's reluctance to sanction trade unionism and his

preoccupation with the land issue rather than the struggle between capital and labour, his appeal in the divided Australian colonies of the early 1890s was short-lived.

In contrast, Bellamy's utopian ideas struck a very responsive chord in working-class Australia and, in *The Sydney Morning Herald's* words 'ran like wildfire in all the colonies'. *The Bulletin* welcomed *Looking Backward* with a glowing full-page review. An accompanying letter drew on American parallels to argue that Bellamy's book would 'count against industrial slavery as *Uncle Tom's Cabin* did against chattel slavery ... the time is at hand when Labor will ask for rights instead of concessions'. In 1905, as the infant Australian Commonwealth experimented with a series of social and economic reforms, *The Sydney Morning Herald* concluded that Bellamy's 'fascinating new views' had brought about radical legislative change: 'The system of taxation was recast in the interests of the workman, and progressive land and income taxes struck heavily the propertied and moneyed classes'.

Yet the appeal of Bellamy, and to a lesser extent George, lay partly in the fact that their analyses and prescriptions drew on English precedent and reinforced the impact of European ideas, notably those promoted by the Fabian socialists. William Lane, for example, embraced *Looking Backward* because 'it expressed the political aims of all progressive labour men since the Chartist time'. Its emphasis on moral regeneration and the relationship between Christianity and socialism also broadened its appeal in colonial Australia. In addition to stimulating debate over state socialism, reinforcing the appeal of Gronlund's *Cooperative Commonwealth* and providing a model for Lane's utopian experiment in Paraguay, Bellamy's work also influenced the establishment of the Australian Labor Party following the defeat of the workers in the maritime strike of 1890.

The rise and fall of the American Knights of Labor also attracted considerable attention from unionists and socialists in Australia after 1885. By that year its American membership had reached almost one million. Its record of successful strike action and its emphasis on broader political programs were widely reported in the radical colonial press. Its slogan, 'an injury to one is the concern of all', galvanised Australian workers before the great strike of 1890. Assemblies of the Knights of Labor even appeared briefly in Victoria. Its political objectives guided the platform adopted by

the Labor Electoral Leagues in the early 1890s. Despite organised labour's relatively early political successes in Australia, American influences did not disappear. After 1895, Daniel de Leon and the Socialist Labour Party of America influenced colonial socialist thought and the program of the Australian Socialist League. A decade later, after the founding of the Industrial Workers of the World in Chicago, an Australian chapter of this radical organisation was formed in Sydney. Though the IWW emphasised the inevitability of class struggle between the working class and the employing class, and called for direct action by the workers to overthrow capitalism, the Australian 'Wobblies', because of their fierce rhetoric and defiant actions, gained considerable sympathy from the working class.

Even as America was a source of inspiration for social change, it was also for many radicals the symbol of unrestrained capitalism. They argued that America represented a system of class relations which must not be repeated in their new nation. The widening inequalities of wealth and power in the 'Gilded Age', and the periodic reports of police violence against striking workers were constant subjects of debate in the Commonwealth Parliament. 'Surely we are not asked to imitate America, a country which is seething with industrial strife, and where the police are called out to shoot down men who are fighting for their rights?' a Labor member asked Parliament in 1903. At the same time, W M Hughes portrayed America as 'a creation of yesterday' where 'extraordinary divisions' of wealth had betrayed democratic promise. The bitter struggles between capital and labour, notably the 1901 steel strike, provoked a broad critique of American capitalism by the *Australian Worker*.

The economic conditions in America have reached the stage where the class division is more strongly marked than anywhere else in the world. Nowhere has the ownership of industry concentrated so quickly and so inexorably into fewer hands and consequently nowhere else has there developed a wide wage working class so completely dependent upon the owners of industry for the opportunity to labour and live. And as this class division has become clearer so have the interests of the opposing classes of workers and capitalists come into sharper conflict.<sup>6</sup>

Rural Australia, like rural America, resented the threat of industrialisation and urbanisation to traditional agrarian values.

Australian farmers made their own much of the American rhetorical attack on the city and the banks, and they drew on the American experience to fashion their own response to the crises.

Though less obsessed than the American populists with conspiratorial views about the evils of the city and the gold standard, Australians did develop agrarian myths similar to those of the United States which stressed the significance of the farmer-producer, the corruption of city life, and the superior virtues of the bush. During the late 1880s and early 1890s, at the height of the agrarian protest movement, leagues were formed in Victoria and South Australia advocating the return to silver as an international currency. During the same period a Queensland Farmers' Alliance modelled on that of the United States was formed. In Victoria, a Farmers' Union and later a Farmers' Protection Association, also inspired to some degree by American example, were established. From about 1910 on, Australian farmers confronted sharp price variations on the international market, indebtedness mounted, and rural dissatisfaction with the protective tariff intensified. In this harsh economic climate, Australia's farmers turned to political organisations reminiscent of those which surfaced intermittently two decades earlier. The result, ultimately, was the formation of the Australian Country Party.<sup>7</sup>

Australia at the turn of the century was even more influenced by America's urban reform movement, 'progressivism', than by either its radicalism or ruralism. 'Progressivism' was predominantly a middle-class response to industrialisation, urbanisation and migration. It sought not only moral purity and social justice, but also national efficiency and social order. Though its reformist ideas were common to bourgeois movements in the United States and western Europe, it was only in the United States that it became dominant. Progressivism, as it affected Australia, interested itself in a wide range of reforms, including free preschool kindergartens, child welfare policies, scientific management, hospital services, tariff protection, conditions of work, judicial arbitration of industrial disputes, antimonopoly legislation, and pensions for the aged and disadvantaged. But the transmission of progressivism to Australia was not confined to political and social reforms. In the United States in particular, concern about moral purity translated itself into concern for racial purity, and national efficiency led to ideas about

‘racial’ homogeneity. There was a ready reception for such ideas in Australia.

American progressive responses to the social ills of the city, the factory, and the large corporation, were widely discussed in the Australian press from about 1896 to 1910. Press reports highlighting American reforms in public sanitation, water supply, public health, smoke pollution, ‘corruption in city government’, and in regulating monopolies and other unfair corporate practices, were complemented by feature articles on America’s expanding role in world affairs, its ideas on progress, work and efficiency, its educational structures, and the ‘wonders of American science’. On 4 July 1903, for example, *The Sydney Morning Herald* highlighted America’s successes in commerce, politics, literature and science in terms repeated often in the Australian press during the Progressive era. That nation, said the *Herald*, ‘may well claim that the system which it has adopted—even if it be not the “world’s best hope” as Jefferson claimed for it—justifies the pride and confidence which Americans feel in it’. Praise for its power and economic growth, tinged with reservations about its diverse population and brash philistinism, were themes common to both conservative and liberal views of America.

Commenting on what he called the United States of Australia, Percival Cole wrote glowingly in 1910 of the interrelatedness of ‘progressive’ reforms adopted in the two societies. ‘Australia has truly embraced the United States as a friend and teacher’, he suggested, and ‘in her turn, she demonstrates certain object lessons that are receiving an increased amount of attention from expert American[s]’. His conclusion, while undoubtedly an exaggeration, does attest to a considerable convergence in cultural and political life in the two societies before World War I. ‘For there is a real, living, organic community between the United States and the young white power that faces her across the southern seas’, he wrote, ‘it is such that an American may live in Australia, or an Australian in America, and feel all the time as perfectly at home as if in his own country’.<sup>8</sup>

Women’s organisations were founded in all Australian colonies by the late 1880s. Female suffrage was the central political demand of these predominantly middle class groups. Their pragmatism and an implicit confidence that immediate rewards would flow from the right to vote, grounded them unmistakably in the liberal ethos of the late nineteenth century. ‘Expediency feminism’ was an accurate

description of this movement, with its emphasis on legislation as the vehicle for ending the evils of patriarchy.

To the extent that Australian women's organisations were concerned with suffrage and moral reform, they were inextricably part of a broad international movement. The effects of vast distances and slow communications between countries were not sufficient to fragment women's drive for the vote. This is not to imply that western feminism was a uniform movement. It differed over time and place, and from society to society. Yet in each country feminism was nourished by international developments. The Australian women's movement was familiar with American, British, and New Zealand experiences.

The movement for women's suffrage in Australia drew on important American precedents, stretching from the Seneca Falls Declaration of equal rights for women of 1848 to the extension of votes to women in many territories, states and municipalities through the 1860s to the 1890s. South Australia in 1894 became the first Australian colony to extend the suffrage to women, and the other colonies, except Victoria, quickly followed this example. Australian women were enfranchised, at a national level, two decades before women were permitted to vote in Federal elections in the United States. Despite this, in the 1890s, colonial suffragists exploited American initiatives at the municipal and state levels to press for similar gains.

As in the United States, many middle class women in Australia were drawn into social reform organisations after the early 1880s through their participation in a crusade to purify society of the evils resulting from male domination of both the public and domestic spheres. Through voluntary organisations, most notably the American-based Women's Christian Temperance Union, these colonial women worked assertively outside the home, church, and neighbourhood for a range of reforms. Elizabeth Ward, an activist in New South Wales, implored colonial women to follow the 'sound ... political instincts' of American women who viewed temperance and suffrage as 'the left and right hands of moral reform'. American arguments and pamphlets were consistently employed by Australian women reformers.

For two decades, from the early 1890s, visiting American women transported reform ideas and organisations to a sympathetic band of women in the Australian colonies. Prominent amongst these

frequent visitors were Catherine P. Wallace, Mary Love and the dedicated Jessie Ackerman who, significantly, became the first Federal President of the Australian Women's Christian Temperance Union. At times, as with the pamphlet *Twelve Reasons Why Women Want to Vote*, American literature was used without modification by Australian activists. Following the American example, while women's organisations made temperance and the vote their main objective, they also interested themselves in such matters as 'raising the age of consent, prison reform, suppression of narcotics, temperance, prohibition, peace work and social purity legislation'.<sup>9</sup>

During the 1880s and 1890s, the Australian colonies began to move towards the formation of a federal union. The aim of 'a nation for a continent and a continent for a nation' was not easily won. Throughout the struggle for Federation, the example of the United States remained paramount. The very success of the United States as a federal union was a constant reminder of the advantages of colonial union. Thus many believed that what the thirteen British colonies in America had achieved in the late eighteenth century, the six British colonies in Australia could accomplish in the late nineteenth century. As few Australians wished to break from Britain and the Empire, they conveniently accepted that America's material achievements were rooted in its federal structure rather than its republican character. As the disparate colonies started to discuss union they thus turned naturally to the American experience for broad inspiration as well as concrete guidance. 'The framers of our own Federal Commonwealth Constitution', Sir Owen Dixon, a Chief Justice of the High Court, later concluded, 'found the American instrument of government an incomparable model. They could not escape from its fascination'. Alfred Deakin, one of its leading architects, estimated 'that four-fifths at least has been built out of materials quarried from American legislation and American decisions'. The Australians, however, were selective about the elements which they took from the American Constitution. They retained the British tradition of parliamentary government as it had evolved in the nineteenth century and they did not include a Bill of Rights guarantee of individual liberty in their Constitution.

The federal structure of the United States Constitution was incorporated—often with only minimal adjustment—into Australia's new Constitution. As one of its advocates, Sir John Cockburn, told a receptive audience in Philadelphia in 1899, that

‘our problem has been throughout almost identical to yours’, and thus ‘in the fundamental characteristic of our constitution we have followed the example of the United States’. Each constitution conferred broadly similar legislative powers on the Federal Parliament. The powers of Australia’s states’ house, the Senate, closely resembled those of its American counterpart, as did the important judiciary functions vested in the High Court. Even the establishment of a national capital, in a special territory of the Commonwealth, was modelled on American example. In contrast to the United Kingdom, Australia adopted a written constitution, specified the balance of powers between the central and state governments, and permitted the judicial arm of government to interpret the basic laws and, in effect, challenge the will of Parliament. Given the mixture of American and British influences, some pundits have conveniently labelled the Australian system the ‘Washminster mutation’.<sup>10</sup>

Concepts of Anglo-Saxon superiority and demands for an exclusively white nation were central features of Australian political culture as the colonies moved towards Federation. Fear of ‘racial contamination’ and unfair economic competition from Asian workers, were unifying themes in Australian nationalism from the early days of the gold rushes when barriers to Chinese immigration were first erected. If the rapid decline in Aboriginal numbers was welcomed by most white Australians, many were disturbed by the possibility of an influx of other non-European peoples. Against a background of violence, there developed widespread pressure to preserve Australia exclusively for settlement and exploitation by the so-called white race. This racialism was not born entirely of local conditions. Nor was it sustained exclusively by experiences on the frontiers of cultural contact as the Australian colonies expanded through white conquest.

European racism in the nineteenth century was an international phenomenon. The confusion of cultural attributes with biological distinctions penetrated general western thought, especially in the late nineteenth century. The United States and Australia were both influenced by, and in turn contributed to, the elaboration of racist ideas. Both countries responded in broadly similar ways throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century to two fundamental issues—relations with indigenous peoples and voluntary immigration by non-whites. The broadly parallel experiences of the



two Pacific communities encouraged widespread interaction between them over race relations and immigration issues. The ideological construction of 'race', the exploitation of 'racial' issues, and the legislative responses to them, were broadly similar in the two white communities. Comparable circumstances do not entirely account for this. British law sanctioned white settlement of native lands in nineteenth century Australia. But the process of taking Aborigines' lands and then placing them on reservations owed much to American policies, beginning with the Indian Removal Act of 1830.

It is in the area of immigration restriction, however, that the Australian and American attitudes to racial questions were most interdependent. For fifty years, from the earliest days of the gold rushes, the responses of Australian colonists to Chinese, and later broader Asian, immigration were directly linked to developments in California. Both societies erected 'Great White Walls' against non-Europeans in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Australian perception of California's Chinese 'problem' was a crucial element in the shaping of attitudes towards race and immigration.

Legislation restricting the entry of Chinese to the eastern colonies was first introduced in 1854, at the height of the gold rushes. California's response to the rapid influx of Chinese miners was less formal, but broadly similar. Though whites in California failed to win Washington's approval for their attempts to expel Chinese or restrict their entry, they developed a complex of barriers, regulations and practices for the purpose of hindering or intimidating Chinese miners. A second wave of opposition to the Chinese surfaced in the late 1870s and gave rise to a protracted legislative assault against Asian immigration on both sides of the Pacific. Pragmatic local reactions to specific problems associated with the Chinese presence gave way to an elaborate ideology which embraced stereotyped ideas about race, cultural and biological 'inferiority', and Anglo-Saxon 'purity'. It ultimately expressed itself most fully in laws aimed at excluding not just the Chinese but all coloured peoples; in Australia by the Immigration Restriction Bill of 1907, and in the United States by the restrictive laws of 1902 to 1907 which had covered Japanese as well as Chinese immigrants.

The American influence on Australian attitudes to race questions was distinct, even if complex. Colonial advocates of a white

Australia cited the divisive legacies of slavery and unrestricted Chinese immigration in America to warn fellow colonists of the evil consequences of a racially mixed society. Conflict in America between black and white, Asian and European was portrayed as the inevitable result of that nation's self-inflicted 'racial problems'. For Eurocentric colonials a white Australia was essential for avoiding the dislocations and disharmony which they claimed were endemic in a pluralistic society like the United States. In this context, America was a future to be avoided, not emulated. Ignoring differences in the composition of the two nations, one anti-Chinese agitator predicted: 'The same thing that happened in America would be repeated in Australia'. The 'obnoxious presence' of the Chinese in California was frequently pointed to and anti-Chinese riots, like the Rock Springs Massacre in Wyoming in 1885, confirmed the wisdom of a 'White Australia' Policy. Exaggerated assessments of America's 'racial problems' again loomed large in colonial arguments over Asian immigration in the 1870s. Typical of the many references to the United States was a lengthy report in *The Sydney Morning Herald* on 11 August 1876.

The article from the *New York Herald* which we published yesterday, will give our readers an idea of the manner in which Chinese are said to horde and live in America; and we are now getting sufficient evidence that, unless prompt and suitable checks are interposed, the evils which have resulted from the crowding together of large numbers of Chinese elsewhere will exist and thrive on a smaller scale in the leading cities of these colonies.

Similarly, when the Commonwealth Parliament in 1901 adopted the White Australia Policy, it was promptly interpreted as a decision linked directly to American conditions and arguments. 'They have made up their mind that Australia is to be reserved for White men', a British observer, W T Stead, noted with delight: 'No yellow, brown, or black man need apply'. In explaining why the 'cry of White Australia had carried all before it', he attributed a decisive role to developments in America. Again, 'following the example of the United States', he wrote, 'the Federal Parliament is absolutely opposed to the introduction of coloured labour'. While he appeared oblivious of the rhetorical inventiveness of those determined to win passage of the 1901 Act, Stead's conclusion nonetheless attests to the pervasive influence of American experience: 'All the arguments

which are now being used in America to secure the renewal of the Chinese Exclusion Bill are brought out and urged in order to lock and double lock the door of Australia against any influx of Asiatics'. But had America not existed, there is little doubt that those determined to make Australia into an exclusively white society would have pursued their course.<sup>11</sup>

The creation of a united white Australia was not the only expression of the emerging nation's determination to see Anglo-Saxon 'civilisation' dominant in the South Pacific. A combination of regional insecurity and race consciousness also encouraged support for what one observer as early as 1877 called 'a kind of Monroe Doctrine' which would ensure 'that all the islands in this part of the world should be held by the Anglo-Saxon race'. Difficulties with British policies over control of territories in the Pacific, especially the German presence in New Guinea, strengthened support for this proposal in the 1880s. The rise of Japan as a world power, following its victories over China in 1895 and Russia in 1905, intensified Australia's fear of strategic isolation on the edge of Asia. Deakin's words expressed this mounting concern at the time of the Russian-Japanese War. He stated that Australia could no longer 'depend on its isolation for security', it needed to take new steps to guarantee its defence from the 'hordes of Asians'.

The widening contest over the spoils of new imperialism in the Pacific and Asia, allied to the rise of a non-European power to prominence in this region, provoked in Australia new anxieties and new international initiatives. It attempted to participate more directly in imperial arrangements, took steps to build up its own military and navy, and turned for support to the United States as the leading 'white' power in the Pacific. The expansion of America into the Pacific, Asia and Caribbean which climaxed in its victory over Spain in 1898 was welcomed by many Australians, specially those who saw it as an Anglo-Saxon triumph. A decade later, Deakin disregarded Britain's wishes and invited President Roosevelt to send the Great White Fleet to Australia. America's ships were welcomed to Australian ports in 1908 with words which underscored the fusion of racial values and regional vulnerability in the outlook of many in the new nation. An 'Oriental invasion is ever threatening', the *Adelaide Advocate* proclaimed. The 'teeming millions of Asians' are our nearest neighbours, the *Register* warned, and this was a cogent reason for welcoming the visit of progressive whites to the

Commonwealth. *The Sydney Morning Herald* interpreted the Fleet as a tangible expression of 'the brotherhood of the Anglo-Saxon race', as confirmation that 'America may be the first line of defence against Asia'. The *Brisbane Courier* concluded prophetically: 'The presence of the United States fleet gives the opportunity for the peaceful development of the interests of the white races in the Pacific which will inevitably be brought closer together for mutual protection'. These sentiments were widespread. Most representatives of the ALP welcomed the Fleet as a symbol of Anglo-Saxon accord and an important 'notice to the yellow races that they will have to stop in Asia'. Some from the ranks of labour, and the iconoclastic *Bulletin*, were unenthusiastic about the visit, but only the radical American derived IWW went so far as to label the Fleet 'Uncle Sam's Blood Ships'.

America's imperial expansion had not been welcomed enthusiastically by all sections of colonial Australia in the 1890s. Radicals, republicans and many sections of organised labour were dismayed by the arrival on the world stage of yet another capitalist power pursuing colonial policies reminiscent of those followed by the old powers of Europe. Attempts to portray American expansion as an extension of its civilising mission, or an unselfish example of open-door policies designed to break the grip of European colonialism everywhere, were rejected by these sections of colonial society. For most republicans and nationalists, America's behaviour overseas was different from that of the European colonial powers only because it was justified by a different rhetoric. But opposition to America's 'spread-eagleism' was usually offset by praise of the progressives' assault on the powerful monopolies and trusts which dominated it. This ambivalence was not restricted to the left in Australia—it was voiced, for example, by both *The Age* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* during Theodore Roosevelt's presidency.

By 1908–09, however, these varied perceptions had changed. Continuing fears of an Asiatic threat to 'White Australia' gave rise to a broad consensus about America and its place in the Pacific. The prospect of war between Japan and America during 1907–08, coupled with intensified Anglo-German naval rivalry the following year, prompted Australia to seek new assurance of international support. Amidst press reports that a second expedition by a Great White American Fleet was likely, Prime Minister Deakin in 1909 put forward his 'proposition of the highest international importance'.

Australia's inchoate plans for its own Pacific Monroe Doctrine were now submerged beneath an attempt to have the original Monroe Doctrine cover Australia and the wider Pacific. Deakin proposed 'an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to all the countries around the Pacific Ocean supported by the guarantees of the British Empire, Holland, France and China added to that of the United States'.

Despite subsequent misgivings about America's belated entry into the Great War, and the bitter conflict between Prime Minister Hughes and President Wilson over the Versailles Treaty, Australia consistently sought assurances of American support in Pacific affairs. In the 1930s, against the background of Japan's invasion of China and new tensions in Europe and the Pacific, Prime Minister Joseph Lyons proposed a Pacific Pact very like that sought thirty years earlier by Deakin. These appeals to Washington reflected more than narrow strategic insecurities or disillusion with imperial defences. As the dogged nationalist, Billy Hughes, commented to a gathering of Americans in 1938: 'What we are, you were; and what you are, we hope to be'. The 'future America' fantasy survived amidst the competing claims of nationalism and Empire. Indeed, if Hughes is representative of Australian attitudes, this affection grew rapidly as international relations deteriorated in the 1930s and fascism threatened in both Europe and the Pacific. Certainly, he no longer criticised the brutalities of American capitalism or portrayed America as 'a creature of yesterday'.

At the turn of the century the newly independent Australia sought to establish itself as a progressive liberal society. At the same time, it remained overwhelmingly British and defiantly white. It pursued a vision of political and social reform based on unqualified democratic rights (for all but its indigenous peoples). However, innovative reform at home was not accompanied by independence in foreign policy. Indeed, Australia clung politically, economically and militarily to mother England while proclaiming its new status as an independent dominion. Within a decade of Federation, however, Australia had to address external realities which challenged its survival in a potentially hostile geopolitical environment. Traditional ties to Great Britain were no longer adequate to compensate for regional isolation and vulnerability. Its attempts to promote new ties in the Pacific through a symbolic visit by the American Navy, and calls for a regional security agreement with Washington, initiated a pattern for responses which became a familiar ritual in its

international behaviour throughout the twentieth century. In the long interval before America accepted that its own national interests demanded a formal security association with Australia, the dominion remained tethered by ties of tradition to Great Britain. Even before World War I, however, Australian leaders were not fully satisfied by these connections. As the limits to British interests and authority in the Far East became progressively more apparent, the dominion looked increasingly across the Pacific for guarantees of its national survival.<sup>12</sup>

This reorientation was not accompanied by a uniform or uncritical embrace of the political values, programs or priorities of the United States. Australia's responses remained varied and variable. Its search for regional security did not immediately undermine the strength of its distinctive nationalism or its affection for Britain and the Empire. This quest for closer military ties with America did not initially bring with it greater dependence on the political culture or economy of the major power. Australians adopted, filtered and deflected influences from the United States to suit the broad demands of their own community, or the particular interests of different classes or sections within this community. The predominance of American power and its accelerating economic and cultural penetration abroad, were not yet sufficient to threaten Australia's political sovereignty or ideological independence—even though its strong links with Britain already made these somewhat tenuous achievements. Not until after World War II was the fundamental autonomy of Australia's political culture seriously undermined by its asymmetrical new association with America. In contrast to their earlier relationships, this change was determined more by the needs of the great power than by the interests of its small Pacific partner.

### Independence and Dependence

By the 1890s the myth of America as a land of bright promise was under challenge. If it remained a magnet for millions of European immigrants fleeing the hardships of the old world, it was also recognised abroad as a society divided by colour, region, religion and class. America had not succumbed to the social and political problems of the old world, but it was touched by them. It was no longer viewed abroad as an innocent newcomer on the world stage,

but as an expanding global power intent on pursuing its own national interests in a competitive imperialist world. These conflicting images coexisted—the image of America was always shaded by light and dark. It both attracted and repelled. And in the twentieth century its image, especially in the English speaking world, was further complicated by its decisive engagement in the two world wars and its leading role in the Cold War. After World War II the western states were drawn to the international authority of America, and increasingly dependent upon it. But reliance on the ‘great power’ of the United States implied a loss of small power sovereignty and authority, and few nations welcomed either this or the secondary status which it implied. Many resented the constraints on their nation’s independence, and judged it harshly. But at the same time it was generally recognised that the realignment of global power had sharply reduced the political options available to most nation states. In addition, the rise of an increasingly integrated global economic system undermined further the relative power and sovereignty of the nation state. American multilateral corporations led in this fundamental transformation—a transformation which undercut the independence of national economies, made them far more vulnerable to external economic conditions, and reduced sharply the power of national governments to control economic developments or sustain an autonomous political culture. Military and economic integration produced an increasingly homogenised community of western societies. Yet, though most were heavily dependent on American power, they were generally reluctant to surrender their political authority or cultural distinctiveness.

From the early nineteenth century, as Margaret Mead observed, many Americans believed that ‘other peoples’ were touched by the light of their civilisation and would follow it willingly. In 1970 Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as President Carter’s National Security Advisor, asserted that the model provided by American society was ‘prompting a far-reaching transformation in [the] outlook and mores’ of ‘all others’. The Americanisation of the world, which W T Stead had enthusiastically predicted at the turn of the century, was now being accomplished. Postwar America had become, in Daniel Boorstin’s words, ‘a mold for the future’ of other societies. But it was no longer a light on the hill to which other liberal societies looked for inspiration and guidance. Rather, it was a dominant and dominating world power, one which explicitly sought

to make the world in its own image without erecting in the process a formal empire.

‘There can be little doubt that this has been the century of Americanisation’, Akira Iriye has asserted: ‘The world has come under America’s economic and cultural influence to a far greater extent than any other country’s [sic]’. This dominant international role was, from the very first days of its involvement in World War II, actively sought and consciously promoted. Before the humiliations of Vietnam punctured the hubris of their Cold War pretensions to make the world safe for democracy and capitalism, few influential Americans were inclined to accept any limits on American influence abroad.<sup>13</sup>

Like other liberal democracies, Australia was drawn rapidly into the Cold War and its consequences. As a small, or at most middle power, the options open to Australia in world affairs were always limited. Yet it was an important Allied power in the Pacific War and played a prominent role in the postwar settlements. Under Labor governments in the 1940s, it adopted a relatively independent stance in international affairs. It used a combination of residual British influence in the Far East, newly formed international agencies, and concerted actions with other small and middle powers in an effort to offset or deflect American domination of its economic and foreign policies. Increasingly, however, the vast asymmetry of power and status between the two Pacific societies biased their relationship towards an American model and American interests.

Although from the early 1950s Australian governments sought to hinge their foreign policies on an alliance with America, the Liberal-Country party governments still did not wish to cut the ties of Empire. Conservative leaders, including Robert Menzies, Casey and John McEwen, wanted physical protection for their vulnerable nation, but they remained privately disturbed by the penetration of American cultural patterns. They were enthusiastic allies but reluctant friends. *The Sydney Morning Herald* echoed this ambivalence in words common in conservative circles, when it suggested in 1951: ‘Australia’s relations with America are often imperfectly understood abroad ... They imply no weakening of the Commonwealth bond, nor any turning away from Britain’. Such protestations were frequent, but unrealistic. Even in the late 1960s, while Australian troops fought alongside Americans in Vietnam, it was not uncommon for prominent Australians to announce, as did a former



Ambassador to Washington, Sir James Plimsoll, that 'we do not see our United States relationship as a threat to British relationships'. Such assertions could not conceal the drift away from Great Britain. However, this realignment was much slower than most historians have assumed.

Curtin's appeal for support in the dark days of December 1941, following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, was not directed exclusively at the United States. Nor did he envisage a permanent break with Britain or the Empire. 'Summed up', Curtin stated, 'Australian external policy will be shaped toward obtaining Russian aid, and working out with the United States as the major factor, a plan of Pacific strategy, along with British, Chinese and Dutch forces'. However, it was a measure of the panic and alarm which gripped Australia that the Prime Minister also emphasised that: 'Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom'.

Despite Churchill's outraged reaction to this assertion of dominion autonomy, Australia's wartime alliance with America was not immediately translated into a permanent new association. No 'special relationship' was forged during the war. The bilateral alliance was often strained and it survived only the years of conflict with a common enemy, Japan. Nor did the 'friendly invasion' during the war by almost one million American troops—black and white, male and female—have a lasting impact on postwar relations. The Australian reception was never as uniformly warm or accommodating as the propaganda agencies of General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters or the host government asserted. Rigid wartime censorship put a bland facade on the difficulties which accompanied the American presence. On balance, however, it was welcomed as a tangible reminder of America's decisive contribution to the victory over Japan.

The legacies of the wartime alliance and the extensive American presence quickly evaporated as Australia's troops returned home and the nation redirected its energies towards reconstruction. In the final phases of the war against Japan, and in the immediate postwar years, relations between Australia and the United States were marked by uncertainty, friction and mutual suspicion. Traditional links with the United Kingdom were revived as Australia sought to play a more prominent international and regional role, free of a close bilateral

association with America. For a brief few years, before the exigencies of the Cold War in Asia reshaped its domestic perceptions and foreign policies, Australian patriotism extended in complementary ways to both nation and Empire. The strains of war and gratitude to America were incorporated with surprising ease into Australia's traditional allegiances and perceptions.

## **‘Race’/Ethnicity: Social Difference**

Most modern states are shaped by ethnic distinctions within their national boundaries. Cultural differences and competing identities are dynamic features of these societies. Indeed, less than ten per cent of all nation states are overwhelmingly monolingual, and in over forty countries the largest single ethnic community comprises less than half the total population. Diversity within the state is, on one level, a product of broad historical changes, especially conquest, colonialism, and immigration. Yet this diversity is also influenced by the particular dynamics of the modern plural society, within which ethnicity and identity are constantly redefined and mobilised by individuals and the cultural groups with which they empathise.

Founded as fragments of Europe which struggled to dominate vast lands and diverse indigenous nations, modern Australia and the US are today both culturally diverse liberal democracies. Their developments were fuelled by waves of immigrants—European and non-European, free and unfree, and by struggles to subdue and dispossess indigenous peoples colonised by immigration and settlers from abroad. Despite America’s image as a unique magnet of migrants—a ‘nation of nations’ born of unrivalled diversity—the relative impact of voluntary immigration is arguably less significant in the US than in Australia. Both nations are defined fundamentally by their responses to issues embedded in their multicultural character; by their responses to such central realities as the

persistence of racial and ethnic discrimination; inequality; uneven patterns of assimilation; and the consequences of cultural differences and social diversity.

After World War II the political elites in both states were obliged to respond to a rising tide of protest from so-called 'racial' and ethnic minorities. Political discourses centred in the US on demands for civil rights and resistance to coercive cultural practices also took root in Australia, helping to mobilise peoples struggling to claim economic equality and cultural autonomy. In the 1960s, especially, African American and Amerindian mobilisations against the hegemony of Anglo-European cultural practices served as a catalyst for broadly similar challenges to the overwhelming power of Australia's Anglo-European centre.

This paper traces the influences of US example on the politics of 'race' and ethnicity in postwar Australia. These influences are significant, embedded in such broad historical processes as decolonisation; struggles for recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples; and contests over civil rights, ethnic revival, assimilation, resistance and cultural pluralism. While both Australia and the US emerged as increasingly diverse modern societies under these influences, their formal political responses, and the discourses which sustained them, diverged considerably. Both states struggled to contain cultural pluralism within the boundaries of the liberal state. Yet the character of those struggles, and the implications of proliferating cultural diversity, remained largely distinct to each nation. While the political institutions and nationalist ideologies of each nation imply a fixed and consensual identity bounded by the physical limits of the nation, contests over 'race' and ethnic culture represent struggles over power within dynamic, fluid societies. In each society after World War II difference was increasingly politicised, constructed by resistance to an assumed ideological and political consensus—a consensus to be sustained ultimately by the assimilation of ethnocultural differences.

The ethnic identities and groups within immigrant receiving nations are defined both within social boundaries mandated by the host society and by individual choices based on ancestry, history and culture. In other words, 'one's ethnicity is a composite of the views one has of oneself as well as the views held by others about one's ethnicity'. Ethnic identity is not static. It is also multilayered. Changing over time and place it is incessantly shaped and reshaped

the individuals' circumstances and social context. As Nagle emphasises: '(e)thnic boundaries, and their identities, are constructed by both the individual and group as well as by outside agents and organisations'. In discussing multicultural societies and ethnic identities it must be remembered that community values, collective memories and the sense of ethnicity are 'changing realities both within the group and the host society'. Ethnic communities are not tightly bordered, uniform or static cultural groups. Furthermore, ethnicity is perhaps best understood as 'a process of construction or invention which incorporates, adapts and amplifies pre-existing communal solidarities, cultural attributes and historical memories'.<sup>1</sup> This discussion of 'race' and 'ethnicity' accepts that both are cultural constructs which have assumed fundamental sociological importance regardless of their 'objective' existence. Concepts of 'race' and ethnicity exist within fluid, blurred boundaries, while both centre on notions of a shared history within a group. Thus race relations are here understood as a particular aspect of ethnicity—referring in Eurocentric terms to relationships involving people of colour, incorporated into diverse national societies by slavery, colonialism, dispossession and elaborate systems of social engineering embedded in policies promoting reservations, segregation, 'protection', and 'assimilation' into the ideological norms of the core society. Nonetheless, as Banton observes, ethnicity is a form of group identification concerned with 'us', the privileged European observer; 'race' categories are usually invoked to identify 'them', the subjects colonised and marginalised by the core society.<sup>2</sup>

Developments on the other side of the Pacific did not initiate the rise of Australian racism and ethnocentrism in the nineteenth century. But the social mix of the US always provided a convenient warning that was exploited by those who feared diversity and wanted an homogenous new nation. US experiences of segregation, social tension, and the immigrant 'ghetto' generally reinforced white Australia's already exaggerated fears of 'racial' and ethnic diversity. Throughout most of the twentieth century, the so-called 'racial problems' of the US were cited by powerful interests in Anglo-Australia as a difficulty which must be averted in their nation. From the mid-1950s, especially developments in the US also stimulated liberal interventions by the Australian state which attempted to control contests growing out of ongoing social inequality

confronting newly arrived migrant communities as well as indigenous peoples. And, at the same time, the struggles and aspirations of America's so-called racial minorities touched the lives of many of Australia's most disadvantaged peoples, helping to focus their rising political demands.

### **Indigenous Australians**

Native American 'Nations' had won in the nineteenth century some recognition of 'sovereignty' under treaty arrangements. In contrast, when Aboriginal Australians were placed on reserves, these lands were not recognition of prior ownership or remnants of 'treaty lands'. Nor did white Australia transfer ownership or control of reserves to indigenous families or their associations. Inhospitable parcels of 'crown land' were set aside under European administration. In contrast, under the Indian Reorganization Acts 1934 and 1938, 'Indian title' recognised mineral and timber rights and empowered local tribal councils with rights equivalent to those of municipal government.<sup>3</sup>

On the eve of World War II Australia adopted an explicit policy of 'assimilation' to replace efforts of 'absorption' of Aboriginal peoples, both physically and culturally, into an undifferentiated society. Like later attempts to promote a policy of 'integration', 'assimilation' was invoked following American practice. Yet as Rowley observed: 'There seems, then, to have been no very widespread appreciation of the long and bitter history of "assimilation" programmes in the American Indian situation, up to the Indian Reorganisation Act of 1934'. As late as the 1960s suppression of the rights and character of Aboriginal societies persisted under overt regimes of 'assimilation' and 'protection', the success of which were judged by the rates at which reserves were depopulated and Aborigines relocated into institutions which would improve their 'assimilation' as productive labour in the mainstream economy. In contrast, from 1928, US practices, developed under Lewis Meriam and John Collier, were built on limited recognition of political sovereignty and empowerment though cultural revival.

Until well after World War II, both societies were dominated by notions of European superiority which justified the exclusion of other 'races'—both spatially and politically—from their entitlements as citizens in the nation. Most Native Americans were accorded

extended citizenship rights in 1924, while Aboriginal Australians won broadly comparable recognition only in 1967. Yet both peoples continued to live under qualified legal rights and to suffer acute social disadvantage. Just as the 1967 referendum in Australia gave belated recognition to the rights of indigenous peoples, bringing them under federal government jurisdiction, so in 1968 the US Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act that symbolically guaranteed that the nation's Bill of Rights extended to all people living on Indian lands. Not until 1975, however, did Congress approve the important Indian Self-Determination and Education Act granting significant autonomy in economic and cultural affairs.

Given their sometimes overlapping histories of invasion and marginalisation, indigenous people in both Australia and the US might have been closely linked in common political struggles. But it was the plight and politics of African Americans under the banner of civil rights, rather than Native America's activism, which first attracted sustained attention in Aboriginal communities. Aboriginal activists were less aware of the aims and tactics of 'Red Power' than of 'Black Power'—at least until the symbolic seizures of Alcatraz Island from 1969 to 1971 and Wounded Knee in 1973. Earlier, in 1966, formation of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and the American Indian Movement (AIM) had passed with little recognition in indigenous Australia, while movements linked to Civil Rights for African Americans were widely reported and influential. In both societies, from the late 1960s, indigenous groups increasingly resisted assimilation, arguing that it constituted cultural genocide. Political sovereignty and cultural autonomy through indigenous control of land were common aims of indigenous revival—even while Aboriginal leaders remained only vaguely familiar with the struggles and tactics of Native Americans.

Postwar Australians were, until the 1970s at least, arguably more familiar with the 'racial' politics of the US than of Australia. During the Vietnam War, the youth rebellions and the feminist protests, the Australian media, intellectual circles, and popular culture were reoriented towards developments in the US rather than in the UK or Europe. The changing constructions of 'race' in American film television, music and news media were instantly recognisable in an Australian audience increasingly receptive to American cultural changes—both popular and political. News reports and editorial opinion increasingly discussed US 'race questions'—urban riots; the

assassinations of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King; affirmative action in education; civil rights and the Black Power movements. At the same time, coverage increased of wider political developments, notably the decolonisation of much of Asia and Africa; struggles for indigenous rights and land; the persistence of institutional inequalities in mixed societies as different as South Africa and Malaysia; and the links between European colonialism, race, and war, especially in Indochina. Yet as these stories circulated sharpening debate over 'race' and multiculturalism, they resonated differently in the two societies.<sup>5</sup>

Liberal opinion in Australia welcomed the 1954 Supreme Court ruling paving the way for desegregation of public education. This decision was interpreted by *The Age* as: 'an important advance towards racial harmony in America. The Supreme Court action was also embraced because it would go a long way towards combating the Communist contention that western concepts of democracy are hypocritical'.<sup>6</sup> Three years later, efforts to implement school desegregation, centred on the struggles in Little Rock, Arkansas, were also welcomed by liberal opinion in Australia—provided they proceeded under a policy of 'gradualism'.<sup>7</sup> Throughout the so-called civil rights years in the US, influential Australian opinion overwhelmingly endorsed moderate programs and tactics. *The Age*, for example, responded to Martin Luther King's assassination in 1968 by arguing that the US 'cannot much longer delay' granting equal rights to all Americans. At the same time, it feared that the 'white liberalism' and 'black moderation' of the early civil rights movement was being 'swamped by the ugly clamourings of Black Power and the obstinacy of white conservatism'.<sup>8</sup> Alarm over a decline in 'tolerance', rather than concern with systemic inequality and discrimination, was the focus of much Australian commentary on US 'race politics' during the long hot summer of 1968. Earlier, some in Australia expressed concern that America's 'race problem' at home was undermining its prestige abroad and thus reducing its authority in the Cold War.<sup>9</sup> By 1968, these concerns centred on the negative impact of 'racial disorders' on US involvement in Vietnam. At the height of the urban riots which erupted after King's assassination, *The Sydney Morning Herald* proclaimed editorially: 'It is



a civil war'.<sup>10</sup> The equation of 'race' with 'violence' could not have been more explicit, or more exaggerated.

If so-called 'race problems' excited predictable fears in some sections of middle Australia, examples drawn from the politics of race and civil rights in the US also helped stimulate activist programs and tactics in Australia. Black Australians now more confidently challenged the racist social order, articulating separate black identities which rejected assimilation while celebrating cultural difference. Yet developments in the US and Australia were fundamentally products of broader international changes linked to struggles against European colonialism and internal colonial structures built on racial exploitation and segregation. In 1964—the year of President Johnson's important Civil Rights Act and the dramatic 'March on Washington'—Australian activists formed an organising committee for Aboriginal Rights. In the following months Abschol was formed at Sydney University; Student Action for Aborigines (SAFA) was set up with Charles Perkins as President; 2000 students demonstrated outside the US consulate in Sydney against 'racial segregation' in the US; and Freedom Rides took the struggle against segregation to towns in rural NSW.

Protests in the US stimulated broadly similar tactics by activists in Sydney and Melbourne. Peter Read commented that the press sensationalised the story (of 2000 demonstrators outside the US consulate), highlighting 'appalling displays of "irresponsibility" by protesters, but after a few days reflection, both students and members of the public began wondering why so little attention was given to the "plight" (not "segregation", about which most were ignorant) of Aborigines'. The cultural contradictions reflected in this protest were acute. The demonstrators sang the US civil rights anthem 'We Shall Overcome'; took steps to establish SAFA (Student Action For Aborigines); and explicitly recoiled from promoting demonstrations which might have been interpreted locally as 'aping American students'. And American influences also had other perhaps more important consequences, as protests against the US role in Vietnam quickly eroded local student support for 'movement' on Aboriginal issues generally.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless Aboriginal leaders were not distracted and some sections of the press continued to give grudging approval to the aims, if not the

tactics, of the Freedom Riders—although as the *Canberra Times* was at pains to point out, NSW was ‘not Alabama’.<sup>12</sup>

From 1965 Aboriginal organisations focused increasingly on particular local issues, notably access to education, improved health care for remote communities, and legal services for rural and urban communities alike. Radical leaders within these organisations rallied around ‘Black Power’ symbols and rhetoric, but their debt to US ‘Black Power’ advocates was always tenuous. Following the 1967 Referendum moderate Aboriginal leaders increasingly emphasised the need for political autonomy and self-reliance. As Kath Walker argued: ‘If black Australians are to become masters of their own destiny, white Australians must recognise them as being capable of formulating their own policy of advancement ... Black Australians ... must define what is best for their own advancement and then *they* can determine where white Australians can be of *assistance*’. During the late 1960s the American ‘Black Power’ movement was discussed within Aboriginal organisations, including the umbrella association, FCAATSI, which carried a motion supporting ‘the principle of black power, without necessarily condoning all the ways by which it expresses itself’.<sup>13</sup>

The cultural separation advocated by Malcolm X was invoked by some Aboriginal activists, as was a language of Black Power and Black Movement. Yet as Black activist Roberta Sykes conceded, white Australia recoiled from references which resonated with radical African American experiences. ‘When the media reports our demonstration, omits the reasons behind it, and tosses in the words ‘Black Power’, Sykes argued, ‘the unaware public is then free to interpret the demonstration as a “Black Power = Blood and Guts” demonstration, and the result is often a hysterical reaction of fear, and therefore a loss of support for our movement’. Sykes acknowledged the ambivalent connotations of ‘Movement’ in Australia, asking rhetorically, ‘Black Power in Australia—a spurious American import or a genuine movement expressing the frustration and anger of Black Australians? A path to violence or a viable means of uniting Australia’s dispossessed?’ In the Australian media, Sykes noted Black Power was ‘synonymous with blood, fighting in the streets, murder, riots and looting’.<sup>14</sup> Many Aboriginal activists rallied around this slogan as a symbol of unity and ‘race’ pride—even if they overwhelmingly rejected political violence. Bruce McGuinness, who like Sykes and Charles Perkins wrote articles

under the title 'Black Power', argued that the rallying power of the imported slogan derived from fundamental similarities in the history of oppression of Blacks in the US and Australia. 'The similarities between oppressed coloured people in Australia and the United States are obvious', he wrote: 'Firstly, both come under the category—Black. Both have suffered oppression for two hundred years. Both know the full significance of squalor, hunger and degradation. They are both made to feel inferior from the very first days of comprehension'.<sup>15</sup>

Sykes and Perkins were anxious to refer to developments in Black America while simultaneously emphasising the particular struggles of local Blacks as part of a broader movement of colonised 'Third World' peoples. Ultimately, as Sykes argued, "'Black Power", because of the unique and difficult circumstances which exist here, can be said to have its own interpretation'.<sup>16</sup> Perkins conceded the American roots of the term Black Power and acknowledged that the Freedom Rides in Australia were 'a reaction to what was being done in America at the time'. But he was fundamentally hostile to what he termed 'the American Disaster', and in 1968 bemoaned the extent to which 'Australia is gradually becoming a duplication of America ... in the handling of the [race] situation'.<sup>17</sup> Other Aboriginal leaders, and some younger activists, were more sympathetic to developments in America—especially those few like Bruce McGuinness who visited the US during 1968–72 and displayed sympathy for the programs of Black Power advocates, especially those built on Black control of Black affairs. In 1972 a Black Panther Party was formed in Brisbane. As M.A. Franklin has noted: 'At this stage its platform and rhetoric were almost wholly derivative'. Indeed, its manifesto concluded with nine lines from the American Declaration of Independence.<sup>18</sup> In contrast, the most lasting symbols of Aboriginal resistance—the Gurindji's strike for rights at Wave Hill Station in 1966, and the tent Embassy established outside Parliament House in early 1972—were demonstrably local responses to dispossession. They marked the rise of a pan-Aboriginal movement built increasingly around demands for land rights and local political struggles.

From the late 1960s indigenous groups in both nations intensified their challenge to state authorities and the cultural assumptions which sustained deep patterns of institutional disadvantage. Significantly, at the same time, Native American

protests centred on efforts to enforce uncertain land rights claims in the face of threats in the proposed Indian Omnibus Bill of 1967. And in 1972 Indian protests came to a head in the powerful re-enactment of the Trail of Broken Tears and protracted occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. These actions were set against broadly comparable domestic circumstance confronting indigenous peoples in both the US and Australia. And these peoples were joined through awareness of the plight of so-called 'indigenous minorities' (or in terms common in the 1960s and 1970s, awareness of the shared Third World conditions suffered by colonised people of colour everywhere).

The politics of Aboriginal resistance were broadly paralleled in changing academic discourse where, occasionally, indigenous voices were now heard. The important multivolume works of C.D. Rowley and Frank Stevens, for example, drew heavily on themes of colonisation and institutional discrimination applied by Robert Blauner, Stokely Carmichael and others to analysis of 'race relations' in the US in the 1960s and 1970s. Writing of official efforts at assimilation—which he equated with Anglo-Australia's desire for the 'disappearance' of Aboriginality—Rowley argued: 'The policy itself, and the arguments advanced to justify it, are interesting anachronisms, as a cursory examination of the history of the Amerindian and Maori affairs will show'. And, he observed: 'the Meriam Report of 1928 indicated clearly enough the disastrous consequences for Indian society of several decades of intensive "social engineering" to promote assimilation'.<sup>19</sup> Increasingly, comparative history embracing North America informed interpretations of local experience. Rowley cited Amerindian cultural assertiveness as a model which Aboriginal Australians might emulate, but he conceded that the 'political time' of the US 'was quite different from that which marked Aboriginal affairs'.<sup>20</sup> Many of the US examples adapted by Australian social scientists focused on particular Black experiences growing out of slavery and segregation, rather than the shared indigenous experiences of conquered peoples.

Yet at times, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, these shared histories were used to support comparable legislation. For example, the 'Aboriginal Children's Research Project' in NSW highlighted the US Federal Indian Child Welfare Act (1978) arguing that its extension to Australia would promote Aboriginal control

over Aboriginal children; recognition of the Aboriginal extended family and Aboriginal values; and transfer of resources to Aboriginal control. And, it concluded: 'Whilst there are significant differences and similarities between the Aboriginal and the Indian situation, the Indian Act is a model that needs serious consideration by Aboriginal people and policy makers'. Such uncomplicated references to indigenous American examples were rare, and they declined as local struggles over land rights and identity came to dominate 'race' politics in Australia.<sup>21</sup>

General comparative study, like the political rhetoric of some Aboriginal activists, linked the plight of indigenous Australians to that of both Amerindians and African American. 'The Aboriginal communities are thus rather comparable with those Indians of the United States who lost their tribal lands' Rowley observed:

They inherited the worst of both worlds, that of the Amerindians and that of the American Negro. For a long time, as with the Indian, the Aboriginal's proper place was considered to be within a reserve and away from the dominant social group: but this reserve was never conceded to be part compensation. As happened with the poorest Indian groups, Aborigines obtained no property from legal settlements. The Aboriginal, as legally defined, remained suspended like a migrant in a white society, like the Negro; and so long as he remained recognisably Aboriginal (again, like the Negro) he faced social rejection. Only now, within the last few years, has the process of re-establishing his legal equality begun.

Given the shared histories of oppression and separation of Black minorities in both the US and Australia, Rowley concluded: 'The Aboriginal minority in 'settled' Australia was left, at the end of all this, in a situation more comparable with that of the American Negro, or the Metis of Canada, than with that of the Amerindian or the Maori'.<sup>22</sup>

From the late 1960s, the quests for civil rights and sovereignty for indigenous groups were sustained in Australia, as in the US, by a language which legitimated 'race pride' and 'ethnic consciousness', and by shared tactics centred on freedom rides, civil disobedience and 'movement'. Yet it was the Gurindji strike of 1966 and the referendum debates in 1967, far more than overseas example, that invigorated Aboriginal action. Land rights, as Weaver argues, 'which included treaty rights in Canada, became the central symbol of the emerging self-identity of Indians and Aborigines and the focus of

their political movements in the late 1960s and early 70s'. Confronted with 'resistance to these demands, they intensified their protest activities'. As disparate Aboriginal communities sought to organise on a national scale, the National Indian Brotherhood of Canada provided a viable model. Fundamentally, however, the origins and character of Aboriginal political movements were rooted in Australian soil. 'The normal categories of social policies—race, poverty and immigrant minorities', Weaver argues, 'did not secure the Aboriginal demands for recognition of their unique Aboriginality and the resources they wanted to flow from this recognition'.<sup>23</sup> Aboriginal Australians redefined their own ethnicity, and largely developed their own programs and tactics in ways appropriate to their distinctive traditions and aspirations. From the mid-1960s self determination, cultural empowerment, and the end of discrimination, increasingly defined the broader programs of diverse Aboriginal communities and organisations. Yet some academic commentary continues to confuse historical differences with political backwardness, suggesting that Australia remains 'vulnerable to the repetition of North America's mistakes'.<sup>24</sup> The American model persists, but it survives. In contrast, Sykes writes: 'Because indigenous peoples, such as Australian Blacks and Native Americans, have a very different history, their struggle has not developed in the same way'.<sup>25</sup> This is not to imply, however, that indigenous people do not share internationally recognised rights. Nor is it to deny that a large international alliance of indigenous peoples has emerged which is united by a broadly shared 'Alternative Vision' which emphasises 'the character and universality of their circumstances'.<sup>26</sup>

Aboriginal Australians, like other indigenous peoples in so-called settler societies, have focused attention on their bitter history of exploitation and demanded both symbolic and material recognition of their status as founding 'First Nation' peoples. A strikingly assertive cultural renaissance (especially in dance, painting and sport), along with broad politicisation and some acknowledgment of prior ownership and land rights, embody important changes in race relations within Australia. The High Court's rulings on *Mabo* (1992) and *Wik* (1996), along with the role of ATSIC, confronted European Australia in the 1990s with fundamental political and moral difficulties rooted in local historical conflicts. The concerns of Aboriginal Australians are central to the nation's formal political

agenda, and challenge white Australia's efforts to construct a national identity built on myths of toleration and equity within a recognisably plural state. In this sense, at least, the position of Aboriginal Australians is comparable to that of Blacks in American society. Yet questions centred on land, sovereignty, recognition and compensation link the politics of Aboriginal Australians more closely to indigenous peoples generally than to Amerindians or African-Americans.

Until the mid-1970s, right wing racist organisations opposed equally to immigration reform and civil rights for Aborigines, owed much to British organisations like the National Front and white-settler extremists resisting democratic change in Southern Africa. Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech, along with Great Britain's contests over so-called 'Asian immigration' and the claims of white supremacists in Rhodesia and South Africa, provided much of the rhetorical ammunition used by an informal coalition of racist organisations in Australia.<sup>27</sup> Increasingly, it was the periodic outbreaks of urban conflict in the US which attracted the interest of those in Australia determined to discredit social pluralism.

Media representations in Australia have since the first days of civil rights movement equated urban protests with social disorder which Australia's cities must avoid. To quote Sykes again: 'When the American black summer riots first broke out in the Sixties, newspaper and television coverage seized on the opportunity to air the fearful "Black Power" slogan at every chance, to instil fear of takeover by blacks into the hearts and minds of blacks. Thus, news of riots combined with a new and fear inspiring slogan, "Black Power", became a highly acceptable presentation for the media—regardless of the repercussions'.<sup>28</sup> Thirty years later, Australia's conservative media, at least, remained predictably hysterical in its response to urban conflict in the US. *The Bulletin* cover story on the O J Simpson murder trial proclaimed, 'Race Hate: How Vulnerable Is Australia?', while it allegedly 'exposed' for its Australian audience the threatening implications of 'a society riddled with colour cancer'.<sup>29</sup>

Fear of the ghetto and of Black activism growing from the ghetto was not restricted to conservative white opinion. In *Black View Points* (1975), Aboriginal leader Chicka Dickson warned of a growing 'racial divide': 'this situation contains the seeds of race riots'. He wrote:

Right now in this State, there are groups in Sydney who are advocating Black Power, they're reading literature from the Negro people, they're wearing soul-brother and soul-sister shirts, they're combing their hair up in 'Afro' style, and they're shaking clenched fists. Now this could be prevented.<sup>30</sup>

More recently, Pauline Hanson's 'One Nation' xenophobia was rationalised by references to American language and experiences of 'ghettos' inhabited by those who allegedly 'do not assimilate'. A truly multicultural country can never be strong or united, Hanson pronounced: 'The world is full of failed and tragic examples ... America and Great Britain are currently paying the price'.<sup>31</sup> Such concerns are not restricted to the extreme right of politics. Recently, Craig McGregor has also revisited American urban experiences, comparing changes in Australia with 'racial ghettos'—with 'ghettos of poverty, unemployment and distress'. In his analysis, the typical US city symbolises the brutality of the modern city generally, while capturing Australia's fate as its cities are incorporated into global patterns of urban life. For Australia, as for America, the ghetto foreshadows urban dystopia. In the 1990s, as during the urban riots in the 1960s and 1970s, experiences in the US remain a warning of impending chaos and social decline. *The Bulletin* headline cautioned its Australian audience in the aftermath of the riots growing out of the Rodney King verdict in 1992: 'No, not a movie, this could be the future?' In some corners of Australian society, fear of 'undigested minorities' and 'self-perpetuating enclaves' persisted more than a generation after the end of 'White Australia'. America's so-called 'racial problems' were still implicated deeply in the rhetoric and images which sustained this insecurity.<sup>32</sup>

### **Ethnicity and Multiculturalism**

A broad desire to maintain 'racial' and cultural homogeneity, along with social isolation from the peoples of the Pacific and Asia, defined white Australia's insularity until well after World War II. This conflict broke Australia's isolation and ethnic exclusiveness. Cautiously at first, postwar Australian governments opened the nation's borders to increasing numbers of migrants from a greater variety of nations and regions. Initially, new migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe entered, along with almost 200,000 refugees. This wave of postwar immigrants was broadly equivalent in



composition, and social impact, to the so-called 'new' migrants who reached the US during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Increasingly, Australia's postwar immigrants were drawn from Southern and Eastern Europe, from non-English speaking countries as well as non-Protestant or non-Christian religious communities. By the late 1960s, on the eve of greatly expanded migration from Asia, Australia accepted newcomers from over one hundred different ethnic communities, speaking more than eighty different languages. By the early 1990s, almost forty per cent of Australia's population of eighteen million were immigrants or children of immigrants (a proportion not exceeded in the US, even at the height of its 'new' immigration influx at the turn of the century). Approximately half of those who arrived annually in Australia during the 1980s–1990s were from countries in Asia. The proportion of overseas-born from areas which traditionally had dominated Australia's immigrant intake—the UK and Ireland—fell to about thirty per cent. Yet it was the increased social complexity of its population, rather than its numerical growth, which was the most significant feature—and determinant—of the fundamental transformation of modern Australia. From the late 1960s the twin pillars of Australian immigration and settlement policies—preference for Europeans and overt pressures for assimilation—crumbled with unexpectedly little resistance.

The transformation of Australian society and culture embodied in these ethno-demographic and policy changes were linked in complex ways to developments in the US and the Asia-Pacific generally. Paradoxically, perhaps, the example of America's struggle to contain the consequences of persistent internal diversity helped to shape political interventions in Australia which were designed to manage and control the consequences of pluralism. These policies coalesced under the phrase 'multiculturalism'. Inherent in the reasons for abandoning its Eurocentric immigration priorities were equally powerful incentives for Australia to modify its efforts to assimilate all communities, whether they be immigrant or indigenous, into an homogenous national society. From the mid-1960s, especially, Australian discourses on 'race' and 'ethnicity' increasingly incorporated the language and symbols of the US. But when transplanted abroad, the distinctive character of the receiving society transformed the US example in unpredictable ways.

Efforts to encourage the seemingly natural process of assimilation of minority peoples dominated politics and scholarship in the US and Australia's before the watershed of the civil rights movement and the resurgence of 'ethnic consciousness' (the so-called 'ethnic explosion') in the late 1960s. Previously it was assumed by the core society that all migrant groups should be assimilated into the broader national community. At the heart of this drive was a claim that gradual social acceptance, acculturation, and wider socio-economic opportunities are ultimately afforded to all groups in an increasingly undifferentiated society. As John Higham wrote of the US in 1968: 'we come finally to a paradox in assessing the impact of immigration ... in general it has enhanced the variety of American culture, yet the diversities seem in the long run to give way to an irresistible pressure towards uniformity.'<sup>33</sup>

Thus, immigrant-receiving democratic states were assumed to respond equitably to the needs of all citizens—regardless of ethnic differences. While the cultural pluralities of the society were acknowledged, these were assumed to be impermanent and to be mediated fairly by an open, competitive political system and economy. Cultural pluralism, in this context, was unproblematic as it did not contradict broad processes of assimilation. However, as developments in both Australia and US during the postwar years starkly revealed, attempts to apply rigid assimilation models to the actual dynamics of intergroup relations in societies made up of diverse 'racial', ethnic or cultural groups could not succeed. Indeed, in the area of 'race' and ethnic relations, 'pluralism' was increasingly used to describe fairly permanent patterns of cultural division, inequality and stratification, as well as informal 'racial' segregation. In the absence of clear patterns of emerging assimilation and equity in mixed society, ruling elites were obliged to confront the segmented and unequal nature of social relations.

Throughout the turbulent 1960s and 1970s US experiences were constantly invoked to warn Australian officials of the likely consequences of a laissez fair approach to immigration and migrant settlement. For example, M L Kovacs and A J Cropley cautioned that assimilation pressures alienated newcomers and their children, leading to social marginalisation and psychological trauma. '[T]his throwing of the immigrant into the mainstream of American life, without concessions or support', they argued, was a 'model for receiving immigrants' that Australia must *not* follow. If Australia was

to avert the growth of “prejudice”, “discrimination”, “segregation”, ethnic “stereotypes”, and the “alienation” of ethnic communities’, Kovacs and Cropley asserted, Australian politics must not only accept but actively encourage cultural pluralism. ‘Multiculturalism’, a strategy promoting ethnic group ‘social uniqueness and diversity’, was invoked as a vehicle for preventing immigrant-receiving Australia from becoming a mirror image of US experiences. As multicultural policies developed in Australia, many bureaucrats, scholars and commentators accepted that it was ‘highly relevant to examine the American experience’.<sup>34</sup>

If those contesting Australia’s prescriptive assimilation aims looked to trends in the US, so too did the proponents and opponents of immigration law reform. Even some who welcomed immigration reform from the late 1960s were, like those opposed to change, adamant that they did ‘not want to see any Little Rock in the country’. Donald Horne observed perceptively: ‘Australians tend to argue from extreme examples of inter-racial disturbance and they say it mustn’t happen here. Only a madman would want to cause racial disturbance deliberately, but the examples given by apologists are irrelevant to Australia. Absurdly their usual example is the United States’. Social conflicts symbolised by ‘Sharpeville’ and ‘Notting Hill’ also exacerbated the concern of Australian conservatives, even if the US remained the center of their alarmist fears.<sup>35</sup>

The roots of Australia’s formal acceptance of multiculturalism lay in a growing belief that the assimilation of ethnic communities was neither natural nor necessary. The policy acknowledged the informal preferences of immigrant groups to live within their traditional communities and family patterns—patterns reflected in the neighbourhoods and broader social geography of immigrant-receiving nations. At the same time, multiculturalism symbolised a growing recognition internationally that social equity and civil rights were implicitly denied by efforts to assimilate ethnic communities and erase cultural differences. In short, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, in both North America and Australia, assimilation was widely interpreted as unworkable and unjust. Equally unacceptable were efforts to use immigration restrictions to avert social or cultural diversity within the nation—especially that rooted in ‘racial’ categorisations. Governments in the US and Australia were obliged to dismantle immigration policies built on racist premises which

unashamedly privileged social homogeneity over ethnic and social diversity. In the US the challenges of the 'new ethnicity' of the 1960s–1970s were not translated into a broadly institutionalised political response. In contrast, on a formal level at least, growing recognition of ethnicity in Australia resulted in an explicit and more coherent political response, 'multiculturalism'—a response designed partly to contain the manifestations of competitive pluralism so evident in the US.

North American example was an important influence, helping to break down barriers to open immigration in other race-conscious nations. In 1965, the US Immigration Act ended restrictions on entry by peoples from beyond Europe—restrictions which had mirrored discriminatory practices under the so-called White Australia Policy. It was not merely coincidental that, beginning in the following year, the racist Australian policy was progressively dismantled. The erosion of restrictive immigration laws by the late 1960s opened Australia's borders to more diverse waves of migration. At the same time, it challenged the nation to develop more tolerant and equitable settlement policies than those promoting assimilation which had confronted the various immigrants arriving from South and Eastern Europe who made Australia their home after 1945. By the late 1970s, the celebratory label of multiculturalism symbolised the adaptation of Australian cultural and political life to ethnic and demographic changes which were eroding its insularity. The acceptance of cultural pluralism and its formal political reflection, multiculturalism, developed symbiotically with the pressures to end 'White Australia'. And the origins of Australia's multicultural policies lay partly in American experiences and precedents. However, in practice, the two states have followed different 'multicultural' initiatives. Scholarly and political discourses over multiculturalism have also followed increasingly different paths in the two societies.

In the mid-1960s the Canadian Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism adopted the term 'multicultural' to describe that nation's polyethnic society. By 1972, the Whitlam Government in Australia had initiated a range of initiatives which merged into an explicit policy known as 'multiculturalism'. Some conservative politicians, commentators and many from the so-called Anglo-Australian (or 'core') culture resisted these initiatives, claiming they were an unwarranted assault on assimilation and the

cultural cohesion essential for national survival. Typically, critics cited US experiences, arguing that 'Australians do not want self-perpetuating enclaves and undigested minorities', and that Australia 'should not support policies aimed at permitting—or actively encouraging—the migration of substantial groups of different ethnic origins'. Hostility to pluralism never disappeared. Indeed, it resurfaced periodically throughout the 1980s and 1990s in bitter contests over immigration, ethnic difference, 'race', and Aboriginal rights. However, the view that Australia should remain 'cohesive', 'undivided', and without 'permanent minorities' failed to defeat the formal acceptance of multiculturalism, just as it had earlier failed to maintain racist immigration laws.<sup>36</sup>

Yet official multiculturalism sought, ultimately, to constrain 'ethnic' cultural and political expressions even as it ostensibly celebrated difference. Many proponents of multiculturalism conceded that diversity should be managed by the state if the social conflict evident in other mixed societies was to be averted. James Jupp, for example, obliquely cited American experience in his explanation of why Australia developed legislative programs to shape its emerging multicultural character. 'Australian governments have adopted multiculturalism because it makes sense, not because the cities were burning', he claimed. Fear that uncontrolled diversity would foster ghettos and urban violence remained central to the arguments of those liberals anxious to foster government interventions in the name of multiculturalism. It was also a central concern for those conservatives hostile to a widening migrant intake and to the very prospect of a multicultural state.<sup>37</sup>

In official discourses, references to the US were often oblique, invoking images of tragic division in societies unable to contain 'racial' and cultural contests. The Office of Multicultural Affairs offered such a justification in marketing 'multiculturalism': 'Overseas experience has shown the often tragic consequences that occur when societies are unable or unwilling to integrate newcomers, especially in situations in which some minority groups find themselves restricted by barriers of prejudice or culture from enjoying the same opportunities as the host society'.<sup>38</sup> Yet political interventions by Australian governments designed ostensibly to abandon assimilation and promote integration through cultural pluralism, differed markedly from those pursued in the US.

Under the watershed US Civil Rights Act of 1964, especially Article VII, employment discrimination based on 'race', colour, sex, religion and national origin was outlawed. Seven years later this clause was, in effect, amended by Congress, forming a central part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. By the late 1970s the politicisation of issues growing out of civil rights legislation focused bitterly on affirmative action (and conservative's claims that such action legitimised preferential treatment of 'racial minorities' and women). Unlike most debates over critical moral questions, as Michael Rosenfeld points out: 'Both the most ardent advocates of affirmative action and its most vehement foes loudly proclaim[ed] their allegiance to the ideal of equality'.<sup>39</sup> In Australia, broadly similar contests emerged. Yet here they focused largely on discrimination based on gender, rather than 'race' or ethnicity. As Sykes astutely noted in 1987: In Australia the term 'equal rights' has been hijacked by the women's movement, and where 'equal opportunity' and 'equal rights' refer to equitable participation of Blacks in the US, they refer only to the rights of women in this country.<sup>40</sup> While the titles of some antidiscrimination legislation in Australia borrowed from US acts, the substance of the Australian legislation did not closely mirror US practices. Nor did US initiatives quickly influence Australia. Apart from distinctive legislation aimed at individual acts of 'racial discrimination' or so-called 'racial vilification', significant Australian legislation was gender focused, expressed in the *Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act 1986*, and the *Sex Discrimination Act 1984*. Importantly, the 1986 Act specifically refuted the use of quotas by stressing that nothing in the Act should be interpreted as requiring a relevant employer to take any action incompatible with the principle that employment matters should be dealt with on the basis of merit. In Australia, efforts to reduce or remove systematic discrimination were essentially limited to 'passive non-discrimination' and did not extend to 'affirmative action' and preferential hiring of 'minority' groups or women—limitations reflected for example in the early South Australian *Prohibition of Discrimination Act 1966*. However, some exceptions must be acknowledged—especially in the field of state legislation in areas of Aboriginal public employment and education.<sup>41</sup>

Efforts to institutionalise ethnic political organisations, most importantly through the Ethnic Community Councils in 1974–76,

derived from specific concerns over exploitation of NES immigrant workers, especially unskilled women, and the failure of the trade union movement and ALP to recognise the exploitation and powerlessness of so-called 'ethnic' Australians. The Whitlam Government's *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* made unlawful discrimination on the grounds of 'race', colour, descent, or ethnic or national origin, but was directed particularly at discrimination confronting migrant workers who the Commission of Community Relations acknowledged as 'the largest single group of workers in the community which has claimed it suffers general pervasive and widespread discrimination'.<sup>42</sup> Subsequent Acts directed explicitly at racial discrimination or racial vilification applied equally to the conditions experienced by members of different ethnic communities, as well as Aboriginal communities. In official discourses, at least, 'race' often unproblematically encompassed 'ethnicity'. In contrast, popular discourses implicitly separated questions of 'race', centred particularly on indigenous and 'Asian' communities, from labels of ethnicity associated with communities descended from postwar immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe.

If Australian political culture referred to Affirmative Action and Equal Employment Opportunity legislation in the US, the implementation and trajectory of such programs differed in the two societies. Most significantly, US programs focused far more on institutional 'racial discrimination' than did Australian laws. Education and job quotas based on proportional access for 'racial minorities' were central to US practices—at least until 1996 when California and Texas initiated referenda outlawing affirmative action by proscribing the use of ethnic, racial or gender preferences in the activities of state government. Australia's various anti-racism Acts were directed at expressions of individual prejudice and discrimination, stopping short of elaborate group based affirmative quotas (referred to pejoratively by critics in both the US and Australia as 'reverse discrimination'). Unlike the broader debate over so-called political correctness (PC), the assault on affirmative action in the US in the mid-1990s passed with little comment in Australia—although some conservatives still attempted to dismiss programs seeking equality for indigenous Australians as unacceptable evidence of reverse discrimination and special treatment.

The different formal expressions of multiculturalism, along with the virtual absence of controversial 'racial quota' legislation in Australia, robbed local opponents of PC of a target exploited by their US counterparts. In Australia opposition to multiculturalism did not strongly resonate, as it did in the US, with complaints about reverse discrimination or 'race based' quotas which allegedly contradicted fundamental notions of individual equality under the law. Recently, however, Pauline Hanson's 'One Nation' Party has assaulted Aboriginal Australians as privileged by special legislation and exceptional recognition of their rights as distinct from those of so-called middle (European) Australians. Aware of the opposition to PC in the US, Hanson's rhetoric plays heavily on references to the 'inequality' of the white majority which is allegedly denied the advantage of 'reverse' discrimination.<sup>43</sup> Visiting Americans, with links to extreme right anti-government groups, including the remnants of the Ku Klux Klan, fuel One Nation's rhetoric and rallies with the so-called lessons of rampant multiculturalism and PC in the US.

Before Hanson's party was formed, Sneja Gunew concluded that: "The 'political correctness' (PC) controversy in the US is beginning to intrude on Australian debate, but there seems to be little awareness of the controversy's origins and specific resonances within North America'.<sup>44</sup> America's 'culture wars' were fought largely across intellectual divides. Australia's cultural contests were more pragmatic and conventionally political. In both nations, however, the debate encoded an ongoing struggle by an old core culture to retain hegemony through a social consensus that disempowered and marginalised others.

In legislative and managerial terms, at least, Australia has pioneered domestic initiatives which accept a level of cultural pluralism. In contrast, the US has not felt obliged to develop equally elaborate social, economic or cultural policies under an official rubric of multiculturalism. Indeed, the very concept of multiculturalism and the privileging of ethnic differences are more strenuously resisted by a powerful alliance of conservative groups in the US than in Australia. In the US, far more than in Australia, 'multiculturalism' has been submerged in vitriolic disputes over PC. As Joan Scott has observed of the US: 'if "political correctness" is the label attached to critical attitudes and behaviour, "multiculturalism" is the program it is said to be attempting to



enact'.<sup>45</sup> In sharpening contrast to Australia's institutional efforts to manage diversity through 'multiculturalism', in the US 'multiculturalism' is an ill-defined term employed especially by those hostile to groups viewed as unsympathetic to European cultural norms and the so-called western intellectual cannon. These allegedly disruptive groups include prominent 'social' or ethnic communities, especially African Americans, Hispanics and Asians, as well as a broad alliance of movements promoting 'identity politics' and/or politics critical of the consensual Anglo-American centre (especially gays, ecologists, feminists, and intellectuals linked to postcolonial and poststructuralist enterprises). Despite the very different institutional and polemical trajectories of 'multiculturalism' in Australia and the US, debate over cultural pluralism and empowerment have become central to political discourses in both nations. Gunew concludes her discussion of multicultural multiplicities appropriately:

Questions of cultural/racial difference raised under the banner of multiculturalism have provided an impetus to challenge the traditional production of knowledge, with all its institutional boundaries and its universalist propositions and truth claims. It has also become clear that if questions of cultural difference are not linked to analysis of power inequalities—both in access to resources and in structures of legitimation—then we are lost in the maze of liberal pluralism that Todd Gitlin calls 'the shopping center of identity politics'.<sup>46</sup>

A body of Eurocentric scholars, led by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., has attacked multiculturalism as a threat to ideals that bind the US and Americans together. 'Pressed too far, the cult of ethnicity has unhealthy consequences', Schlesinger argued, 'the balance is shifting from *unum* to *pluribus*. Group separatism crystallises differences, magnifies tensions, intensifies hostilities'.<sup>47</sup>

Other commentators hostile to 'political correctness', notably expatriate Australian Robert Hughes, have argued that while the US has 'always been a heterogeneous country', the pursuit of multiculturalism endangers national cohesion and purpose, causing 'The Fraying of America'. Like Schlesinger, Hughes fears that multiculturalism means 'cultural separatism within the larger whole of America—a Balkanized culture'. Formal political recognition of

cultural difference defies, in Hughes's view, the fundamental unity of the nation state and contradicts consensus.<sup>48</sup>

In Australia, also, the 'cult of multiculturalism' is criticised by some ever-anxious to preserve the privileges of the 'core culture'. As might be expected, some Anglo-Australians do remain disturbed by their nation's accelerating diversity. And, like their relatively more influential counterparts in late nineteenth-century Australia, these critics often cite the deep social fissures and periodic public violence in the US, as emotional warnings of Australia's possible future. Conservative commentators in Australia still routinely use the spectre of US 'race relations' to attack cultural pluralism at home. 'We must learn from US Divide', B A Santamaria argued in the aftermath of the O J Simpson trial:

Although nothing even remotely approaching the racial problems of the US exists in Australia, the never ending insistence on multiculturalism has created incipient problems that should be taken in hand early rather than late. In a potentially hostile geopolitical environment, Australia cannot afford to encourage threats to national unity that come from constant insistence on racial and cultural differences.<sup>49</sup>

Commentators hostile to Australia's increasingly plurality conveniently ignore historical and demographic differences between their nation and the US, conflating colour, ethnicity and Aboriginality into categories of incipient separatism and inevitable conflict in both societies. Indeed, many proponents of multiculturalism embraced it as a policy for managing diversity and constraining the possible consequences of so-called ethnic tribalism. Official policy betrays the qualified agenda of multiculturalism. It emphasises that all residents 'should have an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia', and carefully defines the maintenance of ethnic identity as 'the right of all Australians, *within carefully defined limits*, to express and share their cultural heritage, including language and religion'.<sup>50</sup>

The contradictions growing from global integration and the postcolonial revival of 'racial' and ethnic differences are mirrored within the self-consciously 'multicultural' Australian state. As Castles et al observe:

The Australian model of multiculturalism, with its complex and ambiguous balance between separatism of the varied groups, and

cohesion of society as a whole, is one—relatively successful and peaceful—way of managing this contradiction. Yet it is inherently unstable, because the institution on which it is premised—the nation-state as the fundamental human collective—has itself become questionable. This is apparent on three interrelated levels: the economic, the cultural and the political.<sup>51</sup>

It would be facile to attribute either the particular role of the Australian state in managing ethnic diversity, or the dynamic manifestations of ethnic cultural invention, to imported models. The roots and fundamental character of these processes lie in the particular and shared histories of the various communities and individuals who continue to give expression to their cultures within Australia. And in the 1990s the discussion and politics of multiculturalism feed overwhelmingly on local circumstances—not on commonalities with the 'racial' or ethnic histories of the US, or other multicultural projects like those of Canada or Brazil.

US examples continue to influence debate and politics centred on cultural pluralism in Australia. But these examples are very often rejected or modified by a largely unsympathetic Australian nation. Today, US experiences have relatively little bearing on domestic Australian practices or policies. Australia's overriding economic links with Asia have significantly deflated debate over 'race', ethnic differences or the future of multiculturalism. It is an index of Australia's newfound national maturity and independence that US experiences and examples exert far less influence on contemporary Australia than they did in the debates over 'race' and immigration a century ago, or in the civil rights era of the 1960s and 1970s. The discourses and practises of multiculturalism and indigenous rights in contemporary Australia increasingly reflect its distinct social patterns, separate national interests and particular cultural expressions.

Contemporary Australia's embrace of elaborate programs to promote multiculturalism is not without irony. A nation defined as recently as the 1960s by 'racial' and ethnic exclusiveness, now formally defines itself as tolerant and plural. The realities of Australia's social practises often fall well short of the pluralist rhetoric and legislation which sustain them. Yet there can be little doubt that ideologies of multiculturalism, in their many manifestations, are the central feature of contemporary Australian life and collective identity. They are accepted by an insecure core

society to contain cultural differences within the state, while simultaneously projecting the nation abroad as distant from its distinctly racist past and from the social conflicts of other mixed societies.

## Decline or Renewal?

### The Debate Over American Empire in the Late Twentieth Century\*

*Reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated*  
Mark Twain

Paul Kennedy's scholarly history of *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, precipitated a major debate when it was published in 1987. It gave added substance to a recent focus in American intellectual and ideological fashion, the discussion of 'declinism'. Already books predicting the collapse of capitalism (or at the very least a repeat of 1929) had made it on to the best seller lists and the talk show circuit. An ageing President seemed to some the very symbol of the nation's inadequacies and decline; unprecedented budget and trade deficits, and the stock market crash of October 1987 fuelled America's growing insecurity; and the spectre of a rising Japan and a resurgent, united Europe confirmed the worst fears of those who believed the

\* Although focusing on very different public debates about American power, the following two essays address broadly similar issues: questions relating to the persistence of the 'American empire', the unilateral exercise of power, and the unstable nature of America's hegemonic authority in the post-Cold War era.

American Empire was entering an irreversible phase of decline. Against this background, Kennedy's long and sophisticated book proved remarkably popular.

Kennedy was not alone in arguing for declinism. Nor, indeed, did he initiate the debate over it. In some respects, the debate revisited a much earlier one which Richard Nixon stimulated. In 1972, Nixon observed that the pre-eminent position of the US in global affairs must inevitably decline as the rigid bipolar configuration of the Cold War gave way to a genuinely multipolar world in which the US, the USSR, a united Europe, Japan and China were all important participants. More recently, during the 1980s Japan's conspicuous economic power provoked mounting concern over the impending eclipse of American economic, industrial and technological supremacy. In *The Reckoning*, published a year before Kennedy's book, David Halberstam captured this growing uncertainty. 'In just twenty-five years we have gone from the American century to the American crisis', Halberstam wrote: 'That is an astonishing turn around—perhaps the shortest parabola in history' (Halberstam, 1986).

Foreshadowing more closely the Kennedy thesis, Gore Vidal proclaimed in the mid-1980s that the American Empire was dead—economic indebtedness had overpowered its ability to maintain hegemony abroad. Like 'most modern empires', he wrote, 'ours rested not so much on military prowess as on economic primacy', and that primacy could not longer be sustained. In more moderate language prominent left historian Walter La Feber, writing at the same time as Kennedy, found the origins of America's decline, the eclipse of the 'American Age', in the decades after World War II. Against this background, the Kennedy thesis was hardly new. What was surprising, however, was the intensity with which it was received and discussed.

Kennedy's central hypothesis was that the US had, like its Great Power predecessors, now reached a point of 'imperial overreach' and was entering a long phase of irreversible decline. In an increasingly multipolar world, he argued, the power and authority of the US, relative to that of other major nation states, was gradually slipping. Kennedy shifted easily from broad correlations to caution, and embraced a cyclical notion of historical change, in arguing that the US is in a circumstance similar to that which had, eventually,

afflicted all major imperial states. 'It has been a common dilemma facing previous "number one" countries', he wrote:

that even as their relative economic strength is ebbing, the growing foreign challenges to their position have compelled them to allocate more and more of their resources into the military sector, which in turn squeezes out productive investment and, over time, leads to the downward spiral of slower growth, heavier taxes, deepening domestic splits over spending priorities, and a weakening capacity to bear the burdens of defense.

While aware that the immediate postwar years were aberrant, in that they witnessed a dramatic growth of US economic power relative to that of a devastated Europe and Japan, Kennedy nevertheless argued that America's decline had been continuous over the long-term. In other words, decline was, and is, deeply embedded in changes to the global political economy in the twentieth century, and is more than a short-term relative slip highlighted by the recovery of other economies from the ravages of World War II. 'The US share of world GNP, which declined naturally since 1945', Kennedy asserted, 'has declined more quickly than it should have over the last few years'.

Others, like political scientist David Calleo, went further. 'Thanks to economic strain and mismanagement', he claimed, 'relative decline has begun to turn absolute'. In *Beyond American Hegemony* also published in 1987, Calleo concluded: 'The United States has become a hegemony in decay, set on a course that points to an ignominious end' (Calleo, 1987: 220). John Agnew wrote in the same year, in his excellent study, *The United States in the World Economy*, 'In the period since the late 1960s the United States has reached an impasse in its previously hegemonic position within the world economy. Evidence of relative decline abounds' (Agnew, 1987: 202). Working from a series of long-term economic indicators, Aaron L. Friedberg reached a very similar conclusion: '[S]ince the end of World War II the United States has certainly experienced a substantial erosion in its relative economic preponderance'. 'Question of causality aside', he wrote in words which capture the subject of this discussion, 'the central issues are how far that erosion has proceeded to date and whether and to what extent it is likely to continue into the future'.

Nor has America's self-proclaimed recent victory in the Cold War stemmed the tide of 'declinist' prophesy. Walter Russell Mead

cautioned that any euphoria over events in Eastern Europe would simply divert Americans from a crisis at home. The United States, he proclaimed, was *On the Road to Ruin*, having simultaneously won the Cold War and lost the economic peace. 'Fifty years ago, the United States was the wonder of the world: a rare combination of Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Japan. We had enormous quantities of strategic minerals, the largest oil reserves in the world, vast stocks of food, and the most dynamic industrial economy of any nation.' Mead (Mead, 1990: 63–64) claimed:

At the end of World War II, other advantages were added to these. We were the only major country whose economy and infrastructure had not been destroyed by the war. No one else had a merchant marine capable of handling such a flow of goods in international trade. We have accumulated an enormous gold reserve. We have the best equipped army in the world and an unchallengeable navy and air force. We enjoyed an atomic monopoly, made all the more useful by our demonstration that we possessed the will to use the bomb. These weapons have fallen from our hands. Our oil production is no longer adequate for our own uses. World markets in minerals and food are glutted. Our industrial economy has lost its supremacy—it is, at best, first among equals. We now owe foreigners more than Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico combined; Germany and Japan can set the value of the dollar.

This is the road to Argentina ... There is nothing inevitable about the future. But to avoid a fate like that of Argentina, the United States will need to stop gloating about winning the Cold War and start to assess, soberly, its place in the global economy

Decline scenarios have taken many forms. Ultimately, however, all centre on a small body of long-term economic indicators, most notably:

1. The United States share of total world economic output fell dramatically from 45 per cent in the 1940s and the early 1950s, to less than 25 per cent in the decades from 1960;
2. The United States's share of total world manufacturing production fell from 'nearly one half in 1945 to less than one-third in 1980', falling further in the decade since;
3. The proportion of world exports supplied by the United States has fallen from twenty-six per cent in 1960 to only eighteen per cent in 1980;



4. Foreign penetration of the domestic United States market has risen from a low 4.5 per cent as late as 1965 to 13.5 per cent by 1980. This tendency has been accentuated in the 1980s by further increases in foreign ownership especially by the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan;
5. United States dominance in technological innovation, and the manufacture and sale of 'high-tech' products has been seriously challenged;
6. The United States had become, in the 1980s, an indebted nation with a significant trade imbalance, large budget deficit, and increasing levels of penetration by foreign capital;
7. During the 1980s, for the first time since the nineteenth century, 'total foreign holdings of American assets first equalled and then surpassed total American holdings of assets in foreign countries' (Friedberg, 1989, note 33).

Furthermore, the decline hypothesis has, in the view of some scholars at least, found additional support in recent events in Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War compounded, rather than reversed, America's decline. The more complex multipolar configuration of the world of the late twentieth century presented the US with new difficulties rather than new opportunities. According to Robert Kuttner, for example, the world is 'slouching towards Pluralism'—a change which heralds the 'end to the American Century'. 'The sudden prospect of detente with the East further complicates this picture', he writes:

for it invites Western Europe and Japan to effect their own rapprochement with the USSR and Eastern Europe. This prospect appalls Washington, whose leadership is predicated on the value of its military protectorate to Japan and Western Europe. As detente becomes more likely, the United States finds it even harder to pursue its own economic self-interest within the noncommunist economic and political alliance, lest Tokyo and Bonn cease behaving as loyal client states. In short, the domestic costs of American hegemony grow ever greater. (Kuttner, 1990: 226)

According to the Kennedy thesis, such economic changes are evidence of 'imperial overreach'. Yet even Kennedy is not totally convinced that the United States has entered a period of long-term irreversible decline. At most, he argues, the hegemonic nation will

experience a relative decline in its economic and military power. It will never again be as dominant, or as dominating, as it was in the decades immediately after World War II. While implying that the United States will follow the Great Power cycle of rise and fall, he is ultimately ambivalent about this. The 'only answer to the question increasingly debated by the public of whether the United States can preserve its existing position is "no"', he argues. At the same time, however, he does not expect the United States to follow the path of Spain, the Netherlands, or even the United Kingdom, and, he concludes equivocally that if the United States manages its affairs adroitly the '*relative* erosion' of its global position should take place 'slowly and smoothly' (Kennedy, 1987: 533–534). In a less guarded moment Kennedy observed, reassuringly for his American audience: 'I am very far from composing a dirge for the United States':

The hope, as I see it, is for the United States to take its place among the concert of nations fortified with the knowledge that it is, and with intelligence can remain, a great power, yet no longer perceiving itself as, or even desirous of being, the great power. (Kennedy, in Heilbroner, 1989: 37)

Clearly, Kennedy is not an unambiguous exponent of the decline thesis. He is simply its most celebrated (and perhaps misunderstood) representative. Thus the arguments, and evidence, advanced against 'declinism' are not necessarily identical with those which provided the building blocks for the critical appraisal of Kennedy's book.

Any summary of the arguments and evidence marshalled by the critics of the decline thesis must include the following points:

1. While the United States no longer dominates the international economy as it did in the immediate decades after World War II, these decades were aberrations and do not provide a genuine benchmark against which 'decline' or recovery can be measured. Unlike Europe, the USSR or Japan, the United States was not devastated by this conflict but emerged from it in a dominant economic position. If 1965, not 1945, is used as a benchmark, the United States' share of total global economic activity has not declined appreciably—it has hovered consistently between twenty per cent and twenty five per cent of total activity. Whether or not one finds evidence of economic 'decline' depends largely on the base year adopted for statistical

comparisons. As Friedberg has concluded, reference to America's diminished 'share of such large aggregated measures as total world output of goods and services' can mislead: 'After the disruption of the 1940s and the recovery of the 1950s, the United States may now simply have reverted to roughly its pre-war ranking' (Friedberg, 1989: 401);

2. The US remains the dominant global economic power. As Huntington and a host of conservative commentators have emphasised (in words which ironically sound like those of The New Left in the late 1960s):

In short, if 'hegemony' means having 40 percent or more of world economic activity (a percentage Britain never remotely approximated during its hegemonic years), American hegemony disappeared long ago. *If hegemony means producing 20 to 25 percent of the world product and twice as much as any other individual country, American hegemony looks quite secure.* (Huntington, 1988–89)

The current US share of Gross World Product is greater than that of Japan and the USSR combined, and is exceeded only marginally by the combined total share controlled by the twelve countries of the European Community;

3. US control over overseas banks grew dramatically after 1960. Its authority over the major financial and institutional instrumentalities of international capitalism has not significantly declined, despite the growth of a more integrated, multinational economy;
4. The massive budget deficit, a legacy of the Reagan years, is not a permanent difficulty and is now at a level which can be sustained without real damage to the overall strength of the national economy;
5. Problems associated with a large and growing trade deficit are not permanent structural features of the economy. These problems became serious only in 1982 and were being addressed, and in some cases reversed by 1988. Increased manufacturing productivity and efficiency, relatively low wage costs, rescheduling of Third World debts, and evidence that Japan will open its market more liberally to the US are cited as evidence that America's trade deficit, while a difficulty, is not an unambiguous symptom of national decline;
6. Despite its current, vast capital surplus, Japan's economic growth is slowing and, indeed, Japan confronts serious

structural difficulties which will limit its competitive abilities. Bill Emmott's study, *The Sun Also Sets* is often cited by those anxious to puncture the bubble of national hysteria over a resurgent Japan;

7. Whereas the US ranked about 15th out of 19 industrialised capitalist economies in terms of economic growth rates in the period 1965–80, it ranked third in the years 1980–86. Nor have the principal economic rivals of the US, namely Japan and the major European economies, grown at a faster rate than the US in the last decade. According to Huntington: 'The biggest economy has been getting bigger, absolutely and relatively' (Huntington, 1988–89);
8. There is no convincing evidence that the US is 'de-industrialising', as manufacturing has since 1945 held a fairly constant 20–22 per cent of total GNP;
9. Even if the US has experienced some slight relative loss of economic supremacy, this does not necessarily mean that it will be obliged to play a less dominant political or military role in international affairs. In other words, fragmentary evidence of short-term economic difficulties will not necessarily impinge negatively on a wider sphere of US activity. In short, the links between military power, political hegemony and economic expansion—on which Kennedy bases much of his argument about previous Great Powers—might no longer be necessary conditions of global Empire;
10. Events of the last twenty years, notably the rise of new economic powers in Europe and East Asia are not 'sweeping the world quickly and inevitably into an era of genuine multipolarity' (Friedberg, 1989: 401) Indeed, the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and the end of the Cold War suggest that America hegemony may be greater today than at any time since 1945;
11. Students of international political economy, like James Petras, argue that domestic structural advantages ensure the long-term triumph of American capitalism. According to Petras, the US is uniquely advantaged, relative to other capitalist states, by the nature of its domestic political and social relations. 'Lacking any organized class challenge to capitalist hegemony, US capitalism has an unlimited capacity to recuperate from economic crises without paying the political and social costs that its competitors must confront,' he argues:

Among the industrialized capitalist countries the US has among the highest rates of unemployment and the poorest social services, while providing the biggest subsidies to privately controlled research and challenge this allocation of goods and services, possessing a party system that maintains these priorities, and a trade union bureaucracy that actively supports both the allocations and the parties while harshly disciplining internal challengers—US capitalism is in an excellent position to ‘modernize’ industries, increase productivity and lower the cost of goods by maintaining high levels of unemployment and lowering the social costs of production. (Petras, 1976)

Moreover, the US has greater internal self-sufficiency, especially in natural resources and domestic market size, than any of its major rivals. It also has much easier access to global markets and resources than its smaller, less diversified and more dependent economic competitors;

12. Finally, it is argued, the economic slowdown which has affected the US since 1973 has also affected other major economies. Moreover, (and in flat contradiction to Kennedy’s ‘imperial overreach’ argument), America’s period of most rapid economic growth, 1945–73, coincided with the period when defense expenditures as a proportion of Gross National Product, were at their highest. The proportion fell from 8.6 per cent in 1945–73 to 5.7 per cent in 1974–88.

In essence, the intellectual attacks against declinism mounted by the likes of Huntington, Nye, Harries, Nau, Rosecrance and Kirkpatrick, have revolved around these specific ‘economic’ arguments. These critiques, like Kennedy’s assertions, are largely concerned with establishing America’s current economic and military position in the global community. Their arguments, however, are unduly narrow, infused with notions of American exceptionalism as a Great Power, and rooted in an unacknowledged but pervasive national chauvinism. The decline thesis can best be understood in a wider international and intellectual framework than that applied by most of its conservative critics.

Kennedy’s essentially cyclical understanding of the dynamics of international relations obscures fundamental linear changes in the international system. The far more integrated global capitalist system over which the US currently presides is less amenable to direct interference or influence than was the international economy

before the early 1970s. American hegemony is grounded in an informal empire: it is no longer a formal equivalent of the European empires of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As David Reynolds has emphasised, (1989: 485), today, formal hegemony 'is both more difficult and less necessary'. Or, as students of political economy emphasise, in late capitalism the central instrument of hegemony is no longer the traditional Great Power.

The rapid integration of the global economy, while largely a product of American policies and economic power, has had unexpected results for that nation. It helped the US to achieve a dominant position in the international political economy, but at the same time it has reduced the significance of national economies as the building blocks of the world economy. Transnational activities in production, distribution, marketing and finance now operate without reference to a particular national interest.

Indeed, the interests of the national economy and those of the transnational enterprises are often in conflict. For example, since the 1970s American investments abroad have grown rapidly while there has been a scarcity of capital for private and public investments within the nation. While the American state spends significantly from public funds to maintain the military-industrial complex at home and its military hegemony abroad, the benefits of this support flow increasingly to transnational enterprises with interests which do not necessarily coincide with those of the nation. In other words, the costs of hegemony are borne by the state, while the returns from this do not flow directly back to the nation state. Transnational corporations, multilateralism, and international deregulation (while far from complete) have meant that in many respects the state is withering away. (Agnew, 1987: 86–88; Calleo, 1982: 1951).

To interpret the nation state today as an isolated or exceptional entity is to use a category which is, if not obsolete, at least very misleading. Distinct national societies, cultures, as well as the boundaries between states, are increasingly difficult to specify. As Wallerstein (1984: 28) has argued, the idea of the national society 'presumes what is to be demonstrated—that the political dimension is the one that implies and delineates social action'. Rather, he argues, states are 'created institutions' operating in a world economy that has increasingly acquired boundaries much larger than those of any separate political unit. The modern global economy is not simply the sum of its 'national' parts. It is increasingly integrated,

covering broader fields and more diverse activities than at any time previously. Wallerstein's model of the 'core' and periphery is most useful in understanding these changes. He suggests that, as the central factor in the 'core' economy, the fate of the US is integrally linked with that of other metropolitan states. To view decline or renewal in strictly national terms is to miss elements of change and interaction common to the different tiers of the global economy. In Agnew's words, 'American hegemony has been achieved through an internationalisation of the world economy to an extent unknown in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries'. (1987: 7) Thus, judgements of America's continuing hegemony abroad which rely on aggregate national statistics necessarily exclude complex dimensions of its overall economic activity and performance. This, in turn, makes arguments about decline based on national statistics potentially inadequate and inaccurate.

Clearly, the nation state is not the sole player in international affairs. Nor can 'decline' or 'renewal' be measured simply in terms of an individual nation's aggregate economic well-being or ill health.

Additionally, the metaphor of 'decline', Joseph Nye Jr. has pointed out, is misleading and ambiguous:

Decline bundles together two quite different concepts: a decrease in external power, and internal deterioration or decay. A country, though, may experience decline in one sense but not in the other. For example, the Netherlands flourished internally in the seventeenth century but declined in power relatively, because other nations became stronger. Spain, in contrast, lost external power in part because it suffered an absolute economic decline from the 1620s to the 1680s (Nye, 1989).

While it might be anticipated that conservative scholars would focus on America's international power and military authority, more liberal and left scholars are equally concerned with domestic manifestations and implications of national 'decline'. In general, however, the debate triggered by Kennedy's book has been concerned with the nexus between aggregate national economic power and external military authority. Relationships between economic growth, political economy, and domestic social structure have rarely entered into the debate. Yet is it not axiomatic that a slow reduction in the relative economic might of the US will result in a significant decline in its military capabilities nor seriously weaken its

domestic economy. In addition, a nation's geopolitical authority is not necessarily linked to either its capacity or willingness to ensure that its people live in reasonable comfort with broad social equality. Living standards, not Gross National Product, might arguably be the most significant measure of a nation's status. National 'decline' or 'renewal' might best be measured in terms of a nation's ability to translate economic efficiency into social well-being.

Today the US might not be in the grip of 'imperial overreach'; but it is undoubtedly suffering from 'domestic underreach'—it has neither sought nor achieved broad social equality at home. It has failed to translate a long period of international hegemony into improved living standards for all, regardless of colour, gender, class or region. According to recent United Nations figures, the US currently ranks nineteenth on the so-called Human Development Index. This combines three measures: life expectancy, adult literacy, and an individual's purchasing power. When evaluated against such criteria, the US falls behind most of Europe (including parts of Eastern Europe), Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It might be argued that America's generally low living standards are endemic to it and have been fairly static over time. Thus these figures do not necessarily reflect a nation in decline. Equally, however, they could not be construed as evidence of 'renewal'. At the very least they underscore the fact that America's global economic and military supremacy has not brought with it generalised material well-being. This is hardly surprising, for the great Empires of the past have also been notable for generating national wealth and rigid class divisions at home, not for translating the profits of Empire into equality of opportunity or equality of condition for their citizens. The US may well decline further in its ability (and willingness) to provide affluence or abundance for its people. David Potter's *People of Plenty* might have existed, briefly, in the 1950s but they have declined as a segment of America's population since that exceptional decade. Growing public cynicism over politics and politicians has accompanied these widening social divisions. During the 1980s only about one in every two Americans bothered to participate in Presidential elections. A buoyant, celebratory nationalism gave way increasingly to feelings of uncertainty, alienation and powerlessness, especially among those people on the margins of American economic life. This reduced faith in America's democratic



institutions and values mirrored the nation's declining ability to meet the material needs of all citizens with fairness and equity.

However, it does not follow that America's inability (or reluctance) to satisfy the material needs of all of its people will reflect the eclipse of its global economic or military hegemony. Domestic decline, as measured by living standards, social inequality and political (non) participation, may well accompany continued supremacy in international affairs.

A similar argument could be mounted in relation to America's international status and internal regional inequalities. While US economic power may rise or fall, such changes will have differential effects on different geographic, as well as class, segments of domestic America. In a most subtle and important recent study, *The United States in the World Economy: A Regional Geography*, John Agnew has demonstrated: 'The history of American involvement with the world economy is also a history of [domestic] regional growth and decline'. He argues that the long period 'of political and economic *domination* by the businesses and politicians of the Northeast' has ended, and concludes:

Since the 1940s, but especially since the late 1960s, the western and southern regions have experienced much higher rates of economic growth and increased political influence relative to the Northeast. As this pattern is still emerging it is hard to say what the final outcome will be. Hence the characterization of this period as one of volatility (Agnew, 1989: 23, 89).

Differential rates and types of regional 'decline' or 'renewal', rather than broadly uniform economic change across the nation, are, in Agnew's informed view, inevitable results of America's changing place in global economic arrangements.




The wide readership attracted to Kennedy's book and the critical reception given it, implied that at the very least, the US public found the idea of American hegemony and American Empire accurate and comforting descriptions of their nation's global position throughout this century. Twenty years before, the New Left and revisionist historians had been dismissed by the academic establishment for proffering similar assessments of America's dominant and dominating global role. Debate over Kennedy's book accepted as axiomatic that the twentieth century was the American century. So deeply rooted in economic power, military strength, and political

authority was this American Empire that, in the opinion of most commentators and academics, it would easily overcome shifts in global power which might accompany a revitalised Japan, a dynamic Pacific rim economy or a united Europe. I see little reason to doubt either the New Left's earlier definition of American Empire or the more recent confident prediction of the conservative academic establishment that this Empire will remain the dominant force in international life for the foreseeable future. Reports of America's decline and impending death have been greatly exaggerated. But if the criteria of decline embrace domestic life as well as international power, then the decline thesis is highly relevant to an understanding of contemporary America. The United States has not become 'The Great Society' anticipated by Lyndon Johnson, but it remains 'The Great Power'.

Public obsessions and international politics have changed fundamentally since 'declinism' and 'imperial overreach' first entered American political rhetoric. The public, academics and talk-show celebrities scarcely had time to become afflicted with such symptoms of national malaise when their self-indulgent pessimism was punctured by revolutionary upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Significantly, the pessimism of declinism has, since the eruptions in Eastern Europe, given way to the celebratory rhetoric of 'endism'—a view that the US and its values have triumphed in the last major international contest, the Cold War. This victory represents the universalisation of liberalism, democracy and capitalism. Believing like Thomas Paine that 'the cause of America is in great measure the cause of mankind', proponents of 'endism' argue that the end of the Cold War brought an end to history as it marked the end of fundamental conflict between nations and ideologies. In the words of its most celebrated exponent, a State Department official with the unlikely name of Francis Fukuyama, events of 1989 constituted the 'unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism' and the 'exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives' (Fukuyama, 1989). With Marxism finally buried the US, it seems, is now free to celebrate the international triumph of its interests and values. Rather than acknowledge relative or absolute national decline in the late twentieth century, 'endism' is a reaffirmation of the triumph and universality of the American Century. As a manifestation of American insularity and ideological

tenacity, 'endism' is a fascinating new phenomenon. As an understanding of America's actual place in the global political economy it has no more substance than the popular 'declinist' mythology which it so quickly pushed aside.



## **The Limits to Hegemony: American Foreign Policy Options and War in Iraq**

*No society has more firmly insisted on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, or more passionately asserted that its own values were universally applicable.*

Henry Kissinger

*Of course, terrorism and instability are the reverse face of empire.*

Norman Mailer<sup>1</sup>

‘America is unique in time and space’, Joseph Joffe has very recently proclaimed: ‘the suite of its interests, the weight of its resources and the margin of its usable power are unprecedented’. Discussion of ‘unipolarity’ and references to the US as a unique superpower—a hyper-power—today usually predicates assessment of its rapidly expanding international presence. In the words of the French foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, US ‘power and influence are not comparable to anything known in modern history’. The implications of the ‘new’ American empire are now widely debated—despite Niall Ferguson’s surprising claim that it is an empire that ‘does not speak its name’. Ferguson writes that modern America is ‘an empire in denial’; an empire ‘that does not recognise its own power’. Yet

America's imperial reach is widely recognised abroad. It is generally perceived as an exceptional empire rooted in unrivalled economic power, military authority, technological strength, and cultural appeal: an empire uniquely able to project both 'hard power' and 'soft power'. The US has never been more powerful, or more willing to engage internationally. Yet this ubiquitous global presence inevitably provokes deep resistances and escalates international divisions as it confronts an unstable global order.<sup>2</sup>

American authority is unprecedented—even if, as in the Cold War, the exercise of this power is ultimately circumscribed. It has become routine to speak of imperial America, although it is usually conceded even by its sternest critics that the US is not a conventional territorial empire. In Michael Ignatieff's words, the US 'is the only nation that polices the world through five global military commands; maintains more than a million men and women at arms on four continents; deploys carrier battle groups on watch in every ocean; guarantees the survival of countries from Israel to South Korea; drives the wheels of global trade and commerce; and fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires'.<sup>3</sup> Announcing the 'new era' in US national security strategy in December 2002, the State Department noted routinely: 'Today the US enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence' (and, in language consistent of official claims in the American Century it added: 'we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage'). The Bush Doctrine articulated in response to the September 11 attacks put unilateralism at the very centre of American policy: it unambiguously asserted that 'the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others'.<sup>4</sup>

The nature and impact of terrorism since September 11, 2001, expresses radical changes in international politics. These are rooted in the globalisation of communications and militarism: globalisation has simultaneously made the world's people and regions interdependent and precipitated new fault lines of conflict. In this newly complex international environment, conventional great power supremacy does not guarantee security at home or supremacy abroad. Despite the unprecedented asymmetry of state power today, the internationalising of new technologies has given radical political groups and so-called rogue states unprecedented—and largely unanticipated—capacities to wage terror campaigns across national

borders. William Greider has written in *Fortress America: The American Military and the Consequences of Peace*, that a 'deadly irony is embedded in the potential of these new technologies' in information technology and weaponry: Smaller, poorer nations may be able to defend themselves on the cheap against the intrusion of America's overwhelming military strength' and invoke terrorism against civilian targets.<sup>5</sup> Thus as September 11 demonstrated, all states are vulnerable regardless of their military power. The inconclusive war in Afghanistan, along with the aftermath of the assault against Iraq, highlights the ambiguous results arising from the exercise of unilateral power in the current unstable and unpredictable global environment. Although militarily successful in the short-term in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States continues to shoulder the obligations of an occupying power responsible for 'nation building' in deeply factionalised and unstable non-western societies. At the same time, its very military presence and efforts to impose political order invite charges of American imperialism and stimulate anti-Americanism. In short, American intervention threatens to aggravate the very circumstances ostensibly responsible for breeding terrorist assaults against it. However unpalatable to opinion in the US or the west, the identification of America as a 'rogue superpower' resonates with many in the so-called Arab or Islamic world, and with large numbers of its critics everywhere. US political interventions abroad—especially those without broad multilateral support—threaten to deepen resistance to American policies and to intensify what Chalmers Johnson and others have labelled 'blowback'—violent retaliation against America's military actions and global cultural presence.<sup>6</sup> More broadly, the implicit (and at times, explicit) embrace of a rhetoric of 'good' and 'evil', or a 'clash of civilisations' model to explain terrorism or rationalise responses to it, can only deepen the obstacles to agreed international action in a world divided very differently from that of the Cold War era.

The September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and the Pentagon provoked a chorus of anguished observations that the world and America had changed, utterly, and could never be the same again.<sup>7</sup> Certainly the nature of the attacks and the televised spectacle they presented were unique. They suggested to many that international conflict between organised states pursuing traditional national interests had been replaced by random terrorist acts—acts linked by

fundamentalist ideology and deep resentments against western and American hegemony in the modern world. September 11 starkly symbolised the vulnerability of the United States—and other western states—to a new type of warfare. And it confronted them with an elusive and ill-defined enemy against which to retaliate. September 11 suggested that the nature of terrorism had changed. However, precedents are evident in numerous terrorist actions against US and western interests from the late 1970s. And, as Peter Rogers and others have correctly pointed out that: ‘the methodology and scale of Islamic anti-American violence changed, but the shift was incremental, not fundamental. How quickly the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre seems to have been forgotten’.<sup>8</sup>

Initially, Washington’s response was considered as it downplayed unilateralism and successfully enlisted European (and Australian) support for a multilateral war against terror. For the first time since its formation NATO invoked Article V of its Charter displaying—briefly—unprecedented solidarity with its surprisingly vulnerable major partner, the United States. However this unity was short-lived. To the surprise and consternation of most of its allies, the United States response did not embrace patient diplomacy or employ genuine multilateralism as it attempted to defeat the Taliban and eradicate al-Qa’ida.<sup>9</sup>

In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush independently identified the new enemy of the west as an ‘Axis of Evil’ comprising Iraq, Iran and North Korea. No longer could US policy be defined as a retaliatory response to specific terrorist threats linked directly to al-Qa’ida. Now, ‘rogue states’—those which harboured terrorists or were developing weapons of mass destruction—were joined in administration rhetoric as imminent threats to global order and American security. Washington’s ‘new thinking’ on international relations now explicitly incorporated unapologetic unilateralism, ‘pre-emptive’ strikes and military intervention abroad to achieve so-called ‘regime change’ and protect America’s global interests. It would be misleading to overstate the revolutionary nature of the new Bush foreign policy doctrine, just as it would be misleading to exaggerate the long-term consequences of September 11 on global affairs. While it departed radically, at least in explicit intent, from the reactive international compromises of the Clinton years, the roots and precedents of the Bush doctrine lie in the often frustrated exercise of America’s pre-eminent power throughout the postwar



years. More immediately, the keystones of the doctrine were evident before September 11. This 'new' direction was most bluntly expressed by the influential columnist and advisor, Charles Krauthammer before the Twin Towers shock: 'The new unilateralism seeks to strengthen American power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of self-defined global ends'. In the late 1990s, well before September 11, 2001, the very neo-conservatives who have become so influential in the Bush administration identified the removal of Saddam Hussein as vital to US interests.<sup>10</sup> The Bush Doctrine is widely interpreted as expressing the long-frustrated ideas of the so-called neo conservatives in his administration and those linked to 'The Project for the New American Century'—notably Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, William Kristol, and Lawrence F Kaplan. However, its origins can also be traced to the greatly expanded noncombative role of the American military since the end of the Cold War and the decline of the State Department as the principal source of international policy. 'The US government has grown increasingly dependent on its military to carry out its foreign affairs', Dana Priest has concluded recently in her study, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*. 'The shift was incremental, little-noticed, de facto ... the military simply filled a vacuum left by an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Department, and a distracted Congress'.<sup>11</sup> The 'War on Terror', 'pre-emptive war', 'regime change', the 'shock and awe' campaign in Iraq are public slogans which reflect this fundamental shift. Even the burdens of 'nation building' embraced (at least rhetorically) by the Bush administration are understood primarily in terms of military occupation rather than political security or economic stability.

The 'set of convictions that came to dominate' the Bush Doctrine, Samuel (Sandy) Berger has observed recently, are starkly obvious: 'That the requirements of US national security profoundly have changed. That in a Hobsian world, American power, particularly military power, is the central force for positive change; that it is more important to be feared than admired; that 'root cause' is dangerous, moral relativism: evil is evil and can never be justified'.<sup>12</sup> In the period before the Iraq war, the Administration exhibited absolute confidence in America's massive military advantage. At the same time it exhibited a remarkable willingness to promote American values as universally appropriate and to assert

that national interests must be protected regardless of the impact on anti-Americanism or damage to old alliances and relationships.

Despite initial military success against the Taliban, the so-called 'War on Terror' has done little to enhance American security. Osama Bin Laden has not been captured or his influence reduced. Al-Qa'ida has not been destroyed. Terrorist attacks against 'Western' or American targets continue. It is now more than eighteen months since the Northern Alliance and US troops drove the Taliban from power. But security beyond the perimeter of Kabul has not been established; warlordism, opium production and Taliban elements have re-emerged; chronic levels of poverty, unemployment and illiteracy remain endemic—the conditions which sustain the very terrorism Washington understandably seeks to eliminate. Amnesty International estimates that more than sixty percent of the country remains chronically unstable. Most observers agree that the Taliban is again influential and that the US-led force of more than 11,000 and the international security assistance force of about 5,000 are simply incapable of demobilising the factions which brutally control this desperate region. Thus it could be argued that the first stage of the War on Terror has not been won. Washington must refocus on Afghanistan's reconstruction and more successfully wage war on terrorist groups in Afghanistan's south and east along the border with Pakistan. Regardless of how successfully the War on Terror is fought on other fronts it can not be won until a viable central government can exert genuine authority over a cohesive Afghanistan. Expressed more broadly, the United States must (re)define its interests in Afghanistan, reinvigorate its nation building efforts, and match both its strategic and humanitarian goals with the required resources.

The attempts by the Bush administration to overthrow the Taliban and destroy al-Qa'ida were justified and appropriate initial responses to the attacks of September 11. Yet Washington's broader campaign in Afghanistan was misconceived. By rejecting collaboration with NATO, Washington signalled its reluctance to share responsibility for the War on Terror. Terrorism is a global phenomenon that requires broad international solutions. The assault on terrorism, and the conditions which sustain it, require agreed, long-term, multilateral cooperation. If such initiatives are identified

with unilateralist American ambitions or interpreted as reflecting the Pentagon's military hubris, they run the risk of compounding anti-Americanism and encouraging terrorism. Washington's efforts to justify the invasion of Iraq as somehow linked to September 11 and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the rogue Iraq regime alienated many important states initially committed to the US-led response to terrorism internationally. It is now public knowledge that when President Bush publicly authorised war in Afghanistan he privately directed that the Pentagon begin planning for war against Saddam Hussein's regime.<sup>13</sup> By moving precipitously against Iraq on grounds widely considered spurious by most of its allies and enemies alike, the Bush administration greatly damaged its efforts to construct a lasting alliance against terrorism. At the same time the continuing chaos in Afghanistan and Iraq have brutally exposed the limits of American unilateralism.

By broadening its war on terror to include regime change in Iraq, the US has exacerbated friction with its allies; compromised its anti-terrorist campaigns, elevated the risks of 'blowback', including further terrorist attacks against it and its allies; and compromised its support for agreed norms of international law. Military action against the government harbouring al-Qa'ida was widely accepted as appropriate and just. In contrast, Washington's strained efforts to justify war against Iraq suggested that the Bush regime reserved the right to employ military force selectively in pursuit of short-term national interests. War against Iraq expressed most forcefully the doctrine of unilateral pre-emptive action and intervention which underpinned America's wider foreign policy ambitions.

'An honest intelligence assessment would have raised questions about why we were going after a country that hadn't attacked us', Paul Krugman has observed bitterly: 'it would also have suggested the strong possibility that an invasion of Iraq would hurt, not help, US security'.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, the Iraq adventure and Washington's inconsistent attempts to justify it have greatly weakened the integrity of the Bush administration and damaged the reputation of the intelligence on which its foreign policy is built. Future actions in the War on Terror will be more difficult to justify to a sceptical public both at home and abroad. Events centred on Iraq suggest that neo-conservative ideological preoccupations overshadowed the rational evaluation and pursuit of American interests. It is to be hoped that this situation is not repeated—that more reasonable and reasoned

policies will guide future US action. Alternatives to unilateral action against repressive or failed regimes might be developed through the UN or through a broad coalition of democratic states. Collective efforts to limit violence in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor suggest that intervention and even regime change can be justified on human rights grounds or when civil violence threatens regional peace and security.

The reconstruction of Iraq presents major challenges for current US policy. These are not restricted to the need to ensure military order and political stability or to sow the seeds of economic recovery. Budgetary difficulties at home might ultimately pose even greater challenges to the United States than those on the ground in Iraq, or Afghanistan. The costs of military occupations and nation-building have already exposed the limits of American power. With 160,000 troops in Iraq and more than 11,000 still in Afghanistan, the costs of winning peace are starkly evident. The US budget has moved from a surplus of \$240 billion in 2000 to a deficit of \$455 billion in 2003. It is estimated that the cost of war and reconstruction in Iraq will be at least \$50 billion and perhaps as much as \$100 billion. In the view of many observers the United States is already showing signs of 'imperial overreach'. Clearly there are limits to the exercise of America's 'hard power'. It appears that the Bush Doctrine will be vigorously invoked only against Iraq: other options, based on shared military responsibility and shared costs, now have a renewed appeal in Washington.

US policy in postwar Iraq is flawed. The longer it takes to establish stability and orderly governance, the greater its failure. If the United States is to share responsibility for a defeated Iraq it must demonstrate that it does not seek a prolonged occupation or special rewards from the war and occupation. Criticisms stemming from within the UN and indeed the US suggest a way forward. 'There was an overwhelming demand for the early restoration of sovereignty', a UN special envoy found in July 2003, and 'the message was conveyed [by the Iraqi people] that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside'. Short-term changes have been demanded by US senators returning from a fact finding mission in June 2003. Influential Democrat Senator Joe Biden argued: 'We need to get more troops in. They need to be more effective. We need to take a look at how we get more NATO forces in'. More surprising, leading Republican Richard Lugar supported Biden's appeal: 'We need the

help of our allies in Europe and we need the help of the United Nations'.<sup>15</sup> There is little agreement within either NATO or the UN on the allocation of responsibility for postwar Iraq. However, it is crucial that long-term programs for recovery and stability—especially those linked to the distribution of oil revenues—be sanctioned by the UN and accepted by the Iraqi people.

Despite its inability to win broad multilateral support or UN approval for invading Iraq, the United States should nonetheless encourage a significant UN involvement in the occupation and transition to representative government. UN involvement should be underwritten by Security Council resolution, and include a special UN representative to work with, and replace, current US leadership to establish a legitimate civilian government. As *The Washington Post* cautioned in April 2003 the US cannot rebuild Iraq 'by wilfully excluding Europe, the United Nations or Iraqis not of its choosing'.<sup>16</sup> Washington's profound difficulties over Iraq demonstrate that it needs to be less willing to wage war and more willing to wage peace; that it needs to be more willing to share responsibility for the painstaking and often frustrating task of reducing violence and promoting civil stability in areas that come under its control as it pursues its War Against Terror.

Current events in Liberia—and for Liberia read any number of unstable postcolonial states—ironically underline Washington's reluctance to wield its massive power without UN-sanctioned support or to become involved in the messy affairs of any 'failed' state. Despite its 'special relationship' with Liberia the Bush administration offered little more than verbal encouragement to those seeking to remove its brutal leader. It is not just the humiliating memories of Somalia a decade ago that feeds America's reluctance to intervene: rather recent events indicate that intervention, regime change, and nation-building are expensive, inconclusive, and often counterproductive. And it is now unlikely that even so-called 'rogue states' possessing or planning the development of WMD will be targets of any future application of the Bush Doctrine.

The US has no formal diplomatic relations with Iran—although it obviously has extensive bilateral covert contacts with it. Washington has sought openly to stop sales of military technology to Iran by North Korea, China and Russia. Washington has routinely charged that Tehran supports terrorism—especially Hezbollah, and

Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad; that Tehran is aggressively developing WMD, including nuclear weapons and delivery systems; and that Tehran is willing to transfer its advanced weapons technology to terrorist groups. Iran, more than Iraq, fits Bush's description of a rogue state able and willing to supply weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. The spectre of such rogue actions has shaped American policy since September 11 (even if its intelligence capacity has failed to demonstrate the nature or dimensions of this threat). In Bush's much repeated words, this possibility is 'the greatest danger facing America and the world'.<sup>17</sup>

After Iraq, the enemies of the US might be silenced—at least temporarily. The Bush administration is unlikely to attack Iran, North Korea, or Syria. It is possible that the example of Iraq will reduce support for terrorism and slow the acquisition of WMD in perceived 'hostile states', including Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It is also possible that the aftermath of Iraq will be a prolonged occupation and factionalised violence, accompanied by a continuing cycle of international terrorism and retaliation.

The overt rationale offered for war in Iraq highlighted deep-seated issues embedded in nuclear weapons proliferation. As more states acquire a nuclear weapons capacity the probability of terrorism employing WMD grows. Thus efforts to restrain the further development or spread of nuclear weapons or weapons technology have resurfaced as central issues in international politics. Today four nations remain outside the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty)—Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The war on Iraq was justified (rhetorically at least) as an overdue attempt to limit the spread of nuclear weapons technologies to noncomplying (rogue) states. In future, the US may have to return to consensus building on this issue, using old-fashioned multilateralism and UN-sanctioned accord to constrain further proliferation of WMD.

The nuclear option is disturbingly attractive, at least at a policy level, to the Bush administration. Four months before September 11 Bush declared that 'Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies'. Preparing for war with Iraq, Bush went further declaring that 'the United States will continue to make it clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—to the use of WMD against the United States'. His administration's Nuclear Posture Review reactivated research and development into nuclear weapons. More broadly, the US has

refused to ratify the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and has ignored the crucial Article Six of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which obliges the five officially recognised nuclear powers to negotiate the reduction (and elimination) of nuclear weapons. 'The Bush administration', George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment has charged, 'essentially favours a strategy of repeated regime change plus a large, steadily modernising nuclear arsenal'.<sup>18</sup>

Given decades of successful 'containment', despite nuclear proliferation, it is remarkable that US policy doctrine now implies that possession of WMD (or planning for such weapons) by so-called 'rogue states' is sufficient to justify war against that state. Indeed, current strategic doctrine suggests that Washington may take pre-emptive military steps before WMD are developed or to deter a state from developing such weapons. At the same time the Bush administration has repudiated the established nuclear non-proliferation regime. Thus it could be argued that US policy has accelerated attempts to acquire such weapons and aggravated the current crisis over North Korea. The contradictory and potentially devastating outcomes of current policy should be acknowledged, especially as the impasse over North Korea has dramatically raised the stakes of such a radical shift in US policy. Internationalism, not militarism, must be invoked to manage issues embedded in the development and proliferation of WMD. To cite Stanley Hoffman again: 'There is no substitute for a policy of concerted diplomatic pressure exerted by the UN and of collective, and selective, measures of coercion. These range from much stronger international controls on imported technologies to more intrusive inspections than in the past. They could ultimately include the use of force under international auspices against nuclear power plants that are being built or operated. This means a reinforcement, not—as Bush proposes—a repudiation, of the present nuclear non-proliferation regime'.<sup>19</sup> Second order diplomacy must be exhaustively pursued; collective initiatives must be employed; rewards for compliance might be proffered. The US should join such initiatives even if they are all UN sanctioned, and it should indicate its 'good international citizenship' by accepting non-proliferation arguments and limitations on its nuclear arsenal.

America's War on Terror revealed—starkly—the decline of western European solidarity with Washington—solidarity so assured

during the decades of Cold War. No solid geopolitical axis of western states exists today, and little agreement is evident about the extent or nature of the threat of terrorism. The geographical centre of conflict—both cultural and military—is no longer Europe, but the Middle East or the Arab world. The fault lines that divide the world are increasingly cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, rooted in complex histories of colonised peoples struggling for recognition in an ostensibly postimperial world. And if many Arab/Muslim states and people are hostile to America's overreaching global authority, significant sections of Europe are variously reluctant to endorse American leadership in global affairs.

Not surprisingly, military intervention in Iraq has accelerated Washington's efforts to promote the so-called 'road map' for settling the intractable Palestine-Israel question. Washington and its allies now accept that progress here is vital if broad Islamic and Arab resentment over the occupied territories is to be addressed. The need for a just settlement which includes a 'viable' Palestine has apparently been accepted. Installation of the moderate Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian Prime Minister and agreed restraint on both sides, have provided a window of diplomatic opportunity which Washington must exploit. In endorsing the current revitalised peace initiative *The Sydney Morning Herald* correctly observed: '[I]f Mr Bush steers a settlement, he may well find other Middle East pieces fall more or less evenly into place. Without settlement, the prospects of enduring peace across the region, or containing terrorist ambitions across the globe, are remote indeed'.<sup>20</sup>

Thus the United States must again become involved in an urgent and genuine search for peace between Israel and the peoples of Palestine. Washington's perceived double standard on UN resolutions relating to Iraq and Israel highlights the need for an even-handed US role in the Middle East. The recently released 'road map' for peace and reduced violence suggests progress is not impossible. Crucially, the reception given American policy generally in the Arab world hinges as much on the intractable Palestinian issues as on individual American actions in Iraq or on US policies towards Iran. And, as widely acknowledged in recent months, anti-Americanism and the sources of terrorism are embedded in the Palestinian perception that Israel enjoys a 'special relationship' with Washington that sanctions the routine suppression of the rights of Palestinians. Peace in the Middle East, and an easing of anti-



American extremism, cannot be realised unless both Israel and Palestine are separately independent and secure.

'The Europeans simply no longer agree with the US. They don't agree about the terrorist threat. They don't think Osama bin Laden is a global menace. They don't take Washington's view of rogue states. They don't agree about pre-emptive war, clash of civilisations, the demonisation of Islam, or Pentagon domination of US foreign policy. Such views are interpreted in the United States as "anti-Americanism"'.<sup>21</sup> Iraq and the War on Terror heralded a new international landscape where established formal alliances carried little weight and temporary alliances were joined to wage or support war. 'We are witnessing a sea change vis-à-vis everything that has been built up since World War II', Francois Heisbourg claimed as the UN struggled with the Iraq issue: 'This is the new America. It does not have permanent alliances, it has partners of convenience. It's now the mission that determines the coalition'. The 'Coalition of the Willing' is not a permanent alliance, but an immediate response to a perceived crisis. US isolation from its traditional allies as it prepared for war against Iraq was evident in its failure to enlist strong support in the UN, or from regional friends like Mexico, Canada and Chile. More broadly, traditional friends and allies in NATO have complained that defeat of the Taliban has 'reinforced some dangerous instincts' in US foreign policy, 'that the projection of military power is the only basis of security; that the US can rely on no-one but itself; and that allies may be useful only as an official extra'.<sup>22</sup> Differences between Washington and its allies over Iraq hinged largely on disquiet over the precedent of 'regime change' which the forced removal of Saddam Hussein established. Many of the nations that refused to join the 'Coalition of the Willing' argued, in effect, that invasion of Iraq was the wrong war, at the wrong time, and for the wrong reasons. Yet it would be premature to assume that the pragmatic and factionalised international responses to US plans for Iraq imply a permanent change in alliance politics. Since the end of the Cold War international relations have become increasingly fluid; alliances and cooperation often issue-specific. Moreover, the 'new America' observed by Heisbourg now shows signs that it recognises the importance of conventional alliances, shared international responsibilities and routine diplomacy. (This is particularly evident in US efforts to negotiate broadly over North

Korea and Iraq and to publicly value the role of the UN and traditional allies in the War on Terror and postwar Iraq).

A fundamental lesson of the Cold War is that the policies of containment and deterrence directed against conventional state regimes need not fail. Washington now appears to accept this dictum in relation to North Korea; but it rejected the view that a strategy of deterrence was appropriate against Iraq. While deterrence is not an effective policy against non-state actors, like al-Qa'ida, it must remain an attractive option to the US in its dealings with conventional states. And, deterrence backed by multi-level diplomacy, is capable of fostering genuine coalitions of willing allies—even if this willingness is crisis-specific and does not extend to supporting pre-emptive strikes, or preventive war, or regime change.

Ironically, as Washington manufactured its reasons for war in Iraq, the nuclear threat posed by North Korea was real, immediate and growing. Pyongyang possesses chemical and biological weapons; it continues to develop its nuclear weapons capability; and it exports weapons, equipment and contraband. In contrast, the so-called nuclear threat posed by Iraq was neither concrete nor imminent. Iran also poses a far more tangible nuclear-related threat than did Iraq. Thus the US-led invasion of Iraq highlighted fundamental contradictions in its efforts to deal with the self-proclaimed 'Axis of Evil'. The (very narrow) 'Coalition of the Willing' was arguably able to take action against Iraq because that state did not possess a viable nuclear weapons program, or a dangerous capacity to retaliate militarily to forced 'regime change'. Thus Iraq has exposed the limited options confronting the US in its efforts to deal with any rogue nation that actually possesses a threatening nuclear weapons (WMD) capacity. The doctrine of pre-emptive intervention is impotent against states possessing a significant military capacity and WMD. Moreover, the Bush Doctrine and the invasion of Iraq have arguably stimulated further development of nuclear weapons programs in both North Korea and Iran.

Concerns with destabilising issues ranging from Islamic fundamentalism to nuclear proliferation are shared by all major powers, including Russia, India, China and Japan. By naming North Korea in the Axis of Evil the Bush administration has belatedly felt obliged to re-emphasise the importance of broad regional

cooperation, and bilateral collaboration with China. Anticipating a shift in Sino-American relations conditioned by September 11, Avery Goldstein has argued that Washington should mute its concerns over human rights, Taiwan, and China's regional ambitions in order to promote it as a strategic partner opposed to terrorism. Bush declared immediately after the al-Qa'ida attacks that the US and China 'can accomplish a lot when we work together to fight terrorism'.<sup>23</sup> More recently, China has played a crucial role in mediating with North Korea. This has reduced the expression of bilateral differences over Taiwan. Nonetheless, the Taiwan issue remains unresolved and potentially very dangerous. The US remains adamant that Taiwan cannot be reincorporated forcefully into China, while China reserves the right to use force to reintegrate Taiwan.

While Bush has proclaimed that the US can 'not tolerate' a nuclear-armed North Korea, and reiterated that states developing WMD will 'be confronted', Pyongyang has very publicly accelerated the development of its nuclear program. Pre-emptive military action against this member of the Axis of Evil is unlikely in the aftermath of Iraq. As Paul Kelly has perceptively observed, direct military intervention is no longer a viable option in American policy. 'Pyongyang's lesson is that imposed regime change is an option only before the rogue state has a nuclear capability,' he observed: 'Iran's lesson is that imposed regime change is not an option in a nation of reasonable size and political weight'.<sup>24</sup> To date, fortunately, brinkmanship rather than blunt confrontation has guided negotiations on the North Korean issue. Nonetheless there remains a very real threat of another war on the Korean peninsula. Washington has little choice other than to persist with efforts to find a broad-based regional solution—even as it covertly encourages Beijing to intercede directly with Pyongyang. The US can best manage its interests in the Asia-Pacific by nurturing patient, multi-layered diplomacy, regional consultation, and shared responsibility for agreed action to resolve specific problems. The current six-power negotiations centred on North Korea are an overdue step towards engaged multilateralism. It is to be hoped that these discussions serve as a successful model for future US efforts in crisis resolution.




Unilateralism, even without military adventures abroad, risks alienating allies, exacerbating anti-Americanism and provoking

retaliatory militarism and weapons development. It provokes the spectre of a superpower jealously pursuing its separate interests without regard for interests shared with either friends or enemies. Nor does leadership of so-called coalitions of the willing erase concern with unilateralisation. Indeed, Washington's clumsy efforts to enlist such a coalition for war in Iraq provoked a deep schism within Europe and NATO. And belated attempts to embrace the UN or multilateral peacekeeping *after* an America-led military victory are widely seen as cynical and self-interested attempts to defray the costs of 'nation building' without compromising US interests. Germany and India, for example, have both indicated willingness to join a UN operation in post-Saddam Iraq, but the US actions since September 11 have alienated many within the UN and undermined cooperation with or through the UN.

Unilateralism and pre-emptive strikes threaten to bring greater instability to world affairs and even greater disrespect for established conventions in international relations. Walter Russell Meade, of the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, expressed a now widely held view when he claimed, as Bush sought to enlist a willing coalition to invade Iraq: 'We are headed for a tumultuous century and, if the UN's rule is reduced there will be no international structure to keep the peace'.<sup>25</sup> Other commentators argue that in an age of terror and diminished internationalism the United States and its close allies should join a 'global covenant to raise the UN to a radically higher level of integrity and effectiveness'.<sup>26</sup> While this appears an unlikely development it is nonetheless important that the Bush administration support international efforts to establish a more just and equal international community. Its refusal to join the International Criminal Court; its reluctance to ratify the Kyoto Protocols establishing environmental safeguards; its fluctuating support for the UN; and its recent decision to fast-track research and development on low-yield nuclear weapons, have undermined its international appeal as a liberal society and a 'good international citizen'. To cite Hoffman again: 'In foreign policy, following norms of self-restraint and international law and institutions can augment the real power of a strong country even if such norms curb the harshest uses of military power'.<sup>27</sup>

The Bush administration's current policies overstate America's ability to effectively exercise its 'hard power' and undervalue the need to share responsibility to promote international order. While

confident of the preponderance of its military authority, US policies explicitly seek to universalise ‘a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests’—values defined as human dignity, liberty, and justice, principles ‘right and true for all people everywhere’. Evelyn Goh has perceptively concluded—before America’s current difficulties in Iraq were evident—that a strategy built on military supremacy, assertive intervention to protect national interests, and expansive ideological ambitions ‘can be expected to exacerbate existing problems’.<sup>28</sup> The direction of American foreign policy, along with the extreme ideological rationale given publicly for it, must change if the roots of international instability and violence are to be successfully addressed.



## **Cultural Shifts, Changing Relationships: Australia and the United States**

The 'Americanisation' of global culture after 1945 has been widely understood as a vital precursor of the triumph of the United States in the Cold War. America's global reach was, and is, underpinned by its cultural ascendancy—by the appeal of its so-called 'soft power'.<sup>1</sup> Writing of Australia during the Cold War, Richard White suggested that it 'could possibly be argued that the "Americanisation of popular culture created the conditions in which American investment and military alliances were accepted without popular opposition"'.<sup>2</sup> Given its modern Anglophone culture, Australia, Geoffrey Serle claimed, was more vulnerable to Americanisation than were other western nations.<sup>3</sup>

In the wake of Vietnam, a growing number of Australian scholars explored the complex 'web of dependence' that it was claimed underpinned the expanding postwar relationship between their nation and the US. 'No examination of the Australian–American connection, however general, would be complete', Joseph Camilleri argued in 1980, '... without at least passing reference to the pervasive influence which the US came to exert over Australian culture and politics'. Several other studies also attempted to detail the level of Australia's postwar 'dependency' on the dominant power of capitalist America. Although essentially

concerned with economics or 'political economy', some of these analysed culture, media, and ideology. To cite Camilleri again: 'The phenomenon of dependence in Australia's external relations, though most conspicuous in the diplomatic and military alignment with the US, has also had a critical economic and cultural component'. His work accepted that 'American values, institutions and policies have come to dominate not only Australia's external conduct but its economic and political life'.<sup>4</sup>

While some commentators were reluctant to speak of the US as imperialist or Australia as a satellite, most of a left-nationalist persuasion accepted that these terms accurately summarised the postwar bilateral relationship. And if this had special qualities they implied these lay not in generous reciprocity but in the extent to which Australia's sovereignty, interests and national identity have been compromised by American power and influence. Since the mid-1980s, as Australia has sought engagement with Asia and remained unwilling or unable to break its constitutional links with the UK, such claims have receded in scholarly debates—but not in the popular imagination.

In the mass media, especially, Australia has been variously interpreted as a 'satellite society' of metropolitan America; an 'American satellite'; the ideological and economic victim of Americanisation or American cultural imperialism; or as a 'client state' of the US. At the same time, journalistic clichés frequently characterise Australia as the '51st state' or, to cite Phillip Adams, as 'the ventriloquist's dummy on the American knee'. Whether the issue is freeways or footwear, delinquency or divorce, the Ku Klux Klan or Calvin Klein, America's present is seen as Australia's future, with cultural and consumer products painted as everyday affects of American economic power. Australia is seen as a part of America's informal empire, or at the very least as the future America—a smaller and slightly retarded nation pursuing the American path to modernity.<sup>5</sup>

Not all of those who have written of Australia's transition from 'British colony to American province' have argued that this was the result of American intention. A combination of regional insecurity and cultural deference, some argue, made Australia willing to surrender its sovereignty to US interests and policies. '[Not] only are we determined to be a satellite for strategic reasons, and cannot resist, even if we wanted to, American command of key sectors of



the economy, but we lack an existing strong sense of nationality and any language barrier', Serle claimed as early as 1967: 'Britain, France, Mexico, Canada, are all to some extent insulated from Americanisation in ways we are not. What is there which might stop us going all the way?'<sup>6</sup>

Cultural processes are deeply intertwined with the exercise of power internationally. Yet attempts by historians to trace the role of cultural interactions on relations between states are bedevilled by the infinite complexity of 'culture' and the difficulty of defining the nature or effects of cross-cultural interactions. Cultural influences or inferences are frustratingly difficult to demonstrate. Thus, in the field of international relations, power has largely been understood in conventional strategic 'or economic' terms, and as an expression of identifiable national interests. Nonetheless, as the triumph of the so-called American Century has merged into discourses about globalisation, 'culture' or 'soft power' have surfaced as analytical tools in international relations. As Uta G Poiger notes in *Diplomatic History*, '[r]ecent scholarship on [US] foreign relations focuses increasingly on its cultural dimensions'.<sup>7</sup>

It might be accepted that today America's overwhelming cultural influence and technological strength helps maintain its ubiquitous power abroad. Yet this is not to argue that earlier US cultural exports 'Americanised' its western allies, including Australia, and conditioned the soil in which postwar US foreign policy flourished. Nonetheless, given America's pre-eminent military power in the postwar world, and the incessant presence of American popular culture abroad, it is hardly surprising that diplomatic historians have belatedly discovered culture. A recognition of British and Australian cultural interactions and shared histories is fundamental to an understanding of Anglo-Australian relations. And it is not extravagant to claim that cultural forces have played important roles in shaping—or symbiotically revealing—Australia's changing relationships with its other great and powerful friend, the US.

The reorientation of Australia's international relationships after World War II, including its formal strategic alliances, was embedded in very broad processes of cultural change flowing from modernisation and globalisation—processes that were substantially American in form and content. Yet Australia's distinctive postcolonial history obviously cannot be reduced to one which implies that the smaller society simply, if reluctantly, exchanged one

imperial relationship for another. Furthermore, while culture is a crucial dimension of relations within and between nations, as well as between social groups and individuals, it is seldom, if ever, simply imposed from abroad or from above on a powerless subject.

Specific causal relationships are impossible goals of historical enquiry. (And in a postmodernist age which eschews teleological neatness such a quest is as meaningless as it is flawed.) Even very traditional historians now concede that it is difficult to discern, let alone demonstrate interconnections that go beyond a surface description of 'background causes'.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless this paper seeks to move beyond generalisations which view Australia's deepening links to the US as reflections of shared language, heritage, culture, values and destiny. It is impossible to sustain an image of postwar Australia as a uniquely receptive and docile society transformed by American cultural forces. Furthermore, US cultural interests in Australia were rooted in changes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even if they grew dramatically from the 1960s. At most, American influences consolidated local cultural formations and discursive practices that were built on persistent geopolitical insecurities and sharpened by war against Japan, decolonisation and Cold War in Asia and by Britain's phased withdrawal from the turbulent region. The pursuit of national interests, not foreign cultural power, and certainly not so-called 'Americanisation', stimulated Australia's strategic reorientation after World War II. Furthermore, Anglo-Australian ties of language, sentiment, society, kinship, migration, 'race' patriotism, political culture and popular pastimes, persisted in the face of Australia's strategic realignment and its putative 'Americanisation'.

Over more than a century before Curtin's December 1941 appeal to the US, many influential Australians had looked across the Pacific seeking political guidance, cultural stimulation and strategic reassurance. Australia, a much younger and smaller colonial fragment than its North American cousins, was influenced not only by Europe but by examples drawn from the US—by that unique model of a successful democracy which had rejected its colonial status and established an independent liberal republic.

Ideas, people and commodities flowed incessantly between the two societies even before Federation. US political influences centred on republicanism, federalism, immigration restriction, eugenics and the quest for racial purity, rural and urban reform, regulation of

labour and industry, women's suffrage, temperance and radical trade unionism. The 'other America' was increasingly invoked as the disparate colonies moved towards Federation and struggled to define themselves as a 'white nation' located precariously on the edge of Asia. Against this background some leaders spoke warmly of their 'kindred in America' and appealed to common ties of 'race', language, traditions, and institutions that made the two Pacific nations natural friends. Alfred Deakin went further, advising London that: 'the closer the alliance' between Australia and the US 'the better, for although I am fully alive to the many objectionable features of their political life, after all they are nearest to us in blood and in social, religious and even political developments'.<sup>9</sup>

Newly federated Australia clung politically, economically and militarily to mother England while proclaiming its new status as an independent dominion. Within a decade of Federation, however, Australia had to address external realities which challenged its survival in a potentially hostile geopolitical environment. Traditional ties to Great Britain were no longer adequate to compensate for regional isolation and vulnerability. Its attempts to promote new ties in the Pacific through a symbolic visit by the American Navy, and calls for a regional security agreement with Washington, initiated a pattern for responses that became a familiar ritual in its international behaviour throughout the twentieth century. In the long interval before America accepted that its own national interests demanded a formal security association with Australia, the dominion remained tethered to Great Britain. Even before World War I, however, Australian leaders were not fully satisfied by these connections. As the limits to British interests and authority in the Far East became progressively more apparent, the dominion looked increasingly across the Pacific for guarantees of its national survival.

In 1908 the Great White [US] Fleet was welcomed by the press in headlines that underscored the fusion of 'racial' ideas and regional vulnerability in the outlook of many in the new nation. *The Brisbane Courier* concluded prophetically: 'The presence of the United States fleet gives the opportunity for the peaceful development of the interests of the white race in the Pacific which will inevitably be brought closer for mutual protection'. It noted gravely, 'Were Japan to turn her naval arm against what lies in Australian waters, we should go down'. The naval visit was a tangible symbol of 'the brotherhood of the Anglo-Saxon race', *The Sydney*

*Morning Herald* asserted, and evidence that 'America maybe the first line of defence against Asia'. At the same time, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin sought cover for Australia under an expanded US Monroe Doctrine. Deakin claimed his 'proposition' was 'of the highest international importance', but was careful to add that it implied no weakening of imperial ties.<sup>10</sup> This quest for closer strategic ties with America did not dent Australia's affection for Britain and the Empire. Nor were the contrasting colours of a sometimes strident nationalism rendered less distinct by the search for American protection. Indeed, fear of so-called 'American' values and products sharpened local nationalism through the interwar years, as it did well beyond the war.

A curious alliance of conservative Anglo-Australians and left-nationalist politicians and pundits has warned against the encroaching evils of Americanisation. Jill Julius Matthews has observed of the inter-war years that many Australians feared Americanisation, not because it was understood as a form of cultural imperialism, but rather because 'one's own people were being seduced away from their own true national values. They were being corrupted and the source of corruption was America'. (Not surprisingly, metaphors of seduction and the corrupting evils of mass culture still dominate much local resistance to putative Americanisation.) Fearing a loosening of older hierarchical values, opponents of 'Americanisation' denounced it as responsible for 'a democratisation of values, an individual "cosmopolitanisation", a subjective "modernisation"'.<sup>11</sup> At the same time most Anglo-Australians eagerly consumed imported popular culture, especially films and welcomed visits by the US Navy as tangible sinews of 'racial' and social accord, while some, like Billy Hughes, revived a nineteenth-century rhetoric which portrayed the new nation as 'the future America'.<sup>12</sup>

Later, in the 1930s, against the background of Japan's invasion of China and new tensions in Europe and the Pacific, Prime Minister Joseph Lyons proposed a Pacific Pact very like that sought thirty years earlier by Deakin. Such appeals to Washington, like Hughes's softened views on the US, overwhelmingly reflected narrow strategic insecurities and disillusion with Imperial defences.

For some Australians, if not Americans, war against Japan initiated a lasting 'special relationship' between the two nations—a relationship confirmed by close military partnership and cultural interaction during the Cold War. Although ultimately victorious, the bilateral wartime alliance was characterised by significant conflict as well as cooperation. It was always uncertain and tense, even before the immediate threat of Japanese invasion receded in early 1943. Later, claims that the relationship was successful because it was built on a 'special' understanding between two broadly similar Pacific societies, and that it embodied a happy convergence of 'sentiment and self-interest', became a part of Australia's historical mythology. Prime Minister John Curtin's very public 'turning to America' after Pearl Harbor has been widely interpreted as a watershed in the history of Australia's place in the world: war in the Pacific was the crisis that severed the umbilical cord to Mother England and pointed Australia permanently towards a new future with the US in the Asia-Pacific region. Part of this mythology is the belief that the 'wartime embrace' of Australia's new protector was unconditional and enduring, surviving the defeat of Japan and shaping the Cold War alliance under ANZUS.<sup>13</sup>

It does not follow that close international accord necessarily resulted from deep cultural integration. Nonetheless, it has been often asserted that with 'Friends in High Places', Australia has successfully protected its national interests through wars, both hot and cold, since 1941. When seen in this narrow, if comforting, way, Australia's relationship with the US has provoked little controversy among historians. The small Pacific state, as textbooks and the press routinely asserted, had scurried from under the umbrella of the British Empire to the sheltering mantle of the US—a cosy (and dry) history of protection by great and powerful friends.<sup>14</sup>

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, with Singapore's collapse imminent, Curtin's famous appeal made it quite clear that:

Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom. We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength. But we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go and shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan,

with the US as its keystone, which will give our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy.

While acknowledging the primary importance of future American aid, Curtin did not underestimate the significant, but essentially complementary, military role which Britain, China, the Netherlands or the Soviet Union could play in the Pacific.<sup>15</sup>

Yet enduring affection for Britain and Empire was evident even in Australia's darkest hours. Curtin's statement was aimed realistically at promoting immediate and substantial American assistance. Being directed essentially towards America during a critical phase of the Pacific war, the appeal exaggerated Australia's willingness to break its traditional links. Moreover, Curtin's suggestion that Australia would not compromise its own security by dispersing its military resources to support wartime Britain did not imply that Australia was anxious to alter permanently the Dominion's associations with Britain or the Empire. Nonetheless, Curtin accepted implicitly that Britain was no longer capable of protecting the South Pacific Dominions.

Curtin's statement was also an unprecedented public assertion of Dominion autonomy. It provoked some criticism locally. Menzies described the statement as a 'great blunder'. In a series of critical editorials, *The Sydney Morning Herald* described Curtin's words as 'deplorable'. The former Prime Minister Billy Hughes interpreted Curtin's apparent willingness to deprecate the military value of the Imperial connection as 'suicidal'. In response, Curtin asserted that despite its support for closer Australian-American relations, his government did not regard Australia as 'anything but an integral part of the British Empire'.<sup>16</sup> Later, at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in 1944 Curtin 'made no apologies for asking for American assistance in the days when Australia was seriously threatened'. He argued that the decision 'in no way affected Australia's deep sense of oneness with the United Kingdom', or implied any reduction in Australia's traditional loyalty to the British Commonwealth or Crown.<sup>17</sup>

As conservative Australian governments reluctantly rebalanced the nation's 'great and powerful' friendships in the 1950s and 1960s the myth of a 'special relationship' with its 'new protector' the United States, was routinely asserted. This powerful myth was

underpinned by cultural assumptions and assertions: by narratives of a shared triumph in the Pacific War; by discourses of a shared Anglo-European history; by implied 'racial' and historical similarities as new world settler societies in the Pacific; by shared language; by American influences on popular culture; and by common political cultures centred ostensibly on democracy, openness and freedom. Yet such claims to cultural convergence were overwhelmingly rationalisations justifying pragmatic bilateral linkages established through ANZUS, war in Korea, concern over China, intelligence sharing and expanding trade and investment. The myth of a special relationship retrospectively sanctioned Australia's formal alliance under ANZUS as it conveniently reinterpreted the nation's wartime relationships with both the US and the UK. Not only did it erase nationalist Australian narratives of discord and frustrated military inequality as a minor ally during conflicts in both Europe and the Pacific, but also it celebrated Australian–American strategic relationships born in a uniquely successful alliance, not as a pragmatic postwar reaction to decolonisation and rural communism in East and South East Asia. As the reassuring ties of Empire unravelled, the myth implied, they were replaced by special links to another protector, the US.

The so-called wartime 'look to America', like ANZUS a decade later, pre-dated both significant Americanisation of Australian life, significant loss of Anglo-Australian identity and significant economic linkages between the two Pacific states. Developments in World War II did foreshadow Britain's retreat from its vast imperial reach. Yet the end of conflict did not immediately precipitate a rupture in its relationships with its 'white' dominions. As a surprising number of scholars have demonstrated during 'the initial post-1945 period, Australia's external relations remained overwhelmingly oriented towards Britain'. War in the Pacific did not constitute a decisive turning point in Australia's external relationships.<sup>18</sup>

Nonetheless, after revolution in China in 1949, relationships with the US assumed centre stage. American influences challenged many of those associated with the UK, its empire, or western Europe. The rhetoric and symbols of traditional ties to the 'mother country' were not extinguished, but the realignment of Australia towards the US continued. Against the background of an allegedly new 'Asian' threat to its security, centred on communism in China and war in

Korea, Australia accommodated itself to American authority in the Asia-Pacific. This political and strategic adjustment was crystallised by self-interest. It did not flow directly from special ties of sentiment or cultural empathy. Furthermore, a broad analysis of Australian-American relationships in the postwar years demonstrates that cultural processes were not directly or causally linked to the political and strategic decisions which marked Australia's increasing embrace of American power as the focus of the Cold War shifted to Asia in the late 1940s and 1950s. Anglo-Australia's affections for Mother England long survived its recognition that traditional ties could not sustain the small nation in war and upheaval in the Asia-Pacific.

During the Menzies years Australia's relationships with the US remained uneven and ambivalent. As ANZUS was negotiated in 1950-51, Australia's perceptions of China and Japan differed from those of Washington. The US agreed to the alliance because it paved the way for a 'soft' peace settlement with Japan, and provided another link in a broad anticommunist network in Asia. In contrast, Australia initially viewed ANZUS as a guarantee against a resurgent Japan. Four years later, during the Suez crisis, the two nations also acted from very different perceptions and pursued very different policies. Menzies's effort in support of British and French aggression against Egypt led to a sharp exchange with Eisenhower, who condemned the attack as a debacle that merely accelerated the decline of Anglo-French prestige in the Middle East and paved the way for expanded Soviet influence. Under Menzies, Australia sometimes distanced itself from America's Cold War policies, especially if these challenged British interests. Australia was not yet an uncritical follower of America. However, the Dominion's refusal to recognise the communist government of China, its willingness to fight in Korea under American leadership, and its anxious promotion of ANZUS and SEATO were portents of the new direction in its foreign policy.

In the early Cold War years, Australia's commitment to the United States was 'not unqualified'. In Pemberton's words, 'Menzies and the majority of Cabinet maintained their first loyalty towards Britain'. Despite Menzies's embarrassing intervention on behalf of Britain in the Suez crisis, Pemberton has correctly judged that throughout the 1950s the Australian Government remained 'sympathetic to Britain, but not to the extent [that] it would risk



straining relations with America'.<sup>19</sup> At the same time the conservative elites which dominated Australian political life remained ambivalent about the United States, viewing it as the crucial factor in national security while remaining wedded to Britain and Britishness, the Monarchy and high Anglo-European culture. As *The Sydney Morning Herald* commented, in greeting the Queen in 1954 amidst an unprecedented outpouring of Anglo-Australian sentiment: 'Australia is still and always will be a British nation whose greatest strength lies in the tradition she has inherited from England'. For Protestant Australia, at least, the Queen and Empire still expressed the 'supreme achievement of the British race'.<sup>20</sup>

The tenor and direction of Australia's policies in the period framed by wars in Korea and Vietnam were expressed by Menzies in discussions with his cabinet in 1958. Australia must not disagree publicly with the US, he stated, and Australia's defence forces must be geared to fight alongside those of its great and powerful friends. Independence in policy formulation, or military-strategic activity, was rejected. 'The greatest practical fact of life for Australia is that we are in no danger of conquest, either directly or indirectly, except from Communist aggression,' Menzies observed. '[O]ur doctrine at a time of crisis should be "Great Britain and the United States right or wrong" ... The simple truth, therefore, is that we cannot afford to run counter to their policies at a time when a crisis has arisen.'<sup>21</sup> Surprisingly, this observation came after the Suez crisis of 1956 had exposed the impossibility of simultaneously courting two great and powerful friends in the event of a disagreement between them. This crisis, along with events in Malaya, South Africa, and Indonesia, confronted Australia with additional difficulties as it attempted to pursue its particular material interests, embrace British imperial interests and not alienate its powerful new Cold War partner in the Pacific.

Despite ANZUS and SEATO, the Menzies Government was slow to recognise Britain's decline. In its own limited way, it attempted to hold back the tide of decolonisation that symbolised this decline. As mentioned above, in the Suez conflict of 1956 Australia's support for British and French colonial policies left it isolated from the US as well as from nations in the process of decolonising. Again in the late 1950s, Menzies's clumsy attempts to keep White South Africa within the Empire (Commonwealth)

signalled his nation's isolation in the climate of rapid international change that accompanied the drive for decolonisation and racial equality in the 1950s and 1960s. Events in Malaya and Indochina eventually convinced even Anglophile Australia that its physical security, if not its demographic character, depended on events in the region rather than traditional ties to the Old World. Britain's application to join the European Union in 1963, and its decision of 1967 to gradually withdraw its forces from Malaya and Singapore, obliged even the most conservative Australians to recognise that their future lay in developing regional security and closer ties with the US.

Australia had traditionally displayed what Bruce Grant has labelled 'loyalty to the protector',<sup>22</sup> and in the 1960s it belatedly accepted that its old protector had to be discarded. So more than twenty years after the shock of Pearl Harbor and Singapore, Curtin's claim that Australia would look to America, free of guilt about its ties to Great Britain, had come to fruition. Anticipating Britain's retreat into Empire, Menzies's successor, Harold Holt observed that it made the American alliance 'even more important for us'.<sup>23</sup> Australia now encouraged its new protector to commit ground forces to Asia and to expand its permanent military presence in the region. As Gregory Pemberton has bluntly observed:

Close political and military relations were forged between the two countries only because after 1949, and especially after 1961 American became more deeply involved in Vietnam ... with the steady decline of European interest and capacity in that region, Australia eventually became America's only reliable ally. This new situation created greater opportunities for Australia to exploit American power for its own purposes.<sup>24</sup>

The formal reaction to communism in Asia revealed Australia as an enthusiastic ally but reluctant friend of the US. Anglophile Australians were drawn to America as a protector, but remained anxious to retain ties of monarchy, 'race', culture and history that bound them to England and Empire. As *The Sydney Morning Herald* stated on the eve of ANZUS: 'Australia's relations with America are often imperfectly understood abroad ... They imply no weakening of the Commonwealth bond, nor any turning away from Britain'.<sup>25</sup>

Until the late 1960s, at least, Protestant Australians, in particular, continued to share what Russell Ward and others have described as

a 'dual identity': 'For most, but not all people, national and imperial patriotism were complementary, not contradictory'.<sup>26</sup> The lessons of Singapore and Darwin, and later the decolonisation of Asia, dented but did not destroy the illusion of an imperial umbrella under which white Australia could shelter. 'We draw our main strength not from eight million of our own population,' Richard Casey claimed, 'but from the fact that we are a member of a great cooperative society: the British race, of which the senior partner is our mother country Great Britain'. Significantly, he added: 'We also have the very great potential asset of the friendship of the greatest single nation in the world, the United States of America'.<sup>27</sup> Although Australian conservatives were anxious to negotiate a formal alliance, royal visits, royal honours, and celebrations of Empire remained linchpins of public life in the Menzies years. Even in the late 1960s, while Australian troops fought alongside Americans in Vietnam, it was not uncommon for prominent Australians to announce, as did former Ambassador to Washington, Sir James Plimsoll, that 'we do not see our United States relationship as a threat to British relationships'. Such assertions could not conceal the drift away from Great Britain<sup>28</sup>—a gradual realignment confirmed by Britain's anticipated withdrawal from East of Suez in 1971.

In his study, *Menzies and the Great World Struggle*, David Lowe suggests that while Australia's Cold War rhetoric derived in part from London and Washington it was also 'Australianised'. A broadly similar argument dominates work on so-called 'Americanisation' of Australia. The language of Menzies and most of his colleagues 'drew on familiar allusions and shared hopes and fears which had a particular resonance for Australians', Lowe argues: 'amidst the most rhetorical and the most matter-of-fact descriptions of the state of Cold War were core hopes and fears, visions of white racial progress and rapid development, anxieties about decolonising Asia, and nervousness about Australian's tenuous proprietary hold on a vast continent and about the future of European civilisation'. Australian political culture was not swamped by American preoccupations or language during World War II or the early Cold War. If events in the Pacific and distrust of British policy in the Far East had 'fractured the Imperial imagination' in wartime Australia, these events also sharpened local nationalism, encouraging greater international assertiveness under Labor and efforts to define and defend 'the

Australian way of life' during the decades of postwar reconstruction'. In wars both hot and cold in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, Australian identities were more sharply defined and confirmed while, as Lowe suggests, the Menzies years proved 'a great rejuvenating force for Australian identification with the British Empire'.<sup>29</sup> Although less stridently asserted, Geoffrey Bolton's *The Middle Way* builds a broadly similar argument emphasising the adaptive features of Anglo-Australian identity in a national paradoxically able to transform imported culture even as it behaved, in Robin Boyd's words, as 'the constant sponge lying in the Pacific'. The modest level of US cultural incursions is unwittingly reflected in a special edition of *Australian Historical Studies* published in 1997 on 'The Forgotten Fifties'.<sup>30</sup> Suburbia, rock'n'roll, and youth culture are the few American importations noted, and these are judged of little consequence in comparison to Australia's complacent Britishness and local traditions which were beginning to be shaken by mass migration and modernisation.

The first decade of Liberal Party government under Prime Minister Robert Menzies has often been portrayed as a static era—'a frozen decade'—marked by a sentimental attachment to Britain, comfortable affluence, ideological consensus, and Cold War suspicions. However, beneath this bland surface new forces and tensions were transforming local society and culture. Wider access to consumer credit, the expansion of mass advertising, and a revolution in consumer expectations drew Australia's growing middle class towards a real or imagined American model. Material abundance became associated with the 'Australian Way of Life', and was sustained increasingly by borrowing US products and advertising models, as well as by protection for local industry.<sup>31</sup> The Menzies regime sought to hold the line against the cultural extravagances, superficiality, and moral decadence that conservatives identifies as 'American'. At the same time, however, its economic policies, rhetorical assaults on state intervention, disdain for 'socialism', as well as its strategic dependence on ANZUS and the American alliance, paved the way for incursions by the very 'American' values and symbols it seemed to fear and resent. Australia's emergence as a modern industrial society, which John Docker and others have argues 'meant in effect moving from a British to an American model', was a 'complex and contradictory process'.<sup>32</sup>

The paradox of cultural resistance in the face of pervasive social change and political accommodation was apparent from the early postwar years. At least at the level of public utterance, Americanisation could be denied even when it could not be delayed. To borrow Max Lerner's observation on Europe in the postwar decades, Australia was 'caught between the need for America and the recoil from it'.<sup>33</sup> Indeed elements of this cultural schizophrenia were evident as early as the nineteenth century. Modern Australia was obviously the product of complex, contending forces. Australia's own traditions and identities, British legacies, its deepening multicultural complexion since the 1950s, as well as distinct religious, class and regional characteristics formed the social grid into which American pressures were incorporated and adapted.

Over more than a century, Australia's anxious search for security was paralleled by its increasing economic and cultural links with the United States. Like much of the modern world, especially English-speaking societies, Australia was increasingly influenced by American products, ideas and practices as it was joined inextricably to the 'American Century'. From the 1920s especially, US political culture, business culture and popular culture increasingly infused Australian society, challenging British influences and reshaping local practices and values. The new nation's constitution, advertising, marketing and shopping, housing design, suburban culture, consumerism, anticommunism, ideas on 'race' masculinity or individualism, Hollywood, television, and popular music were some of the many areas significantly influenced by American importations and American models. Australia became an increasing target of US investment capital and trade. Yet as a number of authors have separately observed, it was not until the late 1960s—a generation after Pearl Harbor and a decade after the Suez crisis—that economic links along with 'American ideas, values and information had made substantial inroads into the traditionally British cultural and ideological hegemony in Australia'.<sup>34</sup> And, at the same time as Britain's empire and influence retreated after World War II, fears bred of the evils of the 'air-conditioned [American] nightmare' were voiced increasingly.

Cultural resistance, often expressed simply in anti-American slogans, resurfaced as Australia was joined to American interventions abroad during the Cold War. Many Australian commentators and scholars—anxious since the 1960s to identify

and protect an emerging national identity—were convinced of the transforming power of America and Americanisation on receiving cultures. As US cultural influences grew and a conservative Australian government went ‘all the way’ with Washington in Vietnam, cultural and political resistance to putative Americanisation strengthened. From the mid-1960s, as in the 1920s, US culture was widely decried as vulgar and concern was expressed at the ‘steadily growing ... Americanisation of this country’.<sup>35</sup> Left nationalist attacks against the incursions of American popular culture and political ideology intensified after the war. ‘Coca-Cola colonisation’ became a symbol of unacceptable American modernity and excessive consumerism. A curious alliance of Anglophile conservative, British ‘race’ patriots and left-nationalists expressed concern with the barbarism of mass culture and its levelling effects on Anglo-Australian values and pastimes. As Geoffrey Serle’s much quoted claim implied, a substantial cross section of educated Australians lamented what they understood as a sudden shift from traditional British cultural associations to corrupt or vacuous American importations—even if most welcomed the protection of the US against the tide of change in decolonising Asia and watched their children consume American film, music and television with alacrity. Political cartoons from the late 1960s were equally convinced of the implications of American power and cultural imperialism for Australian independence and identity. In *The Sydney Morning Herald*, for example Molnar’s much reproduced cartoon of 1966 depicted the Australian flag with the stars and stripes replacing the Union Jack in the top left-hand corner. Two decades later, Moir used a now familiar image of a satellite controlled from Washington to suggest Australia’s uncontested dependence on its great powerful ally. Yet if such representations were judgements about Australia’s putative Americanisation, they were also appealing popular statements of anti-Americanism which symbolised the limits of cultural subservience to Australia’s so-called protector.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, Australia’s involvement in Vietnam gave rise to contradictory expressions of bilateral commitment and anti-Americanism.

Throughout much of the Cold War, ambivalence about America and fear of ‘Americanisation’ continued, giving voice to both local nationalist discourses and residual British traditions. In short, British political culture and popular culture remained significant even as

American influences increased. And if culture is carried in the baggage of immigrants, Britain and Europe, not the US, remained at the centre of Australia's cultural practices and ideas—even as a more independent nation celebrated its multicultural complexion and embrace of Asia. Further, if trade and investment are rough yardsticks of the extent of foreign borrowings, Australia's cultural links were not significantly reoriented towards the US until the late 1960s—after the strategic importance of the US had been demonstrated in World War II, formalised under ANZUS and deepened by decolonisation and subsequent regional conflicts.<sup>37</sup>

Complaints about so-called Americanisation have, since, the end of the Cold War, largely shifted from the political to the cultural sphere—from alarm over Australia's subservience to American power and interests, to fears over the erosion of national identity and local cultural authority. 'Imported' 'Americanising' language, dress, drugs, screenagers, sport, fast food, film, television, music, tabloid journalism, crime and punishment, fashion and 'lifestyle' have largely displaced foreign policy and the Pentagon as the focus of Australian concern. Yet close strategic and economic links do not necessarily reflect, or serve as precursors of cultural imitation or subservience. As in the past, Canberra's current willingness to play 'deputy sheriff' to Washington reflects perceived national interests, not persuasive Americanisation. Indeed many Anglo-Australians, from Menzies to John Howard, have been happy to seek an intimate alliance with the United States, even as they longed nostalgically for the Mother Country and sought to reinvent 'core' national values centred on a British-Australian past or the nation's independent exploits in wars abroad.

Like much of western Europe and Canada, Australia has a long love-hate relationship with US exports, whether these be material or ideological. These continue to be both welcomed as the glittering promise of modernity, capitalism and democracy and resisted as a hegemonic threat to national differences and diversity in an increasingly globalised/Americanised world. This contradictory understanding and reception of America abroad implicitly suggests flaws in the claim that unequal societies are simply vulnerable to the Great Power's influences, unable to resist the homogenising consequences of its 'soft power'. Yet the Australian example—like that of say, France, Germany or the UK—indicates that American influences have been variously effective and unpredictable within

different national cultures. Cultural resistance, negotiation, adaptation, modification, and outright rejection as well as different or varied levels of acceptance or accommodation, are everywhere apparent. From within an allegedly imitative culture, like Australia, particular local responses are generated by distinct historical legacies, unique social forces and particular cultural forms. (For example, in the field of television—an apparent spearhead of Americanisation—local programs and productions have flourished despite the popularity of some US sitcoms, big budget movies and transplanted current affairs formats. Over fifty years of viewing, a vernacular Australian voice, local accents and Australian stories have not been swamped or indeed diminished by television product made for the US market.)

Obviously the United States remains a powerful social model and cultural precursor which other states find difficult to ignore. However, in a variety of studies of Americanisation published from the early 1990s, interpretations built on ideas of unilateral domination or cultural imperialism have been rejected. Rob Kroes, a leading European scholar in this field, summarises these arguments perceptively: 'America's culture has become an unavoidable presence' globally, but its 'reception knows many voices: there is a resilience in other cultures that refuses to be washed away'.<sup>38</sup>

Recent studies also agree that so-called Americanisation cannot be separated from even broader processes or modernisation, consumerism and globalisation—processes of which America is a part but for which it is not separately responsible. Writing of France, Richard Kuisel argues that Americanisation has 'become increasingly disconnected from America', is confused with global changes affecting much of the postwar world, and might best be identified as 'the coming of consumer society'.<sup>39</sup> Writing of how Australia was 'implicated' in America and Americanisation, Bell and Bell have suggested that broadly parallel developments in different modern societies—from suburbanisation to fashion or economic rationalism—should not be interpreted as caused by the United States, imposing its own image on other willing, or unwilling imitative cultures. It is appropriate to view Australia as following the US along a broadly similar if somewhat retarded road towards post-industrial status, passing through stages of modernisation that characterise most capitalist or mixed economies this century. Thus,



in this interpretation, the suburbs, freeways and mass culture were not symptomatic of the Americanisation of Australia but of the modernisation of both the US and Australia.

Exaggerated fears of external threat and cultural loss have characterised Australian history since the mid-nineteenth century. Australia has long struggled to reconcile the forces of its European past with the imperatives of its geographic location. Even if it is argued that domestic Australia has been overwhelmed by Americanisation, its foreign relations continue to be shaped fundamentally by national interests not cultural integration with another state. While US culture has been deeply and variously implicated in Australia's modern history, it does not necessarily follow that American cultural power has reoriented Australia's insecure international gaze from Britain and Europe. Realpolitik, not cultural or social similarity, shaped Australia's quest for American strategic assurances. In peace, as in war, national interests not shared values or pastimes, determined fundamental shifts in Australia's diplomacy and foreign policy.

Americanisation, real or imagined, did not serve as a Trojan horse making Anglo-Australia receptive to new military alliances or Cold War ideology. Such a view oversimplifies and distorts the transforming influence of imported culture. It is also built on exaggerated estimates of Australia's compliance with the wishes of the policies of the US in international affairs. To argue that the alleged Americanisation of Australian life has conditioned its drift from the UK, shaped the ANZUS alliance, and tied the Pacific nation to the US during the Cold War, is to ignore the fundamental and rational exercise of perceived national interests in Australia's behaviour. Additionally, this view ignores the complex receptions given by local communities to imported cultural forms and ideas. Postwar Australia has not moved either willingly or unwillingly from imperial appendage to American satellite—except in the eyes of those who continue to confuse so-called Americanisation with the smaller nation's increasingly distinctive incorporation into a modern, globalised world, and who continue to ignore the way cultural influences are resisted, adapted and transformed by receiving national cultures. Generations of intimate ties to the UK did not, ultimately, transform prewar Australia into a 'new Britannia'. Nor have alliances in war and peace reflected the transformation of

Australia into the 'other America' that was both welcomed and resisted from the late nineteenth century.

**‘Americanisation’:  
Political and Cultural Examples  
from the Perspective of  
‘Americanised’ Australia**

**Philip Bell and Roger Bell**

The international and internationalising dimensions of culture—from the political to the popular—are today the focus of unprecedented scholarly attention. Paradoxically, a ‘postmodern age’ which celebrates egalitarian diversity and subjectivity is confronted with the homogenising authority of economic liberalism, western values, and popular culture—a process linked at every level with the triumph of American power and example. Victory in the Cold War has been interpreted as marking the end of ideological contest, or even, more glibly, as the End of History. America’s triumph has signalled the universal victory of forces which Francis Fukuyama has labelled interchangeably ‘economic and political liberalism’, ‘the Western idea’, ‘consumerist Western culture’, ‘modern liberalism’, and ‘Western liberal democracy’.<sup>1</sup> Where once American hegemony from the military to the ideological was proposed, more recent analyses emphasise globalisation and/or modernising and postmodernising processes. However, the American example, if not naked American power, is still usually seen as implicated most deeply in these fundamental expressions of cultural change. Many Americanists and students of popular culture are convinced that in the late twentieth century one nation has emerged as the principal source of an homogenising global culture. As Todd Gitlin has

observed: 'American popular culture is the closest approximation there is today to a global *lingua franca*, drawing especially the urban and urbane classes of most nations into a federated culture zone. American popular culture is the latest in a long succession of bidders for global unification.' (Or, perhaps, the world is culturally *bilingual* with 'American as its second language').<sup>2</sup>

The power of the US abroad is increasingly understood as a consequence of its cultural and ideological authority or appeal. Even conservatives, such as Joseph Nye, have argued that traditional uses of military force and diplomacy are of declining importance in maintaining America's role as the dominant world state. Instead he identifies 'soft power', America's 'cultural and ideological appeal', as the basis for its international authority in a post-Cold War world. Writing from a much less celebratory position, Gitlin has observed that 'the dominance of American popular culture is a soft dominance—in a certain sense a collaboration',<sup>3</sup> between the more and the less powerful economies and cultures. Other nationalities have also lamented this assumed process: the West German filmmaker, Wim Wenders, has one of his characters proclaim that 'the Americans have colonised our consciousness (in *Kings of the Road*, itself paying ironic homage to the Hollywood 'road' movie); the British sociologist, Stuart Hall, has spoken of a world 'dreaming itself to be American'; while Jean Baudrillard has claimed: 'America is the original version of modernity. We are the dubbed or subtitled version.'<sup>4</sup>

Many commentators, from Austria to Australia, have argued that the 'Americanisation' of popular culture after 1945 was the principal, even the necessary, precursor to 'the political, military and economic success of the United States in the Cold War'.<sup>5</sup> While seldom defined, so-called 'Americanisation' has been widely invoked as the process most responsible for what is seen as the growing homogeneity and interdependence of cultures. In the eyes of many representatives of western states with close links to metropolitan America, it is also the process most responsible for the erosion of cultural diversity, ideological difference, and at times, political sovereignty. Typical of these claims are those made with growing frequency about Australia. Given its geographical homology, European migration, military alliances and modern suburban consumerist culture, the Anglophone, strategically insecure Pacific continent was arguably less ambivalent about Americanisation and

more open to it than were other western nations. Nationalist historian, Geoffrey Serle, for example, has written of Australia as 'more vulnerable to "Americanisation" than any other country ... Britain, France, Mexico, Canada all are to some extent insulated from Americanisation in ways we are not'.<sup>6</sup>

Although written against a background of his nation's involvement alongside the US in Vietnam, Serle's words echoed those of generations of Australians who had invoked America as either a utopian ideal or a dystopian warning. From early in the nineteenth century the theme of Australia as 'the future America of the Southern hemisphere' resonated through local political discourses on republicanism, federation, immigration, suffrage, social reform and security. For over a century, before the Pearl Harbor attack drew Australia and the US into a critical alliance in the Pacific, the two nations were linked in myriad ways by shared political values and cultural forms. For many antipodean radicals and reformers, the models provided by Republican America, Progressivism or the New Deal helped to qualify the authority of British influences on local political culture and contests. At the same time, popular cultural practices were influenced profoundly in colonial and federated Australia by examples and ideas drawn from its New World cousin across the Pacific. This influence was felt in such diverse cultural fields as vaudeville and theatre; literature and comic books; vocabulary and accent; radio and film; advertising; painting; popular music; sport; fashion; magazines; suburban design and architecture. On the eve of World War II, Australia's 'little Digger', former Prime Minister Billy Hughes, told a US audience: 'What we are, you were; and what you are we hope to be'.<sup>7</sup>

Not all nationalists welcomed the American model. In the interwar years 'penetration' by US culture had evoked articulate resistance within Australia. W.A. Payne protested in 1930: 'Americanisms ... have crept insidiously upon us with the "inevitability of gradualness" and become habits no longer noticeable to ourselves'. These influences were far more pervasive half a century later, when global advertising, television, popular music and films were dominated by US corporations. Routine exposure to US popular culture was a result as well as a cause of Australia's integration into US commercial, industrial, advertising, and media circuits. More importantly, it also reflected the modernisation of Australian society and political culture, as well as

the language the two societies shared. Before it was tied to Washington by anticommunism and ANZUS, Australia had long-established sympathies for the power that was to become the dominant external source of its commercial culture. The growth of mass consumption and commercial communications media, along with shared anxieties during the Cold War extended the 'future America' paradigm and it remained a powerful influence on popular culture and political life. In reporting the Los Angeles riots of 1992 to its Australian audience, the influential *Bulletin* magazine's cover story began: 'No, not a movie. This could be the future'.<sup>8</sup>

The notion that the American empire or American hegemony was sustained without military occupation was, of course, one that was commonly reiterated in the press as well as in the academic literature. Assuming that the smaller state was the *effect*, so to speak, of the American *cause*, modern Australia has been widely interpreted as part of an informal American empire. If not *de jure* then at least *de facto* it is an economic, military, and cultural dependent of the Great Power. Australia has been variously interpreted as a 'satellite' of metropolitan America, or as the ideological and economic victim of 'Americanisation' or 'American cultural imperialism'. Nationalist commentators constantly lament Australia's docile collusion in this process. In Phillip Adams' view, for example, Australia 'has succumbed, yielded, sold-out to a cultural imperialism that makes past imperialisms look puny'.<sup>9</sup>

Just as Australian–American relations are understood narrowly in terms of a bilateral political association of unequal national states, so too is the historiography of international relations dominated by study of the exercise of power and diplomacy between otherwise autonomous nations. As Akira Iriye acknowledges: 'the phenomenon of cultural transmission and diffusion has been studied more extensively by anthropologists and art historians than by diplomatic historians'. While he concedes that 'culture may become as crucial a concept of international affairs as security and trade', like most historians writing more narrowly of the Australian–American relationship, Iriye views culture as an independent manifestation of national character which can be understood in isolation from politics, economic and even ideology.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, traditional interpretations of bilateral relationships have been slow to recognise that less powerful nations actively negotiate influence and power, whether these are political,

economic, or cultural. They assume that power emanates from the nation that is ostensibly more powerful, which then constitutes the second nation as its effect. But such an emphasis on bilateral power relations makes it difficult to understand broadly parallel developments in two nations, such as those which might more appropriately be labelled modernisation or westernisation. If viewed only bilaterally, such developments are too easily explained as the simple consequences of unidirectional power, and labelled as 'Americanisation'. In discussing Australia and the US we reject unidirectional causal models, sometimes phrased in terms of 'imperialism', which are initially appealing in their generality, but fail to capture the complexity and the genuinely interactive features of the relationship. Despite some important if isolated exceptions, ideological and cultural power and their resistance, negotiation and accommodation by Australians have been neglected by historians, as have the social and cultural texture of these negotiated relationships.<sup>11</sup>

After a decade of Labor Party governments, Australians are (again) debating the prospect of severing constitutional ties to Britain and becoming a Republic. In this climate, the media have re-examined Australia's political and cultural relationships, with some commentators arguing that the Pacific nation is (or ought to be) independent of both its British colonial origins and American hegemony. They point out that in bilateral security arrangements, as in economics, the myth of a 'special relationship' has evaporated. Australia is now 'on its own' in a world made unpredictable by the global complexities of the 1990s. Without God or America on its side, Australia is coming to recognise its Asian and industrial realities as reflected directly from its region rather than as refracted through American perspectives. The press now acknowledges that the US 'no longer guarantee[s] [Australia's] security, let alone its economic well being'; and Australia is 'no special ally for America'. These observations were made by *Time* magazine in an article ironically titled 'Home Alone', after a popular American movie about a child left without a babysitter.<sup>12</sup> The cultural similarities which were assumed by *Time* when addressing Australian readers underscored the fact that commercial culture remains one medium through which Australians can be spoken of by American interests outside the diplomatic discourses of ANZUS or GATT. Although the local edition of the American magazine proclaimed Australia's

independence, the very existence of *Time* (Australia) signified the implication of America's global culture in that of the smaller nation.

In this paper, we have chosen to use the terms 'implication' and 'implicated' to summarise the various relationships between the greater and the lesser power. We hope to avoid simple formulations that see the more powerful nation as directly dominating, colonising, or imperially controlling the small nation. In many accounts of the relationship it is taken for granted that the power of the larger state is directly imposed on the smaller nation, albeit, in most cases, with a degree of consent. Although power is clearly an essential concept in any analysis of this question, it is important to avoid pre-judging the issue and therefore to emphasise the various potentially independent domains within which, within Australia, American influences have been differentially effective. This means looking at the ways in which Australia has sought to negotiate, resist, modify, and accommodate the various influences to which it has been exposed. Although it might seem difficult to make the claim, in some areas it can also be argued that Australia has itself had influence on the greater power. Certainly, Australia usually modified and gave its own character to the relationship. Moreover different analyses must be provided for the military-political sphere on the one hand, and for the subtleties of parallel cultural negotiations on the other.

To study the impact of US policies abroad it is necessary to go beyond the boundaries of the Great Power and beyond the archive of intention and policy. The relationships between the two 'Pacific' powers looks very different when seen from within the context of the 'receiving' culture—that of Australia with its unique traditions and interests. The tendency to aggregate American influences into a monolithic explanatory concept ('Americanisation') is empirically simplistic: it assumes the very 'effects' it seeks to explain, and could be argued to disempower alternative interpretations which arise from within the 'weaker', smaller nation involved in the relationship.

The blanket term 'Americanisation' is frequently no more than an assumption concerning the origins of a cultural example (language, dress, food) which may or may not be accurate. It is applied indiscriminately within Australian media discourse to label an array of factors seen as threatening to national(istic) 'identity', 'way of life'



or 'values'. This pejorative use of 'Americanisation' sees Australia as adopting social practices and cultural values which putatively originate in the US (or in 'Hollywood', 'Los Angeles' or some metonymic reference to that nation). It assumes that the offending items are not meaningful within the Australian context merely because they make cultural sense to some local groups, but that they carry with them their alien 'American' origins. It follows that popular discourse on this issue is frequently nationalistic, assuming a unique Australian cultural and political identity and consensus which US-originated culture threatens.

In more scholarly discourse, it is possible to detect elements of a similarly negative critique of social and cultural change thought to originate in the United States. In this essay we use the terms found in such discourse but do not wish to pre-judge either the effect these labels assume nor to align ourselves with the nationalistic rejection of 'Americanisation' with which they are frequently linked. Nevertheless, we implicitly argue that 'Australian' responses to 'American' power, influences and example are not simply those of protective nationalism. Rather, they are culturally specific, active and much more complex than 'national identity' reactions would predict. So, in this paper we discuss the example of the Cold War, in which Australian politics clearly echoed dominant US policies, but also the example of the Australian cultural repose to the Vietnam War, in which the smaller Pacific nation fought as America's most servile ally. By comparing the most salient popular cultural forms originating in the two countries, it can be seen that Australia has constructed very different 'memories' of Vietnam. Insofar as the Australian cinema and television industries rationalised and mythologised local involvement in the South East Asian conflict, they produced a distinctive reconstruction of the country's traditional values, markedly different from the American films and television series which were nevertheless widely distributed within Australia during the period 1978–92.

The need for different analyses of these political and cultural dimensions of Australia's relationship with the US highlights the inadequacy of the assumption that 'Americanisation' may be thought of as a simple cultural consequence of economic/political influence, even control, by a powerful US. From within a putatively imitative national culture, Australia, local history and conditions, not imported cultural forms, generate local responses.

The paradox of cultural resistance in the face of pervasive social change and political accommodation was apparent in Australia from the early postwar years. At least at the level of public utterance, Americanisation could be denied even when it could not be delayed. To borrow Max Lerner's observation on Europe in the postwar decades, Australia was 'caught between the need for America and the recoil from it'.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, elements of this cultural schizophrenia were evident even in the nineteenth century. Although unable to free itself from dependence on American military strategy, economic priorities, and mass culture, Australia nonetheless has consistently attempted to define itself in distinctive national terms and to promote its separate national interests abroad.<sup>14</sup> As we shall argue in our analysis of the relationships that developed throughout the postwar years, Australia fluctuated between an easy deference to American power and an uneasy fear that its great friend might use this power selfishly or irresponsibly. Yet modern Australia was obviously a product of forces other than those that might be identified as 'American'. Australia's own traditions and identity, its British legacies, its deepening multicultural complexion from the 1950s, as well as distinct religious, class, and regional characteristics, formed the social grid into which American pressures had to be incorporated. Thus throughout the Cold War a paradoxical nationalism defined itself against what Geoffrey Serle saw as Australia's ostensible vulnerability to 'Americanisation'.<sup>15</sup>

At least from the election of the Robert Menzies Liberal-Country Party coalition in 1949, the suspicions and rhetoric of the Cold War that justified America's global confrontation with communism came to dominate official Australia perspectives and actions in foreign affairs. Independent efforts of the Labor governments of the 1940s may have delayed, but could not avert, a broad realignment of Australia's policies consistent with American perceptions in both its foreign policy and, to a lesser extent, domestic affairs. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s interlocking changes in international politics, economics, technology, and culture transformed Australia's links with the outside world, and relationships with the US assumed centre stage. American influences squeezed out many of those long associated with the UK and its empire. Although the rhetoric and symbols of traditional ties to the mother country were not all displaced, the realignment of Australia towards the US was to be insistent and irreversible. As

interactions between the two multiplied, the vast asymmetries in power and status between the societies biased their relationships towards American models and American interests.<sup>16</sup>

Despite America's decisive role in defeating Japan, and the escalating tensions of the Cold War, Australia's postwar Labor Government refused to accept that Washington's international actions were in the interests of all former Allies. Indeed, through the UN, in its continuing imperial links, and through bilateral diplomacy, Australia encouraged other nations to join it in attempting to counter, resist, or at least deflect US foreign policy initiatives. As a small state, it felt its particular economic interests and regional ambitions stifled by the predominance of American power and influence in the Asia-Pacific area. Only gradually and against the background of an allegedly new Asian threat to its security in the form of communist China, did Australia accommodate itself to American authority in the Pacific. The war that erupted in Korea quickly became a brutal reminder that the divisions of the Cold War had been transferred to the Asia-Pacific region and would now be contested in virtually every sphere of international politics. Against this background, the new Australian Government became increasingly receptive to American definitions of international threat, as it did to American interpretations of security issues and international politics more generally.<sup>17</sup>

As the Cold War intensified, the Asia-Pacific region joined Europe as a focus of superpower rivalries. Australia's foreign policies and strategic assumptions were radically recast by its associations with the US. Some on the left in Australia rejected the need for such a relationship and refused to view international events through what they saw as the distorting lens of the Cold War. Instead, they interpreted revolutions in Asia as legitimate manifestations of nationalism and evidence of long overdue social change. They criticised the assumption that China and North Korea (and later North Vietnam) were merely willing satellites of the Soviet Union, or pawns in the global contest between 'Marxism' and 'democracy'. But for members of the ruling Liberal-Country Party coalition, as well as the Democratic Labor Party which had recently splintered from the Australian Labor Party, such interpretations were at best naive, at worst comfort to the 'enemy'. In the first months of war in Korea, for example, Liberal MP Paul Hasluck greeted his government's decision to send troops to serve under

General MacArthur with words that clearly echoed official US statements: 'This expansionist, imperialistic and aggressive policy of the Soviet Union must be resisted wherever it is exemplified'.<sup>18</sup>

The tenor and direction of Australia's policies in the period framed by the wars in Korea and Vietnam were expressed by Prime Minister Robert Menzies in discussions with his cabinet in 1958. Australia must not disagree publicly with the US, he stated, and Australia's defence forces must be geared to fight alongside those of its great and powerful friends. Independence in policy formulation, or military-strategic activity, was rejected. 'The greatest practical fact of life for Australia is that we are in no danger of conquest, either directly or indirectly, except from Communist aggression', Menzies observed. '[O]ur doctrine at a time of crisis should be "Great Britain and the United States right or wrong"'. He continued: 'The simple truth, therefore, is that we cannot afford to run counter to their policies at a time when a crisis has arisen'.<sup>19</sup> Surprisingly, this observation came after the Suez crisis of 1956 had exposed the impossibility of simultaneously courting two great and powerful friends in the event of a disagreement between them. This crisis, along with events in Malaya, South Africa, and Indonesia, confronted Australia with additional difficulties as it attempted to embrace British imperial policies without alienating its powerful new Cold War partner in the Pacific.

As war in Vietnam revealed, the decolonisation of much of Asia was a protracted and bloody contest that ultimately drew the US and Australia deeply into the region in a struggle against nationalist and 'communist' movements. These movements generally enjoyed wide local support as they led the struggles to overthrow European colonial authority and create more egalitarian, sovereign states. But nationalist victories over the French during 1953–64 were won as Cold War rivalries intensified throughout Asia. To the Cold Warriors in Washington and Canberra peasant nationalism had become merely a euphemism for communist subversion. In Australia, deep-rooted anxieties about Asian expansion and 'racial contamination' were now mixed with ideological alarm over the expansion of communism in what came to be called the 'Near North'. The Menzies Government, along with most Australians, understood communism as a monolithic movement that had spread from the USSR to Eastern Europe, China, and the wider Asian region. Communities once obscure to western interests, notably Laos,

Cambodia, and Vietnam, were interpreted as precarious strategic 'dominoes' by Australian officials now locked into the ideological imperatives of the Cold War. Justifying his government's decision to send troops to Vietnam, Menzies echoed this familiar argument. 'The takeover of South Vietnam would be direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and Southeast Asia', he said: 'It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans'. Should one domino fall, all the others would topple in quick succession.<sup>20</sup>

Throughout the period of conservative government in the 1950s and 1960s the symbols of Empire and Mother England were often invoked to placate those disturbed by the new direction in Australia's foreign policy. Yet even the cloying Empire rhetoric of Menzies could not conceal this dramatic change in direction. Imperial relations were not the only casualties of Australia's orientation towards the US. Many Australians who had anticipated that dependence on Great Britain would be replaced by a vibrant regionalism and independence in defence and foreign affairs, along the lines suggested by John Curtin and H V Evatt in the 1940s, viewed with dismay their nation's reliance on American leadership and power. Opportunities for regional initiatives—perhaps even 'non-alignment' as pursued by many recently decolonised nations—were lost as Australia transferred its allegiances from one 'great and powerful friend' to another.<sup>21</sup>

Initially, as the private musings of Menzies indicate, many Australians promoted a close public military relationship with Washington while they spoke disparagingly in private of America and Americans, and clung longingly to the culture of Britain and the Empire or celebrated their distinctive 'Australianness'. However, by the mid 1960s military dependence on America was encouraged both publicly and privately in the language of the Harold Holt and John Gorton governments. Later governments were sometimes less effusive. The Labor Government of Gough Whitlam (1972–75), and to a lesser degree Malcolm Fraser's Liberal-Country Party Government (1975–82), did not blindly follow American leadership on all matters. Under Labor, particularly, the alliance was exposed to new tensions as Australia sought a more autonomous role in global affairs, anticipated US policy by recognising the People's Republic of China, and immediately withdrew its forces from Vietnam. But from the early 1960s until the late 1980s examples of Australian

independence or dissent from American initiatives and perceptions were fairly rare. Ironically, as recent disclosures in West Irian and Vietnam reveal, before Labor's brief period in office Australia's most forceful initiatives in foreign affairs sought not to offset American power, but to increase America's presence in Asia and bolster its military effort against 'communism' in the region. It has been argued recently that Australia deliberately exploited American anticommunism and Cold War fears in order to draw this powerful nation into ANZUS and later into Vietnam.<sup>22</sup> This interpretation dramatically exaggerates Australia's influence on Washington. It also ignores the powerful interests and perceptions that motivated American initiatives in Japan, China, Indochina, and the Pacific from 1945 to 1975. But it does correctly highlight Australia's determination to embrace a new protector from the early 1950s. If this initiative was considered consistent with Australia's perceived security interests it nonetheless narrowed the foreign policy options Australia could subsequently pursue. By constantly emphasising the centrality of the American alliance to its foreign policies, Australia undermined its own capacity to bargain with the US. While always anxious to demonstrate its reliability as an ally, Australian governments, both Liberal and Labor, found it difficult to dissent from American actions or to resist American pressure for military support.

Occasionally, this docile emulation has been interrupted by independent assessments and initiatives—most notably the Whitlam Labor Government's prompt withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and recognition of China, and more recently the efforts of the Bob Hawke and Paul Keating Labor governments to challenge America's protectionist agricultural policies and to promote independent initiatives over such diverse issues as Antarctica, Cambodia, and chemical weapons. But, in general, Australia until the late 1980s followed America's initiatives and endorsed the rationale on which such policies were based.

Notwithstanding the apparent military, political and economic alliances and cooperation between the US and Australia throughout the Cold War, it is not possible to generalise beyond these spheres and to argue that, in its domestic culture, Australia uniformly or dependently became 'Americanised' as a result.<sup>23</sup> This is most clearly evidenced in relation to the significance and meaning which the so-called Vietnam War has been given in Australian culture compared

to its dominant construction in the culture of the US. Despite the alliance between the US and Australia which brought the two nations into day-to-day cooperation, and despite ostensibly similar domestic conflicts over communism, the Cold War, the prosecution of the war in Vietnam and military conscription, Australian culture (especially its 'popular' culture) has interpreted and remembered the Vietnam war period, the events and their significance, very differently from its American counterpart. The difference between the two countries' respective 'memories' of the period are reminders that 'culture' always involves the active construction of meaning by its participant members, that the argument that one culture might simply impose itself on another, imitative culture, is very difficult to sustain.<sup>24</sup>

By the 1970s and 1980s, Australians, large numbers of whom had no personal memory of the Vietnam War, had been exposed to many hours of film and television presenting particular interpretations of America's involvement in that Southeast Asian conflict. At the same time, Australian cinema and television (to the extent that it dealt with the conflict at all) sought to construct another history of just this period, one in which America was represented partly as Australia's enemy. Even in this recent example, it could be argued that the formal relationships between Australia and America in the actual military and strategic sphere of the Vietnam War, have had cultural ramifications that reach beyond the particular period of that political and military alliance. In seeking to understand the relationships between the two nations, even in the recent past, it is important to examine these cultural as well as the political dimensions, and not to assume that what is held in the archive and studied by the traditional historian exhausts the significance of the relationships in question.

The cultural legacy of Vietnam to the US is partly embodied in the many Hollywood movies and TV series which sought to reconcile America to this defeat, beginning with *The Deer Hunter* and *Coming Home* (1978) and continuing through to *China Beach* and *Tour of Duty* (shown on Australian television in the late 1980s).<sup>25</sup> A necessarily brief comparison of the American and Australian cinematic and televisual remembering of 'Vietnam' shows very clearly how, despite the repeated, almost continuous exposure to American popular culture, Australia produced contrasting images of this period. Moreover, the Australian films represented America and

Americans, as well as Vietnam and 'Asia', quite differently. In this way, Australian television mini-series and movies provided a representation of 'what America means' in the post-Vietnam period. This cultural meaning is paradoxical and linked to formal aspects of the US–Australia relationship.

Until Vietnam, the American involvement in modern war had been uncomplicated by defeat and uncompromised by moral or political ambiguities sufficient to cause major rifts in public assent to the legitimacy of the war efforts. Australia had similarly supported the victorious Allies in the two world wars and in Korea. But its nationalistic pride has usually been epitomised by valiant defeats, where mateship and 'battling' could compensate for otherwise pointless losses. Conflict over conscription had split the nation fifty years before Vietnam, and the Boer War involvement by pro-British Australians was less easily rationalised as having God on its side than was either the First or Second World War commitments. However, in the 1960s both the US and Australia had to come to terms with the moral contradictions of supporting a succession of failed South Vietnamese regimes. Each also had to deal with its own internal political conflict over intervention in Asia, as well as conscription. Finally, the relationship between the two allies 'invited' to prevent the Southeast Asian dominoes from tumbling towards Australia was always tense and continually being renegotiated.<sup>26</sup>

Fictional film and television have always found political and historical analysis difficult, given the conventions of Hollywood. Vietnam films proved no exception. Put very simply, Hollywood subsumed Vietnam to American popular cultural paradigms which repeated the stories of other, earlier genres. It ignored the contradictions and complexity of the period which culminated in the war. Australian popular cinema of the 1970s and 1980s virtually avoided Vietnam completely. The only widely released local film set in Vietnam, however, is significantly different from its American counterparts and indicates some of the ways Australians have been invited to see their own involvement.

*The Odd Angry Shot* (Australia, 1979) did not see war as apocalyptic and transcendental, nor as a theatre for the clash of Good and Evil. The biblical and the metaphysical connotations of America's Vietnam films were ignored in favour of earthy, scatological humour, the mundane necessity to kill in order to survive, and a detached, ironic stoicism shown by a cross-section of



ordinary blokes—blokes played by a virtual who's who of 'Aussie' actors of the time. It is significant that early in this film, the Aussie camp is attacked, suggesting that 'our' boys, the Americans' allies, are not the aggressors. Yet the Asian enemy is curiously invisible, and the Americans themselves become Australia's symbolic enemy defined in terms of sporting competition, which allows the underdog diggers to assert their value by contrast with the more powerful 'Yanks'. Deeply ethnocentric, *The Odd Angry Shot* contrasts the innocent mateship of Aussies to the power of America and the incomprehensible corruption of the Vietnamese. The principal character's reference to Vietnam as 'this tossed-up, \*\*\*\*\*-up never-come-down land' epitomises this resigned but perversely comic attempt to stay Australian in the alien world of Asia. Vaguely critical of authority (the 'they' who sent the troops in), while celebrating ordinary mateship, the film is as populist as it is determined to avoid any engagement with the very questions its 'shit-shovellers' ask about why they are there, or about class or politics in any form. The nearest the film comes to critical reflection is the cynical, self-congratulatory jokes by which morale, masculinity and mateship are maintained. If America's Vietnam films saw the enemy as 'within', Australia's films largely displaced the enemy onto a symbolic power against which an innocent, populist heroism-of-the-underdog could be asserted. The shadows of nationalist Australian leaders, Prime Minister Billy Hughes at Versailles, and Prime Minister John Curtin and Dr H V Evatt in the 1940s, stretched across these films.

Whereas many American-produced movies such as *The Deer Hunter* (1978) were centred on the powerful male hero, or the rite of passage (especially *Platoon*, 1986), on the nation reconciled, and on the alien Asian culture and enemy, Australian television dramas presented a more ambivalent and vulnerable hero.<sup>27</sup> They saw the family as the social unit torn apart by Vietnam and therefore in need of reunification, and constructed the Asian enemy very differently. The Australian television series presented the US and its soldiers themselves as an enemy, or at least they contrasted them with Australian servicemen, to the advantage of the locals, of course. *Vietnam: The Miniseries* (1987) lists four sets of *dramatis personae*. Significantly these begin with 'The Family', then come 'The Politicians', 'The Soldiers', and 'The Friends'. The nostalgic 1960s montage of old advertisements, news clips and pop stars which opens the series is set to the pop song 'to everything there is a

season and a time to every purpose under heaven ...'. This nostalgic fatalism sets the somewhat resigned mood which the series seems content to rely on for its general emotional force. Against these filtered recollections of the 1960s, the Goddard's family drama plays out various 'positions' on the Vietnam conflict—the father's support for government intervention changing to its opposite; the mother's and daughter's liberalism turning to active opposition; the volunteer soldier son's experiences leading to alienation, cynicism and aggression. Finally, however, the family accepts the experience and painful growth of the war period to emerge tentatively united, the son accepted by, and accepting of, the family.

However, it is in its treatment of the Vietnamese that the miniseries offers a more complex, less clearly ethnocentric image of the war than do its cinematic counterparts from the US. Phil Goddard's love for a Vietnamese woman, from whom he is separated by the war, and her subsequent death as a Viet-Cong at the hands of the Australian soldiers, constitute a rather trite subplot. Yet the Vietnamese villagers are portrayed as human, humane and politically sophisticated. The savage rape of a second Vietnamese woman by US soldiers and her later attempts to relate to the insularity and insensitivity of suburban Sydney are overtly critical of 'us' Australians, if rather condescendingly sentimental about the Vietnamese. It is significant that the innocent victims of the war, women and children, become the acceptable representatives of the Vietnamese which allows Australia to be distinguished from what the miniseries sees as the excessive brutality of America.

Our necessarily brief discussion of Australian-produced popular cultural rememberings of Vietnam is not intended to illuminate mainland US readings of the war and its aftermath. Rather, we emphasise that within the putatively Americanised Australian society, arguably very different discourses circulated, discourses grounded in the local culture, including its traditional anti-heroic, collectivist strands. The claim that Australia is in some sense a 'ventriloquist's dummy'<sup>28</sup> for powerful US culture is refuted by such examples. Significantly, it is in cases in which US media appear so imperially present in the local culture that their meanings may be most explicitly challenged by indigenous alternatives. What 'Vietnam' or 'America' meant was not determined by the ostensibly hegemonic Hollywood cycle of films which became ironic counterpoints, not imposed models, for local cultures.

This is not to imply that all, or a majority of 'typical' Australian citizens share a simple consensus around these issues. The popularity of local film and television explorations of post-Vietnam adjustment, however, does itself indicate that Australian popular culture actively reconstructed complex, perhaps contradictory memories of this period which local audiences understood but which would make little sense to British or US audiences. Local film and television was not merely 'anti-American', it was culturally significant beyond such limited nationalism.

Australian military support for the US in Vietnam has been remembered by Australia's recent movies and television as a reluctant alliance.<sup>29</sup> The US has been painted as excessive, even barbaric, in local versions of the war. By contrast, American films such as *Platoon* and *Good Morning Vietnam* (1987), have been widely distributed in Australia, providing a more positive representation of America 'finding itself' in the jungles of Asia. These examples suggest that the degree and quality of cultural 'Americanisation' through even during a period in which American media were highly visible in Australia depend on local accommodations, including resistances to, and reinterpretations of what 'America' means in the local, receiving culture. Second, Australia's response to the Vietnam experience shows that military and political cooperation, bordering on acquiescence, need not be translated into cultural imitation or dependence. Culture is dynamic, inconsistent and rooted in the soil of the society whose meanings and values it expresses.

'What is modern', Bruce Grant has claimed, 'always comes from America and is always replaced by America: only America can both create and destroy'. He concluded pessimistically that these are 'harsh terms' for Australia to negotiate'.<sup>30</sup> However, the implication of the US in Australia provokes active negotiation, albeit negotiation which has frequently been conducted within the language and culture of the greater power, and within global structures in which Australia has exhibited ostensibly very little power. Despite this, when studied from the perspective of the supposedly servile or imitative lesser power, negotiation, resistance and cultural independence may be seen. This is evident even during the Cold War period when the more distant view might see only unidirectional power at work.

Neither strategic agreements nor profound economic change, and certainly not cultural interpretation, constituted




'Americanisation' in the sense that they were imposed on Australia by power from abroad. Relations in every field were negotiated and modifications won which were appropriate to Australia's increasingly subtle interests as it sought material support and nationalistic meanings in the old and the new English-speaking empires. To conclude, any simple chronology of the postwar implications of the US in and for Australia is complicated by various processes which do not simply reflect inequalities of power. These include the many levels of material and cultural interaction between the two nations and the fact that more general modernising and globalising changes have driven both the US and Australia from the late nineteenth century at least. Furthermore, the particular nationality of ownership of the culture industries and of retail or other consumer industries is not necessarily an indicator of their significance in the 'receiving' culture, as we have seen in the Vietnam example. Finally, because power is always negotiated, even between apparently unequal allies, it may be resisted overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly.

Culture is a dynamic condition of social life, not just its 'reflection', so negotiation, resistances and accommodations between interacting cultures can be seen at all periods of their history. These are particularly evident in the contradictions in which 'America' has been embedded in Australian discourses which construct the larger nation as a model for the smaller. As 'Australia's future', the US has been represented in both utopian and dystopian terms. America has been seen as the locus of progressive idealisations and of threatening nightmares alike; as the positive promise and as the negative fate of its little antipodean brother. Both of these conflicting narratives interpreted the US as an extreme version of a projected Australian future. Many examples of this can be cited: in Australia, in the 1890s and a century later, 'Republicanism' was and is generally seen in the example of the US, 'Presidentialism' likewise, whether endorsed or rejected; Australian cultural industries, like the cinema, even individual artists, were judged in terms of potential US success; criminal and political corruption from Al Capone to Watergate were seen as the models towards which Australia was heading. More recently, 'American serial killers' have been characterised as the limit point of violent tendencies in 'our own' society, while social contagion imagery associated with drug use has been widely cited to represent 'our'

future following the American example.<sup>31</sup> In these 'extreme future' scenarios, Australian popular discourse may turn clichés from the US against themselves, or it may embrace them as its own fate. Because discourses of both positive and negative 'Americanisation' have had as their subtext various other discourses of 'modernisation', these proclamations of, and laments for, Australia as 'a future America' may emphasise either the gleaming promise of modernity or the barbarism of an economically-driven consumerism.

C W E Bigsby has argued that 'Americanisation' is a label applied to the processes of mass reproduction, urbanisation, industrialisation, and consumerism, appropriate in a world 'for whom the modern experience is coeval with the American experience'. Cultures quite different from that of Australia have lamented or welcomed 'Americanisation', which 'frequently means little more than the incidence of change'.<sup>32</sup> American entertainment has always evoked reactions that accused it of 'levelling down' high standards of literate and musical culture, but it also produced a rich array of non-elite cultural enjoyments as the byproducts of material progress and modernisation. More importantly, because culture involves shared and contested meanings and values, Australian cultural negotiations with imported examples are distinct and rarely imitative. Materially, as well as symbolically, Australia may have become another America, but only in the sense that it is another modern, western state. It is 'other', and therefore different, yet expresses similar world historical processes. Australia is not made in America's image, is not a dependent satellite. Nor is it a simple effect of the 'great power'. To see it as 'Americanised' greatly overestimates the strength of America's global reach since 1945. But, America has been deeply implicated in many spheres of 'that other America's' political and cultural life. 'America' has also come to symbolise the very processes of social and cultural modernisation themselves. Yet tension, resistance, adaptation, and even indifference have characterised the various relationships between America and Australia since the Second World War.

Other modern nations have also been touched by American example and allegiance—by its 'soft' or 'hard' authority abroad. Like Australia, however, they should not be interpreted as unwitting victims of America's transforming power.



## **Cultural Crossroads and Global Frontiers: New Directions in US Diplomatic History**

Writing in the wake of the Cold War, the respected historian of American foreign relations Akira Iriye lamented that ‘the phenomenon of cultural transmission and diffusion has been studied more extensively by anthropologists and art historians than by diplomatic historians’. The dry historiography of postwar international politics was, he inferred, dominated by narrative studies of the exercise of military power and diplomacy between otherwise autonomous nation states.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, power has largely been understood in conventional strategic or economic terms as an expression of identifiable separate national interests. Yet as recent debates over US foreign relations implicitly acknowledge, cultural processes are deeply enmeshed in the exercise of its international power.

Although difficult to analyse or assess, incessant cultural exchanges have long complemented international linkages encoded in treaties, military cooperation or trade agreements. Indeed, it might be argued that cultural interactions carried by culture—from its ‘political’ to its ‘popular’ dimensions—provide the substrata on which more formal bilateral or multilateral associations are built. NATO and NAFTA, for example, reflect underlying cultural or symbolic interactions as well as shared strategic or economic

interests. Attempts by historians to trace the role of these interactions on formal relations between states are bedevilled by the infinite complexity of 'culture'<sup>2</sup> and by the difficulty of defining the nature or effects of transcultural relationships. Cultural influences or inferences are frustratingly difficult to demonstrate. In contrast, analyses anchored to conventional archival sources provide accessible narratives little troubled by such challenges. Nonetheless, as the triumph of the so-called American Century has merged into discourses about globalisation, culture and 'soft power' have surfaced increasingly as analytical tools in the historiography of international relations and US foreign policy. Indeed, as Uta G Poiger noted in *Diplomatic History*, '[r]ecent scholarship on [US] foreign relations focuses increasingly on its cultural dimensions'.<sup>3</sup> Much of this work is informed by new intellectual currents in cultural history and cultural studies. This article traces the emergence of these changing historiographical paradigms, most of which centre on the implications of US power and example abroad during the so-called American Century.

Before September 11, much scholarship accepted that overwhelming economic power, technological strength, and cultural appeal underpinned the unrivalled power of the US abroad. Yet, given the nation's pre-eminent authority in the postwar world generally and the ubiquitous presence of its popular culture abroad, it is surprising that US diplomatic historians were slow to discover cultural transfer and reception as central to understanding the United States and the world. 'Ideally', Poiger suggested in 1999, 'work on American cultural relations abroad speaks to both sides in cultural transmission, to both the US and the receiving nation'. And, she concluded, researchers are 'increasingly realizing that in order to assess the American impact abroad, including the successes or failures of American foreign policies, they need to pay close attention to social and political conditions within recipient nations'.<sup>4</sup> Anticipating Poiger's plea, Michael Hunt in *Ideology and American Foreign Policy*, published in 1987, attacked the 'naïve positivism' and archival fixations that dominated conventional diplomatic historical narratives.<sup>5</sup> More recently, another prominent international relations scholar, Walter L Hixon, has expressed concern that subtle cultural analysis remains marginalised in most work on US foreign policy. 'One thing is sure', he argued, 'the United States can never be fully understood as a world power' without 'consideration of the appeal



of its lifestyles and consumer and popular culture abroad. Nor can the nation's approach to world affairs be understood in isolation from domestic culture'.<sup>6</sup>

However Hixon's assessment underestimates significant paradigm shifts which have influenced much recent scholarship. As Anders Stephanson argues, diplomatic history is now a greatly expanded field: 'Diplomatic historians ... seem less and less interested in the history of diplomacy'. Interstate relations, the sovereign state and the very idea of the diplomatic subject are 'in every sense in question'. In the light of a 'vastly expanding world of signs and media, increasing commercial and popular mobility, new and fluctuating identities and, most strikingly, the decline of the sovereign along with the geopolitical,' Stephanson claims, the diminishing importance of conventional international relations study is readily explained. He might have added that these influences are compounded by the scholarly popularity of 'cultural studies' and a broad recognition that the 'nation' is dissolving and fragmenting in an increasingly 'globalised' world.<sup>7</sup> Writing of the shifts towards 'theoretical eclecticism' in international relations scholarship more generally, Samuel M Makinda notes that recent work builds on a variety of paradigms, including critical theory, feminism, postmodernism and poststructuralism.<sup>8</sup> Typical of this change in US diplomatic history is Emily Rosenberg's explicit use of 'cultural critique' to revisit American dollar diplomacy, in which she argues somewhat opaquely 'that many of the concerns of recent critical theory have relevance to the history of US international relations: attention to cultural narrative, the analytical decentering of states, performativity and social drama, gender and racial codings'.<sup>9</sup>

Not surprisingly, the trajectory of this new cultural emphasis in US diplomatic historiography reflects recent retheorising in the humanities and social sciences more generally—a change often referred to as the 'linguistic turn' or as poststructuralism. For example, Marxist-informed constructs of Open Door expansion and cultural imperialism have been challenged and largely displaced. The end of the Cold War, and with it a recognition of the triumph of the American Century, is now written about in cultural as well as politico-strategic terms. Like critical work on American ideology, cultural imperialism and the transforming influences of consumer capitalism which characterised 'New Left' and 'revisionist' historiography from the 1960s, much recent scholarship also

focuses on the effects of American cultural exports and values abroad. Yet, overwhelmingly, recent scholarship is far more sanguine than are earlier revisionist arguments about the implications of a more open world in which American exports and capital travel freely. Accusations of 'cultural imperialism' still resonate in public discourse—especially in protective receiving societies like France—but these have little purchase in current scholarly discourse.

Rather than imply that an emphasis on cultural factors is unique to recent scholarship or restricted to a dated 'New Left revisionism', it should be acknowledged that culture and ideology have been central to a range of interpretations of US diplomacy published throughout the Cold War—especially those concerned to explore the domestic origins of US policy. A variety of topics have been explored through a cultural lens—including such themes as Wilsonian internationalism; ethnic, religious or regional influences on domestic tensions over isolationism or intervention; racial discourse on US involvement in conflicts in the Asia-Pacific; or most obviously the role of American ideology in the Cold War. More specifically, historians like Iriye, Rosenberg, Ninkovich, and Christopher Thorne, as well as a host of revisionists, influenced by William A Williams's Open Door arguments, placed culture and (as) ideology at the forefront of varied interpretations of US foreign policy and diplomacy.<sup>10</sup>

Nationalist historiography written against the background of the early Cold War generally reflected the lament of conservative American scholars over the limits to US efforts to confront communist propaganda as socialism spread and closed much of the world to American influence and commerce. At the same time, a critical historiography labelled American ideology and cultural exports as vehicles of a vast informal empire. In both conservative and radical interpretations, 'ideology' and 'culture' were often used interchangeably and remained vague polemical terms. In a field dominated by American academics and supported by bodies like the United States Information Service, the State Department and the CIA, debates were shaped by the partisan politics of the Cold War. A substantial body of literature followed Walt W Rostow's celebration of the transforming power of the American model of modernisation, and implicitly promoted the ideology of the US abroad from the late 1950s. In the Cold War against Marxist prescriptions for development in newly emerging states,

Washington's agencies and scholarly conscripts to its cause attempted to exploit the social and economic achievements of their nation to guide the postcolonial world towards an American model of progress, democracy and free enterprise. 'Claiming that the lessons of America's past "demonstrated" the best route to genuine modernity', Michael Latham suggests, they confidently believed the US 'could push "stagnant" societies toward the universal, evolutionary endpoint represented by an America that had already arrived there'.<sup>11</sup> These efforts were deeply frustrated, not least because this scholarship failed to address national differences and the complex reception accorded America's ideological prescriptions and economic pressures abroad.

Not until the 1960s was the reception of American ideas and institutions given serious consideration. Initially, European scholars led this response. Often this work was labelled anti-American and by implication as sympathetic to America's enemies in the Cold War. Commenting on the rise of anti-Americanism, Paul Hollander has concluded that it expressed 'an aversion to American culture in particular and its influence abroad ... a rejection of American foreign policy and a firm belief in the malignity (sic) of American influence and presence anywhere in the world'.<sup>12</sup> The historiographical equivalent of these reactions surfaced in a sustained 'left' critique of American 'cultural imperialism'—a force allegedly responsible for eroding national differences and organic culture as US-sponsored Open Door multilateralism spread the 'American model' and consumer capitalism. As in New Left historiography more generally, the sources of this critique were both political and intellectual: they reflected disillusion with the Vietnam War, the role of the CIA abroad, racial and urban disquiet at home, as well as the influences of the Frankfurt School and Neo-Marxist writers including Jurgen Habermas, C Wright Mills and William A Williams and later Noam Chomsky. No book was more important than Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* in providing a new framework which situated economic and cultural ambition at the heart of an expanding informal empire. The drive for an open world was interpreted as a euphemism for imperial expansion rooted in the economic and cultural dominance of America internationally. Emerging from this literature, 'Cultural Imperialism' became the central claim of a widening popular and scholarly discourse critiquing America's dominant world role.<sup>13</sup>

John Tomlinson has argued that the cultural imperialism thesis comprised four related scholarly sub-species—those centred on media influence, the erosion of national cultural differences, the rise and dominance of global (largely US) capital, and the critique of modernity as westernisation/Americanisation imposed on reluctant receiving societies.<sup>14</sup> In recent work, ‘cultural imperialism’ is often understood as ‘an instance of internationally circulating ideology’ which serves the interests of the greater power—interests that are both material and cultural. Ideas embedded in the concept of ‘cultural imperialism’ were often expressed—in the public, political and intellectual domain ... in terms linked to the dependent status of smaller states at the ‘periphery’ of power which radiated from the ‘metropolitan’ centre, the US. So-called ‘satellite societies’ (including Canada, Australia, or various states of Latin America) were usually understood as victims of unequal power relations in a shrinking world subject increasingly to American authority. ‘Americanising’ influence and interests abroad were served by the consent that consumer capitalism and/as ideology both engineered and expressed.<sup>15</sup>

After the fall of the Berlin Wall the US celebrated its ideological triumph and conservative pundits spoke of the end of history (as conflict). Surprisingly, at the same time, overseas concern with American cultural imperialism and hegemonic power declined—at least in parts of Europe, Canada, Australia and much of Latin America. This change should not be over emphasised, as anti-Americanism remained a powerful force, both intellectually and politically, especially in non-Christian societies. Nonetheless, the persistence of national and local differences, coupled with the disorder of the post-Cold War world and deep conflict rooted in religion and ethnicity, undermined the appeal of arguments which stressed the unidirectional transforming influences issuing from an American ‘centre’. If radical critiques had earlier exaggerated US cultural influences abroad, in the 1990s prominent conservative nationalist commentators did likewise. For example, Francis Fukuyama and Joseph Nye Jr in different ways delighted that their nation’s culture, technology and example now underpinned America’s international triumph. In Fukuyama’s ahistorical hyperbole, US power was reflected in the alleged victory of

democracy, consumer capitalism (free enterprise), and liberal internationalism—the very forces targeted by an earlier generation of New Left commentators as the agents of Open Door imperialism. While not fully echoing Fukuyama's nationalistic hubris, Nye was equally convinced of his nation's triumph and the reasons for it. Defining US culture abroad as 'soft power', Nye wrote enthusiastically of his nation's desire and ability to sustain its pre-eminence in a world in which people, technologies, capital, products, images and ideas flowed incessantly across national borders. Disproportionately, these influences flowed from America to the world. 'American popular culture, with its libertarian and egalitarian currents, dominates film, television, and electronic communications', he wrote, 'American leadership in the information revolution has generally increased global awareness of an openness to American ideas and values'.<sup>16</sup> Yet American triumphalism exerted only a passing influence on interpretations of culture transfer and foreign policy. Most conservatives remained dismayed by the constrained impact of the American model abroad and by the unfulfilled promise of a new world order centred on US authority. By the time Bill Clinton assumed office, optimistic assessments of the New World Order were eclipsed by discourses bemoaning the New World (Dis)order.

Following Nye, it might be accepted that technological strength and cultural forces helped to maintain America's international pre-eminence. Yet this is not to argue that US cultural exports and values have 'Americanised' other societies or conditioned the soil in which its foreign influence flourished. Ironically Nye's arguments implicitly reinforced the claims of scholars concerned by the export of US culture and ideology as weapons in the Cold War. In general, these scholars were critical of Washington's ambitions and drew attention to its efforts to foster democracy and capitalism through cultural diplomacy and state instruments like the United States Information Agency, Voice of America, the Fulbright Foundation and the Peace Corps as well as the CIA. The pursuit of US Open Door ambitions from the early 1940s always relied on more formal instruments than the anticipated appeal of its mass/popular culture and the so-called 'American model'. These instruments ranged across support for multilateralism and free trade, overt and covert efforts to promote 'regime change' abroad, and the linking of economic and development aid to military alliances or trade agreements or loans.

Predictably, in the wake of September 11, President George W Bush has moved to reinvigorate the Peace Corps and to link foreign aid to prescribed school curricula in developing countries as he aggressively champions the virtues of American 'civilisation'. More broadly, Wilsonian Open Door rhetoric survives. In US Secretary of State Colin Powell's words: the American example of 'democracy and free markets work' and are 'helping to reshape the entire world'.<sup>17</sup>

The terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon have undoubtedly dented the triumphalism which shaped much US public discourse in the decade after the Cold War. At the same time, these acts resuscitated a discredited debate over what Samuel P Huntington claimed in the early 1990s was the inevitability of 'The Clash of Civilizations' in the post-Cold War era. Published in 1993 amidst increasing discussion of the New World (dis)order, Huntington joined those seeking to define the nature of the new international environment. Instead of the end of conflict—whether ideological or economic—Huntington found in the 'west' and 'Islam' the source of fundamental 'cultural' conflict. 'It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic', he wrote; the 'great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations. The clash of civilisations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future'.<sup>18</sup>

Within the crises of the unstable 1990s—the Gulf War, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and the Middle East—Huntington's simplistic ahistoricism won limited scholarly support. Instead most analysts emphasised the shifting, plural and fragmentary nature of identity and nationality; the incessant migrations of peoples and ideas; the tenacity of cultural resistance and difference; and the porous nature of boundaries, whether these be cultural, ideological, political or geographic. Nonetheless events of September 11 have resuscitated the appeal of Huntington's gross generalisations, especially in conservative American circles which refuse to recognise the persistent pluralities within so-called cultures, religions, ethnicities and nationalisms. Vast abstractions purportedly reflecting Huntington's 'civilisation identities' have resurfaced. As Edward

Said and others have observed, the crude 'clash of civilisations' thesis is little more than a restatement of 'the basic paradigm of west versus the rest'.<sup>19</sup> Despite polemical clashes over 'civilisation and culture', scholarly attention has not been diverted from more subtle interpretations of the complex and unanticipated consequences of American cultural power and reception abroad—interpretations which emerged, as did Huntington's claims, as attempts to comprehend the nature and limits of American influences abroad.

However, by the end of the Cold War, definitions of 'Americanisation' were always deeply contested, especially abroad. They focused to varying degrees on political and ideological issues, American values, 'Open Door' economics, as well as popular culture and mass media (issues which largely mirrored the four features of cultural imperialism identified by Tomlinson above). 'Americanisation' was increasingly understood in the context of an expanding modernity, global economic and cultural integration, and, later, in terms of the international implications of 'soft' US cultural power in the 'American century'. Jean Baudrillard cleverly anticipated this understanding in his 1989 study *America*, where he claimed: 'America is the original version of modernity. We are the dubbed or subtitled version'.<sup>20</sup>

In Cold War discourses, both scholarly and popular, 'Americanisation' was often identified as the agent of 'cultural imperialism'. Edward Said expressed this connection unambiguously nineteenth century, but it was in the second half of the twentieth, after the decolonisation of the British and French empires, that it directly followed its two great predecessors'.<sup>21</sup> While Fukuyama has welcomed this fundamental change, most studies were alarmed by it, especially those written from abroad. In much scholarly and popular debate, 'Americanisation' was a pejorative label for a range of threatening incursions into the values and identities of receiving societies. Anti-Americanism, expressed most vociferously in western Europe and Latin America from the early 1950s, reflected a deep resistance to US influences.<sup>22</sup> Australian nationalistic responses to putative 'Americanisation' in these years typified the rhetorical resistance of small societies to an expanding American presence internationally. In the mass media especially, Australian fears were voiced by those who interpreted their small nation as a 'satellite society' of metropolitan America, an 'American

satellite', a 'client state' of the US, or the victim of 'Americanisation' or American cultural imperialism. Journalistic clichés often saw Australia as the 'fifty-first state' or, to cite Phillip Adams, as 'the ventriloquist's dummy on the American knee'.<sup>23</sup> America's present was often characterised as Australia's future. Australia was interpreted as a docile recipient of America's informal empire, or more subtly as the future America—a smaller, slightly retarded nation following the American path to modernity.

Scholarly references to concepts linked to the blanket term 'Americanisation' declined in the 1990s, although anti-Americanism and fear of 'Americanisation' remained strong in popular discourses. Increasingly, the international reach of the United States was interpreted as a process embedded in wider currents of modernisation and globalisation. At the same time, the new world (dis)order which surprisingly followed the collapse of Soviet communism, served to highlight the limits to 'Americanisation' as a homogenising international force. By the late twentieth century most scholarship acknowledged, as did Peter Worsely and others, that nationalism, regionalism, ethnicity, gender and class divisions remained 'far more important than internationalism'<sup>24</sup> or an 'Americanised' homogeneity. It was now widely accepted that America's 'soft power' had not and would not remake the world in its own image. Cultural interrelatedness, exchange and diversity, not 'Americanised' uniformity, remained. American ascendancy, in Said's words, was 'unstable', confronting fragmentation and difference (even within the host culture).<sup>25</sup> And, to return to the Australian example, today few nationalist pundits or scholars remain disturbed by what Phillip Adams still sees as a 'growing penetration' by a form of US 'cultural imperialism which makes past imperialisms look puny'.<sup>26</sup> In contrast to such protective nationalism, overwhelmingly, understandings of cultural reception and transformation now accept that complex processes of negotiation and adaptation are involved, not powerless imitation or uncontested domination.

Three works written from very different national perspectives and published coincidentally in 1993, situated 'Americanisation' within these broader emerging debates over global change. These studies were Rob Kroes, R W Rydell and D F J Bosscher's large two volume edited work on Europe, Bell and Bell's study of Australia, and Kuisel's award-winning work, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanisation*.<sup>27</sup> Reflecting shared arguments, Kuisel wrote that:



The issues raised by this study bear on a global phenomenon of basic economic, social and cultural changes that has unfolded during the second half of the twentieth century ... There is a kind of global imperative that goes by the name of Americanization. Although the phenomenon is still described as Americanization, it has become increasingly disconnected from America. Perhaps it would be better described as the coming of consumer society. Whatever the case, the phenomenon to be observed in postwar France has parallels all over the world in recent decades.<sup>28</sup>

Nonetheless, Kuisel's work emphasised that 'Americanization has made Europe more like us [the US]. And the transformation continues'. Despite Kuisel's claims, in general since the early 1990s interpretations stressing cultural imperialism, American hegemony and unidirectional influences from the metropolitan centre to the periphery have been eclipsed by more subtle interactive paradigms. Most recent interpretations stress not 'Americanised' cultural domination but shared national experiences of modernity and consumerism within an increasingly globalised community. In this view, as Bell and Bell argued in *Implicated* in 1993, western societies share many characteristics typical of modernising states, including mass advertising, consumer credit, a commercial mass media, advanced levels of education, technology, individual mobility, suburbanisation, mixed economies, increased leisure and large middle classes. In these societies, a broadly interventionist liberal-pluralist state supports education, health and general social infrastructure. 'Instead of attributing such developments to American causation and even influence', they argued, 'both America and other interdependent western capitalist nations moved into the "modern" era for similar reasons'. These correlated developments 'need not be interpreted as caused by the US imposing its own image on other imitative cultures'. Thus, rather than emphasising the cultural effects of American power abroad, it is possible to interpret the recent histories of most western societies 'as following the US along a similar, if slightly retarded, road toward postindustrial status, passing through the modernising stages characteristic of all western capitalist nations during the twentieth century'. In this view, developments linked to such changes as the motorcar, radio, television, or advertising are vehicles of a shared modernity not expressions of Americanisation. 'National boundaries are irrelevant to the process', Bell and Bell claim. 'The

local and the traditional and communal are being “modernised” regardless of their geographical or ethnic origins’.<sup>29</sup>

Yet the modernisation thesis knows many varieties—some of which continue to stress American intention, influence and benefit. Recently, for example, Poiger has suggested that the ‘modernization paradigm’ should be understood in terms of America’s dominant role in the postwar world. In this view, modernisation ‘links American culture to economic development and political democratisation and presents Americanisation as a process by which the United States, through its political, economic and cultural presence, manages the development of liberal democracies, market economies and consumer culture abroad’.<sup>30</sup> (President George W Bush’s attempts to link Open Door economic reform and American economic aid to ‘democratisation’ abroad is but the most recent articulation of American intention which Poiger identifies.) Other analyses interpret modernisation as (potentially) global in scope and substitute the broader concepts of ‘globalisation’ for neatly deterministic ideas centred on cultural imperialism and Americanisation. In Tomlinson’s view, for example, globalisation has undermined the ‘cultural coherence of all individual nation-states, including the economically powerful ones—the imperialist powers of a previous era’.<sup>31</sup> While broader studies of western cultural influences and globalisation are now common, disagreements remain over both the relative influence of the US within these processes and over the importance of explicit manipulation of receiving societies within wider processes lumped together as globalisation.<sup>32</sup> This emphasis on globalisation is not isolated to new scholarly paradigms. Today within administration circles in Washington, for example, US ambitions are routinely acknowledged as linked to globalisation. ‘I am not afraid to say that globalization is good for the US’, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman observed on 26 March 2002.<sup>33</sup>

Paradigms stressing Americanisation have not been erased by those centred on globalisation. Americanisation is still an important focus of much recent research. However, in general newer studies of cross-cultural transmission argue that resistance, not powerless emulation, characterises the response of other nations and communities to US culture and ideology. Influenced—albeit implicitly—by poststructural theory, these studies stress the varied and transforming receptions given cultural imports—from the

‘popular’ to the ‘political’. A range of studies of the US and postwar Europe have in Rob Kroes’s words, emphasised that ‘receiving cultures have constructed “American” culture dialectically, incorporating it into local debates over identities past and future; and appropriated cultural modes into forms of cultural resistance and hybridisation’. A docile Europe was (is) not incorporated into an Americanised global village.<sup>34</sup>

The very title of the first major scholarly debate of the ‘Americanisation’ of Europe—*Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe*—succinctly captured this new emphasis. Interaction replaced domination at the interpretive centre of this work and in most studies published subsequently. Richard Pells, who along with Kuisel has dominated US writing on Europe’s ‘Americanisation’, invoked theories of cross-cultural fertilisation, mutuality, cultural exchange and selective cooperation to ground his recent analysis. Under the title *Not Like Us*, Pells wrote in 2000, ‘the issue ... is not so much the absorption of one culture by another, but how to make sense of diverse and conflicting impulses inherent in contemporary western culture as a whole’. While Kuisel’s earlier study of France placed greater emphasis on America’s capacity to seduce and change a foreign culture, Pells wrote of *How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since the WWII*.<sup>35</sup> Cultural studies influences are even more evident in other recent work. Much of this emphasises linguistic metaphors and fluid dialogical cross-cultural interactions and borrowings. Additionally, they refer to ‘creolisation’ and ‘hybridisation’, not Americanisation. To cite Bell and Bell again:

If one thinks of Australian culture and society as structured like a language ... then one might think of ‘Americanisation’ as like linguistic infiltration. It does not so much replace or displace the local lexicon as supplement it and change its elements ... change is effected throughout the whole structure even though no obliteration of a previous lexicon may occur ...<sup>36</sup>

In this model, the United States itself might be interpreted as a dialogical response to European culture—a ‘creolised’ version of deep historical interactions rather than the dominant force in unbalanced centre–periphery relationships. And, as Kroes has written, if ‘America’s culture has become an unavoidable presence’ abroad, its ‘reception knows many varieties’.<sup>37</sup> In a related claim,

Arjun Appadurai and C Breckinridge write that 'most societies today possess the means for the local production of modernity', and through processes of cultural contestation, influences from an Americanised and modernised centre 'become a diversely appropriated experience'.<sup>38</sup>

It might be argued that it is naïve to imply that because American influence abroad is adapted and transformed by receiving cultures it is simply one nation in an international community of equals. While the consequences of US power are complex and contradictory, few would dispute Geir Lundestad's assessment that the 'American Century' distinctly reflects one nation's particular and unprecedented power. And Lundestad argues: 'America's message to the world—in the form of democracy, the market economy, free trade, and American mass culture—has rarely, if ever affected the world more than today'. Echoes of the 'cultural imperialism' thesis remain—although even these interpretations are now tempered by more subtle ideas about cultural transfer, reception and vernacularisation. If explicit charges of cultural imperialism are no longer widespread in scholarly discourse, the central transforming international role of the United States and 'Americanisation' remain lively concerns. In seeking to explain why the United States 'seems to be the partner of [alliance] choice for all the major powers', Lundestad suggests that this is probably because its power is both overwhelming and complex, and also because its power is of a different nature from that of traditional super powers and imperial states. His conclusion is reminiscent of much earlier revisionist discussions of Open Door empire, and echoes ideas of American exceptionalism: 'Rarely does the United States conquer; it rules in more indirect, more American ways'.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, American practices and ideas are so inextricably enmeshed in broader processes of modernisation, globalisation, and consumerism that is widely accepted as simplistic and misleading to identify Americanisation as an unproblematic process (re)making the world in the image of the United States. Such broad concepts are at the centre of debates on US diplomacy and foreign relations, and increasingly shape scholarship in a field long dominated by narrow empirical narrative historiography.

## American/Global: Australian/Local

Philip Bell and Roger Bell

*You just walk out of the world and into Australia.*

D H Lawrence, *Kangaroo*, 1923

*The cultural transition is almost complete ... If Americans can put a man on the moon they can fit Australia into their flag.*

Phillip Adams, 'All the Way with the USA', 2002

United States culture—from the 'political' to the 'popular'—is deeply and variously implicated in Australia's recent history. Often represented as rampant 'Americanisation', the forces putatively transforming modern Australia are carried by consumer capitalism and embedded in the triumph of the 'American Century'. Links between cultural and political change were widely assumed as postwar Australia became closely identified with US interests in the Cold War, Vietnam, and the so-called 'war against terrorism'. Despite populist local fears of 'Americanisation' this paper argues that cultural shifts in the smaller nation are not directly or causally linked to politico-strategic decisions which identify it closely with US power and ambition. In the new world (dis)order following the Gulf War, Australia has been called on to again demonstrate its allegiance to the United States, especially in concert against terrorism, while continuing as a good international citizen working sympathetically with the United Nations and international legal and

humanitarian tribunals. At the same time during the past decade Australia has actively promoted to the world its own changing social and cultural identity through sport, television, cinema and the performing arts. These idealised expressions of 'Australian-ness' climaxed in the September 2000 Sydney Olympic Games. This paper argues that the political and cultural dependencies of Australia on the United States have been radically transformed since the end of the Cold War as 'what Australia means' has been rewritten in an increasingly postmodern, global vocabulary. These two spheres, the political and cultural, have become increasingly independent of each other, we suggest, and Australia's military/political subservience to Washington offers little insight into the complex cultural relationships between the two nations. First, we consider the claims made by many commentators that Australian politico-strategic deference to the US has increased and is linked to the great powers' unparalleled global hegemony. Second, we evaluate the claim that cultural infiltration and coercion by American 'soft power' has strengthened during the past decade, by exploring two key cultural fields—local broadcast television and the nationalist stories celebrated in the opening ceremony of the 2000 Olympics.

### **International Relations and Cultural Change**

Australia's emergence as a modern industrial society, which John Docker and others have argued 'meant in effect moving from a British to an American model', was a 'complex and contradictory process'.<sup>1</sup> The paradox of cultural resistance in the face of pervasive social change and political accommodation was apparent from the early postwar years. At least at the level of public utterance, Americanisation could be denied even when it could not be delayed. To borrow Max Lerner's observation on Europe in the postwar decades, Australia was 'caught between the need for America and the recoil from it'.<sup>2</sup> Indeed elements of this cultural schizophrenia were evident as early as the nineteenth century. Modern Australia was obviously the product of complex, contending forces. Australia's own traditions and identities, British legacies, its deepening multicultural complexion since the 1950s, as well as distinct religious, class and regional characteristics formed the social grid into which American pressures were incorporated and adapted.

Over more than a century, Australia's anxious search for security was paralleled by its increasing economic and cultural links to the US. Like much of the modern world, especially English-speaking societies, Australia was increasingly influenced by American products, ideas and practices as it was joined inextricably to the 'American Century'. From the 1920s especially, US political culture, business culture and popular culture increasingly infused Australian society, challenging British influences and reshaping local practices and values. The new nation's constitution, advertising, marketing and shopping, housing design, suburban culture, consumerism, anti-communism, ideas on 'race', masculinity or individualism, Hollywood, television, and popular music were some of the many areas significantly influenced by American importations and American models. Australia became an increasing target of US investment capital and trade. Yet as a number of authors have separately observed, it was not until the late 1960s—a generation after Pearl Harbor and a decade after the Suez crisis—that economic links along with 'American ideas, values and information had made substantial inroads into the traditionally British cultural and ideological hegemony in Australia'.<sup>3</sup> And, at the same time as Britain's empire and influence retreated after World War II, fears bred of the evils of the 'air-conditioned [American] nightmare' were voiced increasingly.

Cultural resistance, often expressed simply in anti-American slogans, resurfaced as Australia was joined to American interventions abroad during the Cold War. Many Australian commentators and scholars—anxious since the 1960s to identify and protect an emerging national identity—were convinced of the transforming power of America and Americanisation on receiving cultures. As US cultural influences grew and a conservative Australian government went 'all the way with LBJ' in Vietnam, cultural and political resistance to putative Americanisation strengthened. From the mid-1960s, as in the 1920s, US culture was widely decried as vulgar and concern was expressed at the 'steadily growing ... Americanisation of this country'.<sup>4</sup> Left nationalist attacks against the incursions of American popular culture and political ideology intensified after the war. 'Coca-Cola colonisation' became a symbol of unacceptable American modernity and excessive consumerism. A curious alliance of Anglophile conservative, British 'race' patriots and left-nationalists expressed

concern with the barbarism of mass culture and its levelling effects on Anglo-Australian values and pastimes. As Geoffrey Serle's much quoted claim implied, a substantial cross section of educated Australians lamented what they understood as a sudden shift from traditional British cultural associations to corrupt or vacuous American importations<sup>5</sup>—even if most welcomed the protection of the US against the tide of change in decolonising Asia and watched their children consume American film, music and television with alacrity. Political cartoons from the late 1960s were equally convinced of the implications of American power and cultural imperialism for Australian independence and identity. In the *Sydney Morning Herald*, for example, Molnar's much reproduced cartoon of 1966 depicted the Australian flag with the stars and stripes replacing the Union Jack in the top left-hand corner.<sup>6</sup> Two decades later, Moir used a now familiar image of a satellite controlled from Washington to suggest Australia's uncontested dependence on its great powerful ally. In 2002, popular local commentators ironically welcomed Australia's incorporation as the fifty-first star of the American flag and echoing anti-Vietnam rhetoric, wrote of Australia again going 'all the way to the USA'.<sup>7</sup> Yet if such representations were judgements about Australia's putative Americanisation, they were also appealing popular statements of anti-Americanism which symbolised the limits of cultural subservience to Australia's so-called protector. Just as Australia's involvement in Vietnam gave rise to contradictory expressions of bilateral commitment and anti-Americanism, so Australia's post-Cold War role as deputy sheriff in the Asia-Pacific has sharpened expressions of national independence and anti-Americanism.

Throughout much of the Cold War, ambivalence about America and fear of 'Americanisation' continued, giving voice to both local nationalist discourses as well as residual British traditions. In short, British political culture and popular culture remained significant even as American influences increased. And if culture is carried in the baggage of immigrants, Britain and Europe, not the US, remained at the centre of Australia's cultural practices and ideas—even as a more independent nation celebrated its multicultural complexion and embrace of Asia. Further, if trade and investment are rough yardsticks of the extent of foreign borrowings, Australia's cultural links were not significantly reoriented towards the US until the late 1960s—after the strategic importance of the US had been



demonstrated in World War II, formalised under ANZUS and deepened by decolonisation and subsequent regional conflicts.<sup>8</sup>

Complaints about so-called Americanisation have, since the end of the Cold War, largely shifted from the political to the cultural sphere—from alarm over Australia's subservience to American power and interests, to fears over the erosion of national identity and local cultural authority. 'Imported' 'Americanising' language, dress, drugs, screenagers, sport, fast food, film, television, music, tabloid journalism, crime and punishment, fashion and 'lifestyle' have largely displaced foreign policy and the Pentagon as the focus of Australian concern. Yet close strategic and economic links do not necessarily reflect, or serve as precursors of cultural imitation or subservience. As in the past, Canberra's current willingness to play 'deputy sheriff' to Washington reflects perceived national interests, not persuasive Americanisation. Indeed many Anglo-Australians, from Robert Menzies to John Howard, have been happy to seek an intimate alliance with the US, even as they longed nostalgically for the Mother Country and sought to reinvent 'core' national values centred on a British-Australian past or the nation's independent exploits in wars abroad.

Like much of western Europe and Canada, Australia has a long love-hate relationship with US exports, whether these be material or ideological. These continue to be both *welcomed* as the glittering promise of modernity, capitalism and democracy and *resisted* as a hegemonic threat to national differences and diversity in an increasingly globalised/Americanised world. This contradictory understanding and reception of America abroad implicitly suggests flaws in the claim that unequal societies are simply vulnerable to the Great Power's influences, unable to resist the homogenising consequences of its 'soft power'. Yet the Australian example—like that of say, France, Germany or the UK—indicates that American influences have been variously effective and unpredictable within different national cultures. Cultural resistance, negotiation, adaptation, modification, and outright rejection as well as different or varied levels of acceptance or accommodation, are everywhere apparent. From within an allegedly imitative culture, like Australia, particular local responses are generated by distinct historical legacies, unique social forces and particular cultural forms. For example, in the field of television—an apparent spearhead of Americanisation—local programs and productions have flourished

despite the popularity of some US sitcoms, big budget movies and transplanted current affairs formats. Over fifty years of viewing, a vernacular Australian voice, local accents and Australian stories have not been swamped or indeed diminished by television product made for the US market (a claim argued in detail later in this paper).

Obviously the US remains a powerful social model and cultural precursor which other states find difficult to ignore. However, in a variety of studies of Americanisation published from the early 1990s, interpretations built on ideas of unilateral domination or cultural imperialism have been rejected. Rob Kroes, a leading European scholar in this field, summarises these arguments perceptively: 'America's culture has become an unavoidable presence' globally, but its 'reception knows many voices: there is a resilience in other cultures that refuses to be washed away'.<sup>9</sup>

Recent studies also agree that so-called Americanisation cannot be separated from even broader processes or modernisation, consumerism and globalisation—processes of which America is a part but for which it is not separately responsible. Writing of France, Richard Kuisel argues that 'Americanisation' has 'become increasingly disconnected from America', is confused with global changes affecting much of the postwar world, and might best be identified as 'the coming of consumer society'.<sup>10</sup> Writing of how Australia was 'implicated' in America and Americanisation, Bell and Bell have suggested that broadly parallel developments in different modern societies—from suburbanisation to fashion or 'economic rationalism'—should not be interpreted as caused by the US imposing its own image on other willing, or unwilling imitative cultures. It is appropriate to view Australia as following the US along a broadly similar if somewhat retarded road towards post-industrial status, passing through stages of modernisation that characterise most capitalist or mixed economies this century. Thus, in this interpretation, the suburbs, freeways and mass culture were not symptomatic of the Americanisation of Australia but of the modernisation of both the US and Australia.<sup>11</sup>

Exaggerated fears of external threat and cultural loss have characterised Australian history since the mid nineteenth century. Australia has long struggled to reconcile the forces of its European past with the imperatives of its geographic location. Even if it were

true that domestic Australia has been overwhelmed by Americanisation, its foreign relations continue to be shaped fundamentally by national interests not cultural integration with another state. While US culture has been deeply and variously implicated in Australia's modern history, it does not necessarily follow that American cultural power has reoriented Australia's insecure international gaze from Britain and Europe. *Realpolitik*, not cultural or social similarity, shaped Australia's quest for American strategic assurances. In peace, as in war, national interests not shared values or pastimes, determined fundamental shifts in Australia's diplomacy and foreign policy.

### Lamenting the 'loss' of Australian autonomy

The 'Americanisation' of global culture after 1945 has been widely understood as a vital precursor of the triumph of the US in the Cold War. America's global reach was, and is, underpinned by its cultural ascendancy—by the appeal of its so-called 'soft power'.<sup>12</sup> Writing of Australia during the Cold War, Richard White suggested that it could possibly be argued that the 'Americanisation of popular culture created the conditions in which American investment and military alliances were accepted without popular opposition'.<sup>13</sup> Given its modern Anglophone culture, Australia, Geoffrey Serle claimed, was more vulnerable to Americanisation than were other western nations.<sup>14</sup> In the wake of Vietnam, a growing number of Australian scholars explored the complex 'web of dependence' that it was claimed underpinned the expanding postwar relationship between their nation and the US. 'No examination of the Australian—American connection, however general, would be complete', Joseph Camilleri argued in 1980, 'without at least passing reference to the pervasive influence which the US came to exert over Australian culture and politics'. Several other studies also attempted to detail the level of Australia's postwar 'dependency' on the dominant power of capitalist America. Although essentially concerned with economics or 'political economy', some of these analysed culture, media, and ideology. To cite Camilleri again: 'The phenomenon of dependence in Australia's external relations, though most conspicuous in the diplomatic and military alignment with the US, has also had a critical economic and cultural

component'. His work accepted that 'American values, institutions and policies have come to dominate not only Australia's external conduct but its economic and political life'.<sup>15</sup>

This defensive judgement resonates through much recent Australian commentary on international affairs, cultural change and national identity. During the 1990s a chorus of complaint about American domination has been raised in the pages of Australian newspapers and magazines. Columnist Phillip Adams satirically observed '... if the Americans can put a man on the moon, they can fit Australia into their Flag'.<sup>16</sup> This rather backward-looking rhetoric echoes Don Watson's eloquent lament:

These days we are in no doubt about it: we are America's deputy and trusty as they come. Ask not whether this is an honourable destiny and a fitting conclusion to a century of nationhood; it is a *fait accompli*, both sides of politics broadly agree on it.

Watson believes that the Anglo-Australian identity, built on pioneering hardship and war time bravery, has been swamped by migration and modernisation:

The existing panoply of symbols and mantras excludes too many people and too much of what has happened since the War (WWII)—the migrants, Vietnam, the increase in the educated population, the beneficiaries and victims of the new economy, the new roles for women and new awareness of their roles in the past, a new awareness of the land. Australia now contains multitudes that the legend cannot accommodate.

So long as our leaders ply the legend as if it can accommodate them, the further we drift from the truth about ourselves.<sup>17</sup>

Of course, Watson is correct: Australia needs to imagine new versions of its many communities. The old stories do exclude too many 'new' Australians (both local and overseas born) and their cultures. But it does not follow that no stories make sense to 'us', nor that the dialogues we call 'culture' have been silenced. Modern postwar society is now caught up in dynamic global and bilateral political and cultural currents that might better be called postmodern.

Watson does allow that the newly-globalised Australia is 'pluralist and post-modern', although he seems to believe that such a cultural multiplicity is as incoherent as it is inauthentic. It is inauthentic

because it is modeled on the US and defies definition in traditionally local terms:

If the country has a problem, so has [Prime Minister] John Howard. He has been trying to stuff a pluralist, postmodern bird into a premodern cage. The bird won't go. It's not that it won't fit, but rather that it's not a bird. It's no one thing. It's our multitudes.

Obviously, if one demands that cultures be univocal, homogenous and consensual, they are more easily imprisoned than if they are plural and dynamic, a possibility that Watson seems to lament, along with the Australian Prime Minister. He therefore links global economic forces to cultural and social changes that he fears are disintegrating. He sees the newly minted deregulation of wages and the economy as a counterfeit currency, undermining consensus and coherence, and equates globalisation with Americanisation:

The most useful thing to is recognize that in taking these decisions we took the biggest step we have ever taken towards the American social model. And this has profound implications for how we conceive of Australia and how we make it cohere.

We would argue that Australian cultures are authentic and coherent, though they are not consensual, static or backward looking. Watson's (and Phillip Adams's) defeatist nostalgia is unwarranted. Globally-oriented and irreverent it may sometimes be, but recent Australian proclamations of what the nation values are unmistakably local and historically-grounded. This is despite some American accents and presentational styles, as the recent Olympic ceremonial attests.

### **Celebrating Australia in postmodern ways**

Global media events, according to Dayan and Katz, promote societal integration, nationalistic loyalty and consensus around notions of 'Humanity' ('We are the world', etc.). They proclaim themselves 'historic', and are preplanned, yet they are not ostensibly designed for the media.<sup>18</sup> However they offer a golden opportunity for nationalistic self-promotion, for turning old stereotypes of a country around, a process in which Australia has been deeply involved especially through its tourism and education industries, during the past two decades.

If it is a *sine qua non* of being postmodern that a nation shifts from resources and manufacturing to service industries (moving the dirty and heavy work offshore), then Australia was, in 2000, a very different kind of place from 1956 when Melbourne hosted the Olympic Games. The cultural and social debates which, in Australia, are displacing the more formally 'political' discourses of those times when the nation 'rode on the sheep's back', before the Australian dollar was 'floated', echo these transformative economic and industrial movements. Locally inflected lifestyle consumerism, sports and nostalgic nationalism are increasingly seen as culturally salient overseas, as is the smiling face of state sanctioned multiculturalism. Of course, the ongoing debates around Aboriginal land rights (Mabo), the 'stolen generations' and reconciliation, refugees and human rights, do not intrude into the publicity brochures for our distant and exotic example of somewhere to visit. Herman noted before the Sydney Games that:

The advertising of Australia has started to incorporate characteristics associated with 'the post-modern', such as irony, parody and self-reflexivity. An example (was) the dotted kangaroos on bicycles in the eight minute Australian advertisement at the closing ceremony in Atlanta. In line with Australia's status as post-national, post-colonial or a post-modern archetype, the country has come to be advertised as a model for a globalised society with a fluid multicultural identity and a flourishing indigenous culture.<sup>19</sup>

Other commentators have noted also that Australia's tourist and Olympic marketing has become increasingly engaged in selling images of an exotic transhistorical place, a place of tradition, but also of postcolonial innovation and fun. As Australia is only one among many settler societies coming to terms with its own history, the unique brand of exoticism and spectacle it offers needs to be highlighted. How better than to turn away from temporal history towards a metonymic and metaphoric (what Freud would call 'displaced and condensed') dreamscape? Here, Peter Conrad observes, in the global tourist-inviting, postmodern media-panorama, a new but ancient people and place (or perhaps a more general 'space') could be imagined, building on contemporary European projections and tourism rhetoric.

In England, the advertising agencies have transformed Australian holidays into existential quests, adventures in self-transformation. One television campaign tells a series of short, therapeutic stories ... (of) life changing expeditions.

Conrad notes that Australia has been 're-branded'.<sup>20</sup> We would add that it is now again brand-new (see below): 'Discover the other side of yourself'—Australia is 'the envy of a world that once ignored its existence. Dreams now travel in a different direction, gravitating back from a deracinated northern hemisphere to the earthy enchanted south'. (*National Geographic Magazine* also focused on Sydney, 'Olympic City', in its August 2000 edition. Bill Bryson's piece was studded with sunlit beaches and glittering water. He too pointed to the vibrancy of the city being 'old and young' at the same time.)

From the perspective of Europe or America, the re-enchanted antipodes are unsullied by such vices as the televisually inescapable racism, including genocidal wars, in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. Australia also seems safely distant from blatant technological power (such as that evidenced in the US' Gulf War, and in silicon chip imperialism). Similarly, the corruption scandals surrounding the Olympic movement itself needed to be distanced and put in the past by Sydney. 'Australia' therefore seemed to be created as a label for a kind of European-originated innocence which connoted youth, fun, irony (of an unserious kind) and domestic hospitality. In short, the fresh face of the child as the newest, smiling version of European modernity. Perhaps Australia was presenting itself as a 'new age', transcendent version of post-modernity. It certainly saw itself optimistically, and adopted a peculiarly local iconic and verbal vernacular as it smiled at the huge international television audience. It is true that the symbolic reconciliation between Aboriginal and European Australians enacted during the ceremony could be read as an ideologically-driven attempt to excuse colonial oppression, and that the exploitation of Cathy Freeman (an 'Aboriginal' athlete) to light the cauldron smacked of protesting too much, but even these gestures would have been impossible in, say, the corresponding ceremony of 1956, a time when Australia was importing unprecedented numbers of immigrants and following the 'American social model' of modernisation (pace Watson, above).

The vernacular Olympic ceremony showcased a very particular story about Australianness to sell a new brand of national sensibility. The story resonated ideologically with the discourses of contemporary tourism, promoting Australia as a utopian example of successful westernisation, neither European nor American, but echoing both. This may appear inauthentic if one assumes that Australia 'has' a fixed character or identity, based on pioneering Anglocentric traditions, but the Olympic festivities were understood and endorsed by most who saw them, both locally and globally.

### Vernacular television

Looking back to the first two decades of Australian television, there is little evidence of a distinctive, local voice. American programs and formats dominated the schedules of commercial channels, with the most popular genres centred on the family (*Leave it to Beaver*, *I Love Lucy*); adventures, including Westerns; the law and the underworld; institutions (especially hospitals) and Disney-ing fantasy. Bell and Bell have commented on the first two decades of Australian television thus:

That more Australians watched *Roots* than any other television broadcast prior to 1980 suggest that the idioms and cultural content of American history and American television were familiar and pleasurable in Australia. More generally, however, it is clear from the empirical evidence of the 'ratings' at least, that Australians watched American genre series in huge numbers from the first years of television. Until *The Mavis Brampton Show* (1965) and *Homicide* (1967), locally produced entertainment programs other than the news, sport, or games shows, were too rare to be genuinely competitive with American imports (if one allows that ratings data demonstrate cultural 'preferences'). Three years after the introduction of television, in 1959, all of the 'top ten' programs in Australia originated from the United States: *77 Sunset Strip*, *Wagon Train*, *Sea Hunt*, *Rescue 8*, *Maverick*, *Perry Mason*, *Leave it to Beaver*, *Father Knows Best*, *The Rifleman*, and Sunday night movies.<sup>21</sup>

However, summaries of audience ratings during Australian television's first twenty-five years cannot be extrapolated to describe the 1980s and 1990s. Since the relatively late introduction of colour into the Australian medium, increasingly local programming has flourished. As Jacka and Dermody have shown, the introduction of colour television corresponded with a resurgent nationalism and



nationalistic cinema-generating locally-inflected genres in current affairs, sports and magazine programming.<sup>22</sup> Recent developments in Australian commercial television extend the above quoted generalisations and, in important respects, contradict them. In particular, the rise of magazine-style, 'infotainment', comedy, and consumer advocacy genres has led local audience preferences since the mid-to-late 1980s especially. This change corresponds roughly to the years of the Hawke-Keating governments, when financial institutions were deregulated and there was strong growth in tourism and other service industry employment, the introduction of competition in telecommunications and the multiplication of 'information industries' jobs.

Australian consumerism has shifted towards services and information. This is reflected in new demographics which drive television programming via advertising—the 'key link' in the relationships amongst television industries, audiences and program genres and schedules. Increasingly, many of the most watched programs conflate advertising and their infotainment content. The popularity of these programs, we argue, reinforces retrospective complacency and closes the gate on possible intrusions by the political or the public. In short, they ask audiences to be 'relaxed and comfortable', echoing the disaffection which Prime Minister John Howard's 'battlers' and former One Nation Party leader, Pauline Hanson's 'mainstream', expressed. High levels of rural unemployment, the relative impoverishment of the would-be middle-class, increasing hours of work for static incomes and the dismantling of social security—these might be soil in which such programs thrive.

This is not to argue that during the past twenty years the details of television's populist discourses have not changed. In the 1990s, the global and the American are linked symbolically and Australia itself is represented as relatively disempowered. The corporatist 'other' of populism from which 'Aussies' are estranged is now more opaque and indescribable. But the authentication of 'our' ordinary selves in the privately public rituals of home and leisure remains patent and potent in commercial television. Against the strident banality of the local program, the glamour and professionalism of imported shows is artificial and escapist ('unreal'). American television shows are those in the third person. Australians are addressed as 'you' in the hyper-vernacularised discourses of the

genres we have discussed. Through television, we consume our most ordinary, our most Australian selves.

Commercial television's populism is directed against not America, not the State, but public life, *corporatis* government and all things which proclaim themselves as 'political', although these entities are not named in the televised rituals which celebrate their irrelevance: In King and Rowse's words, '... the non-popular entity remains unnamed and the 'popular' remains plural and inclusive'.<sup>23</sup> 'Real' Australian sports and domestic consumerism are the ground of television's address; the figure consists of the artifice, imported dramas and political display which are segregated from the populist programs by advertisements and station promotions. The latter proclaim television's own power to represent Australia by displacing the public/political, and providing 'all you need to know' about 'the way it is'.

In these popular genres no discernible social context (no particular class, suburb or demographic) is implied. Predominantly Anglo-centric (Anglo/Australo-centric?), chattily optimistic, sentimental or mildly humorous, these genres present their ordinary audiences themselves as their 'stars'. Their 'nationalistic realism' is the realism of the putative reflection—never before has the 'just-like-us-ness' of television been so blatant, so common (in every sense). Australian commercial television has indigenised imported American formats. It has vernacularised almost to the point of parody (e.g. Roy and HG during the Olympics; Elle McFeast; *The Fat*) and has domesticated even the limited images of people in public that earlier genres celebrated.

Many of the programs that have achieved great popularity in the last decade are incorrigibly domestic, sub-urban, nostalgic and ostensibly class-less. They suggest that television's inadvertent, distracted audience *uses* the medium as well as being *used by* it to rehearse various facets of its identity/ies. To focus on the American origins of television programs is to ignore their destinations in the current Australian context. It is in the address of 'live' broadcasts and of locally produced infotainment shows that local populism is principally advanced via various modes of a 'nationalist realism' in which 'Australia' is ritualistically rehearsed. The assertion that television is a conduit for cultural 'Americanisation' seems difficult to sustain in the face of the popularity of the genres considered. Not only are examples of such genres increasing, they are

increasingly popular. We believe they are also distinctively populist in emphasising the authenticity of ordinary people in the non-political realm. The origins of such genres of commercial television and the prevalence of American entertainment notwithstanding, 'Australian' television has vernacularised and indigenised imported formats throughout its history. In the context of global Anglophone culture (with an American accent), local television has increasingly practiced being different during the past decade.

### **American/global/local**

The blanket term 'Americanisation' is frequently no more than an assumption concerning the origins of a cultural example (language, dress, food) which may or may not be accurate. It is applied indiscriminately within Australian media discourse to label an array of factors seen as threatening to national(istic) identity, way of life or values. This pejorative use of 'Americanisation' sees Australia as adopting social practices and cultural values which putatively originate in the United States (or in Hollywood, Los Angeles, or some metonymic reference to that nation). It assumes that the offending items are not meaningful within the Australian context merely because they make cultural sense to some local groups, but that they carry with them their alien 'American' origins. It follows that popular discourse on this issue is frequently nationalistic, assuming a uniquely Australian cultural and political identity and consensus which US-originated culture threatens.

Australian complaints about putative Americanisation have shifted from the economic to the cultural sphere, at least since the rise of global capital in the 1980s which seems to have displaced the Yankee dollar as the preferred culprit in the popular discussions of US influence on other nations. Culture (language, dress and sport in particular) has attracted the most vocal reactions—if the correspondents to and professional commentators in the local media are taken as the yardstick. Yet cultural reception and transformation (what Bell and Bell called 'negotiation' in *Implicated*) involve complex processes, much more than 'imitation' or 'domination' suggest. As Australia is increasingly an exporter as well as an importer of commercial Anglophone culture (such as TV 'soaps') it is increasingly difficult to see all such commerce in imperialistic terms.

Recent culturalist analyses have moved away from 'essentialist', fixed typifications of identity towards more contested, even contradictory and shifting or provisional postulations of 'identities'(always in quotation marks, usually plural). Such a discursive approach emphasises that what we label national 'identities' are not aggregations of psychological types; instead they can be thought of as particular modes and fields of representation itself: Australian cultural identity, then, refers to particular discursive productions rather than to psychological character types or some list of ideal cultural 'values' which have no precise material basis or context. Identity, ironically, is not singular, but a fabric of textual strands with no fixed boundaries.

In *Implicated*, Bell and Bell adopted a linguistic metaphor to express the fluidity and dynamism of cultural influence:

If one thinks of Australian culture and society as structured like a language ... then one might think of 'Americanisation' as like linguistic infiltration. It does not so much replace or displace the local lexicon as supplement it and change its elements ... change is effected throughout the whole structure even though no obliteration of a previous lexicon may occur ...<sup>24</sup>

We have argued that international political relationships are not reducible to cultural 'influences', and that the latter are never simple. Local cultures may become increasingly vernacular and confidently proclaim their distinctiveness to a globalised or American-dominated international community while, at the same time, the smaller nation-state (even an Anglophone, treaty-bound nation-state like Australia), aligns itself more intimately with American initiatives internationally. If the trajectory of Australian foreign relations remains relatively fixed within an American orbit, its cultural borders are continually reimagined in unexpected and complex ways.

# Endnotes

## Chapter 1 Unequal Allies

### 1.1

- 1 See, especially, P Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939–1941*, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1952, and *The Government and the People, 1942–1945*, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1970; M Matloff and E M Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941–1942*, Washington, DC, 1953; L Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, Washington, DC, 1962; and L Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, Canberra, 1957.
- 2 See, especially, T R Reese, *Australia, New Zealand and the United States: A Survey of International Relations 1941–1968*, London, 1969, pp 10–106; A Watt, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938–1965*, Cambridge, 1965, pp 29–105; C H Grattan, *The United States and the Southwest Pacific*, Melbourne, 1961, pp 147–205; R A Esthus, *From Enmity to Alliance: US–Australian Relations 1931–1941*, Melbourne, 1965, pp 70–142; B K Gordon, *New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power*, Chicago, 1960, pp 115–212.
- 3 Reese, op. cit., pp 32–105, is the one work which discusses extensively peace settlement negotiations and economic relations.
- 4 See, for example, theses by J J Reed, *American Diplomatic Relations with Australia During the Second World War*, PhD, University of Southern California, 1969, pp 341–2; A F Walter, *Australia's Relations with the United States 1941–1949*, PhD, University of Michigan, 1954, pp 11, 34, 47, 361. See also P H Partridge, 'Depression and War', in G Greenwood, *Australia: A Social and Political History*, Sydney, 1955, p 397.
- 5 Reed, op. cit., p 2.
- 6 T B Millar, *Foreign Policy: Some Australian Reflections*, Melbourne, 1972, p 7.
- 7 H G Gelber, *The Australian–American Alliance*, Harmondsworth, 1968, p 9.
- 8 Reese, op. cit., p 11.
- 9 Partridge, op. cit., p 403.
- 10 See, for example, T B Millar, *Australia's Foreign Policy*, Sydney, 1968, p xiii; K Tennant, *Evatt: Politics and Justice*, Sydney, 1970, pp 135–8.
- 11 See Hudson, 'The Yo-Yo Variations: A Comment', *Historical Studies*, vol 14, October 1970, pp 424–9. For the traditional view of Australian policy before 1941–42, see E M Andrews, 'Patterns in Australian Foreign Policy', *Australian Outlook*, vol 26, April 1972, pp 32–3.

- 12 See N K Meaney, 'Australia's Foreign Policy: History and Myth', *Australian Outlook*, vol 23, August 1969, pp 173–81.
- 13 Andrews op. cit., p 31, for example, describes the period of Australian foreign policy under Evatt during 1941–49 as an 'aberration'.

## 1.2

- 1 UK Cabinet Record, August 1941, quoted *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 January 1972, p 5.
- 2 Roosevelt, 2 October 1935, quoted N H Hooker (ed.), *The Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat 1919–1943*, Cambridge, MA, 1956, p 128.
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## 1.4

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## Chapter 2

### Testing the Open Door Thesis in Australia, 1941–1946

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- 2 Lisle A Rose, *Dubious Victory: The Coming of the American Age, 1945–1946—The United States and the End of World War II*, Kent, OH, 1973, I, pp 68–9.
- 3 John L Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, New York, 1972, p 21.
- 4 Eckes, 'Open Door Expansionism', op. cit., pp 909–24. According to Rose's *Dubious Victory*, p 69, Eckes, in *Search for Solvency*, advances a similar position that is a 'brilliantly argued and impressively researched' demonstration of America's 'generous' approach to postwar economic planning. For more extreme versions of American benevolence and the disinterested, if flawed, character of US foreign policy, see Robert Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, Baltimore, 1971, p 28, and John Blum, 'World War II', in C Vann Woodward (ed.), *The Comparative Approach to American History*, New York, 1968, p 321. Blum argues that American

interests were expressed in ideals of peace, self-government for all peoples, and expectations of a 'postwar disengagement from the financial and military responsibilities of world power'. He concludes: 'Washington continually divorced consideration of strategy from considerations of politics, and continually pursued ideals embedded in a Wilsonian heritage. These ideals were no less innocent for being majestic'.

- 5 Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945*, New York, 1968; Lloyd C Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949*, Chicago, 1970; Walter La Feber, *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945–1967*, New York, 1967. The debt of these and other revisionists to Williams had been widely recognised, especially their support for Williams's view that America has persistently pursued a policy of Open Door expansionism aimed at stabilising the world 'in a pro-American equilibrium'; see W A Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, rev ed., New York, 1962, p 299. In categorising these studies as revisionist, I do not wish to imply that they share identical views on all facets of US foreign policy. They are, however, united by a general agreement on the nature and significance of American Open Door policies and liberal internationalism. Nevertheless, I agree with Ronald W Pruessen that the very 'label "revisionist"—perhaps like all labels—is innately unsatisfactory because it lends itself too easily to simplistic and misleading definitions and summaries'; see his 'The Objectives of American Foreign Policy and the Nature of the Cold War', in Ronald W Pruessen and L H Miller (eds), *Reflections on the Cold War*, New York, 1974, pp 52–3.
- 6 The restrictions implicit in a single-archive approach to foreign relations studies have been discussed by a number of authorities. See, for example, David Donald, 'Radical Historians on the Move', *New York Times Book Review*, 19 July 1970, p 26. Lynn E Davis, *The Cold War Begins: Soviet–American Conflict Over Eastern Europe*, Princeton, 1974, pp 8–9, acknowledges this limitation. Two of the principal protagonists in the debate over Open Door expansion and World War II, Kolko and Eckes, rely overwhelmingly on US archival and manuscript sources. Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945*, London, 1978, is perhaps the only scholar who has convincingly escaped this restriction.
- 7 Secretary of State for India, memorandum, author unknown, 20 December 1943, UK War Cabinet Memoranda 1939–1945, WP(43)576, Cab 66/44, Public Records Office, London, hereafter cited as PRO.
- 8 Frederic Eggleston, Washington Notes, 26 December 1944, MS 423/10/739–43, Eggleston Papers, Australian National Library, Canberra.
- 9 Although the evidence for this assertion remains fragmentary, it is quite extensive, embracing a number of countries and regions. For the Pacific and Far East, see Thorne, op. cit., pp 279–82, 365, 385–93, 513, 536, 675. For Latin America, see David Green, *The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy*, Chicago, 1971, pp 111–18, 187–96.
- 10 The significance of imperial trade and tariff preferences and the sterling nexus to Australia's economic stability and growth can scarcely be overstated. During 1938–39, for example, almost two-thirds of all Australian exports went to Commonwealth countries. More than half of

- Australia's exports for this year—£53 million in value—were purchased by the UK. In contrast the value of exports to the United States was less than £3 million sterling. This figure was less than that to such countries as Belgium, Japan, and France.
- 11 William L Langer and Everett S Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis of 1937–1940 and American Foreign Policy*, New York, 1952, pp 684–9; Kolko, op. cit., p 243; Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, London, 1948, pp 11, 975.
  - 12 Article VII, *US–UK Mutual Aid Agreement*, 23 February 1942, A981, USA 181, pt 3. Commonwealth Archives Office, Australia, hereafter cited as CAO.
  - 13 Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, New York, 1969, p 29. See also Acheson, memorandum of conversation with John Maynard Keynes, 28 July 1941, PSF Box 19, Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Compare Hull's statement of May 1941, quoted in Kolko, op. cit., p 248. Australia's Minister in Washington agreed with Acheson; see Lord Casey to Churchill, 11 October 1941, A981, Japan 178, CAO.
  - 14 Hull, quoted in Eckes, *A Search for Solvency*, p 40.
  - 15 Hull to Winant, 13 February 1942, in US Department of State, Postwar planning in the Pacific file, 841/2/ 124A, Record Group 59, US National Archives, Washington, DC, hereafter cited as RG, NA. See also Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 February 1942, Roosevelt–Churchill Correspondence, Map Room Files, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers; UK War Cabinet Minutes, 20th conclusion, 12 February 1942, in UK Minutes or Conclusion of the War Cabinet, September 1939 – May 1945, Cab 65/25. Wm(42), PRO.
  - 16 Acheson to Johnson, 8 December 1942, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.24/431, RG59, NA. See also Casey to Curtin, during 1942, A1608, A59/2/1, pt 2, CAO. In contrast to Australia's representatives, Acheson considered 'the Australian government bound by Article VII'. This position was not maintained after late 1942. See Curtin to UK Dominion's Secretary, 11 February 1942, A1608, A59/2/1 pt 3, CAO.
  - 17 Hull, op. cit., p 1153.
  - 18 This argument, although usually attributed to revisionist scholars, is also supported by Eckes—albeit in a somewhat contradictory manner. Eckes, *Open Door Expansionism*, pp 911, 923 and *A Search for Solvency*, pp 39, 124, 275–7, 283. See also Gaddis, op. cit., pp 20–1.
  - 19 Acheson to Johnson, 15 September 1943, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.24/700, RG59, NA.
  - 20 MacArthur to Curtin, 4 February 1944, Foreign Service Post Records, Canberra 1941–1947, Lot 56, F150, Box 030–800, RG84, held at US Department of State.
  - 21 Minter to Hull, 22 August 1941, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.24/ 29, RG59, NA; Meltzger to Acheson, 17 January 1941, *ibid.* Even the authors of the final volume of Australia's official war history have concluded that 'Lend-Lease was administered in the interests of the American manufacturing and commercial lobby'; see S J Butlin and B Schedvin, *War Economy 1942–1945*, Canberra, 1978, as quoted in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 August 1978, p17.
  - 22 Beasley is quoted in Thorne, op. cit., p 367.



- 23 US Foreign Economic Administration, *The History of Lend-Lease: Australia*, Records of US Foreign Economic Administration, item 514, box 68, pp 60–71, RG 169, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, hereafter cited as WNRC; Minter, memorandum of conversation with Evatt, 19 October 1943, in US Department of State, miscellaneous files, 800.796/478, RG 59, NA; Johnson, memorandum, 23 February 1944, 800.50/35–64, *ibid.*; Wasserman, *Report of the Lend-Lease Mission to Australia*, 15 July 1942, Records of US Foreign Economic Administration, item 18, box 230, RG169, WNRC.
- 24 Johnson to Hull, 1 February 1944, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.24/ 775, RG59, NA.
- 25 Johnson to Hull, 1 February 1944, *ibid.*; Minter to Johnson, 19 February 1944, in 847.24/771, *ibid.*
- 26 Johnson to Howard, 3 March 1943, Box 42, Johnson Papers, Library of Congress; Johnson, memorandum, 17 July 1943, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.00/393, RG59, NA.
- 27 See, for example, *San Francisco Examiner* and *Washington Times Herald*, as quoted in Thorne, *op. cit.*, pp 402–3. On the basis of a wide range of newly located evidence, Thorne argues that ‘assumptions about American predominance, present and future, in Far Eastern affairs were indeed by now [1942–43] widespread in the United States,’ and, ‘at the same time there was a growing emphasis upon the vital economic role that the Far East could play in the postwar life of the United States’. See also *ibid.*, pp 160, 170, 421, 553, 729.
- 28 Layton, memorandum, 3 February 1944, UK Prime Minister’s office files, PREM 3, 159/2, PRO; Johnson to Howard, 3 March 1943, Box 42, Johnson Papers; Johnson memorandum, 17 July 1943, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.00/393, RG59, NA.
- 29 Johnson to Hull, 27 December 1943, which quotes Evatt to Hull on 17 December 1943, in US Department of State, miscellaneous files, 611–4731/468, RG59, NA; Hull to Evatt, 24 March 1944, and Johnson to Evatt, 27 March 1944, both in A989, 43/735/70/2, CAO.
- 30 Minter, in Johnson to Hull, 11 January 1944, and Minter to Stewart, 6 December 1944, both in Foreign Service Post Records, Canberra 1941–1947, F150, Box 030-800, RG84, held at US Department of State; Committee on British Commonwealth to Johnson, 2 November 1944, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.00/1-545, RG59, NA; Stewart memorandum, 8 February 1944, miscellaneous files, FW 840.50/3482, *ibid.*
- 31 Evatt, memorandum, 6 November 1944, ANZ (2), no 58, Evatt Papers, Flinders University Library, Adelaide, Australia.
- 32 Johnson, *Australian ... Desire for International Agreement on Employment*, 12 February 1945, in US Department of State, miscellaneous files, 800.504/2-1245, RG59, NA.
- 33 Evatt, memorandum, 6 November 1944, ANZ (2), no 50, Evatt Papers; Eggelston, memorandum, 14 February 1945, A1066, A45/2/3/4, pt 1, CAO. See also R E Walker, *The Australian Economy in War and Reconstruction*, New York, 1947, pp 369–71; W J Waters, ‘Australian Labor’s Full Employment Objective, 1942–1945’, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, XVI, 1970, pp 48–64.

- 34 Minutes of 51st and 54th meetings, US delegation to UNO Conference, San Francisco, 23 and 26 May 1945, UNO files, RSC lot 60-D, 224 Box 96, US Cr Min 51 and 54, NA; OSS reports, XL 33087 and OX 24095, 21 December and 8 June 1945, RG266, NA; Johnson, *Australia's Post-War Economic Policy*, 3 February 1945, in US Department of State, miscellaneous files; 711.47/2-345, RG59, NA.
- 35 R F Smith, 'American Foreign Relations 1920-1942', in Barton J Bernstein (ed.), *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History*, New York, 1968, pp 232-62.
- 36 Hull to Johnson 29 December 1944, Foreign Service Post Records, 'Canberra 1941-1947', F150, Box 030-800, RG84, held at US Department of State.
- 37 Fraser, British Empire PM's Conference, 8 May 1944, UK PM's Office, Records 1941-1944, confidential papers, Premier 4/42/5 Pmm(44), PRO. See also Stewart, memorandum, 8 February 1944, in US Department of State, miscellaneous files, FW840.50/3482, RG59, NA.
- 38 Claude Julien, *America's Empire*, New York, 1971, pp 210-17; Eckes, *A Search For Solvency*, p 64.
- 39 Memorandum, 8 April 1944, in US Department of State, Notter file, box 19, PWC/231-40, RG59, NA; Secretary's Staff Committee, 5 March 1945, box 301, SC-556, *ibid*.
- 40 Acheson to Hull, 18 March 1944, Hull Papers, Library of Congress; Noyes and Rostow to Acheson, 1942, US Foreign Economic Administration Records, item 514, RG169, WNRC.
- 41 Thorne, *op. cit.*, pp 160, 170, 313-34, 401-3, 420, 537.
- 42 Eggleston, Washington notes, April 1943 and 12 December 1944, MSS 423/9/1148 and 423/10/730-38, Eggleston Papers; Eggleston to Evatt, 5 December 1944, Washington file, Evatt Papers.
- 43 Johnson to Howard, 3 March 1943, Box 42, folder 1943, Johnson Papers; Johnson, *Australia's Postwar Economic Policy*, 3 February 1945, in US Department of State, miscellaneous files, 711.47/2-345, RG59, NA.
- 44 Secretary's Staff Committee, Post-War Problems Committee, *Conclusions*, 6 March 1944, in US Department of State, Notter file, Box 297, PWC-52, 5.36 RC59, NA; memorandum, 19 July 1944, Box 19, PWC/231-40, *ibid*.
- 45 Waters, *op. cit.*, pp 48-53.
- 46 See, for example, *Australia, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, pp 190, 934-1006, 1077-1084; Eggleston, memorandum, 26 December 1944, MS 423/10/739-43, Eggleston Papers; Eggleston to Evatt, 11 November 1944, A1066, A45/2/3/4, pt 1, CAO.
- 47 Walker, *op. cit.*, p 375; Hull to Johnson, 20 July 1944, and Johnson, memorandum, 26 July 1944, in US Department of State, miscellaneous files, 800.515/7-2044, RG59, NA.
- 48 *Australia, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, pp 190, 934-1006, 1077-1084.
- 49 Eggleston to Evatt, 11 November 1944, A1066, A45/2/3/4, pt 1, CAO. Given the statement by America's chief negotiator, Harry Dexter White, that the US must maintain sufficient votes to guarantee that 'quotas cannot be changed in a manner detrimental to our interests and that no amendment to the Fund proposal can be enacted without our approval', Australia's skepticism appears to have been well founded; see Eckes, *A Search for Solvency*, p 129.

- 50 Walker, op. cit., pp 318–23; L F Crisp, *Ben Chifley: A Biography*, Sydney, 1961, pp 198–212; L Overacker, 'Australia's Battle for Bretton Woods', *Forum*, May 1947, pp 399–403.
- 51 Butler, US Ambassador in Canberra, 1946–1947, 'Summary ... December 1946', 16 December 1946, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.00/12-1646, RG59, NA; Childs, First Secretary, US Legation, Wellington, 'Confidential File, 1946', 5 March 1947, Foreign Service Post Records, 56 F150 050-892-5, RG84, held at US Department of State.
- 52 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 August 1945.
- 53 Eggleston, memorandum, 24 August 1945, A1066, A45/2/3/4, CAO; Eggleston to Acheson, 1 October 1945, 847.24/10-145, NA.
- 54 Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 February 1945, Map Room file, box-miscellaneous, Roosevelt Papers.
- 55 Eggleston, memorandum, 7 September 1945, MS 423/10/729.43, Eggleston Papers. Orthodox historians have argued that Lend-Lease was not ended abruptly, and that its termination was not related to America's multilateral strategy. Eggleston's observation suggests clearly that America's behaviour was interpreted very negatively by other states in 1945.
- 56 Memorandum, US Department of State, quoted in Kolko, op. cit., p 489.
- 57 Winant to Byrnes, 18 August 1945, in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of United States: Diplomatic Papers*, vol VI, 1945, Washington, DC, 1969, p 104.
- 58 UK Parliamentary Debates, Command Paper 6709, 18.
- 59 Dunk to Eggleston, 4 December 1945, MS 423/10/198, Eggleston Papers.
- 60 Memorandum, 9 May 1946, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.24/5146-12-3146, RG59, NA; Acheson to US Consul, Sydney, 17 May 1946, in 847.24/5-1746, *ibid.*
- 61 Johnson to Hull, 1 February 1944, in 847.24/775, *ibid.*; Dunk to Eggleston, 4 December 1945, MS 423/10/198, Eggleston Papers; Dunk to Clayton, 2 November 1945, Evatt Papers.
- 62 Minter, memorandum, 28 December 1945, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.24/12-2845, RG59, NA; Acheson to US Consul, Sydney, 26 March 1946, in 847.24/3-2646, *ibid.*; Acheson, memorandum, 8 May 1946, in 711.45/5-846, *ibid.* The final settlement obliged Australia to pay only \$27 million (US); see *Agreement on Lend-Lease Reciprocal Aid*, 7 June 1946, in 847.24/6-746, *ibid.*
- 63 Memorandum, 9 May 1946, in 847.24/5-146-12-3145, *ibid.*
- 64 Acheson, memorandum of conversation with Chifley, 9 May 1946, in 847.24/5-946, and Acheson to US Consul Sydney, 17 May 1946, in 847.24/6-1746, both in *ibid.* *OSS Reports*, 12 April 1946, XL 49644, Records of OSS, RG226, NA; Thorne, op. cit., pp 385, 513, argues that London did not ratify the Bretton Woods proposals until its precarious reserves position and US pressure forced it to do so after the war.
- 65 Minter, memorandum, 14 June 1946, in US Department of State, Australia 1940–1946 file, 847.24/6-1446, RG59, NA.
- 66 Allison, memorandum, 14 June 1946, in 841.014/6-1446, *ibid.* See also McCarthy to Evatt, November 1945, USA file, Evatt Papers; Johnson, memorandum, 17 November 1945, in US Department of State, miscellaneous files, 560 AL/11-1745, RG59, NA; Eggleston memoranda,

- 7 September 1945, and 26 December 1944, MS 423/10/739-43 and 423/10/658-60,47, Eggleston Papers; Minter, memorandum, 17 November 1945, in US Department of State, miscellaneous files, 560-AL/11-1745, RG59, NA; Zapf, memorandum, no date, Foreign Service Post Records, lot 56, F150, Box 030-800, RG84, held at US Department of State; and Chifley, 28 June 1946, in Australia, *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, 187, 2027.
- 67 The agreements were only an initial step towards multilateralism. 'The aggregate tariff reductions agreed upon were small', an Australian observer noted 'but nonetheless greater than ever achieved previously at one sweep'. See R F Holder, 'Australian Opinion and the GATT', *Australian Outlook*, V, 1951, pp 22-36; 'International Trade Discussion', *ibid.*, II, 1948, pp 42-9.
- 68 Dixon to John Latham, Chief Justice of Australia, 31 October and 20 June 1942, MS 1009, series A, Latham Papers, Australian National Library, Canberra; Calwell, 10 December 1942, Australia, *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, pp 172, 178-84; Curtin to Roosevelt, 31 March 1943, Map Room file, Box 12(2A), Roosevelt Papers; Eggleston to Evatt, 16 February 1943, A989, 43/970/5/2/3, CAO.
- 69 Curtin to Roosevelt, 31 March 1943, Map Room file, Box 12(2A), Roosevelt Papers.
- 70 See, generally, Roger Bell, 'Australian-American Discord: Negotiations for Post-War Bases and Security Arrangements in the Pacific, 1944-1946', *Australian Outlook*, XXVII, 1973, pp 12-33, and 'Australian-American Disagreement Over the Peace Settlement with Japan, 1944-1946', *ibid.*, XXX, 1976, pp 238-62.
- 71 Evatt, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 July 1945.
- 72 Eggleston to Evatt, 17 August 1945, MS 423/10/727-30, Eggleston Papers. The British view was very similar; see Thorne, *op. cit.*, p 536.
- 73 Australian Department of External Affairs, memorandum, 15 April 1943, A989/43/735/1021, and telegram 24 August 1943, A989/43/735/321, CAO; Johnson, memorandum, 2 September 1944, in US Department of State, Japan 1945-1946 file, 740.0011 PW/9-2440, RG59, NA; and Johnson to Hull, 1 May 1944, Australia 1940-1946 file, 847.00/4-224, *ibid.*
- 74 Eggleston, Washington notes, in late 1945, MS 423/10/1253, Eggleston Papers.
- 75 Johnson, 2 September 1944, in US Department of State, Japan 1945-1946 file, 740.0011 PW/9-2440, RG59, NA; Johnson to Hull, 1 May 1944, Australia 1940-1946 file, 847.00/4-2244, *ibid.*; memorandum, 2 November 1944, 847.00/1-1545, *ibid.*
- 76 Hickerson, memorandum, 22 April 1944, in 847.00/4-2244, *ibid.*
- 77 Johnson, memorandum, 2 September 1944, in 740.0011 PW/9-2440, Johnson to Hull, 1 May 1944, in 847.00/4-2244, and memorandum, 7 May 1943, Notter file, Box 79, all in *ibid.* Johnson to Howard, 3 March 1943, box 42, folder 1943, Johnson Papers: Australian Department of External Affairs, draft memorandum, 15 April 1943, A989/43/735/1021, and draft telegram, 24 August 1943, A989/43/735/321, CAO. Thorne, *op. cit.*, pp 280, 536.
- 78 John Dedman, 'Encounter Over Manus', *Australian Outlook*, II, 1966, p 144.
- 79 Eggleston, Washington notes, late 1945, MS 423/10/1253, Eggleston Papers.

- 80 MacArthur to Marshall, 27 August 1944, RG4, MacArthur Papers, MacArthur Library, Norfolk, VA. Also see MacArthur, 22 November 1944, in W Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries*, London, 1952, p 242.
- 81 J F Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, London, 1948, p 208; see also Thorne, op. cit., pp 599, 679; Bell, *Australian–American Discord*, op. cit., pp 21–7; Bell, *Australian–American Disagreement*, pp 238–45. Australia’s perception of US policy in the Far East closely resembles that of revisionist historians. Kolko, for example, argues: ‘Washington fully intended that at the end of the war America could, and would, determine the basic character of the postwar world’, in op. cit., p 6.
- 82 *ibid.*, p 252.
- 83 The questions of the motives behind, and the internal dynamics of, American economic policies lie essentially outside the scope of this paper although they have been a central preoccupation in the debate between orthodox and revisionist historians who have relied overwhelmingly on American archival sources.
- 84 This point is supported, for example, by Gaddis, op. cit., p 354.
- 85 W R Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonisation of the British Empire, 1941–1945*, London, 1977, p 87.
- 86 R W Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, Baltimore, 1971, p 7.
- 87 Rose, op. cit., p 65.
- 88 Gardner, op. cit., p 319. See also Julien, op. cit., pp 210–17. The war tripled US exports and helped establish a balance of payments surplus double that of 1920, a peak pre-Depression year.
- 89 Compare Gaddis, op. cit., p 23, which portrays the strained economic relations of the late war years as essentially a result of mutual recrimination over the fate of Eastern Europe, and suggests that Soviet opposition to multilateralism was ‘an effect rather than a cause of the Cold War’.
- 90 This is not to imply, however, that American capitalism has uniquely sought to promote a world order receptive to its particular interests and institutions. Nor is it to suggest that all capitalist societies necessarily pursue such a course in foreign policy; see Robert L Heilbroner, ‘Phase II of the Capitalist System’, *New York Times Magazine*, 28 November 1971, and Robert Zevin, ‘An Interpretation of American Imperialism’, *Journal of Economic History*, XXXII, 1972, pp 334–53.
- 91 Stanley Hoffman, *Revisionism Revisited*, in Miller and Pruessen (eds), op. cit., p 14.
- 92 Thorne, op. cit., p 695.
- 93 Eckes, *A Search for Solvency*, op. cit., p 275.

### Chapter 3

#### Australian–American Disagreement Over the Peace Settlement with Japan, 1944–1946

This article is based partly on research completed in the United States with the generous financial assistance of the American Council of Learned Societies.

- 1 Adm. Leahy to Hull, 16 May 1944, United States National Archives, hereafter USNA, 865.014/5-1644. See also ‘Naval Note’, no author, 15

- September 1944, Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, hereafter RL, M R 168, Box 168, Folder 1.
- 2 US JCS 973, 28 July, 1944, sent to Hull, 3 August 1944, quoted M Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943–1944*, Washington, 1959, pp 523–4.
  - 3 See, generally, Roger Bell, 'Australian–American Discord: Negotiations for Postwar Bases and Security Arrangements in the Pacific 1944–1946', *Australian Outlook*, vol 27, no 1, April, 1973, pp 12–33.
  - 4 Johnson to Hull, 26 February 1944, USNA 747.47H/36.
  - 5 See, for example, Johnson to Hull, 22 January 1944, USNA747.47H/6; UK War Cabinet Memoranda, 1939–1945, WP (44) 70, Cab. 66/46, Public Records Office, London.
  - 6 Canberra Agreement, clauses 7 and 25, printed CPD, vol 177, pp 79–80.
  - 7 Blamey, 16 May 1945, quoted Gavan Long, *The Final Campaigns*, Canberra, 1963, p 65. See also Curtin to Roosevelt, 5 June 1944, USNA 847.00/424.
  - 8 CCS to Australian War Cabinet, 3 June 1943, USNA 847.00/424.
  - 9 Churchill, memorandum, 3 March 1944, quoted John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy: August 1943 – September 1944*, V, London, 1956, pp 441–4; see also Curtin to Churchill, 17 May 1944, cited Long, op. cit., p 12.
  - 10 Memorandum for Adm. Brown, no author, 6 September 1944, Roosevelt Papers, RL, M R Box 168, Folder 1.
  - 11 Curtin to Churchill, 4 July 1944, quoted Long, op. cit., p 15.
  - 12 Curtin to Churchill, 12 August 1944, quoted ibid.
  - 13 Johnson, 'Criticisms of General MacArthur's Communiqués', 3 December 1943, USNA 740.OO11PW/3595; Long, ibid, pp 42–3, 53, 590–9.
  - 14 CCS, 'British Participation ... against Japan', 25 August 1944, CCS 370 'Great Britain', 15 July 1944, Section I, USNA, Record Group 218; Curtin to Churchill, 4 July 1944, 12 August 1944 and 17 September 1944 cited Long, ibid., pp 14–17.
  - 15 UK Foreign Office to Churchill, 21 February 1944, quoted Ehrman, op cit., p 438.
  - 16 Col. Billo, 'British Participation in Far Eastern Strategy', 3 September 1944, quoted Matloff, op. cit., p 496.
  - 17 JCS Joint War Plans Committee, memorandum, 'Theatre Boundaries—Pacific – Far East', 7 September 1944, CCS, 24 January 1942, Section 2, Part 2, USNA Record Group 218.
  - 18 JCS 973, 'Fundamental Military Factors in Relation to Discussions Concerning Territorial Trusteeships and Settlements', 28 July 1944, sent to Hull, 3 August 1944, quoted Matloff, op. cit., pp 523–4.
  - 19 Richard D Burns, 'James F Byrnes (1945–1947)', in Norman A Graebner (ed.), *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century*, New York, 1961, p 239.
  - 20 US State–War–Navy Co-ordinating Committee, May 1945, quoted, G Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945*, New York, 1968, p 547.
  - 21 'Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945', US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, 'The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945', vol I, Washington, DC, 1960, p 903. For a brief outline of America's response to Soviet policy, see Burns, op. cit., pp 227–34.
  - 22 Chifley to Churchill, 20 July 1945, quoted Gill, ibid., p 667.

- 23 Lt-Gen Lavarack to CCS, 13 June 1945, Appendix in CCS 878, 15 June 1945, CCS Australia 1942–1945, USNA Record Group 218.
- 24 Memorandum, CCS, 17 July 1945, US Department of State, op. cit., p 1314.
- 25 H V Evatt, *Australia in World Affairs*, Sydney, 1946, p 99.
- 26 Curtin, quoted Johnson to Hull, 14 September 1943, USNA 841.01/100.
- 27 Evatt to Stettinius, for Truman, 24 June 1945, USNA 740.0011PW (peace) 6-2445. See also Stettinius to Evatt, 26 June 1945, CAO A1066, p 45/148/1.
- 28 V Evatt, 'Risks of a Big-Power Peace', *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV, January 1946, p 199.
- 29 US Department of State, Committee on Post-War Programs, Japan: Terms of Surrender: Underlying Principles, in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944*, vol V, Washington, 1965, p 1279.
- 30 Evatt, 'Risks of a Big-Power Peace', op. cit., p 198.
- 31 F Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, 1947, pp 206–7.
- 32 Potsdam Declaration, 26 July 1945, quoted P Hasluck, *The Government and the People 1942–1945*, Canberra, 1970, p 592.
- 33 John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy: October 1944 – August 1945*, VI, London, 1956, p 307.
- 34 Australia, Department of External Affairs (ADEA), 'For Evatt: Potsdam Meeting', late July or early August 1945, Commonwealth Archives Office, (CAO), A 1066, p 45/78/4/3.
- 35 Evatt, quoted *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 July 1945, p 1. This statement received strong newspaper support in Australia. See, for example, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 July 1945, p 2, and *Daily Telegraph*, 31 July 1945, p 8.
- 36 ADEA, 'For Evatt: Potsdam Meeting', and draft telegram to UK Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (SSDA), late July 1945, CAO A1066, p 45/78/4/3; SSOA to ADEA, 2 August 1945, quoted Hasluck, op. cit., p 593.
- 37 Minter to Byrnes, 31 July 1945, USNA 740.0011PW/7-3145.
- 38 Evatt, quoted *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 July 1945, p 1.
- 39 *ibid.*, p 169. For details of Australia's correspondence with London and Washington during August, see 'Summary of Events Leading to Japan's Withdrawal from War', CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/55, no 4. This summary is based on CAO Files p 45/10/1, p 45/10/32, and p 45/10/35, but CAO has been unable to locate these files.
- 40 ADEA to SSDA, 11 August 1945, and SSDA to ADEA, 12 August 1945, in 'Summary of Events ...', *ibid.*
- 41 Eggleston, 'Washington Notes', 17 August 1945, Eggleston Papers, Australian National Library MS 423/10/727-730; and 'Summary of Events ...', *ibid.*, gen.
- 42 Eggleston to Evatt, 14 August 1945, and Telegram D1444, 15 August 1945, in 'Summary of Events ...', CAO A989. Microfilm 14610/55 no 4; and Eggleston to ADEA, 15 August 1945, CAO A1066, A45/2/3/4, pt 1.
- 43 Eggleston, 'Washington Notes', 24 August 1945, Eggleston Papers, MS 423/10/727-30.44. Eggleston to Makin, 24 August 1945, CAO A1066, A45/2/3/4. See also Kolko, op. cit., p 599, note 8, for evidence of the influence of the German situation on America's policy in the final phase of war against Japan.

- 45 Johnson to Hull, 15 November 1944, USNA 747.47H/11-1744. See also D'Alton to Evatt, 8 January 1944, CAO A989, 43/735/168.
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- 61 Chifley to SSDA, 10 September 1945, quoted Hasluck, *op. cit.*, p 610.
- 62 Evatt to Chifley, 14 September 1945, 'Summary of Events ...', CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/55, no 4.
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- 69 Evatt to Eggleston, 23 August 1945, CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/65, no 4.
- 70 SSDA to ADEA, 29 & 27 August 1945, CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/65, no 4.
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- 72 Evatt to Chifley, 29 September 1945, SSDA to Evatt, 30 September 1945; Burton to Hood, 12 October 1945; and Evatt to Byrnes, 10 October 1945, all in CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/65, no 4.
- 73 Eggleston, 'Meeting of Heads ...', 6 October 1945, Eggleston Papers, MS 423/10/470–75.
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- 78 Makin to Maloney, 14 December 1945, CAO A1066, P45/78/4/4. See also Australia, ADEA, 'Draft Instructions for Maloney', 14 December 1945, CAO A1066, P45/78/4/4.
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#### Chapter 4

##### Shifting Alliances

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## Chapter 5

### Anticipating the Pacific Century?

For research assistance I wish to thank Ellen Perdikiannis and Damien McCoy.

- 1 While it is conceptually necessary to speak of 'Asia' and the 'Asia-Pacific', this should not imply that nations in the region share broadly similar features. The many nations of Asia do not comprise a coherent region, although most are obviously undergoing rapid industrialisation and economic change, and participate as equals in various regional forums and institutions. In addition, all nations in the region, with the possible exception of Singapore, are extremely diverse, exhibiting profound domestic differences grounded in ethnic and religious distinctions, rural and urban contrasts, varied gender roles and family patterns, unequal levels of education, and sharply uneven rates of political participation by their citizens. Most obviously, political ideologies and governing structures in Asia range across a very wide spectrum—from rigidly authoritarian to essentially democratic. This plurality and these social divisions are emphasised in recent literature, especially that which seeks to puncture the simplistic optimism about the economic transformation of the Asia-Pacific and the coming of the Pacific Century. See, especially, G Segal, *Rethinking the Pacific*, Oxford, 1990. For examples of Pacific Century optimism, see W McCord, *The Dawn of the Pacific Century: Implications for the Three Worlds of Development*, New Brunswick, 1991 and the World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*, World Bank Policy Research Report, New York, 1993.
- 2 With regard to post-Cold War Asia, Senator Gareth Evans, Australian Foreign Minister, asked in 1991 if Australia was 'forever seen as a European outpost, a kind of cultural misfit trapped by geography in an alien environment? Or are we to recognise that Australia's future lies

- inevitably in the Asia-Pacific region—that this is where we live and must survive strategically and economically, and where we must find a place and role if we are to develop our full potential as a nation?’
- 3 See N Meaney, *The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901–1914*, Sydney, 1976; R Megaw, ‘Australia and the Great White Fleet, 1908’, *Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society*, no 56, 1970, pp 121–31.
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  - 9 Hasluck, 27 August 1950, in *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, 209, 1950, p 30.
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  - 12 For details of Australia’s more independent posture in defence and foreign affairs, see, especially, Dibb, *Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities*, and G Evans and B Grant, *Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990’s*, Carlton, 1991. For comments on Australia’s new defence ambitions, see *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 May 1989, 16 July 1990, 12 June 1992, 9 March 1995; *Bulletin*, 6 August 1986; *Time* (Australia), 6 April 1992. In 1994, the Commander in Chief of US Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Richard Macke, confirmed America’s downgrading of ANZUS in terms which intensified Australia’s drive for greater independence: ‘With regard to ANZUS, I don’t believe that treaty organizations are what is required in the Asia-Pacific region’.
  - 13 J Angel, *Australia and South East Asia*, in P Boyce and J Angel (eds), *Diplomacy in the Market Place, vol 7 1981–1992*, *Australia in World Affairs* (ed.), G Greenwood and N Harper, Melbourne, 1957–92, p 160.
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  - 16 Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945*, New York, 1982, p 232.
  - 17 See, generally, R Bell, ‘Testing the Open Door Thesis in Australia 1941–1946’, *Pacific Historical Review*, vol 51, August 1982, pp 283–311; and

- M Beresford and P Kerr, *A Turning Point for Australian Capitalism: 1942–1952* in E Wheelwright and K Buckley (eds), *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*, vol 4, Sydney, 1980, pp 148–71.
- 18 Doug Anthony, 'GATT Ministerial Meeting, Statement delivered on November 24, 1982', *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, vol 53, no 11, 1982, pp 744–5.
  - 19 Anthony, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 October 1983.
  - 20 Andrew Peacock in *Background*, no 214, 28 November 1979; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 September 1979.
  - 21 In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 June 1979, pp 44–5; *Background*, no 191, 20 June 1979, pp 7–10; no 208, 17 October 1979, pp 5–6, and no 209, 24 October 1979, pp 8–9; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 August 1979, 6 October 1979.
  - 22 *Background*, no 190, 13 June 1979, pp 5–6; *The Australian*, 1–2 December 1979; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 December 1979; *National Times*, 24 November 1979, 6 October 1979, p 72.
  - 23 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 May 1989.
  - 24 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Fiji, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Hungary.
  - 25 See, generally, for reports on APEC and the Bogor meeting, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 October 1994 and 16 November 1994; *The Australian*, 12–13 November 1994; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 September 1994, pp 14–16.
  - 26 For a broader discussion of the origins and nature of APEC, see, especially, *APEC: Which Way Forward Symposium*, various essays in *Australian Journal of International Affairs* vol 46, no 2, 1992, pp 161–202, and essays by Ippei Yamazawa, Andrew Elek and C Fred Bergsten, in Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale (eds), *Asia Pacific Regionalism: Readings in International Economic Relations*, Sydney, 1994, pp 199–224.
  - 27 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 29 January 1986, and 8 October 1987; *Times on Sunday*, 1 November 1987.
  - 28 See R Bell, *Testing the Open Door Thesis*, op. cit. Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreements signed by the US with its wartime allies provided generous emergency assistance in return for commitments from recipient states to seek 'the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce [and] ... the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers'. In the postwar years many states were reluctant to comply with these 'open door' initiatives.
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- 36 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 April 1994, p 46. See also G Sheridan, 'Australia's Asian Odyssey', in Greg Sheridan (ed.), *Living with Dragons: Australia Confronts its Asian Destiny*, Sydney, 1995, p 5. Sheridan speaks of the 'Asianisation of almost every sphere of Australian life'.
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## Chapter 6

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- 3 E K Silvester (ed.), *New South Wales Constitution Bill: The Speeches*, Sydney, 1853, esp. pp 28–35, 40–51, 46–63, 72; N McLachlan, ‘The Future America: Some Bicentennial Reflections’, *Historical Studies*, 17, April 1977, pp 361–83—the most stimulating and thorough discussion of this topic; R White, *Inventing Australia: Images and Identity 1688–1980*, Sydney, 1981, esp. pp 47–59; M Kiddle, *Men of Yesterday*, Melbourne, 1961, esp. pp 210, 219; J West, in A G L Shaw (ed.), *History of Tasmania, 1852*, Sydney, 1970, esp. pp xiv, 48–9, 118, 126, 237–52, 522–4; L G Churchward, *Australia and America, 1788–1972: An Alternative History*, Sydney, 1979, pp 1–68; J S Mill, quoted in S Lukes, ‘Power and Authority’, in T Bottomore and R Nisbet (eds), *A History of Sociological Analysis*, London, 1978, p 654; R M Hartwell, ‘The Pastoral Ascendancy, 1820–1850’, and I D McNaughton, ‘Colonial Liberalism’, both in Gordon Greenwood (ed.), *Australia: A Social and Political History*, Sydney, 1964, pp 46–144; J D Lang, *Freedom and Independence for the Golden Lands of Australia*, London, 1852; R J McDonald, ‘Republicanism in the Fifties ...’, *Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society*, 50, October, 1964, pp 262–78; Ged Martin, *Bunyip Aristocracy ...*, Sydney, 1986, esp. pp 40–73.
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## Chapter 10

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## Chapter 11

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- 7 John Dunmore Lang, *The Moral and Religious Aspect of the Future America of the Southern Hemisphere*, New York, 1840. For an excellent discussion of the US and colonial Australia, see Noel McLachlan, "The Future America": Some Bicentennial Reflections', *Historical Studies*, 17: 68, April 1977, pp 361–83. Although neglected, the study of US influence and Americanisation has not been totally ignored by Australian writers. The following studies are, arguably, the most significant attempts to discuss the broad character of Australian–American interactions: R White, *Inventing Australia: Images and Identity, 1688–1980*, Sydney, 1981, esp. pp 47–59, and "Backwater Awash": The Australian Experience of Americanization', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 3, 1983; C Hartley Grattan, *The United States and the Southwest Pacific*, Melbourne, 1961; R Bell, 'The American Influence', and R Waterhouse, 'Popular Culture and Pastimes', both in N Meaney (ed.), *Under New Heavens: Cultural Transmission and the Making of Australia*, Melbourne, 1989, pp 237–86, 325–78; B Grant, *The Australian Dilemma: A New Kind of Western Society*, Sydney, 1983; L G Churchward, *Australia and America, 1788–1972: An Alternative History*, Sydney, 1979; G Serle, 'Godzone: Austerica Unlimited?', *Meanjin Quarterly*, xxvi, iii, 1967, pp 237–50; S Alomes, 'The Satellite Society', *Journal of Australian Studies*, 9, November, 1981, esp. pp 2–11; M Roe, *Nine Australian Progressives: Vitalism in Bourgeois Social Thought 1890–1960*, St Lucia, 1984; D Collins, *Hollywood Down Under: Australians at the Movies, 1896 to the Present*, North Ryde, 1987. Billy Hughes quoted in F K Crowley (ed.), *Modern Australia in Documents*, Melbourne, 1973, vol 1, p 592.
- 8 W A Payne, 'American Penetration', *Australian Quarterly*, 8, December, 1930, p 19; *Bulletin*, 30 June 1992, pp 83–4.
- 9 The most vigorous and influential claims regarding Australia's 'Americanisation' are expressed periodically by Phillip Adams writing in *The Australian*. See, for example, 'Dolls on the American Knee', *The Australian*, 12–13 September, 1993. See also John Docker, in *The Sydney*

- Morning Herald*, 19 December 1987; Alomes, op. cit; Churchward, op. cit; G Crough and T Wheelwright, *Australia: A Client State*, Melbourne, 1982; G Crough, T Wheelwright and T Wilshire (eds), *Australia and World Capitalism*, Melbourne, 1983 edn., esp. pp 123–216; H McQueen, *Australia's Media Monopolies*, Canberra, 1977; M McNain, 'From Imperial Appendage to American Satellite', *ANU History Journal*, 14, 1977–80, pp 73ff; L Fox, *Australia Taken Over?*, Sydney, 1974; K Tsokhas and M Simms, 'The Political Economy of United States Investment in Australia', *Politics*, 13, 1, 1978, pp 65–80; D Phillips, *Ambivalent Allies*, Ringwood, 1988, esp. pp ix, 109.
- 10 Iriye, 'Culture', *The Journal of American Studies*, 77: 1, June 1990, p 104.
  - 11 Most prominently, Norman Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian and American Relations Between 1900–1975*, St Lucia, 1987; Camilleri, op. cit; and Glen Barclay, *Friends in High Places: Australian–American Diplomatic Relations Since 1945*, Melbourne, 1985.
  - 12 *Time* (Australia), 6 April 1989, p 13.
  - 13 M Lerner, *America as a Civilization*, New York, 1957, p 929.
  - 14 This claim can be sustained even for the difficult years of war against Japan. See, especially, Roger Bell, *Unequal Allies: Australian–American Relations and the Pacific War*, Melbourne, 1977. For the postwar years, see Peter Edwards and Gregory Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments: The Politics of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1948–1965*, Canberra, 1992.
  - 15 Serle, op. cit, pp 247–9.
  - 16 See generally, Gregory Pemberton, *All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam*, Sydney, 1987; Camilleri, op. cit.
  - 17 Camilleri, *ibid.*, pp 124–6; 'Under Orders from the CIA', *Time* (Australia) 10 October 1987, pp 15–17; Malcolm Booker, in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 August 1986, p 13.
  - 18 Hasluck, 27 September 1950, [Australia], *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, 209, 30.
  - 19 Menzies, [1958], *The Australian*, 2 January 1988 (cites Australian Cabinet Papers from 1958).
  - 20 Menzies, cited by Neville Meaney, 'Australia and the World', in Meaney (ed.), op. cit, p 432.
  - 21 See, especially, Harper, op. cit., and Pemberton op. cit.
  - 22 See, especially, M Sexton, *War for the Asking*, Ringwood, Melbourne, 1981; P Edwards, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 June 1989, p 19.
  - 23 For a concise yet sophisticated discussion of various interpretations of cultural influences between 'stronger' and 'weaker' powers, see John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction*, Baltimore, 1991, esp. pp 140–79.
  - 24 Philip Bell, 'Remembering Vietnam', *Current Affairs Bulletin*, 65: 2, 1988, pp 16–22; Ina Bertrand, 'From Silence to Reconciliation: the Representation of the Vietnam War in Australian Film and Television', *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 8: 1, 1988, pp 75–89.
  - 25 It is not our intention to re-present the debates about US cultural responses to 'Vietnam', a topic so deeply analysed that the *Bulletin of Bibliography*, as early as 1986 (vol 43, no 3), included a nine-page entry. The fictional revisions of US history and society which many have seen in the cycle of films beginning with *The Deer Hunter* (1978) and continuing to *Forrest Gump* (1994) constitute a significant cultural force in themselves, not

quite a 'genre' but relying on earlier genres, especially the 'Western'. See, for example, M Ryan and D Kellner, *Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology of Contemporary Hollywood Film*, Bloomington, 1990, pp 194–216; S Jeffords, 'Things Worth Dying For: Gender and the Ideology of Collectivity in Vietnam Representations', *Cultural Critique*, 8, 1987–88, pp 79–103; or A Auster and L Quart, 'Hollywood and Vietnam: The Triumph of the Will', *Cineaste*, IX: 3 1979, pp 4–15, and the 'symposium' in 'Platoon on Inspection', *Cineaste*, IX: 4, 1987, pp 4–15. The authors accept that, notwithstanding the contradictory ideological readings made of this cycle of films, their masculinist, heroic revision of, and frequently nostalgic yearning for, 'the gendered story that is America' (Jeffords, p 98) are very different from their filmic and televisual counterparts produced in Australia.

- 26 See Australian House of Representatives Paper Tabled H R, 13 May 1975, on *Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam*, esp. p 2, which discusses US 'requests' for involvement in Vietnam.
- 27 Many commentators have seen some Hollywood films as concerned to 'excuse' US intervention in Southeast Asia by presenting the US as a *victim* of the conflict. The Australian films can also be read in this way (see Bertrand, op. cit.).
- 28 Phillip Adams, 'Dolls on the American Knee', *The Australian*, 12 September 1993.
- 29 Compare, Pemberton, op. cit.
- 30 Grant, op. cit., p 20.
- 31 For example, Philip Bell, 'PCP and the Press: American Fiction as Australian News', *Australian Journalism Review*, 6: 1, 1984, pp 68–72.
- 32 C W E Bigsby, 'Europe, America and the Cultural Debate', in C W E Bigsby (ed.), *Superculture: American Popular Culture and Europe*, Bowling Green, 1975, p 6. A number of recent works, in addition to T H von Laue, *The World Revolution of Westernization: The Twentieth Century in Global Perspective*, Oxford, 1987, and Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, have revitalised debate over America's globalising cultural authority, and 'anti-American' resistance. See, for example, Akira Iriye, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Volume 3, The Globalising of America, 1913–1945*, Cambridge, 1993; Marshall Blonsky, *American Mythologies*, New York, 1992; Denis Lacorne, *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception*, London, 1990; and Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad 1965–1990*, New York, 1992.

## Chapter 12

### Cultural Crossroads and Global Frontiers

- 1 Akira Iriye, 'Culture', *Journal of American Studies*, 77:1, June 1990, p 104. For a discussion of the state of US diplomatic and foreign relations historiography by 1980, see G K Haines and J S Walker (eds), *American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review*, London, 1981. For a more recent survey of post–1941 historiography, see Michael Hogan (ed.), *America in the World*, New York, 1995.
- 2 Attempts to define culture have increasingly incorporated ideology and popular/mass culture into ever broadening understandings which no longer see culture as a discreet analytical or historical category. For Iriye, culture includes (political) ideology, shared beliefs and customs (ibid, pp

- 99–107). Most recent work finds the concept deeply problematic and takes as its starting point Raymond Williams's concern that culture is 'one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language' (Williams, in John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction*, London, 1991, p 4). For details of changing conceptions of culture in a modern international context, see Mike Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, London, 1992.
- 3 Uta G Poiger, 'Beyond "Modernization" and "Colonization"', *Diplomatic History*, 23: 1, 1999, p 45. For very different examples of this trend, see Emily Rosenberg, 'Revisiting Dollar Diplomacy: Narratives of Money and Manliness', *Diplomatic History*, 22: 2, 1998, pp 155–8; Donald White, *The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power*, Boston, 1996, esp. pp 89, 155; and T H von Laue, *The World Revolution of Westernization: The Twentieth Century in Global Perspective*, Oxford, 1987.
  - 4 Poiger, op. cit., p 49.
  - 5 Michael Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, New Haven, 1987, pp 100–1.
  - 6 Walter L Hixon, 'Revisionism, Post-Revisionism and Recrimination', *Diplomatic History*, 21: 3, 1997, pp 491–7.
  - 7 Anders Stephanson, 'Diplomatic History in the Expanded Field', *Diplomatic History*, 22: 4, 1998, pp 595–6.
  - 8 Samuel M Makinda, 'Reading and Writing International Relations', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 54: 3, 2000, p 398.
  - 9 Emily Rosenberg, op. cit., pp 155–8, 175. Compare her earlier important work, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945*, New York, 1982.
  - 10 William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, Cleveland, 1959, and *The Contours of American History*, Chicago, 1966 edn, esp. pp 413–78; Akira Iriye, *The Globalization of America*, Boston, 1993, and 'The Americanized Century', *Reviews in American History*, 13, March 1983, pp 124–8; C Thorne, 'American Political Culture and the Asian Frontier, 1943–1973', Tryphena Phillips Lecture, Proceedings of the British Academy, 3 December 1986, and *The Issue of War: States, Societies and The Far Eastern Conflict of 1941–1945*, London, 1985; C W E Bigsby (ed.), *Superculture: American Popular Culture and Europe*, Bowling Green, 1975; A F Davis (ed.), *For Better or Worse: American Influence in the World*, Westport, 1981; von Laue, op. cit.; F Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations*, Cambridge, 1981; P Gurevitch, *Dialogue of Culture or Cultural Expansionism?*, Moscow, 1990. The trajectory of 'revisionist', 'new left' historiography has been discussed at length: see, for example, P R Gorman, *Left Intellectuals and Popular Culture in the Twentieth Century*, Chapel Hill, 1996.
  - 11 Michael E Latham, 'Ideology, Social Science and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy-Era Alliance for Progress', *Diplomatic History*, 22: 2, 1998, pp 199–202; W W Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge, 1960.
  - 12 Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990*, New York, 1992, pp 54–7, 337–40. Anti-Americanism is also discussed in D Lacorne, *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception*, London, 1990; Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, New York, 1993; von Laue, op. cit.; M Blonsky, *American Mythologies*, New York, 1992; F M Joseph and R Aron (eds), *As Others See Us: The US*

- Through Foreign Eyes*, Princeton, 1959; and W J Lederer and E Brudick, *The Ugly American*, New York, 1958; Gurevitch, op. cit.
- 13 John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism*, Baltimore, 1991, pp 27, 70–5, 140–7; Rob Kroes, 'American Empire and Cultural Imperialism: A View from the Receiving End', *Diplomatic History*, 23:3, 1999, pp 463–77.
  - 14 Tomlinson, op. cit., p 7; Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Boston, 1984; Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity*, London, 1983. Foremost amongst early studies of the mass media and 'American Empire' are Herbert Schiller, *Mass Communications and American Empire*, New York, 1969; A Mattelart and A Dorfman, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*, New York, 1975; E Herman and N Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York, 1988; and M Gurevitch, et al. (eds), *Culture, Society and the Media*, New York, 1982.
  - 15 P Bell and R Bell, *Implicated: The United States in Australia*, Melbourne, 1993, esp. p 4.
  - 16 J Nye Jr, 'Popular Culture: Images and Issues', *Dialogue*, 99: 1, 1993, pp 22–30; J Nye Jr and W A Owens, 'America's Information Edge', *Foreign Affairs*, 75: 2, 1976, pp 20–3; F Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, 1992. Compare Otis Graham, 'Premature Reports of the 'End of History'', Organization of American Historians, *Newsletter*, May 1990, pp 3, 23.
  - 17 Marc Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 'Seven Themes that Shape Our World', 26 March 2002; and Powell in Alan Larson, US Under Secretary of State, 'Building Strength and Security Through Economic Policy', 29 March 2002, both at United States Government, Department of State, <<http://usinfo.state.gov>>.
  - 18 Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', *Foreign Affairs*, 72, July/August 1993, pp 22–49. For Huntington's reply to the stringent criticisms invoked by this article, see his 'If Not Civilizations, What?', *Foreign Affairs*, 72, November/December 1993, pp 186–94. Typical of this revived debate is the *Sydney Morning Herald* editorial of 17 April 2002, p 10, 'The Clash of Civilizations'.
  - 19 Said, 'The Clash of Ignorance', *The Nation*, 22 October 2001, at The Nation Publishing Company, <<http://www.thenation.com>>.
  - 20 J Baudrillard, *America*, translated by C Turner, London, 1989, p 76.
  - 21 Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, pp xxv, 371, 391–406; see also von Laue, op. cit., pp 165, 181–3.
  - 22 See note 12 above.
  - 23 The most public claims about Australia's 'Americanisation' are expressed routinely by Phillip Adams in *The Australian*; see, for example, 'Dolls on the American Knee', *Weekend Australian*, 12–13 September 1993 p 2, and 'United States of Desire', *Weekend Australian*, 9–10 September 1995, p 2; see also G Serle, 'Godzone: Austerica Unlimited', *Meanjin*, xxvi, 1967, pp 240–5; S Alomes, 'The Satellite Society', *Journal of Australian Studies*, 9, November 1981, esp. pp 2–11; R White, 'Americanization and Popular Culture in Australia', *Teaching History*, August 1978, pp 3–21. For additional evidence of concern about 'Americanisation', see, for example, R Burburg and B Zuel, 'Sold ... A Spoonful of Australian History', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 2 September 1994; L Tingle, 'Selling Off or Selling Out?', *Weekend*

- Australian*, 27–28 January 1996; C W Zissermann, 'The Whole Hog', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 January 1995.
- 24 Worsley, 'Models of the Modern World System', in Mike Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, London, 1990, p 92. See also Arjun Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy', also in Featherstone (ed.), op. cit., pp 295–310.
  - 25 Said, op. cit., pp 371, 391–406.
  - 26 Adams, 'United States of Desire', op. cit.
  - 27 Rob Kroes, et al. (eds), *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe*, 2 vols, Amsterdam, 1993; P Bell and R Bell, *Implicated*, op. cit.; and R Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanisation*.
  - 28 Kuisel, op. cit., pp 1–4.
  - 29 P Bell and R Bell, *Implicated*, op. cit., pp 6–9, 203–8.
  - 30 Poiger, op. cit., p 45.
  - 31 Tomlinson, op. cit., p 175
  - 32 Larson, op. cit.; Orlando Patterson, 'Ecumenical America: Global Culture and the American Cosmos', *World Policy Journal*, ii, 1994, pp 103–17; Roland Robertson, 'Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept', and A D Smith, 'Towards a Global Culture', both in *Theory, Culture and Society*, 7, 1990, pp 15–30, 171–91.
  - 33 Grossman, op. cit.
  - 34 R Kroes, 'World Wars and Watershed: The Problem of Continuity in the Process of Americanization', *Diplomatic History*, 23: 1, 1999, pp 71–7.
  - 35 R Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated and Transformed American Culture since World War II*, New York, 1997; Kuisel, op. cit.
  - 36 P Bell and R Bell, *Implicated*, op. cit., p 11.
  - 37 R Kroes, 'Americanization: What Are We Talking About?' in Kroes et al. (eds), *Cultural Transmissions*, op. cit., pp 303–4, 313–18.
  - 38 A Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference', op. cit., p 45; also, Appadurai and C Breckenridge, 'Public Modernity in India', in Breckenridge (ed.), *Consuming Modernity*, London, 1995, p 5; P Bell and R Bell, *Implicated*, op. cit., pp 11–12. Compare with Pells, *Not Like Us*, op. cit., which echoes this position.
  - 39 G Lundestad, "'Empire by Invitation" in the American Century', *Diplomatic History*, 23: 2, 1999, pp 214–17. Lundestad here echoes Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, op. cit., pp xxv, 391–406.

### Chapter 13 'American/Global: Australian/Local'

- 1 J Docker, Review of *The 1950s: How Australia Became a Modern Society*, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 December 1987.
- 2 M Lerner, *America as a Civilization*, New York, 1957, p 929.
- 3 G Pemberton, *All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam*, Sydney, 1987, p 331. See also P Bell and R Bell, *Implicated: The United States in Australia*, Melbourne, 1993, Part II.
- 4 J J Matthews, 'Which America?' in P Bell and R Bell (eds), *Americanization and Australia*, Sydney, 1998, pp 15–28.
- 5 G Serle, 'Godzone: Austerica Unlimited', *Meanjin Quarterly*, xxvi, iii, 1967, pp 240–9.
- 6 P Adams, 'All the Way to the USA', *Weekend Australian*, 6–7 July 2002, p R32.

- 7 These cartoons are reproduced in P Bell and R Bell, *Implicated*, op. cit., pp 188–9 (prints).
- 8 Not until 1992–95, after the end of the Cold War, did the US displace the UK/EU as the principal source of direct or portfolio investment in Australia. For trends, by region and country, in Australian trade relations from 1949 to 1990, see tables in R Bell, 'Anticipating the Pacific Century: Australia's Response to the Realignment in the Asia-Pacific', in M Berger and D Borer (eds), *The Rise of East Asia*, New York, 1997, pp 208–10.
- 9 R Kroes, 'Americanization: What Are We Talking About?' in R Kroes, R Rydell and D Bosscher (eds), *Cultural Transmissions and Reception: American Mass Culture in Europe*, Amsterdam, 1993, pp 302–20.
- 10 R Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization*, Berkeley, 1993, pp 1–4. For a broader interpretation of American influences on postwar Europe, see R Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated and Transformed American Culture Since World War II*, New York, 1997; and Kroes et al. (eds), op. cit.
- 11 See, generally, P Bell and R Bell (eds), *Americanization*, op. cit.
- 12 Joseph Nye Jr, 'Popular Culture: Images and Issues', *Dialogue*, no 99, January 1993, p 52
- 13 R White, '"Americanization" and Popular Culture in Australia', *Teaching History*, 12, August 1978, pp 3, 21. See also Albinski, 'Australia and the US', *Daedalus* 114: 1, Winter 1985, pp 394–8.
- 14 Serle, op. cit., pp 240–9
- 15 J Camilleri, *Australian–American Relations: The Web of Dependence*, Sydney, 1980, pp Preface, 16–17, 44–75, 120–9.
- 16 P Adams, op. cit., p R32.
- 17 D Watson, 'Rabbit Syndrome: Australia and America', *Quarterly Essay*, 4: 2001, pp 11, 47, 46, 40.
- 18 Cited in J Larson, and H S Park, *Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympics*, Boulder, 1993.
- 19 E Herman, 'Sale of the Millennium: The 2000 Olympics and Australia's Corporate Identity', *Media International Australia*, 94: 2000, p 176.
- 20 P Conrad, 'The New World', *Granta: The Magazine of New Writing*, 70, 2000, p 25.
- 21 P Bell and R Bell, *Implicated*, op. cit., p 173.
- 22 P Bell, 'Television' in P Bell and R Bell (eds), *Americanization and Australia*, op. cit., p 195; See, generally, S Dermody and E Jacka, *The Screening of Australia*, Sydney, 1987.
- 23 N King and T Rowse, 'Typical Aussies: Television and Australian Populism', in M Alvarado and J O Thompson (eds), *The Media Reader*, London, 1990, pp 36–50.
- 24 P Bell and R Bell, *Implicated*, op. cit., pp 202–6.

Sections of this paper discussing culture and 'Americanisation' are informed by the collaborative work of Philip Bell and Roger Bell—work jointly published during the 1990s, as indicated in the notes above.