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The United States and its ANZUS Allies, 1941-2018

War Against Japan: Ambiguous Legacies - Cold War Allies in Asia: ANZUS - At War in Vietnam - Uneasy ANZUS Allies: And Then There Were Two - Towards Asia - 'War on Terror' - Between 'History and Geography': Re-balancing ANZUS

War against Japan, 1941-1945, gave rise to a uniquely enduring alliance between the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Rooted in overlapping geopolitical interests and shared Western traditions, tripartite relationships forged in the struggles against Fascism in World War II deepened further as Cold War conflicts erupted in East and South-East Asia. In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, however, American hegemony was threatened, regionally and globally. A more fluid geo-political environment replaced the alliance certainties of the early Cold War. ANZUS splintered, but was not permanently broken. This paper traces the ebb and flow of the tripartite relationship from the attack on Pearl Harbor to the first decades of the 'Pacific Century' when the 'war on terror' and, in a very different way, the dramatic 'rise of China', revitalised alliance cooperation under ANZUS.

[I] War Against Japan: Ambiguous Legacies

War came abruptly to the Pacific on 7 December 1941. Pearl Harbor was an unexpected catalyst. It brought an alliance of Pacific democracies that persistent small-power diplomacy had failed to achieve either in response to Japan's advance in China from 1931, or during the first two years of war in Europe from 1939. Australia, NZ and the US would now cooperate militarily, politically, and economically against the Axis powers in all theatres of global war. Within weeks of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the limits of British power in the Far East were painfully exposed. Singapore was overrun; Darwin bombed; the Repulse and Prince of Wales sunk. With the bulk of their forces engaged since late 1939 in the European and North African theatres of war, Australia and New Zealand were particularly ill-equipped to defend against aggression in their own region. However, Dominion panic was offset by the realisation of military cooperation with its powerful new ally in the Pacific, the US.

'Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom', Australia's wartime leader John Curtin desperately declared in late December 1941: Australia 'regards the Pacific struggle as primar[y]'. But Curtin's appeal also accepted that support from the US alone was no guarantee of victory over the common enemy. 'Summed up,' the Labor Prime Minister stated, 'Australian external policy will be shaped toward obtaining Russian aid, and working out with the US as the major factor, a plan of Pacific strategy, along with British, Chinese and Dutch forces.'[1] Despite Churchill's outraged reaction to this desperate assertion of Dominion

autonomy, the alliance with America did not immediately displace traditional ties to the Empire and Great Britain.

Throughout the Pacific War, the Dominions struggled to influence Allied 'Grand Strategy'. The primary aim of agreed Anglo-American planning was to achieve victory in 'Europe First' - even if this meant delaying victory over Japan. Consistent with this priority, Roosevelt conceded privately in 1942 that he would 'rather lose' Australia and NZ than deny much needed resources to Europe or contribute to the collapse of Russia - by then a crucial ally against Germany. Early in 1942, the US Chiefs of Staff seriously contemplated abandoning Australia and NZ to the advancing Japanese. US plans classified Australia's protection as 'highly desirable', but not an imperative or 'mandatory' objective. Roosevelt accepted that Australia's survival was of minor importance compared with the need to defend the US, UK, Russia, and the Middle East. Combined Australia and NZ appeals to Washington and London failed to alter these priorities.[2] Neither strategic vulnerability nor forceful diplomacy ultimately distracted the great-power Allies from their commitment to 'Defeat Hitler First'.

Nonetheless, strategic realities dictated during 1942-43 that defending Australia become an important Allied objective. Collapse of the short-lived American–British–Dutch–Australian Command in Southeast Asia in February 1942 made Australia the only viable base from which to prepare the eventual counteroffensive. Japan's rapid advance South, however briefly, brought the small powers increased leverage on the US. NZ was generally less strident than Australia in its criticism of Grand Strategy, especially if directed towards Churchill and the Mother Country rather than against Roosevelt or the Joint Chiefs. But Wellington, if sometimes in muted language, generally endorsed the efforts of Curtin and his energetic Minister for External Affairs, HV Evatt, to shape Allied policy in the Pacific and to participate in the consultative bodies that decided high level policy. Together the Dominions won some concessions. Anglo-American pressure to leave Australian forces in the Middle East was resisted. Roosevelt accepted the need for a Pacific War Council in Washington – although the body was purely advisory, its activities a shallow concession to the complaints of the assertive labour administrations of Curtin or New Zealand's Peter Fraser. So ineffectual was the advisory body that Churchill noted - with undisguised satisfaction - 'the war continued to be run by the old machinery'.[3]

Closer Anglo-Dominion cooperation developed from 1943, partly in reaction to Washington's growing reluctance to share responsibility for the assault on Japan. American unwillingness was justified on the grounds that it had made the overriding contribution to military victory. The smaller Allied partners interpreted this as blatant unilateralism. Close military cooperation in the struggle against Japan; the stationing of large numbers of American troops in each country; and difficulties over Allied policy and arrangements for deciding policy, were experiences shared by the smaller allies. More than 1 million American service personnel passed through Australia during 1942-1945; 400,000 US troops were stationed in New Zealand during the war. In the wider

global conflict from late 1939 almost 1,000,000 Australians served in the Armed Forces and almost 40,000 died in combat. New Zealand with a population of only 1.6 million, much smaller than Australia's population of 7 million, committed 140,000 service-people to combat and lost almost 12,000 lives. The smaller nations were concerned that their wartime military role was undervalued in Washington. Some in the Dominions believed that MacArthur and his American troops were singularly adept at avoiding actual combat on the ground, while few Americans were aware that, until 1944, most of MacArthur's troops were in fact Australians. Australian and NZ leaders complained that military victories in the Pacific were attributed in press releases to US actions, while setbacks or defeats were publicised as the result of 'Allied' difficulties. Ultimately, however, most in the Anzac nations accepted what their political leaders subsequently conceded: that they had been 'saved by America'.

To bolster claims to influence the peace settlement in the Far East, Australia and NZ advocated that they be given a separate military role in the counteroffensive; involved directly in deciding term of the armistice and control arrangements of defeated Japan; and permitted identifiable political and military roles in the post-war occupation of Japan. Naively, they believed their war-roles 'would guarantee' a significant 'voice'. In contrast, during negotiations over the peace settlement as during the war, Washington maintained that its predominant power and national interests were such that if differences developed between it and Australia or New Zealand, the policies of the US should prevail. From late 1943 Curtin, Evatt, and others in cabinet spoke anxiously of growing US 'influence' and 'imperialism' in the Far East. Washington's 'strategic area' trusteeship proposals were portrayed bluntly as 'a decent garment to conceal the nakedness' of the US 'control'**.** Evatt and Fraser were equally suspicious of Washington's post-war ambitions. In early 1944, in the controversial Australia–New Zealand Agreement (the Anzac Pact) the two small states declared that no changes in the control or ownership of any Pacific or Asian territory should be made without their explicit consent. The Anzac Pact was, State Department officials complained, 'aimed all too obviously at the US'. Washington was now even less willing than in the darkest days of the Pacific War to share responsibility for Allied Pacific policy with any other country, including the UK. In the words of Secretary of State Byrnes, Washington was anxious 'to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in'**.** Despite separate Australian and combined British Commonwealth protests, the Truman administration refused to conduct formal negotiations with its Pacific allies over the Japanese surrender terms, because it did 'not intend to invite comments' from the Soviet Union or China. Relations between Pacific allies were shaped by fundamental changes in the distribution of global power, as war ended and the Great Power Alliance crumbled.[4]

Small-power disquiet was magnified by knowledge that the terms of the Japanese surrender were unnecessarily lenient and, in contrast to settlement with Germany, were not 'unconditional'. Furthermore, it was only after bitter protests that Truman consent to give Australia and NZ direct representation alongside MacArthur at the formal

Japanese surrender ceremony in Tokyo, aboard *USS Missouri*. While publicly satisfied with this ceremonial role, the Dominions were never convinced that Washington was prepared to regard them as a 'party principal' in the Japanese settlement, occupation, and control. Later, this resentment was recorded by Paul Hasluck, the official war historian: 'The war was ended by cataclysmic bombs launched by decisions' in which Australia and NZ 'had no part … and knew nothing beforehand'. He concluded that the terms of surrender 'were imposed on Japan by decisions made by others' and without the names of Australia or NZ being mentioned as belligerents.[5]

Eventually, a compromise gave British Commonwealth forces a role in the occupation, and led to formation of the Allied Control Council for Japan as well as an advisory inter-Allied Far Eastern Commission. Washington retained ultimate responsibility for formulating and executing Allied policy. The consultative bodies did expose US actions to closer scrutiny. However, Australia's representative in the Allied Council in Tokyo, W. Macmahon Ball, observed bitterly that they were 'on balance a failure, and at times a fiasco'. During peace negotiations, as during the war, differences between the three Pacific allies were resolved overwhelmingly in accordance with the interests and power of the dominant partner.[6]

War in the Pacific has been widely interpreted as a watershed in the history of Australia's place in the world—a crisis that severed the umbilical cord to Mother England and pointed Australia permanently towards a new future with the US in the Asian–Pacific region. Part of this mythology is the belief that the 'wartime embrace' of Australia's new protector 'was unconditional and enduring, surviving the defeat of Japan and shaping the Cold War alliance under ANZUS'. Related claims of a 'special' American relationship with Australia, if not NZ, emphasise that it was built on a unique understanding between broadly similar Western societies, and embodied a happy convergence of 'sentiment and self interest'. Such claims were seldom advanced about NZ, which remained more tightly tethered to the Mother Country and more willing to dissent from Washington. The 'special relationship' became part of Australia's historical mythology. Yet Curtin's very public appeal for assistance shortly after Pearl Harbor was not directed exclusively at the US. Nor did he envisage, or desire, a permanent break with England or the Empire. And Australia's wartime association with Washington was not exceptionally harmonious or reciprocal -lasting only until defeat of a common enemy; ending in bilateral friction and competition over the future of the Pacific and the shape of the post-war world.[7] In the aftermath of global war Washington perceived no immediate threat to the security of Southeast Asia or the South Pacific, and refused to participate in regional security arrangements embracing its former Pacific allies. Only when faced with the rise of communism in Asia – in Indochina, Korea, and mainland China – did Washington broaden containment and accept a security alliance with Australia and NZ.

(II) Cold War Allies in Asia: ANZUS

The victories of conservative parties in both Australia (under PM Robert Menzies) and NZ (under PM Sidney Holland) in late 1949 coincided with a radical reappraisal of American foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and confrontation with the Soviet Union, put Europe and the eleven-nation NATO agreement of 1949, at the heart of 'containment'. In the middle of 1950, North Korean communist troops moved South, crossing the 38th parallel, sharply exacerbating the Cold War divide in East Asia. US National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC 68), drafted in April 1950, signalled this shift. American perceptions of international communism and the policies necessary to contain it (or preferably to 'roll it back') were dramatically revised. 'Soviet aggression' was held to be responsible for the rise of communism throughout the world—from Yugoslavia to China and Korea, and later Cuba. Strategic assumptions underlying the Truman Doctrine and NATO were quickly generalised to the Asia-Pacific and, as with defeated-Germany after 1945, defeated-Japan became a regional lynchpin of American containment.[8]

America's broader containment policies underscored its refusal to recognise the People's Republic of China (PRC). In seeking to enlist Washington as an ally against communism, the newly elected conservative governments in Australia and NZ endorsed American diplomatic example. Privately, there was strong support for following the UK and most European states by recognising Mao's infant regime and permitting it to join the UN. Publicly, however, Washington's refusal to extend recognition was supported. Subsequently, both Australia and NZ refused to recognise the PRC (decisions reversed by labour administrations in both countries in 1972 as they moved to disengage from Vietnam). However, war on the Korea peninsular, rather than diplomatic recognition of the PRC, was the real testing ground of America's so-called 'containment militarism', accelerating plans to incorporate Japan into an alliance regime that would counterbalance communist gains in East Asia generally.

Hostilities on the Korean peninsula obliged the small Pacific states to back militarily America's hardening anticommunism: polite diplomatic language was no longer sufficient evidence of support. From mid-1950 they committed troops to fight under MacArthur in Korea. Menzies's cabinet greeted this decision in words that closely echoed US NSC 68: 'This expansionist, imperialistic and aggressive policy of the Soviet Union must be resisted wherever it is exemplified'**.** Truman welcomed Dominion participation as of 'great political value', as it helped represent US military involvement as part of a genuinely multilateral UN-sanctioned operation. Anticipating the rationale for ANZUS, the new Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, convinced cabinet that Korea would be a turning point in relations with Washington, advising that 'from Australia's long-term point of view any additional aid we can give the US now, small though it may be, will repay us in the future one hundred-fold.' [9] Wellington was equally convinced. Australian and New Zealand troops fought in Korea as part of the multi-national 'peacekeeping force', seeing action before the terms of ANZUS were agreed. In three years of conflict, before stalemate and the division of

Korea at the 38th parallel, Australia committed more than 17,000 forces; 340 were killed in action. New Zealand committed more than 5000 military and naval personnel; combat fatalities numbered.

Stalemate in Korea accelerated Washington's controversial plan to give neighbouring Japan a pivotal role as an ally in East Asia. For the CIA, 'the crux of the problem' was 'to deny Japan to communism'. However, memories of the Pacific War receded very slowly in Australia and NZ. Neither country welcomed moves to cultivate Japan as a Western ally. Both initially wanted the UK included in any possible security arrangements. US policy eventually prevailed. In February 1951 America's controversial Cold War warrior, Dulles, brought a proposal to Canberra that he correctly anticipated would allay fears – 'hysteria seems closer to the truth' - of the possible consequences of a 'soft' peace treaty and a resurgent Japan, bringing Australia and NZ into an anti-communist network spanning Asia and the Pacific. This proposal paved the way for approval of the tripartite ANZUS Agreement.[10]

ANZUS was the most enduring expression of Dominion efforts to shelter under America's widening anti-communist umbrella. Founded September 1, 1951, it was a much weaker alliance than NATO. Hastily conceived, the compromise agreement anticipated 'a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area' (Clause 5). Over the next four decades ANZUS remained the cornerstone and symbol of a relationship to which Australia - but much less New Zealand - gave enthusiastic support. Unlike the much stronger NATO agreement, ANZUS did not insist that an armed attack on one member-country be interpreted as an attack on all. Washington interpreted the tripartite arrangement cautiously, emphasising only the very limited consultative obligations it imposed on the major partner. At most, it was conceded, ANZUS gave the small Pacific allies 'access to the thinking and planning of the American administration at the highest political and military level'. In practice, it did not ensure even this limited result. While ANZUS was celebrated publicly over the next four decades as a guarantee of US military support, officials in Canberra and Wellington were privately dismayed by its limited and ambiguous nature.[11]

In an increasingly polarised world Australian and NZ promised to be enthusiastic allies - but they remained somewhat hesitant friends. The two Anglophile countries were drawn to America as a Cold War protector, but would not willingly break the ties of monarchy, 'race', and history that bound them to Great Britain and the Empire. *The Sydney Morning Herald* echoed this reluctance when it suggested in 1951 that: 'Australia's relations with America are often imperfectly understood abroad ...[t]hey imply no weakening of the Commonwealth bond, nor any turning away from Britain'. NZ conservatives were, if anything, less enthusiastic about new links to the US and more wedded to Great Britain than were their counterparts across the Tasman. Even in the late 1960s, while their troops fought alongside Americans in Vietnam, it was not uncommon for men prominent in public life in either country to announce, as did a

former Australian Ambassador to Washington, James Plimsoll, that 'we do not see our United States relationship as a threat to British relationships'.[12]

Shortly after ANZUS was negotiated, Australia and NZ hastily joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) – accepting before the aims of the association were finalised. SEATO, far more than ANZUS, expressed the unifying power of anti-communism. It also reflected residual influences of colonialism in Asia. It was negotiated as partition of Vietnam was discussed at the Geneva Convention of 1954. It embraced the US, France, the Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and Australia. Like ANZUS, SEATO did not commit the US or other signatories to anything more than joint discussions 'in accordance with constitutional processes' in the event that any party was involved in military conflict. In contrast to the sceptical posture of European members like the UK and France, within SEATO Australia endorsed US policies - in the words of one American official - 'almost without exception'. Decolonisation soon rendered SEATO of little more than symbolic importance; but it cemented America's hardening Cold War position in the Asia-Pacific and provided a legitimating rationale for the US-led invasion of Vietnam.[13]

Despite alliance intimacy, the relationships of both regional partners with the US were sometimes strained. Most prominently, during the Suez crisis of 1956, Menzies's controversial efforts in support of British and French aggression against Egypt led to sharp rebuke from President Eisenhower. Washington condemned the attack as a foreign policy debacle for the West - an illegal action that emphasised the decline of Anglo-French prestige in the Middle East. Like Australia, NZ was also prepared to stand with Britain - militarily if necessary. But such departures from US policies were rare, even as the limits of ANZUS were revealed. The essence of Australian policy in the period framed by war in Korea and Vietnam, was summarised by Menzies in 1958. Australia 'must not disagree publicly' with the US, he told cabinet. Australia's military forces must be geared to fight alongside those of its 'great and powerful friends'. Independence in policy formulation, or military-strategic activity, was rejected. 'The greatest practical fact of life for Australia is that we are in no danger of conquest, either directly or indirectly, except from Communist aggression,' Menzies stated': [O]ur doctrine at a time of crisis should be "Great Britain and the United States right or wrong' as 'we cannot afford to run counter to their policies at a time when a crisis has arisen'. [14] From the late 1950s Canberra, and less pointedly Wellington, learnt with dismay that in the event of hostilities over communist influence in Malaya, or conflict with Indonesia over the future of West New Guinea, neither ANZUS nor SEATO would guarantee diplomatic or military support from Washington. Not until the 'war on terror' three decades later, was ANZUS ever formally invoked. But treaty obligations indirectly drew the smaller powers into combat in what became America's most disastrous overseas military adventure, war in Vietnam.

From the early 1960s the construction of numerous intelligence and spy 'facilities' on Australian soil greatly strengthened the 'invisible' underpinnings of ANZUS. In

hosting joint operstions, Australia relinquished its normal sovereign rights and sanctioned unilateral American control over their conduct. In 1963 it was agreed that a radio communications station be built at North West Cape. No Australian government ever disclosed publicly the purpose of this facility. Most analysts agreed, however, that it remained one of only three very low-frequency US communications bases that could track nuclear submarines and trigger them into attack. Little was known, also, about the blandly named Joint US–Australian Defence Space Research Facility, known as Pine Gap, which was established during 1966–69 at a cost in excess of US$200 million. It played an important role in satellite reconnaissance and was linked to CIA intelligence gathering activities. A third major base, at Nurrungar, received signals from early warning satellites, assisted US spying operations against the USSR and China, and was a vital link in early warning systems designed to detect enemy nuclear activity. It is estimated that a total of fourteen 'communication', 'defence', and 'scientific' installations were established across Australia. These joined Canberra, and by extension Wellington, to America's strategic activities, both offensive and defensive. Analysts agreed that the politely named 'joint facilities' were 'extremely critical to American military and intelligence operations', globally. Instrumentally, they deepened covert operations formalised in the 1947-1948 'Secret Treaty' - the UK-US intelligence agreement – which, according to Des Ball and other experts, 'remain[ed] the most important international agreement to which Australia is a party', more crucial than ANZUS or SEATO.[15]

(III) At War in Vietnam

Australia's road to Vietnam was marked by attempts to draw the US into direct military intervention against so-called 'communist subversion' on the Asian mainland. By mid-1961 the Australian cabinet accepted that 'must follow the lead of the US in the question of intervention' in Indochina/Vietnam: 'anything less would put at risk the desire of the US to assist in our security in case of need'. In effect, Canberra encouraged wider American military involvement in Asia but deferred to the leadership of it 'Great and Powerful' ally In 1962 Menzies agreed to send special forces to support covert US military operations in Indochina. Australia now encouraged its new protector to commit ground forces to Asia and to expand its permanent military presence in the region. NZ PM Keith Holyoake, however reluctantly, also committed his government to support America's military intervention in Indochina. In contrast to Menzies and his successor Harold Holt, Holyoake's government entered the war grudgingly, ambivalent about its role or place in South East Asia and the value of ANZUS. Seen through the ideological lens of the Cold War, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, were precarious strategic 'dominoes'. Justifying his government's decision to send troops, Menzies echoed a now familiar argument. 'The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and Southeast Asia,' he said, and 'must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.' Should one domino fall, all others would topple quickly. NZ was not convinced by this argument, but its reticence was overridden by loyalty to its regional allies.[16]

Australia's involvement in Vietnam, David Jenkins observed, was decided by 'the need to keep up the premiums on the American insurance policy'. An Australian intelligence officer, returned from serving in Vietnam, observed similarly that the American alliance 'is like an insurance policy and every now and again you have got to pay your dues on an insurance policy'**.** In his pioneering study *All The Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam*, Gregory Pemberton demonstrated that willingness to support intervention in the divided country was shaped by the need to encourage a reciprocal America commitment to its ANZUS partners in the event of conflict with Indonesia or threats to West New Guinea. 'Ultimately it was Australia's dependence on the US that led it into Vietnam', Pemberton wrote: 'it was the necessary price to secure a large US commitment Southeast Asia' and a continuing role ANZUS. Related explanations are more critical, and include claims that Australia's cloying willingness to go 'all the way with LBJ' deliberately sought to bring its powerful ally more deeply into war against communism in Asia. An 'exclusive' *SMH* report in 1981 – that cited recently declassified cabinet documents - was headed, for example, 'How Menzies Prodded the US in[to] Vietnam'. In *War for the Asking* Michael Sexton concluded that 'Australia invited itself into Vietnam'. More circumspect, Pemberton has written that archival sources indicate: 'whatever the circumstantial evidence, it is difficult to accept that Australian pressure was a decisive factor' drawing America deeper into the war during 1962-65. Nonetheless officials in the Johnson administration were delighted that ANZUS partners were willing allies and that America was 'not alone'. Australia's contribution was judged in Washington as by far the most 'politically significant' of any ally. Wellington was more 'reticent' than was Canberra about sending even a modest contribution of troops to Vietnam; but ultimately it too was drawn into combat. As the war dragged on, Canberra attempted to use its SEATO membership to justify intervention. Deep-seated 'fear of abandonment' underlay Australian and NZ involvement in Vietnam, shaping compliance with 'the frequently expressed wishes of the United States for political support from its friends and allies'. However, few of America's other allies, notably members of NATO, were prepared to demonstrate their friendship by joining the protracted and costly war.[17]

'Many nations must depend on others for their ultimate security, but in most cases they try to maximise their own independence within a relationship of dependency,' Alan Watt observed: 'Australia has seemed intent on doing the very opposite: of maximising its dependence, first on Britain and lately on the US.' Less critical, others observed that Australia, under Coalition governments at least, was determined to demonstrate loyalty to its 'protector'. Such assessments did not apply with equal force to NZ - even at the height of its involvement in Vietnam. New Zealand's drift from the Empire was much slower than that of Australia; its economic and social links to the ' mother country' more resilient; its commitment to the American alliance, in turn, much less effusive. From 1961 both allies were pressed by Washington to provide military and economic assistance to South Vietnam. Wellington initially resisted. Canberra offered covert support from 1962 and was subsequently far more heavily involved in the increasingly unpopular war. In the eyes of Menzies and Holt, sending troops to Vietnam

'was the necessary price to secure a large US commitment to Southeast. Asia'. NZ leaders were reluctant to pay this price. David McCraw has concluded that Wellington 'found itself trapped by the expectations of its allies', and responded grudgingly when pressured to send troops: it 'was not prepared to incur the political and financial cost of substantial military contributions'. Thus, its combat role was little more than a 'token gesture'. When, in 1965-66 the Indonesian-Malaysia 'Confrontation' drew to a close, pressure to divert New Zealand's forces to Vietnam increased. From 1968 until 1972 it, like Australia, remained committed, publicly at least, to the American cause. Yet neither small country was willing to sever defence links with the United Kingdom even if - realistically – both now accepted the need to embrace the US. In 1971, with America bogged down in Vietnam a Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), embracing the UK, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and NZ, was negotiated.[18]

War in Vietnam was a turning point in relations within the 'Old Commonwealth'. On no previous occasion had either Australia or NZ gone to war unless as partners of the Mother Country. Despite differing levels of enthusiasm, each Commonwealth countries offered only restrained military support to the US military adventure in Vietnam. Neither country exerted influence on - or had prior knowledge of - controversial American decisions including decisions to bomb the North, 'hamlet pacification', or the invasion of Cambodia and Laos. Holt was much less concerned by American unilateralism than was Holyoake. Described by historian Roberto Rabel as 'a dovish Hawk', Holyoake gave strong if largely rhetorical backing to American involvement while 'supporting almost every peace initiative put forward'.[19]

By 1967 Australia had committed 8,000 men—many of whom were conscripts—to fight in Vietnam. At the same time, as we have seen above, it had also agreed to a series of major 'joint' military installations and linked its intelligence activities inextricably to those of its powerful ally. Welcoming Johnson's divisive visit to Canberra in 1968, the *Sydney Morning Herald* detected 'the first faint outline of a "special relationship" between Australia and United States in the Pacific which may come to parallel the former special relationship between United States and Britain in Europe'.[20] Such effusive claims fell silent as war in Vietnam dragged on and left-labour governments, pledged to withdrawing from the unpopular war, won office in Canberra and Wellington.

In the decade after 1961-62 more than 2.7 million American troops fought in Vietnam. 60,000 were killed. America's allies also made substantial contributions to the war and suffered significant losses. Almost 400,000 troops from six countries other, than the US, fought. Australia, NZ, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan and Canada gave support to the US-led invasion. More than 60,000 Australian troops were committed across almost a decade of conflict; more than 500 were killed in combat and more than 3000 wounded. NZ sent almost 4000 troops and special forces; 37 lost their lives; 187 were wounded.

The newly-elected labour governments of Gough Whitlam and Norman Kirk shared a view – widely held internationally by 1972 - that the war in Vietnam was unwinnable, politically unjustifiable, in contravention of international law, and immoral. Immediately After Whitlam's election, Australia's forces were withdrawn from Vietnam. NZ troops were promptly withdrawn after Kirk won office. Both labour governments broke with Washington and recognised the PRC. Whitlam rejected dependency, claiming in July 1973: 'We are not a satellite of any country: We are a friend and partner of United States, particularly in the Pacific, but with independent interests of our own'. Kirk held a broadly similar view of the alliance. Malcolm McKinnon observed that the NZ PM Norman Kirk successfully separated questions of American guarantees under ANZUS form the larger issue of his nation's involvement in South-East or East Asia. In 1974 diplomatic relations were established with North Vietnam and a meeting of SEATO planned for Wellington was cancelled.[21]

By late 1975 America had been defeated in Vietnam; the Whitlam Labor government removed from power; and an unpredictable conservative, Robert Muldoon, had won office from Labour in NZ. Despite the tensions of Vietnam and presence of left-leaning administrations in Canberra and Wellington during 1972-75, the trilateral partnership was not permanently severed. US ambassador to Australia, Marshall Green, told a New York audience shortly before Whitlam was dismissed that no assertion of Antipodean independence would seriously disrupt ANZUS: 'We have joint facilities and joint security interests, so that I can see nothing … to indicate any change in this fundamental orientation' of close alliance support. Whitlam's successor, Liberal PM Malcolm Fraser (1975-83) promptly reaffirmed the primacy of ANZUS, warning that '[t]he world cannot afford any reduction of (sic) the credibility of United States' foreign policy. In that way would lie huge risk'. Muldoon implicitly agreed - although from 1976 his policies focused increasingly on the Pacific and Polynesia, not 'remote' Asia, and came to reflect bipartisan disenchantment with ANZUS.[22]

(IV) Uneasy ANZUS Allies: And Then There Were Two

The Labour Party under leader David Lange won office in NZ in 1984, during difficult negotiations for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The reformist PM enthusiastically supported a nuclear-free policy that was anathema to the Cold War warriors in Washington. The Reagan administration refused to sign even a weak treaty because this 'would have been a signal for the proliferation of nuclear free zones throughout the Free World'. Washington claimed that '[s]uch zones for the West, unmatched by disarmament in the Soviet bloc, weaken rather than strengthen the cause of peace'. Although Australia attempted to placate its near neighbours by opposing Soviet efforts to gain fishing rights in the Pacific area and by advocating a compromise ('toothless') Treaty, these efforts were not well received in Wellington. Bob Hawke's Labor government (1983-91) was willing only to support conditions acceptable to Washington. The Reagan administration's expanded policy of nuclear deterrence in effect denied New Zealand and Australia the right to pursue nuclear disarmament aspiration permitted Japan and a number of other signatories to non-proliferation

treaties, notably under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In February 1985 Washington suspended treaty obligations in response to its refusal to allow *USS Buchanan* to birth in NZ This action led to a general ban on visits by any nuclear-armed vessel. Given that America's policy was to 'neither confirm nor deny' if its ships carried nuclear weapons, its navy was permanently denied entry to NZ ports. The Reagan administration promptly cut major diplomatic and military tires, limited intelligence sharing, and downgraded NZ from 'ally' to 'friend'. From the mid-1980s New Zealand was effectively excluded from the alliance. The title 'ANZUS' remained, but it now described a bilateral treaty not a tripartite agreement. NZ was not fully reintegrated until after 2001 as it tentatively joined the 'war on terror'.[23]

Washington what not alone in opposing NZ-led efforts to secure a nuclear-free Pacific. Most controversially, France continued to conduct nuclear tests at Mururoa and resisted international pressure that these end. The sinking by French agents of the *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland Harbour in July 1985 added further strain to US relations with NZ. Widely (and correctly) understood as an act of state-sponsored terrorism, the attack was condemned internationally. Hawke joined the chorus of complaint. Most conspicuously, Canberra's censure of France was not supported in Washington. In September the French government admitted responsibility for the widely-condemned attack on the antinuclear activists' ship. Only then did the State Department say it 'deplored such acts, wherever they may occur'. A decade later, after NZ assisted in the 'war on terror' in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington officials suggested gently that Wellington's anti-nuclear policy was an unfortunate 'relic' of a different era. Rapprochement with the former ANZUS partner had begun. As the alliance was repaired Washington described its relations with Wellington from 1985 as like those between 'a valued partner if not a formal ally'.[24]

Links between public opinion and official support for the alliance remained stronger in Australia than in NZ. Many New Zealanders who regretted the collapse of ANZUS argued that the small country wished to distance itself from nuclear weapons, not from its security partnership with America. A conducted in 1987 indicated that 70% of New Zealanders wanted to ban nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered ships from visiting their country. At the same time 66% wanted to remain in ANZUS. Ultimately, the ANZUS relationship was less important to the electorate than was a nuclear-free Pacific. However, opinion was closely divided, as it was in Australia. By the late 1980s less than one-in-ten Australians saw either communism or the USSR as a major threat to national security. At the same time, less than 50 per cent supported the visit to Australian ports of nuclear-armed ships or the continuation of the joint US–Australian bases under existing, secret, arrangements. Other surveys of 'national perceptions' suggested more significant trans-Tasman differences. More than 60% of Australians surveyed believed the US the country with which they had most in common, behind Great Britain and NZ. In contrast, almost 80% of New Zealanders questioned ranked Australia first; the US was ranked third at only 14%.[25]

In contrast to NZ, throughout the years of Republican rule under Presidents Reagan (1981-89) and Bush Snr (1989-1993), Australia generally endorsed the rationale on which US foreign policies were based. For example, in 1984, the Hawke government quickly reversed a decision to deny dry-docking facilities to warships suspected of carrying nuclear weapons into Australian ports. Beneath headlines proclaiming that the 'US Wrote Words of N-Ship Backdown', the local press revealed that 'the reversal' was 'forced on the government by the US Secretary of State, Mr George Schultz', and that the very wording of the announced decision was identical to that recommended by the US State Department. Further evidence of Labor's reluctance to contradict US policy, even when it involved military intervention abroad, was provided by events in Granada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989. Advice from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs had warned cabinet that the invasion of Granada, and later of Panama, violated international law. In the UN most countries echoed this principle and refused to support US actions. Reluctant to alienate Washington, Canberra, endorsed the Granada 'intervention' . Events in Panama provoked a similarly compliant response form Canberra. Initially, however, Australia had voted with a UN majority and condemned US proposals on Panama. On 21 December 1989, the day after the widely criticised US invasion began, Bush phone Hawke. Despite further departmental advice that Australia could be implicated in an unpopular and illegal act, policy was changed. Hawke told Bush that 'Australia fully understood the US action and was supportive of it'. The local press interpreted this as embarrassing evidence that Australia remained anxious - as during the early days of the Vietnam War - to go 'all the way' with America**.** Ironically, Hawke had earlier justified a decision to join the US and send warships to the Persian Gulf as a matter of high principle. It is 'important for Australia that the world understands that big countries cannot invade small neighbours and get away with it', he stated.[26]

Other foreign policy actions were less controversial. Australia did not wait for Washington to request that it send forces to the Gulf War in 1990. Rather, as in the early 1960s over Vietnam, Australia lobbied strenuously in Washington for such a request. Iraqi forces were quickly expelled from Kuwait. The brief war was an unexpected example of multilateral cooperation, made possible as Cold War rivalries receded. In joining American-led efforts to expel Saddam from Kuwait, Australia joined with NATO and others in a broad, essentially Western, alliance. Estranged from ANZUS, NZ was not initially invited to join the multinational force (MNF). However, like a number of European countries, NZ interpreted UN Security Council resolution 665, passed in August 1990, as legitimating multilateral intervention in what became known variously as the First Gulf War, Gulf War I, or the Persian Gulf Crisis and War, 1990-1991. Almost 2000 Australian served in Operation Desert Storm. New Zealand contributed three transport aircraft and a medical team. Military victory over Saddam was widely identified as an American success - albeit also as evidence of Washington's unexpected willingness to cultivate new allies and embrace multilateralism in the wake of the Cold War.[27]

As ANZUS was reorganised, its limits were admitted. Australian government White Papers on Defence openly acknowledged that 'there are no guarantees inherent' in the bilateral Treaty. Canberra now emphasised that 'it is not this Government's policy to rely on combat assistance from the US in all circumstances'. For some Australians, at least, this was a disquieting admission of the small power's strategic vulnerability. Realistically, however, it took cognisance of Pentagon-inspired press reports that in the event of conflict between Australia and Indonesia, the US would either remain neutral or support Indonesia. During 1989 Defence Minister Kim Beazley, openly acknowledged that in the event of a localised conflict with Indonesia the US would be unlikely to come to Australia's assistance. US VP Dan Quayle was equally honest. In such a conflict, he observed, the US would limit its role to the pursuit of 'diplomatic initiatives'. Officials in the Bush and Clinton administrations conceded openly what critics in Australia had long emphasised. Australian officials were obliged to downgrade ANZUS. Modest levels of defence cooperation displaced 'ultimate guarantees' of protection. Self-reliance was to displace dependency. It was belatedly acknowledged that the US 'no longer guarantee[s] [Australia's] security, let alone its economic well-being': that Australia was 'no special ally for America'. Echoing a popular Hollywood movie of the day, the smaller nations were now equally 'Home Alone', despite very different residual links to ANZUS. The end of the Cold War signalled the end of rigid 'alliance era' politics. In security arrangements, as in economics, the myths of special relationships evaporated.[28]

[V] Towards Asia

As Cold War tensions eased, geo-economics increasingly challenged geo-politics as the pivot of international relationships in the Asia-Pacific. Some western commentary spoke anxiously of a new Cold War and the need to 'contain' China. Conservative commentary emphasised not economic opportunity but strategic vulnerability, concerned that as ANZUS frayed Australia no longer enjoyed the 'assured presence of an enormously powerful but unthreatening ally, one that is the only committed to its protection and to maintaining a balance in the region'.[29] However, governments in Australia and NZ - regardless of political persuasion - accepted that the fulcrum of economic power was shifting to Asia: that the American Century was rapidly giving way to the much-heralded 'Pacific Century'. 'Asian engagement' became an enduring mantra in Australian and - to a slightly lesser extent - New Zealand.

The rise of Asia placed Australia and NZ for the first time within, or at least closely adjacent to, the region of greatest global economic power. Increasingly, alliance politics were dominated by economic and trade issues. Arguably, economic multilateralism and free(r) regional trade promised stronger benefits to commodities-dependent countries like Australia and NZ than to the US. At GATT meetings they condemned America's protection of agricultural producers and its support for 'managed trade'. Less enthusiastic about reduced agricultural protection or free trade, Washington was initially hostile to efforts to promote freer through the Cairns Group or the aegis of a broad regional multilateral association, notably APEC (the 21 member organisation for

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, formed in 1989). Hawke warned that American inflexibility over trade liberalisation constituted a potential threat to the bilateral alliance and was, in effect, treating Australia 'as an ally but not a friend'. Visiting Washington he cautioned that the wider relationship did not have 'infinite elasticity'. At the same time he rebuked one of his ministers for implying that Australia might have to use American access to the 'joint' bases as a 'bargaining chip' to win concessions over trade. Instead, Hawke used as his lever Australia's standing as 'the closest of friends and allies' of the US. He also highlighted Australia's deep integration into America's economic, military, and intelligence networks, emphasising that - unlike NZ - his country welcomed visiting US ships and aircraft (including those carrying nuclear weapons); cooperated fully with US intelligence agencies; hosted vital 'joint' bases; purchased 20 per cent of its imports from the US; remained one of the largest cash purchasers of US-manufactured defence equipment; and accepted the US as the largest national source of foreign investment. 'You can therefore see', Hawke told the US Congress, 'why we believe our relationship entitles us to a fair go over trade with the US and in competition with the US in third markets'. Newspaper opinion was equally assertive. *The Australian* commented, for example, that 'the US Embassy [has] put the view that you cannot mix trade and strategic interests—wrong. We can and should do this'. *The Sydney Morning Herald* asked rhetorically: 'Is Australia too friendly for its own good?' Australia was, by its own admission, powerless to win real concessions from Washington. As Hayden acknowledged during talks over US agricultural subsides: 'Australians have the problem that their economy is threatened with terrible damage of the hands of their best friend.' NZ confronted similar harm, although in the 1990s it could not realistically attribute this to action by its 'best friend'.[30]

Not only were Australia's trade ambitions thwarted by US protectionism, particularly of agriculture, but by the late 1980s its overall economic relationship with the US had become fundamentally unbalanced. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region now purchased about 70% of Australia's total exports. Its trade surplus with the region exceeded $(AUD)10 billion annual. At the same time its deficit with its major ally, the US, exceeded $(AUD)12 billion annually, while the trade surplus enjoyed by the America with Australia was greater than that with any other country. At the same time US investment in Australia was significantly above EU, Chinese or Japanese levels. NZ, also heavily dependent on commodities, joined Australia in advocating trade reform. Over the decades from 1990 the NZ economy was increasingly skewed towards Asia as China became its largest trading partner, followed by Australia, the US, and Japan. In contrast to trade-dependent Australia and NZ, Americas massive national trade deficit derived overwhelmingly from imbalances with Asian countries. Washington lacked enthusiasm for multilateral trade reform favoured by Australia and NZ. The smaller countries worked assiduously through GATT negotiations and the Cairns Group to reduce tariffs barriers and coax the US and other regional powers into a comprehensive regional trade grouping, APEC. Signatories were confident that APEC would rival in economic importance NAFTA and the EU. This optimism was confirmed when the PRC joined in 1991. Somewhat reluctantly, Washington could not resist the

multilateral drive for freer trade, accepting in President Clinton's words that APEC was a 'defining, moment' in policy towards Asia. For NZ, especially, the multilateral trade agreement embracing the US and China was genuine compensation for being shut out of bilateral FTA negotiations with Washington. Welcoming China's participation, Evans observed that APEC gave 'real substance to the concept of engagement with Asia'. It represented for both Canberra and Wellington a 'basic shift of focus away from historical connections to geographical connections'. Later, more conservative voices, notably PM John Howard, also accepted this reality, but added the caveat: Australia did not have to choose between history and geography - between traditional links with the UK and America on the one hand and expanding connections to the Asia-Pacific on the other.[31]

As regional engagement accelerated, both Canberra and Wellington were careful not to identify too closely or uncritically with Washington. Journalist David Jenkins wrote: 'It won't help if politicians continue to speak effusively about ties with US' as this 'sends the wrong signals in Asia: it may give rise to the misleading and dangerous perception that we're interested in having the US protect us *from* Asia'. Alexander Downer, Foreign Minister under PM Howard, agreed. 'Gone are the days when Australia just does what Washington and London want us to do', Downer announced: 'we're an Asia-Pacific country. We have to make a future in our region and we have to tailor our policies to ensure that we maximise opportunities for the Australian people'. Typical headlines announced, 'Hello Asian Tigers, Farewell Uncle Sam' and 'Australia Loosens its American Tie'. Wellington, as we have seen, had already loosened these links. Routinely, commentary suggested that economic change in the 'booming East Asian region 'might wean Canberra' from American policy: 'It might be difficult for the next generation of Australia's leaders to negotiate the rocks of great power rivalry without further diminishing relationships with Washington' Yet as late as 1995 US Under-Secretary of State Joseph Nye could note with justifiable confidence that the relationship with Canberra is 'probably the most intimate we have with any Asia-Pacific country' Australian governments, whether Labor or conservative, accepted as axiomatic that engagement with Asia implied no 'downgrade[ing] of the ANZUS alliance'. Increasingly, however, they also emphasised the need for greater self-reliance. The oft-cited Defence White Paper 2000, *Our Future Defence Force*, conceded that US forces would not necessarily act to protect Australia from attack. It concluded presciently that 'a healthy alliance should not be a relationship of dependency but of mutual help'.[32]

[VI] 'War on Terror'.

Responding to terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, Bush observed that '[t[he Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today'. The attacks ignited a US-led 'war on terror'.[33] Against this disturbing background, relations within ANZUS were reinvigorated; fractures from New Zealand's exclusion were gradually healed. At the same time, the unrelenting the 'rise' of China brought new urgency to alliance building in the broader Asia-Pacific. Coincidentally, PM Howard

was in Washington on an official state visit at the time of the terrorist attacks. On September 10, in what had become a bilateral ritual over five decades, the Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed the 'strength and vitality' of the enduring alliance. In contrast to his uncomfortable association with President Clinton, Howard was at ease with and warmly welcomed by the conservative new Republican President, George W. Bush. Howard reasserted the importance of the bilateral relationship in words that would be tested the following day. 'Of all the nations that we value and whose friendship we cherish,' the Prime Minister stated, 'there's no relationship more natural, more easy' or 'more deeply steeped in shared experience [and] in common aspiration'.[34]

The terror attacks of September 11 sharply interrupted Howard's visit. When he returned to Australia, parliament proclaimed that the traumatic events of 9/11 'constituted an attack on the USA within the meaning of the ANZUS treaty'. In no previous crisis had obligations under ANZUS been explicitly used to sanction combat alongside America. Despite strong bipartisan support for invoking ANZUS, the Howard government carefully argued a wider legal basis for joining with the US, citing Article 51 of the UN Charter which accepted 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member' state. Howard also endorsed a UN Security Council Resolution of September 13 that condemned 'these terrorist attacks' and called 'upon all states to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of the attacks' and also held accountable 'those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators'.[35]

French commentator Jacques Almaric observed that 9/11 was 'a purifier of alliances'. It was to prove an unprecedented test of alliance solidarity. Foreshadowing a broad, global response to terrorism, Bush pointedly stated that: 'The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.' America's closest allies quickly adopted similar language. UK PM Tony Blair declared that 9/11 'marked a turning point in history'. He foreshadowed a broad alliance centred on the European Union and NATO that would 'strike at international terrorism wherever it exists'. Howard spoke of the 'terrible moment' and 'its implications for nations' other than the US. No society was immune from the possibility of a terrorist attack, Howard warned: 'regrettably we now face the possibility of a period in which the threat of terrorism will be with us in the way that the threat of a nuclear war was around [sic] for so long before the end of the Cold War'.[36]

The United States-led 'Operation Enduring Freedom' against Taliban forces in Afghanistan commenced on 7 October 2001. Ten days later, Bush officially accepted an Australian commitment of 1550 military personnel to the Operation – a contribution centred on the deployment of a Special Air Service (SAS) regiment of 150 personnel. Australia joined with the UK and the US in early assaults against the Taliban. Twenty-six other nations, including NZ, subsequently contributed forces, although most were

deployed in recovery and peace-building operations. Officially, between 850 and 1300 Australian Defence Force personnel served in operational areas in Afghanistan, Krygyzstan and the Persian Gulf at any one time, from late 2001. Initially unwilling to commit substantial forces, Australia had little influence on US or coalition policy, even after reconstruction authority was transferred to NATO, in August 2003. In contrast to Australia, many states unwilling to later join the US in Iraq participated in Afghanistan under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that comprised service personnel from 30 countries, including 15 members of the NATO alliance. Howard was well aware of Pentagon disquiet with Australia's limited efforts. Belatedly, in July 2005, Howard announced that 'a team of 150 SAS (Special Forces) troops and supporting officers will be 'on the ground' in Afghanistan within two months' – a commitment that became, in effect, permanent. As the conflict wore on Howard also announced he would 'explore options' for sending a 200 personnel provincial reconstruction team in April-May-June 2006. In contrast, NZ, Canada, and Italy had already committed provincial response teams to the reconstruction effort.[37]

Most defence experts interpreted Australia's role in Afghanistan as little more than a symbolic expression of support for its alliance partners – as 'too little too late'. Michael O'Connor, the former Executive Director of the Australian Defence Association stated: 'To consider ours a militarily significant commitment is just ludicrous'. New Zealand's contribution in was even less important. Nonetheless, the 'war on terror' marked the beginning of rapprochement within ANZUS, bringing NZ *In from the Cold*. NZ sent special forces to Afghanistan in 2001 and a contingent of military engineers to support the US mission in Iraq in 2003. NZ's reconstruction efforts centred Bamyan Province. In 2009 PM John Key authorised deployment of SAS forces, which later joined with Australians forces in Operation Anaconda. In 2013 all remaining NZ forces were withdrawn. In contrast, Australian Special Forces and reconstruction teams continued to serve in anti-Taliban operations, with responsibility for reconstruction projects in Uruzgan Province. In the decade from 2007 Australian personnel deployed ranged in number from about 900 to as many as 1500, in 2009, and continued around 1000. In both Australia and NZ the conflict in Afghanistan was declared our 'longest war'. Three years after 9/11, Bush conceded that 'I don't think we can win it' (before adding that he meant there would be no formal peace settlement between the numerous groups waging disparate, uncoordinated 'wars of terror').[38]

The Bush Doctrine articulated in response to the 9/11 attacks put unilateralism at the very centre of US policy. In his State of the Union Address, 28 January 2003, Bush asserted that 'the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others'. In the fluid global geopolitical environment of the early 21st century pragmatic US-led alliances of 'the willing' would coalesce for specific and limited purposes. In the lead-up to war in Iraq the Howard government agreed to make a specific military commitment in the event of conflict. It remained a most conspicuous supporter of American foreign policy. Nonetheless, working with the Blair Labour government in the UK, Howard initially - if unsuccessfully - encouraged the Bush administration to

seek UN authorisation, and the broadest possible multilateral support, for any precipitous action against Saddam's regime.

On October 12, 2002, two massive bombs exploded in the Sari Nightclub in Kuta Beach, Bali, Indonesia, killing 202 people, mostly foreign tourists, including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, 26 Britons, and 7 Americans. In all, citizens from 21 countries were killed in the blasts. This was the largest single terrorist act against Western interests since 9/11. Bush immediately expressed his nation's sympathy to Howard and the Australian people, stating that the bloody acts must further strengthen international resolve to defeat terrorist 'attacks on free and open societies'. As terrorism a proliferated, and American allies as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Spain and Indonesia became targets, along with Britons, Australians and Americans abroad, the character and implications of alliance politics changed. NZ was again a valuable partner. Intelligence sharing, personnel exchanges, and covert security operations increasingly defined the relationship.[39]

In the months leading up to the most controversial action in the so-called war on terrorism, the invasion of Iraq, Howard maintained that Cabinet had not committed Australian troops to any possible US-led operation. Canberra emphasised throughout late 2002 that war could be avoided. However the official Department of Defence Booklet, *The War in Iraq: Operations in the Middle East in 2003*, later conceded that intimate military collaboration in Afghanistan anticipated a joint commitment to military action against Saddam. When war came, Australian Special Forces stationed in the Middle East were immediately deployed. On March 17 Howard publicly pledged Australian military support in 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' – a pledge made after SAS forces had entered Iraq. On March 20 Howard committed 2,000 Defence Force personnel to the invasion, including a Special Forces Task Group, Navy frigates, and aircraft. In contrast to Australia's conspicuous - if ultimately minor - role in the invasion, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1483, NZ was involved only in the post-war reconstruction of the fractious country.[40]

Four weeks after the coalition forces crossed into Iraq the invasion was over. Baghdad had fallen; Saddam's regime was destroyed; brutal factional contests unleashed. The occupation, reconstruction, and democratisation of Iraq were to prove far more difficult than the removal of Saddam's autocratic regime. And, in the wake of the invasion, the claims on which it had been justified were exposed as without foundation. The discredited Iraq regime did not possess Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Nor were any links with al-Qa'ida demonstrated. As one of only three nations participating in the initial military invasion, Howard sought to balance support for the US alliance with domestic disquiet over the reasons for it.[41] Critics of Australia's support for the invasion argued that it was unprovoked, unnecessary and unlawful. Iraq's supposed arsenal of weapons did not exist, and Australian intelligence had established this fact before the invasion began. Like the Bush and Blair governments, the Howard government's public interpretation of intelligence greatly exaggerated the threat

allegedly posed by Saddam's regime, and ignored compelling evidence that Iraq was not complicit in international terrorism. During 2003-04 Parliamentary enquires found no justification for pre-emptive war or disregard of UN procedures.[42]

Defending the decision to go to war in Iraq alongside the US and the UK, Downer conceded that refusal would have weakened, 'very substantially', ties with the US. As terrorist acts on Western interests proliferated, he observed pragmatically that '[i]t wasn't a time in our history to have a great and historic breach with the United States'. Howard's announcement of Australia's military commitment predictably echoed support for ANZUS. 'The Americans have helped us in the past and the United States is very important to Australia's long-term security', the PM said: 'It is critical that we maintain the involvement of the United States in our region'. As in the case of Afghanistan, Howard defended Australia's limited involvement in Iraq as evidence that Australia was prepared to assist with the initial 'heavy lifting', but it was obliged in the longer-term to deploy the bulk of its forces closer to home, to ensure security in its 'troubled immediate region'. Many Australians accepted that involvement in Iraq made Australia a more likely terrorist target (despite the fact that the invasion came shortly after the Bali bombing). Critics of the alliance argued pragmatically that it more deeply implicated Australia in US actions that ultimately undermined Australia's security and, in the words of the former Liberal Prime Minister, Fraser, made 'America's enemies … Australia's enemies'.[43]

In October 2003 the UN Security Council, under Resolution 1511, authorised a United States-led multinational stabilization force for Iraq. Australia and NZ contributed, along with 31 other nations. Australia's actual contribution to the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq was relatively insignificant. By July 2004, 1000 Australian personnel were stationed on Iraqi soil – 880 troops and a security detachment of 120. Defence Minister David Hill defended the deployment in words welcomed by the Bush administration: 'Our commitment obviously is to remain [in Iraq]…until the job is done.' Australia's deployment was, experts observed, 'less risky than the frontline role of US and British troops". Despite the conspicuous role played by the UK, other members of the British Commonwealth refused to participate in the initial invasion that overthrew Saddam – including Canada and, initially, New Zealand. However in 2004 NZ sent a non-combat force of about 60 personnel. In the 12 months to March 2004, the number of nations sending military or security-related personnel to war-ravaged Iraq rose from 27 to 34.[44]

[VII] Between 'History and Geography': Re-balancing ANZUS.

In power until 2007, Howard claimed that Australia did not have to make a 'choice between its history and its geography'. It was of course an oversimplification to imply that it was obliged to make such a fundamental decision. Overwhelmingly, commentary accepted that 'turning our faces to the East does not necessitate turning our backs on the West'. In October 2003 the US and Chinese Presidents were honoured by the Howard government in ways that signalled Australia's efforts to balance old alliances

with new global realities. Bush and Hu Jintao, separately, addressed the Australian Parliament – an honour never extended to a British or Japanese leader. The significance of the equal courtesies granted each was not lost on the local press, with Paul Kelly suggesting in *The Australian* that it 'will be seen as a symbolic turning point in our history'.[45]

Consideration of a US-Australia FTA (Free Trade Agreement) had commenced much earlier, during the Clinton administration. Under Bush trade agreements became more significant instruments of alliance politics (but negotiations for these complex arrangements were always tortuous). Obstacles grew out of Australia's reluctance to compromise protection of secondary industry, cultural production and copyright, as well as general fear that more open borders would accelerate 'Americanisation' and erode national identity. US sectional interests feared competition from agricultural imports, especially sugar, and reduced farming subsidies. Objections raised by both countries had deep roots, as trade and investment issues had for decades been the most divisive issues in the relationship. Despite difficulties, negotiations continued amidst US Defense Department reassurances that ANZUS was 'not a matter of convenience of economic interaction', but a unique alliance 'obligation' that would not be derailed by trade questions.[46]

Approved by the US Congress and Australian Parliament in August 2004, a FTA came into effect on New Years Day, 2005. Mark Vaile, Australian Minister for Trade, welcomed it as 'the commercial equivalent of the ANZUS Treaty'. Downer suggested that agreement was encouraged by Australia's unwavering commitment to ANZUS and role in the 'war on terror'. Although negotiations were well advanced before Australian troops were sent to Iraq, most commentators were convinced that Australia had 'extracted' the agreement 'in return' for 'dutiful soldiering' against Saddam's forces. John Ravenhill described it simply as 'Howard's War Dividend'. Denied similar American largess, Wellington pursued a different route. In 2004-2005 it began formal FTA negotiations with Beijing. In 2008 the NZ-China Free Trade Agreement was signed. Its terms were realised incrementally during the next decade. The agreement had great symbolic importance globally, as it was the first FTA agreed by China with a country in the 'developed world'. Regionally, it drew attention to Washington's reluctance to reach a similar bilateral accord with its former close ally. And, it announced emphatically, that NZ under Labour PM Helen Clark was determined to 'engage quickly with Asia' and 'not be left behind.'[47]

The US-Australia FTA did not immediately, or completely, eliminate barriers to trade. Australian tariffs on many US imports were removed, although tariffs on imported cars, footwear and clothing were to be reduced gradually. US barriers to many Australian products were removed, although tariffs on sugar remained and tariff reductions on beef and dairy imports were to be phased-in over eighteen years. The US did not grant Australia most-favoured nation status on agriculture. The FTA was represented officially as a breakthrough agreement – 'a world precedent' – because it included

changes in domestic regulations of important industries and services – notably copyright law, electronic media, pharmaceutical delivery, quarantine regimes and investment rules.[48]

If Australia's close alliance 'history' encouraged bilateral trade negotiations, New Zealand's very different relationship discouraged them. Their FTA experiences differed sharply. Not until March 2007, did Washington for the first time accept that 'it can live with [the] nuclear ban'; would 'no longer seek to change' Wellington's anti-nuclear stance; and was prepared to enter exploratory trade discussions. The refusal of Clark's administration to join the initial phase of the Iraq War was no longer a stumbling block. In July 2008 US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, while visiting Wellington, that bilateral relations were 'deepening' and would 'no longer be harnessed to or constrained by the past'. Shortly after Rice's visit, negotiations began to include NZ in the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership linking smaller states, including Chile, Brunei and Singapore to Washington through free(r) trade agreements. Clark welcomed this as 'very, very big news'. At APEC in 2009 Obama advised recently-elected NZ PM John Key, that formal negotiations for a bilateral agreement would commence. As these dragged on NZ and Japan continued efforts to reduce trade barriers multilaterally, through an eleven-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11) negotiated under WTO rules. In part responses to China's expansionism, FTAs and multilateral trade arrangements were important spokes in a wheel of agreements at the centre of US trade policy – under Presidents Bush and Obama (but not, from 2017, under Trump). Former PM Keating had warned presciently that 'a set of multi-country' agreements was vital if 'nasty' trade wars were to be avoided (a prediction confirmed immediately after Trump became President and tariff disputes escalated with China). [49]

In the eight years of Obama's very stable presidency (2009-2017) military-strategic and intelligence relationships with Australia deepened; relations with Wellington were rebuilt. In part a result of New Zealand's overtures and contributions to war in Afghanistan and reconstruction in Iraq, rapprochement prompted reports headed, typically, 'In From the Cold: US-New Zealand Ties Returning to Normal'. Re-entry to ANZUS was symbolised by the Wellington Declaration of 2010 which, declared that the two countries shared a' 'strategic partnership to shape future practical cooperation and dialogue'. This confirmed a covert agreement reached in 2009 that fully restored intelligence sharing, linking NZ again to the so-called 'Five Eyes alliance of 1956 between the US, UK Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Annual strategic dialogue was resumed in 2011. In November 2011 Obama told the Australian Parliament that the US would 'play a larger and long-term role in shaping' the Pacific 'region and its future'. Earlier that year, to mark the 60th anniversary of the ANZUS agreement, Labor PM Julia Gillard told Congress that Australia ' is an ally for all the years to come'. (Such an emphatic commitment mirrored decades of similar enthusiasm from all Coalition governments - the alliance remained a bipartisan article of faith.) The two leaders agreed that Darwin would become an important base for joint training and

military exercises. Three years later, NZ was 'welcomed into RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise) – the 'world's largest multinational military exercise' - and the White House acknowledged that for the first time in 30 years a NZ ship would be allowed to dock at Pearl Harbor. US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Bob Work, stated in 2015 that Australia and NZ had supported the US in Afghanistan and Iraq and are now 'invaluable partners in the international coalition against ISIL, [p]roving yet again that our partnership is not bound by any particular geography, conflict or adversary'. In the view of most commentators a de facto tripartite relationship 'has been restored'. Meanwhile, America's war on terrorism, centred on Afghanistan, continued unabated. Backed by many countries in NATO, and the ANZUS partners, Afghanistan was America's 'longest war': it was, as President Bush had anticipated fifteen years earlier, seemingly unwinnable. The annual death toll in 2017-2018 was higher than in any year in the past decade; the authority of the Taliban continued to expand as civilian casualties increased.[50]

Terrorism was - in the short term at least - 'a purifier' of the ANZUS alliance. In the longer term however, rapprochement was a reaction to China's growing ambitions and military presence in the Asia-Pacific. As early as 2006 Kim Beazley, Australia's Ambassador in Washington, had stated confidentially that '[i]n the event of a war between US and China, Australia would have no alternative but to line up militarily beside United States'. Without such action, he conceded, ANZUS 'would be effectively dead and buried'. As rapprochement with NZ quickened it too would have little option other than to support the US ahead of China, or risk ending ANZUS. A decade later, as intervention alongside the US in Afghanistan continued, Gareth Evans made a similar point. 'China knows what side we would be on in any conflict', he stated, while adding that this fact had not inhibited the development of reliable commercial and trading relationships with Beijing.[51]

Surprisingly, in light of comforting ideas about the 'special relationship', after Trump won office, Australian public opinion offered some comfort to Beijing, rather than to the US or its major ally in Asia, Japan. In 2015 more than 80% of opinion poll respondents indicated that Australia should not support Japan, and should remain 'neutral' in the event of conflict between China and Japan. A small majority of respondents, 55%, trusted America to 'act responsibly in the world; while a slightly larger majority supported ANZUS – a level that increased as relations with NZ were normalised and friction with China rose.[52]

Washington's fraught relations with Beijing after Trump came to power, hinted at deeper regional instability and renewed Great Power rivalry that in the view of many experts anticipated a 'new Cold War' – a protracted contest that would cut across both economic and military-strategic issues. In this changed international environment, the alliance loyalty of trade-dependent Pacific allies was sorely tested. An unintended consequence of 'Asian engagement' was for Australia, and less obviously NZ, a gradual drift into China's orbit. This was more than narrowly commercial. Trade, technology,

migration and educational exchanges brought new cultural and social norms to the essentially European counties in the Pacific as, simultaneously, commerce and entertainment from the US 'Americanised' them. Increasingly, the benefits of regional economic integration dulled enthusiasm for ANZUS. Canberra and Wellington welcomed discussion of a comprehensive Asia Free Trade Agreement. An extension of the successful 16-country Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the ambitious proposal was driven by Beijing. As disputes over market access centred on China and India were resolved, a European Union-styled agreement was 'finally in sight', Singapore's PM, Lee Hsien Loong, commented. When ratified it would embrace 10 member states of ASEAN and other regional powerhouses, including China, South Korea, Japan and India; but not an increasingly protectionist US. Earlier, Trump reversed Obama administration policy, withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership while questioning the worth of security alliances with Japan and Korea. As the President's threat of a 'trade war' with China intensified, and tit-for-tat tariff protection began, Australia's old allegiances were further threatened. America's massive annual trade deficit with China hovered around US$400 billion annually. Proposed tariffs of 25% on Chinese products threatened 'third–party' damage, reducing China's demand for Australian and NZ commodities. If caught in the crossfire of a trans-Pacific trade war the ANZUS partners could expect GDP to decline by between 2% or 3% annually.[53]

America's repositioning in Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific was symbolised by Trump's refusal to attend the 21-member APEC meeting 2018. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian leader Vladimir Putin attended. '"Abandoned": Trump Snubs Asia', typified newspaper responses in Australia and NZ. Commentary in Washington was also critical, stating typically that 'symbolism matters': US absence from APEC would confirm Chinese gains and 'undoubtedly solidify the impression that America has essentially abandoned its traditional presence in the Asia-Pacific', undermining security obligations with its ANZUS partners, as well as Japan and South Korea. In Australia, politicians and journalist expressed exasperation and alarm in equal measure. Trump's treatment of traditional allies was 'a bigger threat than the Cold War', Julie Bishop, Foreign Minister in the Abbott and Turnbull governments, stated bitterly. More complex multilateral security arrangements would be needed to balance Chinese expansion and American vacillation. Respected commentator Paul Kelly wrote in *The Australian* that Trump 'emerges as a figure devoid of history - he rejects the Western alliance system, the geopolitics that sustained the West during and after the Cold War, and is devoted to a populist ideology that casts [aside] free trade, US global leadership and a values-based foreign policy'. Writing in the *Sydney Morning Herald* Tony Walker expressed a more local concern, claiming that the new president had 'changed our ties to [the] US forever'.[54] Even as ANZUS was restored as a trilateral arrangement, Bishop bemoaned the unpredictable behaviour of Trump. 'The US is now favouring a more disruptive, often unilateral foreign trade policy that has hardened anxiety about its commitment to the rules-based order that it established, protected and guaranteed', Bishop stated in London in 2018: 'Our closest ally and the world's most powerful

nation is being seen as less predictable and less committed to the international order it pioneered.' The US, not China, was 'disruptive', and unpredictable; its policies and strategies contributing to an international climate reminiscent of contests during the Cold War**.** Such hyperbole was driven more by fears of economic disorder rather than concern that America's 'pivot' to Asia would permanently stall. Without jeopardising ANZUS, former NSW Premier Bob Carr wrote, more soberly, Australian diplomacy should caution Washington to 'plan for a peaceful accommodation of the inevitability of a greater Chinese strategic presence in the Pacific'.[55] Flexibility had replaced blind alliance loyalty. Constructive middle power diplomacy and multilateralism would define Australian foreign policy, as it had NZ policy after the ANZUS rupture three decades earlier.

The US remained the hub of a vast alliance system embracing more than forty countries. In Asia, trilateral strategic co-operation with Japan and Australia was a major spoke in this security wheel. While Trump expected America's many partners to bear financial responsibility proportionate to their size, the Pentagon reassured allies that 'our network of alliances and partnerships remains the backbone of global security', and pushed ahead with plans to establish a new alliance network – the so-called Quad, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprising US, Japan, India and Australia. Informed analysis suggested that this four-way alliance would offer strategic 'protection from Beijing's economic power'. Unsurprisingly, Beijing condemned the proposed arrangement as an aggressive attempt to 'encircle' and 'contain China'. Government in Australia and NZ, regardless of political complexion, worked diligently to remain, simultaneously, militarily allies of America, economic partners of China, and participants in major multilateral initiatives most notably the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 'Australia is in a unique position to engage with both' global giants, newly-installed PM Scott Morison stated optimistically in late 2018. Press opinion was usually far less sanguine, portraying efforts to deal 'independently' with China and the US as 'naïve sleepwalking'.[56]

Australia and NZ had no option other than to deal pragmatically with 'two global powers simultaneously'. Greater self-reliance from smaller partners was essential if ANZUS was to protect against an emerging, 'substantial enemy' (China), former PM Abbott told a Washington audience in July 2018. This interpretation was now widely agreed. At the same time, complex multilateral security arrangements, notably the Quad, would be needed to balance Chinese expansionism. Most commentary accepted that [u]ncertainty about China's rise is now driving' the ANZUS allies 'closer together – even closer perhaps than at the time of the Vietnam war'; that 'a common threat' – China – had given 'new strength to an old alliance', ANZUS. This rising 'threat' also led NZ back into the alliance. Public opinion reflected the concern of the smaller powers: A Pew Research Centre survey in 2018 indicated, for example, that 'in Australia only 14% thought it would be better if China, not the US, was the 'global leader'.[57]

The so-called ‘China risk’ kept the smaller partners ‘tied’ to America – even if they recoiled from its ‘politically distasteful President’, Trump. Canberra openly ‘warned Beijing’ against use of ‘intimidation or aggressive tactics’ that were ‘destabilising and potentially dangerous’. Australia and NZ echoed Washington, expressing ‘concern over ongoing militarisation of the South China Sea’. Beijing’s economic power, strategic expansion, and role as a ‘cyber superpower’, brought ‘new relevance’ to long-standing security relationships between Pacific ‘friends, partners and allies’. Deepening integration of Australia and NZ into the Asia-Pacific, and engaged multilateralism, gradually reduced the smaller nations’ historical ‘fear(s) of abandonment’. Yet apprehension was never fully allayed. Some conservatives, at least, expressed concern that an ‘unreliable’ President, Trump, had deserted friends and was unwilling or unable to reinvigorate alliances that might act ‘as a counterweight to China’. As former Australian PM Abbott remarked anxiously in Washington: ‘None of us should want to find out the hard way what a shrunken America might mean’.[58]

Historiograpical Issues

The more conventional dimensions of international politics - military strategic, diplomatic and economic - have preoccupied most historians exploring relations between ‘friends and partners’ in ANZUS. Relationships beyond these political fields have attracted relatively little attention. Predictably, historiographical debates are clustered around specific foreign relations issues, notably the legacies of World War II; negotiation and participation in ANZUS; military involvement in Vietnam; trade disputes, multilateral arrangements and bilateral Free Trade agreements; and responses to global terrorism. Underlying exploration of these events are questions - and judgments - about the capacity of the smaller partners to successfully navigate foreign policy despite their demonstrably ‘unequal’ status within the alliance. Relationships within ANZUS reflected vast inequalities in strategic power and often diverse foreign policy ambitions. At the heart of historiography are assessments of the ability of smaller partners to exercise ‘independence’ while supporting an alliance dominated by the most powerful nation. In both Australia and NZ historiographical debates have broadly mirrored division in politics and public opinion. Nonetheless, the alliance with America has consistently attracted strong public support and bilateral political endorsement. Implicitly, at least, most historians accept that Australia, if not New Zealand, has long enjoyed a ‘special relationship’ with America.

If the Cold War gave rise to an uncritical historiography of the tripartite relationship, war in Vietnam provoked scholarly discord. A left-nationalists historiography now challenged the subjects and assumptions that dominated bland descriptions of political and military cooperation between the Pacific allies. Conventional ‘international relations’ paradigms were displaced by broader multifaceted analyses. ‘Revisionist’ historians addressed new questions in new ways. Typically, to cite Camilleri’s pioneering 1980 study, they evaluated webs of transnational dependence: ‘the ways in which American values, institutions and policies have come to dominate not only

Australia's external conduct, but its economic and political life' (p. vii). Australia and New Zealand were variously interpreted as 'satellites' of metropolitan America; as dependent 'client states' controlled from Washington. In a related vein, Geoffrey Searle argued in the aftermath of Vietnam, that a combination of regional insecurity and cultural deference made Australia uniquely willing to surrender its sovereignty. We 'are determined to be a satellite for strategic reasons', he wrote, and lack a 'strong sense of nationality' that 'might stop us going all the way' with America. Nationalist concerns about the unequal, asymmetrical character of the alliance with America, underpinned many studies. In 'New Left' discourse, especially, it was argued that small-power sovereignty - whether cultural, economic or political - was sacrificed as a quid-pro-quo for protection by a 'great and powerful friend'. In this view, participation in Vietnam and acceptance of the ideological assumptions justifying US policies in the Cold War, compromised the capacity of the two smaller states to pursue their particular national interests. They were satellites on the periphery, unable or unwilling to act independently on the global stage. Malcolm Fraser, who as leader of the Liberal Party and PM from 1975 to 1982, had endorsed Australia's involvement in Vietnam, later wrote that membership of ANZUS did not promote his country's separate interests. Rather, it brought a 'significantly diminished … capacity to act as a separate sovereign state'. The Howard Government's decision to join with the UK and US in a so-called 'coalition of the willing' to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam's regime, reinforced Fraser's nationalistic anxieties. Since the early days of ANZUS claims that alliance solidarity undermined national sovereignty consistently underpinned evaluation of the American alliance.

However, as mainstream historiography suggests, criticism of 'dependency' ignores evidence of small power initiative, or independence. It is generally accepted that NZ was far more reluctant than was Australia to go to war in Vietnam and generally behaved more independently, pursuing for example regional anti-nuclear policies, despite their divisive consequences for the alliance. Australia's search for multilateral trade arrangements in the Asia-Pacific, notably APEC, is cited as strong evidence of its refusal to be bound by US policies. It has been argued, paradoxically, that 'strategic dependence' was accepted, or indeed promoted, by the smaller powers in an effort to ensure alliance certainty and military protection by the US. For example, some conventional archive-based studies concluded that Australia – if not NZ - anxiously encouraged America to wage war against communism in Asia. Conservative Australian governments, especially, were willing Cold War partners, but reluctant friends, of America. A number of historians, notably Pemberton and Sexton, argued that Australia anxiously ingratiated itself with its Great and Powerful 'protector' by going 'all the way' with it in Vietnam. Later, Australia's conspicuous support for the invasion of Iraq prompted predictable criticism of the persuasive influence of ongoing alliance dependency. However, claims that the smaller country was an enthusiastic accomplice in actions decided unilaterally by its more powerful ally, are very different from assertions that America determined Australian foreign policy and military actions abroad.

The underlying role of so-called ‘soft power’ in the alliance provoked polemical debate from the early 1980s. Singularly important was the work of Joseph Camilleri, who argued that ‘cultural dependence’ helped to ‘establish an environment essential to the public acceptance of the political, economic and security nexus tying Australia to the United States’. In short, Americanization, was the unwelcome consequence of military alignment. Strategic dependence brought, inevitably, political and cultural dependence p.19). However, more recent scholarship highlights cultural interaction, reciprocity or resistance, not unidirectional influence labeled simply as ‘Americanization’. Broadly, it is now emphasized that ‘cultural shifts in the smaller nation were not directly or causally linked to the pursuit of politico-strategic interests which drew Australia away from the United Kingdom and aligned it closely to US power and ambition in international affairs’. Although seldom expressed overtly, participation in ANZUS is generally understood as expressing, flexibly, the perceived interests of its very different member states.

As the transforming forces of modernity and globalization increased, anxious debate over ‘Americanisation’ declined. Ironically, as concerns about US cultural influence receded, the implications of blind ‘strategic dependence’ on America received greater scholarly attention. If Australia and NZ were to exploit economic partnerships in their geographic region, especially with China, they were obliged to downplay the importance of ANZUS. Efforts to juggle traditional alliance obligations with fast-changing economic and strategic realities in the Asia-Pacific, came to dominate historiographical debate in Australian and New Zealand. It is generally agreed, as distinguished historian James Curran suggested in 2016, that global terrorism and, very differently, Sino-American tensions, have resuscitated support for the alliance. At the same time, however, debate has been reignited over the implications of tight alliance solidarity for the exercise of regional independence by smaller ANZUS powers - given that they are both deeply embedded in regional economic agreements and heavily dependent on trade with China.

Assessments of the implications of small power dependence have dominated historiography since the 1940s. Generally, critics of the alliance argued, strategic vulnerability conditioned foreign policy compliance. Former conservative Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser asserted in Dangerous Allies, published a decade after the invasion of Iraq, that in practice ANZUS made America’s enemies automatically adversaries of its alliance partners. In this view the unacceptable consequences of ‘strategic dependence’ were first revealed in Vietnam, and much later in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Publication of Fraser’s book suggested that complaints about extreme level of alliance dependency were no longer expressed exclusively within a critical left-nationalist historiography. As in the Vietnam war, participation in the US-led war on terror disrupted scholarly and popular opinion about the value of ANZUS. It also prompted claims that military action in Iraq defied international law in favor of support for extreme unilateralism under the Bush Doctrine.

Fundamentally it is agreed – to cite Allan Gyngell's recent book - that Fear of Abandonment drove a desperate search for security, keeping Australia if not New Zealand wedded to the American alliance. Australia fought alongside the US in every war from WWII. No other ally has joined America in all of its military engagements abroad. New Zealand has dutifully followed America into war, but did not join the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Against this background, the scholarly preoccupation of historians has been to explore the enduring character of the tripartite relationship, or more narrowly to explain the extreme intimacy that has sustained the Australia-US partnership. Explanations for the longevity of ANZUS vary, although a broad consensus accepts that the relationships it symbolizes are exceptionally stable and intimate. There is much less agreement about whether alliance obedience serves equally the national interest of different partners - a political and scholarly divide exacerbated as Australia and NZ have integrated closely with the fast-growing economies of East Asia and pushed for multilateral trade and security arrangements separately from America.

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[1] Curtin, *Melbourne Herald,* 27 December 1941

[2] Alfred Chandler, ed., *Papers of Dwight Eisenhower*, Vol. I, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1979), 145- 48; James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom*, (London: Harcourt, 1971), 248. Also, Roger Bell, 'The Myth of a Special Relationship, *National Times*, (10-15 October 1977), 12-14. Compare James Curran, *Fighting With America* (Sydney: XXX 2016), 2.

[3] Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol III, *The Grand Alliance,* (London: XXX, 1950), 17; Roger Bell, *Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the Pacific War* (Melbourne: XXX, 1977), 38-66.

[4] From 'At War with America', Philip Bell and Roger Bell, *Implicated:Americanising Australia* (Perth: XXX 2007), 97-124.

[5] Paul Hasluck, *The Government and the People 1942-1945* (Canberra: XXX, 1970), 589-622; Bell, *Unequal Allies*, 173-203.

[6] Macmahon Ball, *Japan: Enemy or Ally?* (Melbourne: XXX, 1948), 42.

[7] Curran, *Fighting with America*, 2, 130; 'Macarthur in Australia', Special Series in *The Weekend Australian*, June 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1974; Roger Bell 'The Myth of a Special Relationship', *National Times*, 349, October 5-10, 1977; Dennis Phillips, *Ambivalent Allies: Myth and Reality in the Australian-American Relationship* (Ringwood, XXX 1988).

[8] NSC68 14 April in T Etzold and J Gaddis, eds, *Containment: Documents, 1945-1950* (New York, XXX 1978) 440-42.

[9] From Bell and Bell, *Implicated,* 156-57.

[10] For an informed summary of developments leading to ANZUS, see Gregory Pemberton, *All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam* (Sydney, XXX 1987), 7-34; see also, Joseph Gabriel Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance* (Melbourne, XXX, 1965); Bell and Bell, *Implicated*, 97-124; W. David McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55* (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1995); I.C McGibbon, 'The Defence of New Zealand 1945-1957', in

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[11] Most commentary at the time correctly judged ANZUS as a much weaker treaty than NATO, as the Pacific agreement did not oblige member nations to come to the support of an ally in the event of military conflict involving any party. Erik Olssen, 'ANZUS: the New Zealand Perspective, 1951-2001', in Peter Bastian and Roger Bell eds. *Through Depression and War* (Canberra, XXX, 2002), expressed a minority opinion, stating somewhat surprisingly that this interpretation of ANZUS 'overlooks the clear *intent* of the treaty' (154).

[12] Cited in *SMH*, 26 November 1951; *The Australian*, 2 January 1988 (references Cabinet documents from 1950).

[13] US Dept. of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951*, V1 *Asia and the Pacific*, (Washington 1977), 207. See generally, W. Brands, 'From ANZUS to SEATO: United States Strategic Policy Towards Australia and New Zealand, 1952-1954, *International History Review*, 2:9, (XXXMonthDATEXXX) 250-70.

[14] Menzies, cited *The Australian*, 2 January 1988 (references Cabinet documents from 1950).

[15] Joseph Camilleri, *Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence* (Melbourne, XXX, 1980), 21-43, 120-34; Ball, 'Australia and Nuclear Proliferation', *Current Affairs Bulletin* 55:11 (April 1979), 16-30; *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia* (Sydney, XXX, 1980).

[16] Pemberton, *All the Way*, 159-61; Bell and Bell, *Implicated*, 158-62.

[17] *The Sydney Morning Herald* (hereafter *SMH*), 24 November 1987, and 8 May 1991. Dean Rusk, William Bundy, cited Pemberton, *All the Way*, 268-71, 333; *SMH*, 6 May 1981, 1-2; Michael Sexton, *War for the Asking: How Australia Invited Itself Into Vietnam* (Sydney, XXX, 1981); See also, John Murphy, *Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam's War* (Sydney, XXX, 1993); Peter Edwards and Gregory Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965*, (Sydney, XXX, 1992); Peter Edwards, *A Nation at War Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy During the Vietnam War 1965-1975*, (Sydney, XXX, 1997); Allan Gyngell, *Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World Since 1942*, (Melbourne, XXX, 2017), esp. 65-75.

[18] *SMH*, 27 November 1987; David McCraw, 'The Demanding Alliance: New Zealand and the Escalation of the Vietnam War', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 34 (3:1988), 308-09, and 'Reluctant Ally: New Zealand's Entry into the Vietnam War', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 15:1 (April 1981), 49-60; and Richard W. Baker, ed. *Australia, New Zealand, and the US: Internal Change and Alliance Relationships in the ANZUS State*s (NY 1991), esp. Jock Phillips 'New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance XXX…1945-1988', 183-202. Carl Thayer, The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever, *Security Challenges*, (February, 2007).

[19] Roberto Rabel, 'The "Dovish Hawke": Keith Holyoake and the Vietnam War' in Margaret Clark ed. *Sir Keith Holyoake: Towards a Political Biography* (Palmerston North, XXX, 1997), 173-94.

[20] *SMH*, 22 October 1966.

[21] EG Whitlam, Australia's Foreign Policy: New Direction, New Definitions, 24th Roy Milne Lecture 30 November 1973, AIIA 1973, 5; Malcolm McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935*, (Auckland, XXX, 1973), 173.

[22] Fraser 12 March 1975, in Camilleri, *Australian-American,*36.
[23] *SMH*, 15 August 1985 and 13 August 1988; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New *Zealand-United_States_relations*, notes 6, 7, 12.
[24] Ibid; Bell and Bell, *Implicated*, 169-72; Olssen, 'ANZUS', 148-52.
[25] Baker, ed. *Australia, New Zealand, and the US*, esp.143-46; Olssen, ibid, 151, 155; Bruce Vaughn, New Zealand: Background and Bilateral Relations with the United States', Congressional Research Service Report, November 13, 2017, 6-7. A most perceptive article on 'Australia and New Zealand: Unequal Partners at the Periphery' in the decade after ANZUS divided, is Ramesh Thakur in James Cotton and John Ravenhill, eds. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australian in World Affairs, 1991-1995* (South Melbourne, XXX, 1997), 266-90.
[26] *SMH*, 31 August 1988, 17 September 1990, 8 May 1991, 30 September 1991.
[27] See esp. Antony J. Cudworth, 'Crisis and Decision: New Zealand and the Persian Gulf War 1990/1991', MA thesis University of Canterbury, 2002, 65-66, 126-149.
[28] *SMH*, 1 May 1989, 12 June 1992; *Time Magazine*, 6 April 1992, p.13; Curran, *Fighting With America*, esp. 25-32. For contrasting evaluations of ANZUS, see also Malcolm Fraser, *Dangerous Allies* (Melbourne, XXX, 2014); Peter Edwards, *Permanent Friends: Historical Reflections on the Australian-American Alliance* (Sydney, XXX, 2005). For a wider discussion of 'ANZUS at 50', see articles by Hoff and Olssen in Bastian and Bell eds. *Through Depression*, 129-55.
[29] Owen Harries, in *Time* ibid.
[30] *The Australian*, 15 September 1987, 10 November 1987; *SMH*, 1, 14, 16 August 1986, 15 August 1987, 24 January 1990.
[31] *The Weekend Australian*, 3-4 August 1996, 14-15 June 1997. For a range of perspectives, American and Australian, on the implications of Asian engagement for the future of ANZUS, see Roger Bell et al eds. *Negotiating the Pacific Century: The New Asia, the US and Australia* (Sydney, XXX, 1996). Also, Vaughn, 'New Zealand…, 4-12, 14-17.
[32] *The Weekend Australian* ibid., and 2-3 August 1995; *Australian Financial Review*, 12 July, 19 July 1995; Nye 'Shaping the Future of the Australian American Alliance', ACAS, Canberra, 23 January 1995; Paul Dibb, 'The Political and Strategic Outlook 1994-2003', Working Paper 282, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994.
[33] Although widely termed 'the war on terror', military conflict after 9/11 centred largely on Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam, although Iraq was subsequently acknowledged not to have been implicated in the attacks on NY or Washington or to have developed WMDs that might have supported terrorism abroad.
[34] *The Australian*, 11 September 2001.
[35] *The Australian*, 19 September 2001.
[36] 'Purifer les alliances' *Liberation*, 17 September 2001, 4.
[37] *SMH*, 20 May, 14 July 2005; Australia *CPD* (Hansard), 17 September 2001.
[38] *SMH*, 26 March, 16 July 2005; Also, Vaughn, New Zealand, 4-12, 14-17; Hierbert et.al., *In From the Cold*, 4-9*; US-New Zealand Ties Returning to Normal*, National Bureau of Asian Research (December 2014), esp.1-7; *The Weekend Australian*, 14-17 September 2004.
[39] *SMH*, 20 March 2003.
[40] *The Australian*, 21 April 2004 Tony Kevin, 'Australian Foreign Policy at the Crossroads', *AJIA*, 56:1 (2002), 31-37.
[41] *The Weekend Australian*, 20 March 2004; Joseph Camilleri, 'A Leap into the Past…', *AJIA*, 57:3 (2003), 435-53*; SMH*, 5 March 2004.

[42] *The Weekend Australian* 16-17 July 2005; *SMH*, 29 March 2003. See generally, Robert Garran, *True Believer: John Howard, George Bush and the American Alliance, (*Sydney, XXX, 2004).
[43] *SMH*, 27 May, 14 July 2004. See generally, Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson, 'Riding Pillion for Tackling Terrorism is a High Risk Policy', in Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) Briefing Paper 05/01 July 2005.
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[45] *The Weekend Australian*, 3-4 August 1996, 14-15 June 1997; *SMH*, 7 November 2000; *The Age*, 23 October 2003; *The Australian*, 23 July 2005.
[46] *The New York Times*, 26 August 2001; *The Australian Financial Review*, 5, 10 September 2001.
[47] Ravenhill 'Australia and the Global Economy', in Cotton and Ravenhill eds. *Trading*, 200-208; *The New Zealand Herald* 27 November 2003, 7, 8 April 2004.
[48] *SMH*, 3 January, 20 May 2005. For an informed, critical evaluation of the FTA see, in addition to Ravenhill, ibid, Elizabeth Thurborne, and Linda Weiss*, 'The Real Deal: Reading Between the Lines of the Australia-US FTA',* 2004 <http://www.australianinterest.com/> 6 September 2005. Also Weiss, Linda, Thurbon, Elizabeth and Mathews, John, *How to Kill A Country: Australia's Devastating Trade Deal with the US* (Sydney, XXX, 2004).
[49] *The New Zealand Herald*, 23 March 2007, 26, 27 July 2008; *SMH*, 24 August 1995, March 2004.
[50] *The Australian*, 11 March, 8 November 2011; Heibert, et.al, 'In From the Cold'; See Nikki Hager, *Other People's Wars: New Zealand in Afghanistan Iraq and the War on Terror* (Wellington, Victoria UP, 2013); Vaughn, *New Zealand*, 7-9.
[51] *SMH*, 17 July 2018; Curran, *Fighting with America*, esp. 76-78, 141.
[52] Alex Oliver, *The Lowy Institute 2015 Poll* (Sydney 2015), 9-10; *SMH*, 14 September 2018.
[53] *SMH*, 31 August 2018, 19 September, 2018; *The Australian*, 19 September, 2018.
[54] *The Australian*, 18 July 2018; *SMH*, 22 July 2018.
[55] *SMH*, 20 July, 2018; *Australian Financial Review*, 17 December 2011.
[56] *SMH*, 5 June, 17 July, 11 October 2018. By late 2018 both Canberra and Wellington had given in-principle support to the controversial T-PP agreement.
[57] *SMH*, 22 July, 3, 11 October 2018. Curran, *Fighting with America*, xi-xiii, 6, 111.
[58] *SMH*, 25 September 2018; *The Australian*, 3 October 2018. Curran, *Fighting with America*, 111, 146. Also Allan Gyngell, *Fear of Abandonment; Australia and the World Since 1942* (La Trobe, XXX, 2017), esp. 5-12.

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